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For empire and greatness, it importeth most that a nation do profess arms as 
their principal honour, study and occupation.
“Of the Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates,” in 
The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. Basil Montagu, 3 vols., 
(Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan, 1857), I: 38
He who desires peace should diligently train his soldiers; he who hopes for 
favourable issues should fight by art and not by chance.
John of Salisbury, Bishop of Chartres, The Statesman’s 
Book of John of Salisbury . . . Policratus, trans. 
John Dickenson (New York: Knopf, 1927), vi. 19 (p. 240)
For much of human history, a martial ethos has dominated the thinking and 
actions of the rulers and aristocratic classes of city- states, empires, theocracies, 
feudal monarchies, dynastic states, and nation- states. In the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, this was reinforced by a more explicit rhetoric of war, 
which in some totalitarian and militaristic societies, gave rise to a cult of war. 
In liberal democracies, war has come to be considered pathological since the 
time of the First World War. Following the devastation of the Second World 
War (or the last part of the “Second Thirty Years War” as Sir Michael Howard 
called it), a rhetoric of peace became more fashionable. There have always been 
advocates of peace, going back to antiquity, but it has always been more difficult 
to imagine universal peace because of a paucity of historical examples.1
Until the end of the eighteenth century and beyond, war was a way of life. 
From the time of the rise of sovereign states, the basic cause of wars was the 
competition for power and the survival of sovereign entities. In early modern 
Europe, war was regarded as something that happened between states, and 
consequently, may be viewed as an adjunct of the sovereign- state system. 
Diplomacy was employed not as a way of preserving peace, but as a means of 
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securing a strategic advantage prior to the next war or as a means of negotiating 
an advantageous peace treaty after a war. This makes it difficult to distinguish 
times of peace from times of war.2
It is necessary to begin this study of the concepts of war and peace in the 
Western world with an examination of these topics in classical antiquity and 
the Middle Ages in order to observe how they were transmitted to early modern 
Europe. This is because the Greek myth of martial glory continued to exert an 
influence on the psychology of war and the culture of valor in the formative 
period of the modern state and society. These classical values were passed on 
through the intervening periods by the code of chivalry and its literary 
expressions as well as by the various chivalric and crusading orders. They 
survive in modern armies in the form of battle decorations and ribbons—even 
for those desk- bound warriors who have rarely, if ever, experienced combat.3
The mythology of war as a source of honor and a test of manly courage no 
longer finds wide acceptance. Most nation- states now belong to the United 
Nations and other international organizations that seek to resolve interstate 
disputes, end civil wars, contain terrorism, avoid genocides, administer 
humanitarian aid, and promote democratic government. These international 
bodies have enjoyed a certain degree of success, but are less effective in 
resolving disputes among great powers where the national interests of those 
great powers usually predominate. These national interests are driven by 
regional geopolitics, the search for sources of energy and raw materials, and 
the need to export in order to maintain full employment and avoid domestic 
unrest. Plans to reduce conflict and promote international peace often run up 
against networks of interests consisting of defense industries, intelligence 
agencies, military establishments, and legislators wishing to promote and 
protect business and employment in those industries and on those military 
bases within their constituencies. Such persons find universal peace hard to 
imagine. The Cold War may have ended, but new pretexts for military 
adventures and defense spending continue to present themselves. While the 
rationale for going to war has changed, and the lethality of warfare has lessened 
since the middle of the twentieth century, it cannot be demonstrated that the 
frequency of war has diminished.4
The Quaker mathematician Lewis F. Richardson undertook a complicated 
survey of what he called “deadly quarrels” covering the period between 1820 
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and 1952. These included the two World Wars, other interstate wars, civil wars, 
rebellions, slave revolts, and various military campaigns, which were arranged 
into six categories based on the magnitude of casualties.5 Including each of the 
two World Wars as single entities, the total number of wars and other deadly 
conflicts during this period totals 315. The manuscript of this book remained 
unpublished at the time of Richardson’s death, and it was subsequently edited 
and published by Quincy Wright and C.C. Lienau. The editors emphasize that 
the list is incomplete, and could be made complete only if a team of investigators 
could be gathered together to examine the records of each and every country.6
In most of the ages of humankind, war was always the main topic of 
historical writing and the language of politics—at least, among the chroniclers 
of the ancient, medieval, and early  modern worlds, and was always a favorite 
topic of poets and dramatists as well. Peace was a weaker concept than war. 
War was ‘ “a more theatrical feature of human life.” Peace was static and 
indistinct. Sculptors and painters often depicted rulers decked in the laurels of 
victory, if not clad in battle armor and equipped with swords and batons. 
Machiavelli recognized that war was transforming politics in the Renaissance, 
and any topic that did not concern the ability to make war, win honor, and 
enhance the reputation of the prince was of secondary importance. As Samuel 
Pufendorf said: “Peace and war . . . comprehend all . . . the conduct of life.” 
Particular wars and battles are something that we are all familiar with to a 
degree, but war itself is a phenomenon that is more difficult to explain. 
Moreover, it is not only true that open and declared wars take up much of 
recorded history, but also that the intervals of what is called peace, when actual 
fighting subsided, were characterized by latent hostility and preparations for 
the next war.7 The belief that war is the stuff of history dates back to the Greeks. 
François Rabelais repeats the proverb bellum omnium pater est (“war is the 
begetter of all things”) from Lucian of Samosata (c. 180–c. 120 BCE), a skillful 
Hellenistic-Syrian satirist, who was making the point that young and 
inexperienced historians of his age thought that history consisted entirely of 
wars and battles. Rabelais, living in an age of religious warfare, used the same 
adage to lament that he lived in an age of iron characterized by pervasive 
warfare that threatened to destroy civilized life.8
War has pervaded historical writing because of its frequency. A number of 
social scientists have attempted to measure the frequency of human conflict, 
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although it is no easy task classifying the types of conflict and defining the 
criteria for doing so. War has always been used in a calculated and rational 
manner as an instrument of international relations. Michael Mann estimates 
that, from ancient times to the present day, the average state in the Western 
world has fought with other states roughly half of the time. Periods of peace 
occur because armies become exhausted and money runs out, and time is 
needed to prepare for the next war. To show that medieval and modern states 
were largely concerned with raising armies and making war, Mann studied the 
finances of English and British governments between 1130 and 1815. He found 
that during this period, between 75 and 95 percent of all revenues raised were 
spent on making war. He adds that the English and British examples do not 
differ significantly from those of other European states during the same period, 
and these estimates also would have been true of ancient empires and political 
societies such as classical Greece, ancient Rome, and imperial China. Mann 
also says that since this pattern was established so early, capitalism could have 
had little influence on the close link between state formation and war- making.9 
By the end of the sixteenth century, dynastic and religious conflicts, which 
frequently took the form of siege craft and trench warfare, had led to prolonged 
conflicts that were to characterize the seventeenth century. The age of the 
professional soldier and standing armies, when combined with technological 
innovations in gunnery, fortifications and tactics, favored the defensive over 
the offensive, and resulted in long, indecisive, and brutally destructive wars. Sir 
Michael Howard observed: “It was a period in which warfare seemed to escape 
from rational control; to cease indeed to be ‘war’ in the sense of politically 
motivated use of force by generally recognized authorities, and to degenerate 
instead into universal, anarchic and self- perpetuating violence.” 10
To provide more precise specific examples, between the years 1585 and 
1702, there were only three years when a war was not being fought somewhere 
in mainland Europe. In Eastern Europe, conflict among Sweden, Poland, and 
Russia occurred four out of every five years; the major powers of Western 
Europe, Spain, France, and the Dutch Republic, were at war two- thirds of the 
time. The Three Kingdoms of the British Isles were engaged in interstate and 
civil conflict during forty- nine of those 117 years.11 There were, of course, years 
in which a number of wars were going on at the same time, including both 
domestic and international conflicts. Evan Luard calculates that there were a 
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total of 229 wars on the European mainland between 1400 and 1559—a period 
of 159 years—which averages out to 1.4 wars per year. France alone was 
involved in international wars for seventy- eight of these years, and in civil and 
religious wars for twenty- six years. During the same period, England fought 
wars for a total of sixty- nine years; the Habsburg Empire, for 114 years; the 
Turks were also at war for 114 of those 159 years, and Poland-Lithuania were 
at war seventy- nine years. These calculations do not include peasant uprisings, 
feuds, or raids. During the period of religious warfare, 1559–1648, there were 
112 wars within a period of eighty- nine years. A war was going on every year, 
and sometimes two or three. The most destructive of all European wars, the 
Thirty Years War (1618–48), according to Quincy Wright, “consisted of 13 
distinct but overlapping wars, involving over 30 bilateral wars.” For example, 
the Thirty Years War subsumed the latter part of the Eighty Years War (1568–
1648), also known as the Dutch War of Independence, in which the Dutch 
gained their freedom from Habsburg Spain, but which also drew in France, the 
three British and Irish kingdoms as well as mercenaries and volunteers from 
all over Europe.12 Micheal Clodfelter’s statistical summary of warfare in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries attempts to break down these wars by 
types of conflict, and shed some light on the changing nature of warfare in the 
early modern period. In the sixteenth century, interstate conflicts constituted 
thirty- one or 56 percent of the wars; religious wars, thirteen or 24 percent; civil 
wars and rebellions, eight or 15 percent; and colonial wars, three conflicts or 
5 percent, totaling fifty- five large- scale violent conflicts. In the seventeenth 
century, there were thirty- three interstate wars, or 41 percent of the total; the 
eleven civil wars accounted for 14 percent of the total, there were twenty- four 
rebellions (30 percent) and two religious wars (not quite 2 percent), while 
colonial wars increased to eleven (or 14 percent), making a total of eighty- one 
violent conflicts for European states and their colonial possessions.13
Certain wars appear to form clusters. Philip Bobbitt uses the term “epochal 
war” to describe a long series of conflicts separated by “periods of apparent 
peace” interspersed with peace treaties and involving differing states, but which 
actually constitute one long conflict. Earlier examples of epochal wars include 
the Peloponnesian War, the Punic Wars, the Hundred Years War, and the Thirty 
Years War. In the twentieth century, Bobbitt argues that the conflict that began 
in 1914 ended only in 1990 with the conclusion of the Cold War. This most 
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recent epochal war was fought over one basic question: What would be the 
nature of the nation- state?14
Michael Mann argues that militarism (or more properly, bellicosity) is the 
result of historical development rather than being inherent in human nature. 
Although most primitive societies engaged in war, not all did; it was a matter 
of choice. Of those tribes that did engage in violent conflict, such warfare was 
sometimes ritualized to reduce fatalities. Compared to the kind of warfare 
waged by supposedly more civilized peoples, such rituals of bellicosity seem 
tame in comparison, and were primarily athletic and recreational in nature, 
according to Mann. This ritualized warfare dispelled boredom, released 
tension, and provided entertaining stories to tell around the campfire. But in 
tribal societies where the numbers were small, such as the North American 
Indians, who lived barely above the subsistence level, just a few deaths could be 
disastrous. Consequently, these groups needed to capture members of rival 
tribes or communities to supplement their labor force. But, such practices, 
together with the injured feelings of rival tribes, would inevitably invite 
retaliation. Nevertheless, participation in combat allowed the warrior to 
enhance his reputation and social status, and helped to perpetuate the myth 
that warriors were useful to the community 15
Azar Gat, in his interdisciplinary study of the phenomenon of war, argues 
that people’s frequent resort to war is the result of human evolution, and does 
not differ from the deadly competition to be found in other species such as 
chimpanzees. People, or subhuman species, can choose to cooperate or 
compete for food, sexual mates, and other resources that often are scarce, 
depending on the strategies they select. Violent conflicts were endemic among 
hunter- gatherers; the death toll among adult males by violence seems to have 
been as high as 25 percent. A number of anthropologists have discovered that 
homicide rates are many times higher in hunter- gatherer and pastoral 
societies—what are called nonstate societies—than they are in state or political 
societies. Murder is a more common occurrence even in the relatively more 
pacific of these nonstate societies than in those that have come to be governed 
by the rule of law. Even under autocratic or colonial rule, the evidence suggests 
that life was more peaceful than in nonstate societies. Thus, Thomas Hobbes 
was mostly correct in saying that life was less violent in a political society that 
was governed by a leviathan than in a state of nature. However, Lawrence 
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Keeley argues that Hobbes’s view of the original state of nature as brutal, 
violent, and miserable is based on the myth of progress. When the development 
of agriculture permitted the emergence of larger political communities, war 
became more organized. Also, as societies became more specialized in 
economic terms, a smaller portion of the population participated in war. As in 
more recent times, so in antiquity, the need to make war on a larger scale seems 
to have driven the state- building process. Once one tribal society proceeded in 
this direction, it compelled neighboring groups to do the same in order to 
defend themselves.16 For the Roman military writer Vegetius, the act of 
building fortified walls around a city was a basic and symbolic part of the 
establishment of the city- state; he imagined that this had to come before Rome 
could conquer the world. The need to build such fortifications as the city walls 
of Rome or the Great Wall of China is indicative of a state of mind regarding 
one’s neighbors.17
In his most recent book, Robert Muchembled argues that a “culture of war” 
has existed in the Western World since before recorded history, and led to a 
disposition to violence that Western military adventurers spread to various 
parts of the non-Western world during the crusades and the Age of Discovery 
and Colonization. But Muchembled’s argument that the European culture of 
war was more disposed to violent conflict than the non-Western parts of the 
world that European colonial powers came in contact with during the early 
modern period is not borne out by Steven Pinker’s statistical comparison of 
the percentage of deaths in warfare in nonstate and state societies, which is 
based on percentages of the population killed rather than raw total numbers. 
In terms of percentages, wars were many times more lethal in hunter- gatherer 
or tribal societies than in more recent state societies, including the wars and 
genocides of the twentieth century.18
One of the reasons for the decline in mortality rates resulting from 
interpersonal and tribal violence was that larger and somewhat more civilized 
states suppressed aristocratic feuding, banditry, and private attempts to secure 
justice and revenge, establishing a state monopoly on the use of violence. A 
more rational and civilized concept of justice slowly emerged that was 
incompatible with private vengeance. Also, those warlike instincts needed to 
be redirected into the prosecution of interstate wars. Violence was thus 
legitimatized in the service of the sovereign state for military ends, but the 
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brutality of soldiers also fell on noncombatants who happened to get in the 
way of these larger- scale and more lethal wars of the early modern period.19
The degree to which prehistoric people’s predilection for hunting disposed 
them to make war remains controversial. Hunting, that is, the pursuit of wild 
beasts such as deer and boar, was very much a part of the martial culture of the 
ancient world. Indeed, Plato regarded warfare as a species of hunting. Rabelais 
believed that hunting was war on a smaller scale. Xenophon said, according to 
Rabelais, that all good war leaders came out of the hunting field. Some 
Renaissance scholars and political theorists, such as Alberico Gentili and 
Joseph Scaliger, believed that the first war was occasioned by a hunt led by 
Ascanius, son of Aeneas, who killed a stag in territory belonging to the ancient 
Latins.20 Plato stated that field sports should be directed toward cultivating 
those qualities most esteemed in a soldier. Hunting prepares the hunter not 
just for the successful pursuit of four- legged beasts, but also for the most 
“noteworthy” quarry in warfare—namely humans. Aristotle echoes Plato in 
saying that hunting was a preparation for war insofar as it prepares soldiers to 
hunt those barbarians who were “intended by nature to be governed,” but 
stubbornly refused to submit to Greek rule. Aristotle further insisted that it 
was morally just to make slaves of barbarians (but not Greeks), who were taken 
prisoners of war, because they were designated by nature for subjugation.21 
Xenophon particularly recommended hunting because “it promotes good 
health [and] . . . and trains men for war.” When the Persian King Cyrus went 
hunting, as he frequently did, he took half of his garrison with him and used 
public funds to do so. Besides acquiring physical endurance and becoming 
used to living under conditions of physical discomfort, Cyrus’s soldiers learned 
to scout the terrain in order to gain an advantage over an adversary and 
developed habits of alertness. Above all, they learned that virtue can be 
achieved only by hard work.22 The practice of taking an army hunting as a 
tactical exercise in preparation for war and to procure fresh meat as a reward 
for the soldiers continued in the Byzantine Empire as long as it lasted, and is 
discussed in the Emperor Maurice’s Strategikon.23
In the middle of the twentieth century, a number of anthropologists argued 
that before the invention of agriculture hunting was the behavior that turned 
apes or man- apes into humans. Hunting dominated the activities of early 
humans. From the time of the earliest Greek philosophers down to modern 
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anthropologists, it has been generally agreed that hunting and war are closely 
related—indeed, that hunting is a substitute for and preparation for war—but 
involved less danger than war. This is known in anthropological circles as the 
“hunting hypothesis.” With a considerable amount of moral disapprobation, 
some anthropologists saw the origin of war in the delight that early humans 
took in hunting and killing and eating their prey. Through evolution, war came 
to dominate human history because males found pleasure in this activity. It 
may have been the revulsion against the destructiveness of the two World Wars 
that led some anthropologists to conclude that men made war on other men 
because of human instinct. However, as the fossil remains of early hominids 
subsequently were unearthed in East Africa, it became apparent that early 
humans were not as dependent on hunting for alimentation as was previously 
supposed. Moreover, humans were hunted as much as they themselves hunted. 
More recently, Bernard Chapais has argued that early hominids took up the 
use of weapons to curtail the power of dominant males to monopolize sexual 
contact with females. The resulting monogamy led to a more egalitarian society 
characterized by intergroup marriage that characterizes hunter- gatherer 
societies. This supposedly lowered the amount of intergroup violence, and 
inaugurated more peaceful societies based on the tribe that were noteworthy 
for the exchange of women between male kinship groups. Rivalries and violent 
proclivities were then directed against other tribes.24
Many of the anthropologists and archaeologists who believe that primitive 
societies before contact with civilized societies were peaceably inclined tend to 
ignore the archaeological evidence of burials with weapons, armor, and 
chariots as well the existence of fortifications. They also assume that the 
accepted causes of war, such as population movements and expansion, or the 
envy of new weapons and other commodities, or depopulation resulting from 
the spread of epidemic diseases were peculiar only to civilized societies. Such 
believers in Rousseau’s concept of the “noble savage” assert that the violence 
and bloodshed of warfare resulted from contact with civilized political 
societies. Those who argue that a primitive peace had formerly prevailed 
assume that war was ritualistic and occurred rarely in prestate societies. The 
fact is that almost all prestate societies engaged in war; totally pacific societies, 
it turns out, were extremely rare. The moralists who drew overarching 
conclusions from so little evidence had to admit that perhaps humankind 
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hunted and made war because of mere perversity, not because of an evil 
instinct inherent in human nature. In any case, it would appear that some 
anthropologists engage in myth- making almost as much as poets.25
While most political societies in the Western world have tried to eliminate 
private war and civil conflicts, it has been argued that one of the most striking 
features of the Western way of war is its lethality. According to Victor Davis 
Hanson, what distinguishes the Western method of waging war, from the time 
of the Greeks down to the present day, is the tendency of Western powers to 
mercilessly slaughter their opponents in battle. This is why the bloodiest wars 
have usually been civil wars and interstate conflicts among and between 
Greeks, Romans, and Europeans; non-Western armies also suffered 
disproportionately when engaged in warfare with Western powers. It is not 
that non-Western armies and their leaders were not themselves brutal; rather, 
Western armies tended to be better disciplined and more effective—especially 
when fighting on foot in tight formations as heavy infantrymen, as exemplified 
by the Greek hoplites and Roman legionaries. Military discipline and 
technological superiority help to explain the lethality of Western warfare, but 
other considerations must be given weight, such as an amoral concept of 
military necessity, the frequent use of citizen armies that are ideologically 
motivated, and a large degree of rationalism, cultural dynamism, and 
adaptability that were lacking in non-Western armies.26
Throughout much of Western history, when kings and emperors were 
expected to be warriors, the mortality rate among rulers was high. Half of the 
kings of Israel died on the battlefield, or more usually, at the hands of rebels. At 
least half of the Julio-Claudian emperors were murdered. Assassination and 
military mutinies determined the Roman imperial succession. During the 
period of the Severans and their successors from 192 to 284 CE, of the thirty- 
seven rulers who claimed the imperial title, twenty- four were assassinated, six 
died on the battlefield, and only four died natural deaths. Among the Anglo-
Saxon kings of Northumbria, similar rates of death in battle may be discerned, 
while of the Viking kings of Norway, only a third died on their thrones—the 
remainder being murdered or banished.27
We lack precise numbers for those who served in the rank and file or for 
civilian populations before the early modern period. But there are good reasons 
for thinking that warfare grew more destructive in terms of casualties during 
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the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The proportion of killed to wounded 
seems to have increased as fewer prisoners were taken because of the massacres 
that accompanied an increase in the proportion of religious and civil conflicts. 
The Thirty Years War may have caused as many as eight million deaths—
representing perhaps a third of the population of Germany. The religious and 
civil wars and attendant plagues and famines during the second half of the 
sixteenth century in northern France generally reduced the population by 20 
percent, and in parts of the Pays Nantais, by as much as 26 percent.28
Organized religion has done little to prevent war or to lessen its brutality. A 
certain ambiguity has always characterized Christianity. It began as a 
nonviolent and pacifist religious culture, but later came to treat heretics and 
nonbelievers with great severity, while at the same time, advocating peaceful 
relations among Christians. Like Islam, Christianity preached holy war against 
infidels, while advocating brotherhood among believers. Christian writers 
frequently employed martial metaphors in the pursuit of peace. As David 
Martin says: “Christianity captured the language of war for the purpose of 
peace. But no victory of that kind is fully secure.” Because Christian teaching 
concerning war was ambiguous, Sir Michael Howard says that Christianity 
was able to become “one of the great warrior religions of mankind.” Nor should 
we forget that the Hebrew Bible also provided the justification for undertaking 
holy war, crusades, and other forms of religious warfare that continue to the 
present.29
Christian thinkers were certainly influenced by the classical Roman belief 
that peace can only be achieved through war and victory. The myth that the 
only way to preserve peace is to prepare for war is a very old and durable one, 
and certainly dates back as far as Cicero. John of Salisbury, Bishop of Chartres 
(d. 1180), who was considered by some to be the most learned classical writer 
of the Middle Ages, insisted that those who desired peace should be prepared 
to go to war to preserve it. A man who did not believe in leaving any task 
undone, he advocated his own canonization before leaving this world. Michael 
Howard quoted Sir Basil Liddell Hart as saying: “If you want peace, understand 
war.” In other words, the pacifist who wants peace, but neglects to study the 
nature and causes of war, is intellectually slovenly. William Penn thought that 
most rulers sought to impose their wills through war rather than peaceful 
diplomacy. He remembered that Oliver Cromwell had employed the old Latin 
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tag pax quaeritur bello (“peace is the end of war”) as his motto. Penn thought 
that justice provided a better path to peace than war.30
The purpose of this book is to examine how the legacy of classical antiquity 
influenced philosophers, theologians, political theorists, humanist scholars, 
and educated members of governing elites and military aristocracies with 
regard to the phenomenon of war, its general causes, and intellectual and 
cultural consequences, and how these attitudes of classical Greek and Roman 
writers were transmitted through late antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the 
Renaissance to thinkers at the beginning of the Age of Reason. Ideas concerning 
war were complex and highly developed in all periods of Western history, 
while concepts of peace remained underdeveloped and limited in terms of 
time, place, and people. Even the Utopian commonwealths of the humanists 
could be imagined only on a small scale and were situated on the periphery of 
the known world. The concept of universal peace had not yet appeared on the 
historical horizon.
From the dawn of recorded history, martial cultures have predominated, 
and in archaic and classical Greece and during the Roman Republic, were 
closely linked with concepts of citizenship and civic participation; irenic 
concepts were associated with cults and civic nonparticipation. In the early 
Middle Ages, pacifism was often associated with heretical sects or cloistered 
monastic communities that practiced asceticism and had withdrawn from the 
world. The code of chivalry, which became an integral part of aristocratic 
values in the medieval world, was pervaded by habits of violent conflict, and 
notions of honor and glory that drew on the warrior ethos of both the antique 
world and the Germanic peoples who menaced the Roman provinces on the 
frontiers of empire. Although these chivalric values were at odds with Christian 
belief and worked against peace, the latter was not an option as the Western 
Roman Empire disintegrated and was overwhelmed by Germanic and Turco-
Mongolic incursions or Arab conquests.
The Eastern, or Byzantine Empire, although prepared to defend itself against 
similar incursions, fought only defensive wars, and was prepared to pursue 
diplomacy or even pay tribute to avoid the devastation of war. Such tactics 
were incomprehensible to the Franks or Western crusaders who thought them 
cowardly and effeminate. The lands of the Latin Christian West had become 
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increasingly isolated from the Byzantine heirs of Rome, and when they re- 
established contact with Byzantium during the Wars of the Crusades, the Latin 
crusaders showed themselves impervious to the political wisdom and peaceful 
habits of the Byzantines. For their part, the Byzantine Greeks rejected the 
concept of holy war espoused by their Latin Christian and Muslim neighbors; 
when they were compelled to go to war, it could be declared only by the 
emperor and not by any caliph or pope.
At the beginning of the Renaissance, a more complete recovery of the 
writings of classical antiquity necessarily reinforced the martial ethos inherited 
from the chivalric culture of the Middle Ages because classical Greek and 
Roman historians had put war at the center of their of their historical discourse. 
Nor was this incompatible with the crusading mentality that medieval popes 
and prelates had fashioned out of the warrior culture of the Franks and other 
Germanic peoples to serve their own political and religious policies when 
dealing with the Byzantine and Muslim worlds. The religious wars of the 
period of the Protestant and Catholic Reformations produced political 
theorists who wished to limit the viciousness of that kind of conflict and 
to diminish the destructiveness of war by making it serve purely political 
ends. This necessitated secularizing political theory, and this approach can 
be detected in Machiavelli and the classical republicans as well as in the Neo-
Stoics who admired Machiavelli’s analytical approach to war and politics, 
but wished to impose some moral constraints on how and why wars were 
fought.
There had always existed a peace ethic, but pacifists had been notably 
deficient in producing practical plans for bringing about universal peace in 
this world. From the time of the ancient Greek Stoics to the monastic houses 
of the Middle Ages to the Utopian communities of more recent times, pacifists 
have usually sought peace by withdrawing from political participation, 
practicing asceticism as hermits, or retreating to the seclusion of remote rural, 
desert, or mountain cloistered communities. Moreover, the quest for peace in 
this world by some Christian sects and communities have also been associated 
with the taint of heresy. The pacifism of Erasmian Christian humanism did not 
wholly escape the accusation of heresy, and Erasmus was forced to back down 
from some of his pacifist pronouncements after many of his writings were 
condemned by ecclesiastical authorities. While it is conceivable that the 
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Christian humanist reforms of the educational curriculum might have lessened 
the warlike proclivities of the military aristocracy, Erasmus and his followers 
never provided satisfactory guidance for how a political community could 
pursue a policy of peace and also be ready to respond to an unprovoked attack 
and conduct a defensive war without being accustomed to the exercise of arms. 
Nor is there any good reason for believing that Erasmian pacifism accomplished 
anything to deter war or impose constraints on how wars were fought.
The Stoic revival, or Neo-Stoicism, also grew out of Christian humanism, 
and was, at the same time, a reaction against the Wars of Religion. Since it 
condemned the brutalities and excesses of the wars of that period without 
denigrating soldiers, it garnered the attention of many military men—both 
Catholic and Protestant—who would have been repelled by the Erasmian 
peace ethic that placed no value on the valor of military men. As such, Neo-
Stoicism probably contributed more to practical and actual constraints on how 
wars were fought and what constituted a just war than any influence exerted by 
Erasmus and his followers. Although some Neo-Stoic thinkers such as 
Montaigne sought to withdraw from the chaos and violence that afflicted their 
worlds, early modern Neo-Stoicism had a strong appeal to those who pursued 
active political and military careers. It particularly promoted the development 
of professionalism in the standing armies that were associated with the 
emergence of the early modern sovereign state. The Neo-Stoics, with their 
emphasis on obedience to established churches, also encouraged political 
stability, but not always religious toleration.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Erasmus’s pacifist writings, which 
appeared in Latin, reached a smaller audience than did the vast outpouring of 
military treatises and memoirs, vernacular translations of Tacitus, and other 
classical historians who made war their main theme, and the many plays and 
epic poems that celebrated the deeds of the great heroes of the past. While 
Christian humanists may have rejected St. Augustine of Hippo’s view of war as 
punishment for man’s sins, many of the Protestant Reformers continued to 
insist that this explanation remained true and that war was inevitable, and 
indeed, could serve Divine ends. The Bible—especially the Hebrew Bible or 
Old Testament—and classical authors continued to exert a powerful influence 
on how war and peace were regarded in the early modern world that seemed 
to defy rational and secular analysis.
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Since the time of the crusades, probably nothing did more to retard the 
existence of a peace ethic than the bitterness engendered by the Wars of Religion 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Many Protestant divines preached 
that wars against papists would always be justified as were those against Turks 
and Moors. Catholic prelates, clerics, and theologians replied in kind.31 The 
ancient Roman assertion that it was justified to go to war with barbarians in 
order to bring the benefits of civilization to them was revived to sanction the 
conquest, subjection, and conversion of the indigenous peoples of the Indies. 
Skeptics and rationalists could well ask if this was not hypocritical and inconsistent 
with the peaceful message of the New Testament. Military commanders saw such 
objections as incipient mutiny and reminded their subordinates of their duty to 
obey the prince and his lawfully appointed subordinate officers. Whether a war 
was just or not was presumably beyond the understanding of the common 
soldier. It was also frequently argued that foreign wars were always a good remedy 
for avoiding civil wars and feuds at home, and were necessary to keep potential 
soldiers used to the exercise of arms, and thus, deter foreign invasions. It was also 
thought to be socially useful to read the authors of classical antiquity and the 
Renaissance scholars who made such writings more accessible to those nobles 
and gentlemen who still felt the need to seek actual experience of battle in every 
generation in order to validate their honor.
By the beginning of the seventeenth century, a number of political theorists 
had wearied of the religious and dynastic wars, and were determined to snatch 
the study of war and peace out of the hands of clerics, divines, and swordsmen, 
and lay the foundations for a secular, scientific, and rational political theory of 
human nature and violent conflict. Hugo Grotius sought to impose legal 
constraints on the doctrine of just war and how wars were fought so as to 
prevent harm to the property and persons of noncombatants, and thereby, to 
establish a body of international law. This he sought to base on natural law, 
which he insisted was discoverable by acquiring an extensive knowledge of the 
works of history, philosophy, and poetry drawn from the past—especially the 
world of ancient Greece and Rome. The principles of natural law were 
something that was shared with other sovereign states—even actual and 
potential enemies—and could constitute a foundation for international law.
Thomas Hobbes also used natural law as a basis for moral philosophy. He 
insisted that in their escape from the state of nature, people sought peace, and 
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where they faltered in this quest for peace, it was attributable not to evil 
intentions and a desire for war, but rather to an ignorance of what constituted 
the principles of moral philosophy. Contentious religious diversity both 
undermined loyalty to the sovereign and his royal dynasty, and cut across 
national loyalties, thus serving as an incitement to both civil war and interstate 
war. The solution to this problem was to strictly regulate all preaching and to 
simplify religious beliefs almost to the point of promoting an established 
church with deistic beliefs (or atheism as his numerous clerical opponents 
preferred to call it). For Hobbes, political stability was always preferable to 
religious and intellectual freedom. Hobbes’s quest for peace in an age of 
perpetual war led him to devise a science of politics characterized by a rational 
and empirical intellectual discipline that sought to explain the origins of 
human conflict. Casting aside the traditions and theories of many classical 
philosophers, Hobbes began his inquiry by constructing a model of how men 
lived in a state of nature before they entered into political societies in order to 
end the climate of war and secure peace. He believed that absolute monarchy 
was the best guarantee of stability and concord, yet he also understood that 
sovereigns were subject to the same frailties as other men, and that dynastic 
rivalries and jealousies often led to conflict. He understood the need for some 
sort of international law and government to rein in their ambitions. Hobbes 
may have been too much of a realist to imagine universal peace in an age of 




The Legacy of Classical Antiquity
Saevit toto Mars impius orbe (“The merciless war- god rages throughout the 
world”).
Virgil [Publius Vergilius Maro], Bucolica et Georgica, 
ed. T.E. Page (London: Macmillan, 1931), I: 511, (p. 41)
A Latian use there was, which Alban towns
Kept ever sacred, and Imperial Rome
Keeps now; whene’er they summon Mars to strife . . . .
Twain Gates of War there were, so named from dread
Of awful Mars, revered and holy fear,
Barred by a hundred bolts’ eternal iron;
And Janus there the threshold constant guards.
Here when the Fathers’ sentence is for war,
The Consul, in Quirinus’1 gown, and cinct
In Gabine wise,2 unbars the door himself,
Himself calls battles forth, then all the rest
Call, and the trumpets blow with harsh assent.
The Aneid of Virgil, trans. Charles J. Bilson, 2 vols. 
(London: Arnold, 1906), vol. ii: bk. vii, lines 601–15
The Temple of Janus, mentioned in the first and seventh books of The Aeneid, 
originally consisted of two gates connected by two walls open to the sky and 
containing a statue of the god Janus. It was located in the Forum in front of 
the Curia. When Roman armies went to war, they marched through this 
enclosure in a kind of ceremony of purification.3 Victorious armies returning 
from battle again marched through this triumphal arch, apparently because 
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Roman soldiers felt the need to be purified from the taint of bloodshed after 
battles. When the Gates of War, as the gates of the Temple of Janus were called, 
were closed in time of peace—and this happened rarely in the history of 
Rome—it was hoped that they would imprison the devils of war. The gates 
of the Temple of Janus thus functioned as an index pacis bellique, that is, an 
“indicator of peace and war.”4
Warfare was pervasive in the ancient world, as an examination of the 
histories of ancient Greece and Rome and the other political societies they 
came in contact with will demonstrate. Even brief periods of tranquility reveal 
an undeclared state of war; peace was more apparent than real, and a concept 
of peace revealed itself slowly and incompletely. It was and remains difficult to 
imagine peace in a world overtaken by war. We are the heirs of this legacy of 
martialism that stretches back to classical antiquity, and this has been passed 
on to us in the Western Tradition. Part of the reason for this disposition to 
bellicosity is that the writing of history since the time of Homer has been, to a 
large degree, concerned with war. It is also more difficult to imagine peace than 
to describe warfare because the latter is an activity commonly recorded in 
history, while the former is “a state or condition” more slowly achieved by law 
and the weight of moral reasoning. Moreover, philosophers, theologians, 
lawyers, and politicians spend more time discussing when war is justified than 
how permanent peace might be achieved. And, over the centuries, the reading 
public has shown a distinct preference for reading about heroes rather than 
moral philosophers.5
The Greek martial ethos
In the archaic period of Greek history, violent conflict was endemic and wars 
occurred frequently. Giambattista Vico tells us that during this time, when 
men were “superstitious and fierce,” and before they made good use of the 
faculty of reason, they equated divine justice with force and revenge. It was 
divine justice that they sought in order to settle their quarrels by fighting duels. 
When they began entering into political societies and establishing laws, duels 
were forbidden. After they had established monarchies and city- states, they 
continued to view the declaration of public war as an invocation of divine 
The Legacy of Classical Antiquity 3
justice. War was a part of the life of the citizen of the polis or city- state, and 
citizens were expected to fight in these wars as long as they were physically 
able. Their athletics, moreover, were directed toward maintaining physical 
fitness for war. Most of our knowledge of early Greek warfare of the Bronze 
Age comes from the epic poems of Homer. Homer’s narrative focuses on the 
deeds of heroic individuals who strut across the stage of history and vaunt 
their glorious deeds. In battle, they run ahead of their comrades and seek out 
warriors of great repute among the enemy in order to engage them in individual 
combat. All of this has been arranged by gods and goddesses such as Athena 
who choose to bestow honor and glory on their favored heroes. The victor in 
the battle believes that he has gained glory if the person whom he has killed is 
of high repute—even if the manner in which he kills him is less than heroic.6
The accounts of battles and warfare, in general, in ancient times are difficult 
for the modern reader to understand because these tales are fabulous and 
cannot be taken at face value. There exists a language of arms that we find 
difficult to penetrate. The historical reliability of ancient Greek literature is 
called into question by the fact that descriptions of battle and martial culture are 
often “stylized literary constructs.” One of the functions of martial poetry and 
narrative in ancient Greece was to reinforce the existing social structure. The 
sixteenth- century French humanist and historian Jean Bodin points out that it 
is difficult to get an accurate picture of the wars that the Greeks fought among 
themselves or with others because they tended to heap glory on themselves, 
whereas an outsider such as Alexander the Great (a Macedonian as the Greeks 
would have insisted) thought that what the Greeks regarded as a great war 
looked to him like “a war of mice and frogs.” Bodin adds that the Greeks tended 
to magnify their own victories with little regard for the achievements of others. 
He also cites Thucydides, Plutarch, and Didorus Siculus who condemned 
Herodotus for inventing speeches and putting them in the mouths of heroes 
and narrators to please readers who preferred eloquence to truth.7
In examining the literature of classical Greece, Simon Hornblower finds 
that although Greek writers generally profess a dislike of war as unnatural, 
they are fascinated by it and write extensively about it, which can lead one 
to believe that war was both more frequent and played a more significant 
role in ancient Greek culture than was actually the case. While it is true that 
c. 490–338 BCE, the Athenians were at war something like two out of every 
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three years, Athens was not typical of all Greek city- states. Other Greek polities 
did sometimes settle their disputes by arbitration.8 Even if war was not as 
pervasive in the Hellenic world as used to be thought, it still is arguable that the 
Greeks did not require much of a pretext to go to war. Indeed, it would be 
difficult to imagine a state of peace in ancient Greece because of the perpetual 
conflict between the Greek city- states. In early Greece and Rome, as in most 
tribes and nonstate societies, anyone who was a foreigner, that is, a person 
different in language, culture, and customs from themselves, was considered to 
be an enemy. Although the Greeks may not have regarded war as the most 
desirable way to settle disputes, they often resorted to violence and revenge 
rather than diplomacy in order to resolve their conflicts with those whom they 
regarded as hostile. One of the main reasons that violence was endemic in the 
ancient world was that the violence of daily life and the weapons employed in 
street fighting carried over into war.9 Levels of violence were high and exceeded 
what was proportionate to the ends to be achieved. Besides fighting among 
themselves, the Greeks were even more likely to become involved in wars with 
Asian races, such as the Persians or lesser peoples such as the Macedonians 
whom they regarded as barbarians. Nor were their methods of war always 
constrained by rules. Even fellow Hellenes were sometimes massacred as 
prisoners of war.10
Greek philosophers made a distinction between civil war (stasis) and war 
(polemos). War was at the heart of Greek culture and gave the Greeks a 
sense of identity. Civil war, on the other hand, led to annihilation. War in the 
Greek world was a kind of athletic competition, fought according to rules that 
assumed the prior existence of law. The existence of law, in turn, assumed 
that there was an agreed way of seeking vengeance within an agonistic or 
competitive society. Greeks such as Heraclitus thought that competition within 
an agonistic society was far better than living in a primitive state of nature 
where every person was at war with everyone else—as Thomas Hobbes later 
imagined it. To put it another way, asymmetrical warfare was carried on 
without constraint, and describes the violent conflict engaged in by primitive 
tribes that were not civilized enough to form themselves into state or political 
societies. The Greeks believed in fighting wars according to the rules—although 
their conflicts could be brutal and quite lethal. And, as in all wars, there were 
Greeks who sometimes broke those rules.11
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Greek poets and historians made war the central topic of their writings, but 
other than attributing these wars to the intervention of the gods, they had little 
to say about the causes of war in terms of human actions. In heroic ages, such 
as those that Homer wrote about, war was regarded as a natural part of life, 
and could be justified by the acquisition of territory, trade, or slaves. In this 
regard, the Greeks differed little from the so- called barbarians for whom they 
had only contempt.12 Homer stresses that the gods approve of war, and 
sometimes allowed mortal heroes the opportunity to participate in their wars 
and win personal glory, or at other times, they sanction wars to punish mortals 
if they believe that they have been insulted. Thus, war also functioned as a 
divination or legal trial to reveal the will of the gods. Although the Greeks 
possessed sufficient moral sensibilities to recognize that war was an evil, they 
still enjoyed the violent conflict. Achilles chose the life of a warrior knowing 
that it would shorten his life span, while Odysseus preferred war to cultivating 
his fields. The Spartans thought that living on booty seized in battle afforded 
both sustenance and glory, while the fruits of laboring in their fields afforded 
only sustenance. Also, as Herodotus observed, both Greeks and barbarians 
believed that shopkeepers and those who worked with their hands should 
be assigned a lower social status than those who devoted themselves to war. 
The intellectual recognition that peace was better than war might exist, but 
the fact remains that one comes across few pacifists in Greek literature and 
history.13
Belief in the divine inspiration of the gods played an important role in 
ancient Greek warfare. The Spartans, for example, were notably religious. They 
refused to come to the aid of the Athenians against the Persians at the Battle of 
Marathon in 490 BCE until they had performed the customary religious 
rituals and sought divine blessings. They variously worshiped Artemis, Hera, 
Demeter, and Pan, who, the Spartans thought, gave them the courage to go 
forward.14 When the Greeks went to war, they sacrificed to all of their gods, but 
different Greek cities regarded different gods as their patron deities. They had 
ambivalent feelings about these gods such as Athena, goddess and protector of 
Athens, and Ares, god of war:
Pallas Athena, the city’s protector, I shall begin singing:
Dreadful is she, her concern is with Ares, polemics and war work,
Sacking of cities concern her and bellicose shouting and battles.
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Yet it is she that protects all the populace going and coming.
Hail to you, goddess, please grant me good luck and felicitous fortune.15
The Greeks might pray to the gods to help conquer cowardice and to achieve 
victory, but even as early as the time of Homer, Ares was regarded as 
despicable—the personification of bloodlust. Although the Homeric poems 
and other literary expressions of archaic and classical Greece were largely 
concerned with describing war, it does not follow that the Homeric poets 
glorified war. They regarded war as abnormal and peace as something to be 
highly valued.16
Thucydides provided a more secular and rational explanation of the causes 
of war. In defending the domination of their empire, he has the Athenian 
delegates at Melos in 431 BCE tell the Spartans that it has always been the rule 
that the stronger should rule the weaker:
Of the gods we think according to the common opinion; and of men that for 
certain by necessity of nature they will everywhere reign over such as they 
be too strong for. Neither did we make this law nor are we the first that use 
it. . .; but as we found it, and shall leave it to posterity for ever, so shall we use 
it, knowing that you likewise, and others that should have the same power 
which we have, would do the same.17
In bellicose societies, competition for honor and military glory is intense 
because that is usually the path to political prestige. Such societies will find 
frequent pretexts for going to war.18 Greek writers sought to justify wars in 
moralistic terms. However, Thucydides admitted that wars were usually fought 
over “three of the greatest things, honour, fear19 and profit.” In the archaic and 
classical periods the Greek aristocracies were driven to acquire more honor 
and more wealth, which necessitated a resort to war because aristocratic honor 
would diminish without displays of martial ardor. In the archaic period, this 
meant that men of repute never traveled abroad without a sword, and needed 
to be prepared to fight in the streets as well as on the field of battle. Because 
they fought only to garner fame and glory, their methods of warfare were little 
influenced by a concern for tactics or military organization.20 As interpersonal 
violence declined during the classical period, more participation in battle was 
expected.21 The cost of weapons tended to reinforce the aristocratic monopoly 
on making war, and it was considered dangerous to arm the peasantry.22 The 
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armies of the Greek city- states remained small when they fought one another—
typically between 6,000 and 8,000 men. When they faced a common enemy, 
such as Philip of Macedon at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BCE, they might 
field as many as 35,000 men. The Greek armies were small because the 
agricultural economies of the various city- states could not support larger 
armies, and the hoplite phalanxes were made up entirely of aristocratic warriors 
who furnished their own armor and weapons, and depended on the labor of 
others. Also, the privilege of fighting in the armies of the Greek city- states of 
the archaic and early classical periods had to be confined to those who could 
control the other social orders.23 Aristotle thought that wars were related to 
the amount of wealth that the citizens of a neighboring city- state possessed. 
The envy of the wealth of an adjoining city- state could invite attack. For this 
reason it was desirable that men be taught not to covet and possess excessive 
wealth, but at the same time, it was well that citizens should possess sufficient 
wealth to arm and sustain themselves for the defense of their city- states. Plato 
and Aristotle both agreed that wars rose from greed for luxuries, not a struggle 
for necessities. Consequently, Greek society was always unstable because the 
aristocratic classes were always competing for wealth and honor.24
The expansion of Athens was curbed by the Peloponnesian War, but civil 
war among the Greek city- states remained an intractable problem, and the 
Persians kept Sparta from being overwhelmed in order to sow discord among 
the Greeks. The Persian Wars, as described by Herodotus, emphasized to the 
Greeks the difference between them and the barbarians, as they called the rest 
of humanity. Although Herodotus might admire the Persians for their courage, 
the Greeks viewed barbarians as lacking both rational and moral faculties, and 
worthy only to be slaves. In response to the continuing Persian threat, a number 
of Greek cities, led or compelled by Athens, formed the Delian League to ward 
off the enemy. This defensive alliance came to resemble nothing so much as an 
Athenian empire, and caused much resentment among other Greek city- states. 
Athens claimed that the Delian League was defensive, but it was seen as 
aggressive and overbearing by other Greeks. In a debate at Sparta in 432 BCE, 
on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, an Athenian ambassador insisted
We have done nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary to human nature in 
accepting an empire when it was offered to us and then refusing to give it 
up. . . . And we are not the first to act in this way. Far from it. It has always 
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been a rule that the weak should be subject to the strong; and besides, we 
consider that we are worthy of our power.25
Plato concluded that it was “the folly of mankind” that led men into war, and 
in a well governed state the magistrates had a duty to ensure that the citizens 
trained regularly in preparation for war during the brief periods of tranquility. 
The state was organized for war, and even during these periods of apparent 
peace, there actually existed an undeclared state of war against all other city- 
states. Hence, the citizens needed to exercise arms at least one day a month in 
all weathers, and they were to be accompanied into the field by their women 
and children. They were also to be encouraged to organize sporting contests 
and combats that simulated real warfare, and these should be accompanied by 
panegyrics on martial prowess and rewarded with prizes or reprimanded with 
censures for those who failed.26 The ancient Greeks are the source of the belief 
that military service was a moral duty of the citizen, which in modern times 
has become closely linked to nationalism. Except in Sparta and among its allies, 
the concept of democratic participation was as strong as the martial ethos. But 
it remained true that war was always imminent. Thucydides observed that 
the Peace of Nicias of 421 BCE could hardly constitute a state of peace after 
twenty- seven years of war—especially considering that the Spartans continued 
to block the Athenians’ access to the sea and their overseas empire by occupying 
the port of Piraeus, and neither side honored the terms of the treaty.27
The Persian and Peloponnesian Wars were quite unlike earlier Greek wars 
because they ushered in more intensive conflict and necessitated changes in 
how the Greeks fought their wars. Herodotus depicted the outcome of the 
Persian Wars as a victory of democratic institutions over Persian despotism. In 
actual fact, the methods of warfare of the Greeks, such as the use of the heavy- 
infantry phalanx, resembled those of other Mediterranean peoples. It was in 
the Lyric Age (especially the eighth to the fifth centuries BCE) that the solid 
phalanxes of disciplined hoplite warriors emerged in Greece. They were small 
farmers and craftsmen of means, but substantial enough to furnish their own 
weapons and armor. The risks they took as a warrior class conferred sufficient 
status on them to claim rights of citizenship, including participation in 
decisions concerning going to war. Sparta was a typical hoplite power at the 
beginning of the Peloponnesian War, and adhered closely to the traditional 
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rules of hoplite fighting. Their soldiers had been bred to strict rules of discipline 
since childhood. Indeed, Sparta’s defensive walls were ordered demolished by 
Lycurgus because they were incompatible with Sparta’s martial culture in 
which Spartans were expected to stand their ground and defend their city. 
However, the evolution of the phalanx came to require more discipline than 
the Athenians and other Greeks were used to, and increasingly led to the use of 
mercenary soldiers. Athens abandoned the single- battle concept of hoplite 
warfare, and thought that as an imperial and naval power, it could wear down 
the Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies in a more drawn- out war. Athens 
had become a very bellicose political society in the fifth century BCE, and this 
was accompanied by a more democratic form of government in which its 
citizens were easily swayed by the rhetoric of leaders such as Pericles. However, 
the Spartans adapted to the Athenian methods of fighting on the seas better 
than was anticipated, and with Persian assistance, won a naval war against the 
Athenians, whose reserves of manpower had been depleted by a visitation of 
the plague.28
Warfare in the writings of Herodotus had been concerned with the epic—
how destiny moves individuals across the stage of history in their quest for 
glory. The individual rather than the political community or society is the 
subject of history, and the individual sometimes helps shape the unfolding of 
events through the intervention of the gods. It was for this reason that the epic 
was concerned mostly with recording the individual deeds of those warriors 
who most distinguished themselves in battle. Whether the battle was won or 
lost or military and political goals achieved did not signify. But Thucydides 
was more interested in war as a collective action in which effective leadership 
and discipline were especially important. For Thucydides, heroism was a 
reflection of corporate rather than individual endeavor, but most generals 
were more concerned to garner individual glory. Because he did not emphasize 
the heroic deeds of individuals, the Greeks did not find Thucydides enjoyable 
to read. Moreover, he did not write in verse. Because the Peloponnesian War 
was a civil war between Greeks, his readers did not find it as glorious as the 
wars against the Persians and the barbarians, and Thucydides failed to pay 
attention to the role of the gods.29
Thucydides, who served as an Athenian general, began his History of the 
Peloponnesian War at the beginning of the war because he thought that the 
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conflict between Athens and Sparta would be especially memorable. He was 
afforded the leisure to continue gathering sources and composing his text after 
the Athenians removed him from command and exiled him following his loss 
of the Battle of Thrace. He thought that wars were caused by chance, but that 
the overheated rhetoric of political leaders and envoys made the Peloponnesian 
War inevitable. In speeches that Thucydides composed as summaries of the 
Spartan and Athenian positions, he distinguishes between the pretexts given in 
public for resorting to war, such as the breaking of peace treaties, and the real 
motives that he discusses retrospectively. The actual motive was Spartan fear of 
the growth of Athenian power, but the Spartans could hardly admit that they 
harbored fear in their breasts.30
Polybius, like Herodotus and Thucydides, thought that war dominated 
international relations. Wars came about because of rational decisions made 
by political leaders based on expected gains balanced against possible losses. 
He discerned another kind of warfare caused by emotional reactions, such as 
shame and revenge, rather than rational calculation. Writing for an aristocratic 
audience, Polybius also spoke of a third kind of warfare—that undertaken to 
preserve honor. Polybius, whose political pragmatism and moral values have 
been compared to those of Niccolò Machiavelli, approved of the first and third 
justifications of war, but not the second: “No man of sound mind goes to war 
merely for the sake of crushing an adversary.” Polybius did not deny that war 
was a terrible thing, but he insisted that peace was to be sought only if it was 
consistent with honor and justice, which presupposes a war leading to victory. 
Polybius attributed the eventual Roman victory over Carthage, despite fighting 
at a disadvantage, to Roman “nobility of spirit.” Even utter defeat was preferable 
to a peace without honor. Polybius insisted that only someone who had been a 
soldier and had risked his life in personal combat was competent to write about 
war. Polybius had done so at the gates of Carthage during the Second Punic 
War when he had served as a military advisor to Scipio Aemilianus (Scipio the 
Younger).31 As a Greek of the Achaean League, a group of Peloponnesian 
states opposed to Spartan hegemony, Polybius viewed the Hellenistic world as 
chaotic because the various states that succeeded Alexander the Great’s empire 
possessed no set of moral standards nor a body of international law to govern 
relations with one another. Although the rulers of these Greek and Hellenistic 
states did engage in negotiations, disputes were almost invariably settled by 
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war. Polybius understood that the strong would always prevail. Taken as a 
political prisoner to Rome, Polybius came to believe that Roman power was 
exercised with greater restraint than was the case with Sparta or Macedon, and 
that political alignment with Rome made sense and allowed the Hellenistic 
Greek communities some room for negotiation.32
Whether men fought wars because of instinct or mere perversity, it certainly 
can be argued that the Greeks were preoccupied with war. Plato’s Republic 
uses the word polemos (“war”) and its cognates “nearly ten dozen times.” Other 
words relating to war, such as battle, courage, manliness or cowardice also occur 
frequently in Plato’s text, but the word peace occurs no more than a dozen 
times, and is sometimes employed in a disparaging context, or to refer to inner 
peace, or to the kind of peace that comes when old age obliterates sexual desire. 
War is a fact of political life; peace is for contemplation. Government by 
oligarchy necessarily brings factionalism, while democracy is never free from 
contention, and tyranny is even more chaotic.33 In the hoplite warfare in 
which swordsmen on foot fought in phalanxes, courage was considered more 
important than skill at arms. Such soldiers were drawn from among the citizens 
of the Greek polis, or city- states, who furnished their own weapons. As such, 
they were associated with government by oligarchy. The resources of these 
political communities, and the need to bring in the harvest before the beginning 
of the campaigning season had tended to make warfare a seasonal activity in 
the Archaic and early Classical periods. Plato, however, believed that war was 
an art and required full- time training, and for this reason, he does not discuss 
militias or citizen- armies. Thus, the army that he recommends is a professional 
standing army, and the main reason for the existence of the city- state is to 
support such an army. The warriors must be heavily armed, and therefore, 
dangerous, but their education and training should not attempt to make such 
warlike and spirited men less warlike and more pacific. Rather, the city- state 
needed a well- developed system of justice to restrain and discipline them. The 
pastimes that Plato recommends for training this warrior class, not surprisingly, 
are those in which warrior aristocracies have always delighted: hunting, horse 
racing, athletic contests, and dancing. Plato recommended that they be billeted 
in austere barracks in a fortified camp that was situated so that it could be 
easily defended. The soldiers should take their meals in common and make 
music that was appropriately martial. It is interesting that Plato does not 
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exclude the possibility of enlisting females since some women are well suited 
by nature for making war. Indeed, whole families might comprise the military 
band and follow their husbands and fathers into battle. In this way, the 
apprenticeship in arms could begin at an early age.34
Hoplite warfare developed over a long period of time in archaic and classical 
Greece. First came the armor and the weapons: these included a bronze helmet, 
breastplate, and greaves (or leg shields), together with a wooden shield, a 
short iron- tipped spear and a short sword for stabbing. The warriors had to be 
farmers of some substance, who could afford to provide their own weapons. 
The tactics came later, and three years of intensive training gave the hoplites 
an iron discipline, a powerful cohesiveness and comradery that made them 
especially effective in face- to-face combat. The hoplite heavy infantry could 
advance swiftly on the battlefield, and alarmed the Persians. These qualities 
also promoted loyalty to the polis and fused the obligation of military service 
with civic participation. However, this hoplite civic spirit disintegrated when 
hoplites began serving as mercenaries in the fourth century BCE.35
In late archaic and early classical Greece, these phalanxes of hoplites, or 
armored heavy infantry of aristocratic status, fought shoulder to shoulder in 
tight formation, which might be eight or more ranks deep. The hoplite phalanx 
moved as one body, and in the first phase of battle pushed against the enemy 
phalanx. Lack of space meant that skill at arms did not signify until the 
formation broke ranks. The hoplites fought only with short swords and thrusting 
spears, and scorned the use of projectile weapons, which were only used by 
light troops of lesser social standing who were no part of the hoplite formation. 
The pitched battle did not commence until the location and time of meeting 
were agreed on, and sacrifices to Ares and the other gods of war were offered. 
The battle did not cease until the losing side ceded victory by sending a herald 
to ask for permission to recover their dead.36
Hoplite methods of fighting in phalanxes constituted a stylized and formal 
kind of warfare. Much of our knowledge of it comes from the epics of early 
Greek writers. The concept of agonistic warfare is a modern interpretation of 
hoplite styles of battle denoting a military struggle fought according to rules 
and constraints analogous to those governing athletic contests. While archaic 
and classical cultures certainly did employ athletic endeavors to prepare for 
war, there is limited evidence that the Greeks followed rules of fair play in 
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warfare or that they regarded their enemies—whether Greek, Persian, or 
barbarian—as worthy opponents. Hoplite ideals of warfare, insofar as they 
ever existed, went into decline when generals resorted to stratagems and 
deception. Some of these, such as the fortification of cities and the use of siege 
engines of a primitive sort to besiege fortified places, date back to the Trojan 
wars; others, such as the use of light troops, cavalry, projectile weapons, and 
naval warfare, certainly were in use by the time of the Persian and Peloponnesian 
wars when the hoplite ideals of the archaic period were in decline. Political 
and military objectives became more important than the demonstration of 
valor or the validation of honor by individual warriors. Military commanders 
resorted more frequently to stratagems such as ambushes and surprise attacks, 
and pitched battles grew more infrequent.37
The hoplite mode of warfare was devoid of strategy, and one conflict usually 
resolved the issue only for that short summer campaigning season. Hoplite 
tactics and limited warfare declined during the Peloponnesian War as a 
consequence of the spread of democracy in Athens, the use of naval warfare 
and the rise of the Athenian empire. When Athens was besieged by Sparta 
and the Peloponnesian League, the Athenians retreated behind their extensive 
fortifications; they could fight over a longer season and could draw food, 
supplies, and wealth from their overseas colonies. In effect, Athens under 
Pericles had invented a concept of grand strategy that allowed Athenians to 
fight a long war against the Peloponnesian League because of their abundant 
manpower and other resources. The Peloponnesian War was a long, drawn- out 
affair that was indecisive, resulted in unforeseen consequences such the Plague, 
the breakdown of accepted conventions of war, and the use of mercenary 
soldiers. Athens lost the war, but its democratic institutions gave it an internal 
cohesion that allowed it to survive as a city- state despite the disintegration of 
its empire.38
Alexander the Great and empire-building
Despite the attempts at empire- building by the Athenians, the Greeks of the 
classical period lacked the logistical and tactical abilities to unite themselves 
into one political unit. They were incapable of, and probably could not have 
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afforded the expense of keeping a permanent military force standing for any 
period of time. The very localized political loyalties of the classical Greek 
world did not facilitate the emergence of larger political societies, such as the 
empire that later appeared under the leadership of Philip of Macedon and his 
son Alexander the Great. The individualistic approach to war and the adulation 
for heroes of the Greeks of the archaic and classical ages got in the way of 
fighting wars for political and military ends. Political unity came only at the 
beginning of the imperial or Hellenistic period when these defects were 
remedied by a permanent military force that incorporated innovations such as 
better weapons, a siege force, heavy cavalry capable of dealing with the Persian 
light cavalry, and a well drilled infantry with tactical skills superior to the 
traditional Greek forces and that was capable of meeting the Persians on an 
equal footing and sustaining the effort for a long period of time. The most 
important feature of the Macedonian army under Philip and Alexander was its 
logistical ability to operate over considerable distances without being heavily 
dependent on slow wheeled transport.39
Alexander gave detailed attention to the provisioning of his army as he 
crossed Asia into India and back. He did not depend on wheeled transport, 
and the use of pack animals was limited by the fact that in crossing barren and 
sparsely inhabited expanses they would have consumed more than they could 
carry. To overcome these supply problems, Alexander, who had always given 
much thought to logistical strategies, arranged to have provisions gathered 
at the destinations of his march in advance of his arrival. This required a 
sophisticated intelligence system. He supplied his troops by sea when possible, 
and took into consideration factors such as weather and local harvest dates in 
areas to be conquered. He broke down his forces into smaller units so as not 
to put too much pressure on the consumption of available supplies, and 
sometimes, resorted to forced marches. The number of servants and family 
members accompanying his expeditions was always strictly regulated. In order 
to accomplish his logistical goals, Alexander had to devise a new type of military 
organization that carried with it a light baggage train, moved quickly, and was 
highly motivated. This terrified his enemies. Reading Xenophon’s Anabasis 
(or The March Up Country) is thought to have led Alexander’s father Philip to 
believe that a well disciplined Greek army with a minimal baggage train could 
defeat a Persian army many times larger.40
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The Assyrian, Egyptian, and Persian empires had all developed armies 
that were more technologically advanced in terms of weapons, strategy, and 
logistics, but it was the Greeks who contributed the enduring concept that 
being a warrior was a source of individual glory. To wield the sword, to display 
courage in the face of death, and to undergo the hardships associated with 
campaigning was thought to be an ennobling experience according to the 
Homeric sagas. During the transition from the archaic to the classical period, 
these values came to dominate the culture of the Greek world, and to represent 
the heroic ideals to which all politically active citizens of the Hellenic age 
aspired. The foundations of this admiration for the heroic individual were 
reinforced by the pantheon of gods found in Greek religious mythology and 
the rationalism of Greek philosophy and science. Greek philosophy of the 
Hellenic and Hellenistic periods would endure over the centuries and continue 
to function as a guide to masculine conduct down to modern times.41
During the Persian Wars, the Greeks regarded the Persians as an inferior 
people, a corrupt race who accepted political subjugation to an oriental despot 
and fought from a safer distance with projectile weapons such as bows and 
arrows, instead of engaging in face- to-face combat with short swords, thrusting 
spears, and shields as the Greek hoplites did. They were cast in the role of 
being an effeminate, Asian people, as contrasted with the masculine and brave 
Greeks. The Romans would later depict the Carthaginians in the same vein—
as a feminine, oriental people who had migrated west from Phoenicia. The 
Western style of martial symbolism and propaganda thereafter frequently 
attempted to demonize the enemy.42 The problem with that kind of reasoning 
is that it is difficult to garner honor and glory on the battlefield if one’s 
enemy is an inferior and unworthy opponent. Another problem is that when 
the Greeks fought the Persian armies, they were often fighting their fellow 
countrymen since the Persian Great Kings, as they were called, employed 
numerous Greek mercenary soldiers. Also, the presence of Greeks in the cities 
of Asia Minor and the use of Greek mercenaries made the frequent rebellions 
of the Greek inhabitants of those cities which were located in Persian satrapies 
look like Greek civil wars.43
Philip II of Macedon arrived on the scene after the Greeks and the Persians 
had exhausted themselves in the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars. The Greeks 
despised the Macedonians as barbarians despite the fact that the Macedonians 
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were linguistically and culturally similar. However, Macedon was a dynastic 
monarchy, whereas the Greek city- states shared the political values of self- 
governance and reverence for the law. In 359 BCE, Philip and the Macedonian 
army defeated the Greeks, led by Athens and Thebes, at Chaeronea. At the 
urging of Isocrates, the Athenian orator who admired and trusted Philip and 
hoped that he could bring peace and unity to the Greeks by making war on 
the Persians, the Macedonian king crossed the Hellespont in 336 BCE to rid 
Asia Minor of the Persians and to free the Greek cities there from Persian 
rule. Philip was assassinated shortly thereafter, and was succeeded by his son 
Alexander III, whom we know as Alexander the Great.44
When Alexander the Great crossed into Asia Minor to make war on the 
Persians, he attempted to unite the Greek people by proclaiming that he was 
avenging the atrocities and other injuries committed by Xerxes and other 
Persians against the Greeks and the insults hurled at their gods. He did this by 
drawing on the cultural heritage of the Greeks as contained in such works as 
The Iliad. This first necessitated defeating the superior forces of the Persian 
army, and then attempting to conciliate the Persian nobility. When Alexander 
conquered Asia Minor, he encountered many cities where Greeks had long 
lived. The campaigns of Alexander, like the earlier Persian Wars, were viewed 
by Hellenistic Greeks as a continuation of the mythical Trojan Wars—a 
repetition of the anabasis, or “march eastwards from the sea.” This expansionism 
grew out of the cultural gulf between East and West. In more recent times, 
these Greek communities in Asia Minor had come to be ruled as Persian 
satrapies. Alexander told the Greeks that they had been liberated from Persian 
tyranny, but in actuality, he merely replaced the Persian satraps, or provincial 
governors, with Macedonian soldiers. And because he claimed to be the heir of 
the Persian Achaemenid Dynasty, he continued to levy the same taxes as the 
Persian rulers. Military functions took precedence over civic governance for 
fear that the Persians would attempt to reconquer Asia Minor. Very little had 
changed for the descendants of the original Greek colonists. After he had won 
over members of the Persian nobility and peace settled on Asia Minor, 
Alexander also appointed some of them as governors.45
One way that Alexander conciliated the Persian nobility was by adopting 
the wife and daughter of the Persian Great King Darius instead of ransoming 
or enslaving them as was the usual practice. Darius was also offered peace if he 
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would accept Alexander as his suzerain. Darius refused, and the Macedonian 
army had to defeat another large Persian army. The Persian cities, as they 
surrendered, were remodeled as Greek city- states. Only the Persian capital, 
Persepolis, was ravaged and looted, and this was done to prevent a mutiny 
among Alexander’s troops, who had previously been denied booty in order 
to win over the conquered Persians. Alexander also destroyed Xerxes’s palace. 
After that, he moved further east through Bactria (Afghanistan), marrying the 
daughters of Persian rulers to solidify his claims to Persian sovereignty and to 
fuse the Greek and Persian peoples. He took more brides from among the 
daughters of Bactrian chiefs to buy peace on his way to India.46
In Plutarch’s account of Alexander, he enjoyed the reputation of being the 
founder of more than seventy cities, which were supposed to have brought 
civilizing influences to barbarian peoples. The reality is that Alexander needed 
to establish fortified bases in the conquered territories that could be garrisoned 
by his own soldiers. His practice of settling immigrants from Greece in these 
new towns frequently aroused the violent resistance of the local populace, and 
these revolts were brutally suppressed. He often named these new cities after 
himself or his son, who was also named Alexander. The most famous of the 
new cities was, of course, Alexandria in Egypt, which was the only one of 
Alexander’s cities that was not heavily garrisoned—perhaps because a large 
number of Greeks had settled there.47
After he claimed the Persian throne and ruled Persian subjects, Alexander 
began gradually to introduce the dress and protocol of the Persian court, hoping 
to reach a compromise acceptable to his Persian and Macedonian subjects. 
Besides affecting Persian court dress, Alexander, as Great King of Persia, tried 
to alter court rituals when he met together with Greeks, Macedonians, and 
Persians. He sought to persuade the former two groups to accept a modified 
version of the Persian obeisance when greeting him, but to those in the 
Greek- speaking world, proskynesis, or “prostration,” was performed only when 
worshiping the gods, which would have implied that Alexander was a god (he 
was, in fact, deified after his death). Gradually, a cult was built around Alexander, 
from being a kind of god among men to proclaiming himself as descended 
from the gods. Alexander even claimed to be the son of Zeus. His attempt to 
introduce Persian court ritual alienated many of his followers, and prompted a 
number of assassination plots against him.48
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Alexander’s success in conquering Greece, the Persian Empire, parts of 
Bactria, and India—uniting for a time parts of Europe and Asia—made him 
the very model of an empire- builder to succeeding generations. His successes 
drew admiration and imitation on the part of Julius Caesar, Pompey, and Marc 
Anthony—not forgetting later empire- builders such as Napoleon. While these 
would- be conquerors of a universal empire forgot that Alexander’s empire split 
into a number of feuding Hellenistic kingdoms following his death, we have to 
grant that Alexander, despite his paranoia and insatiable ambition, did actually 
help to promote cosmopolitanism among his subjects. The building of bridges 
between cultures became characteristic of the Hellenistic and Roman worlds 
despite many instances of internal political squabbles.49
Stoicism and Greek concepts of peace
Greek culture of the archaic and classical periods, at least among the aristocratic 
classes, was formed by the need to make war or prepare for the next war. 
Greek towns were built on promontories and surrounded by walls to facilitate 
defense. The Homeric poems, which were compilations of heroic sagas written 
or composed by bards of earlier generations, reflect the background of ever 
present violence and war. Archaic Greek warfare often led to the annihilation 
of the enemy warriors and the destruction of their cities. While the heroes or 
aristocratic warriors of the Homeric poems pursued glory, we occasionally 
learn something of the feelings of ordinary soldiers drawn from among peasant 
farmers, who thought that war was the greatest of calamities. Even the greatest 
of ancient Greek martial epics does not ignore the blessings of peace that are 
forfeited by the pursuit of martial glory. In his close scrutiny of the very 
detailed scenes described as being displayed on the shield of Achilles in The 
Iliad, Oliver Taplin says that the similes that these scenes evoke force us to 
“think about war and see it in relation to peace.” Only then can we fathom “the 
price of war and heroic glory.” Also, the warriors of The Odyssey are not usually 
given to the bragging that characterizes the heroes of the earlier Homeric tales, 
and were less likely to exalt on slaying an enemy and were disposed to show 
mercy. Warring armies began the practice of agreeing to a truce to give each 
side the opportunity to bury the dead. Gradually, the Greeks began to see the 
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need to agree on rules for the conduct of war. These constraints on how wars 
were fought supposedly derived from the influence of the gods of Mt. Olympus, 
who, though they sometimes influenced the outcome of Greek wars, did not 
really approve of war—with the notable exception of Ares.50
Plato believed that while people in prepolitical conditions were gripped by 
fear, this did not mean that they were savages. People were eager to associate 
with other people, and were willing to share their meager resources of food, 
although they still had much to learn about how to live in peace and harmony. 
They had acquired a primitive body of cultural and moral values from their 
gods and they were more trusting of one another and more inclined to live 
peaceably than after their descendants had formed city- states and entered into 
so- called civilized society.51 While Plato accepted the idea that a well governed 
city must be prepared to fight wars to defend itself, he insists that the question 
of whether to wage war can never be considered apart from the principles of 
justice. The state should be primarily concerned with peace, and a good ruler 
should be able to avoid war. However, in his last work, The Laws, Plato concedes 
that the view of Kleinias and his fellow Cretans that an undeclared state of war 
existed among all states was not easily dismissed. But Plato still thought that 
peace was preferable to war, and it was to be hoped that people would display 
good will toward one another regardless of civic allegiance.52
Greek mythology maintained the idea that a Golden Age had once reigned. 
The poetic depiction of myths of golden ages in a number of ancient religious 
cultures expressed collective hopes for peace in the future. When the Persians 
burst on the Hellenic world and the internecine wars between Athens and 
Sparta grew more destructive, other voices began to protest the martial ethos 
and bellicosity of the rulers of the Greek city- states as depicted in Homer’s epic 
poetry. Pindar of Thebes, the great lyric poet who lived during the Persian 
Wars, wrote that “War is sweet to those who have no experience of it, but the 
experienced man trembles exceedingly at heart on its approach.”53 Even as 
early as the eighth century BCE, the didactic poet Hesiod expressed the 
feelings of ordinary men and lamented that he had been born in an age of iron 
and recounted the peace that had characterized the Golden Age, or as Hesiod 
had put it, the golden race of men who had lived in the Age of Cronus. Hesiod 
propagated the myth of men who had once lived like gods in a pastoral paradise 
where they enjoyed peace and happiness, but were later replaced by an iron 
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race with a proclivity to wage war. The principal cause of war, Hesiod thought, 
was lack of justice. He singled out those gods and goddesses who sowed the 
seeds of war, but also praised Zeus as the fount of justice as well as his children 
such as Eirene, the goddess of peace.54
The poetical metaphors of the gold, silver, bronze, and iron races of 
humankind were devised by Hesiod. Other ancient civilizations had similar 
accounts of a mythical golden age. Subsequently, the Latin poet Ovid, in his 
Metamorphoses, reworked the golden- age myth and depicted an iron age 
where men no longer enjoyed the fruits of the earth in common, but divided 
the earth into property worked by iron ploughs and fought over by weapons of 
iron. In the poetical explanations of the end of this halcyon age, classical Greek 
and Roman writers all agreed that the Golden Age of peace broke down when 
people ceased to live on a vegetarian diet; they began to hunt and kill animals, 
to eat flesh and to take delight in the cruelty of blood sports. From ancient 
times until the disappearance of horsed cavalry, hunting, that is, the pursuit of 
deer, boar, and similar beasts on horseback was regarded as a rehearsal for or a 
simulation of war. The Ovidian age of iron is the Golden Age turned upside 
down. Although the Ovidian age of iron derives its name from the ferrous 
metals used to forge weapons and ploughs, the real source of contention was 
the competitive acquisition of wealth. Ovid does not suggest the possibility of 
a return to a Golden Age, so presumably the age of iron is the last stage 
of history. Men began to look for powerful leaders—usually kings—to lead 
and protect them and to build fortified cities. As we can discern in the writings 
of many classical poets and historians, concepts of honor and the pursuit of 
martial glory also led to armed conflicts.55
In the archaic period of Greek history, the word eirene originally meant the 
opposite of war, or the abundance that people enjoyed when they ploughed 
their own lands and tended their own flocks. Peace did not come to those who 
traveled abroad or traded with foreign parts. Peace could be enjoyed only by 
those who were satisfied with the simple life. Not until the fourth century BCE 
did the word peace take on the meaning of a negotiated treaty that ended a war. 
The Peace of Antalcidas (386 BCE), signed by the Spartans and the Persians, 
bound the signatories not to reopen the conflict and established the legal concept 
of a “common peace” between the Greek cities and Persia. This established the 
precedent for negotiated peace treaties in modern international law. Under the 
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influence of Greek religion, peace also came to signify that tranquility of mind 
that comes from the favor of the gods and leading a just life.56
Isocrates (436–338 BCE), who is generally considered a Sophist, lived a very 
long life and had witnessed the Peloponnesian War. In 357 BCE, he and his 
fellow citizens were gathered in the Athenian assembly to discuss the question of 
war and peace with regard to the rebelliousness of some of the allies of Athens, 
who had come to resent the domineering leadership of the Athenians. Isocrates 
advocated a policy of peace, not only toward the disgruntled Athenian allies, but 
also in her relations with all of the Greek city- states, just as they had signed peace 
treaties with Sparta and Persia. Isocrates condemned the imperialistic expansion 
that earlier had led to the Peloponnesian War. He thought the possession of a 
navy displayed excessive bellicosity toward the neighbors of Athens, and was 
incompatible with democratic government, as was the employment of mercenary 
soldiers—especially since these were things that Athens could ill afford.57
Another philosopher who was skeptical concerning the fruits of war was 
Cineas (fl. third century BCE), who was a companion and royal servant of 
King Pyrrhus of Epirus on the northwestern border of Greece. Pyrrhus, 
attacking with elephants, had succeeded in defeating a Roman army at Heraclea 
in southern Italy in 280 BCE, and imagined that he could go on from there to 
build an empire in Italy and Sicily. Cineas pointed out to his master that he 
already possessed great wealth, and suggested that the cost of victory could 
well exceed what he might gain. Following a very costly victory at Asculum in 
Apulia in 279 BCE, Pyrrhus exclaimed: “If we are victorious in one more battle 
with the Romans, we shall be utterly ruined.” Hence, the expression “pyrrhic 
victory!”58
As a consequence of the Peloponnesian War, the Greeks became disillusioned 
with the polis as a model political society because it had come to be viewed 
as promoting fragmentation and conflict. The Sophists, in particular, began 
to put forward the idea of human equality—even, possibly, between so- called 
barbarians and Greeks. Such ideas would eventually lead to the concept 
of cosmopolitanism and the spread of Greek culture. The person most 
instrumental in the diffusion of Greek cultural values was the soldier and 
conqueror Alexander the Great, a pupil of Aristotle. He was hardly a man of 
peace, but his actions did lead to the creation of the Hellenistic world that 
resulted in a degree of peace between Greeks and non-Greeks within an 
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enlarged sphere of Greek culture and language. Stoicism, in particular, was the 
moral philosophy that helped Greeks to deal with the collapse of the city- states 
following the Peloponnesian War and to learn to accept the equality between 
Greek and barbarian and to live in the cosmopolitan world of the Hellenistic 
monarchies. Stoicism attributes causation solely to providence or fate, but 
Stoics insist that people still have choices to make, and were morally responsible 
for such actions despite the influence of fate. Stoics insist that virtue is sufficient 
for happiness, but distrust emotions. Virtue consisted of the ability to put 
things to correct use. Humans are rational beings, and this means living in 
accordance with nature. Stoics rejected all sufferings and calamities as external 
to themselves in order to cultivate internal peace. The overriding characteristic 
of Stoicism is that it places a heavy emphasis on ethics. Of all ancient 
philosophies, it had the most influence on modern European cultures.59
The philosopher who is generally regarded as the founder of Stoicism was 
Zeno of Citium (322—264 BCE); the influence of his ideas lasted several 
centuries and spread throughout the Greek and Latin worlds. Although only 
fragments of Zeno’s writings survive, we know that he advocated one universal 
state, and it seems reasonable to infer that the purpose of this was universal 
peace. In this cosmopolitan and ecumenical society, all would accept one 
divine being and adhere to a moral code in an atmosphere of brotherly love 
and a recognition of the common relationship of all humanity. Many of the 
writings of other Stoics before the Roman period also failed to survive, but we 
learn from the writings of later authors that Chrysippus of Cyprus (c. 280–c. 
208 BCE) was also a major source of Stoic thought, and that these earlier Stoics 
abhorred violence and war. Later writers, such as Diogenes, Cicero, and Seneca, 
all held the moral principles of Chrysippus in the highest regard. That war 
existed in the world these earlier Stoics attributed to the fall from grace in 
Hesiod’s Golden Age, and the remedy for the violence that afterward afflicted 
mankind was a universal monarchy, such as the empire of Alexander or the 
Roman state that Stoics hoped would eventually bring a return of peace.60
The Greek philosopher Epicurius (342?–270 BCE) advocated withdrawing 
from worldly affairs to seek peace of mind and intellectual pleasure. If duties 
were imposed on a person, they should be performed, but ambition or 
advancement of a person’s career were always to be avoided. Epicureans were 
individualists who thumbed their nose at convention. They were lovers of 
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peace who believed that enthusiasm often led to fighting wars in order to 
achieve glory, and was therefore to be shunned. They felt benevolence toward 
all humankind, but had no interest in cosmopolitanism, and wished merely to 
be spectators. The foremost teacher of Roman Epicureanism was Lucretius 
(c. 94–55 BCE), who advocated a more active engagement in the life of the 
world. He believed that war and superstition must be eliminated if society 
were to evolve to a higher form, and in his De rerum naturae, he called on the 
goddess Venus to persuade Mars to put “the savage works of war to sleep.” 
Another Epicurean was the Syrian Lucian of Samosata (c. 120–180 CE) who 
believed that war was a great imposture that was exploited by morally obtuse 
politicians.61
One noteworthy thinker who stood outside the mainstream of Greek 
philosophy was Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 540–c. 475 BCE). He criticized 
Homer for wishing that conflict might vanish from the affairs of gods and men 
because he thought that conflict between opposites was the creative force of 
nature. Indeed, Heraclitus viewed war, as personified by King Polemos, as 
superior to Zeus and all the other Greek gods. Warfare was pervasive among 
humankind just as there was strife in nature. There was no such thing as good 
and bad strife. Justice was merely a seasonal cycle of the two. King Polemos 
was the father of all, and the father of history.62
The teachings of the orator Dio Chrysostom (c. 40–115 CE) give a good 
idea of the thrust of Stoicism during the period when the Greeks lived under 
the Roman Empire. Dio was well acquainted with historical tendencies toward 
factionalism among the Greeks of the archaic and classical periods. He believed 
that concord within individual communities should be valued more highly 
than the abstract concept of universal peace. Factionalism leading to civil war 
should be more feared than war between states. Concord begins in the family 
and household, and spreads to the local community, and then governs the 
relations between cities. Thus, the road to peace began with persuading the 
Greeks to live in concord.63
Epictetus (c. 55–135 CE), another Greek, was the slave of a high- ranking 
official at the court of the Emperor Nero whose master allowed him to study 
philosophy. He eventually became a free man. He observed that although the 
Roman state was able to provide freedom from external violence during the 
time of the Pax Romana, it could not furnish the kind of internal peace and 
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freedom from personal suffering caused by illness, jealousy, emotional turmoil, 
or personal tribulations. A man could achieve a large degree of inner peace by 
cultivating the values of Stoic philosophy, but that could be achieved only 
through the use of reason, which was a gift of God. After the Emperor Domitian 
banished philosophers from Rome in 89 CE, Epictetus sought refuge in 
Nicopolis, where he taught philosophy until his death in about 135.64
The Roman military machine
Roman military organization was an adaptation of the Greek hoplite phalanx. 
Unlike the phalanx, the Roman legion had a more hierarchical command 
structure, and could be broken down into a number of smaller and more 
maneuverable tactical units. Like the hoplite phalanxes, the Romans did not 
leave the battlefield until they had obtained a decisive victory, and they were 
prepared to fight until they had won. The soldiers of the Roman legions were 
armed with only short swords and javelins. The rear ranks were also equipped 
with thrusting spears. In the earlier days of the Roman armies, which were 
made up of citizens and small farmers, they neglected the use of the light 
infantry and cavalry that Alexander the Great had employed, but they learned 
the value of more flexible tactics when they ran up against the brilliant 
Carthaginian general Hannibal.65
The Roman Republic was a state organized for and devoted to making war, 
and had no parallel until the rise of the early modern state. Roman society has 
been described as a military machine. Because the Roman army was so well 
drilled, it did not need brilliant generals. Those who commanded and led the 
Roman armies possessed no special qualifications or training, and were drawn 
from senatorial and equestrian families. This does not mean that they were 
devoid of military knowledge and experience because military service went 
hand- in-hand with their duties as civil magistrates throughout their careers. In 
the senatorial oligarchy of the Roman Republic, admission to that elite came 
through a long military apprenticeship and service, and the duties of the 
magistrates were essentially military. Because of the wealth and glory that 
military command could provide, there was competition for the higher military 
offices that were the reward of extensive campaigning.66
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In the time of the republic, the decision to go to war was made by aristocratic 
members of the Roman Senate. The senators shared a common martial culture, 
and understood that warfare and expansion of empire could bring them 
wealth, honor, and access to the highest political and military offices. The small 
farmers of the republican period, who were subject to service in the army, 
would in theory also have had a voice in such matters as members of the 
Popular Assembly, but they could easily be persuaded to follow the senatorial 
lead by a successful military commander, to whom he would promise booty, 
land and slaves—not forgetting the prospect of adventure and glory. Following 
the military reforms of 107 BCE instituted by Gaius Marius, a hard- bitten 
professional soldier who had little use for aristocrats, the Roman legions 
became a standing army that relied less and less on the traditional Roman 
citizen- soldier. In the late Roman Republic, the decision to go to war became 
concentrated in the hands of a few ambitious men such as Marcus Crassus 
and Julius Caesar. Both the Roman Senate and the Popular Assembly lost 
influence, and Caesar’s political base came to be located in an army made up 
of long- service veterans. Gradually, military recruiting spread beyond Italy to 
the less romanized provinces of the empire. Such men were at first enlisted 
as auxiliaries, and later, as regulars. Caesar’s heir Octavian Augustus was able to 
concentrate decisions concerning war and peace in his own hands, although 
he sometimes consulted a council for the sake of form. Augustus’s motives 
for going to war are not easy to discern, but the probable explanation is that 
he needed to enhance his reputation as a military leader with some notable 
successes so that he would appear to be a worthy successor to Julius Caesar, 
although he possessed no great qualifications to lead armies. The Roman 
language of arms emphasized and exaggerated the deeds of heroes in order to 
reinforce their command of military forces and the right to govern. It was 
commonly assumed that military success would lead to political success. Also, 
since Augustus was in possession of an army of 300,000 men, stationed mostly 
in the frontier provinces, he needed to keep them busy and away from Rome. 
The policy of pacifying the outlying provinces ended up expanding the 
boundaries of the empire.67
The expansion of Rome was a driving force under the republic, and this was 
a deliberate policy of the senate whenever circumstances permitted and profit 
beckoned. However, the empire was not necessarily construed as a territorial 
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entity over which Rome claimed authority, but also included client states where 
the Romans wielded power. As Rome annexed neighboring cities on the Italian 
peninsula, it demanded military service, whereas the Athenians had been 
content to demand tribute. Moreover, the military service was to be rendered 
every year during the campaigning season. It took time to formally incorporate 
all these client states into the administrative and military system of the empire, 
but before the process of annexation was completed, the Romans thought 
of themselves as the rulers of the world. That the Romans did not possess a 
coherent plan of imperial expansion does not gainsay the fact that they felt a 
strong compulsion to do so. The Greek writer Onasander believed that Roman 
expansion was advanced by the ambition of generals rather than by fortune, 
but Polybius appears to have been the only ancient historian who had a clear 
picture of what the Romans were doing.68 Under the influence of Stoicism, 
Polybius believed that the political unity created by the expansion of the 
Roman Empire must lead to universal unity that would bring peace and an end 
to conflict.69
The perpetual wars of the Roman Republic required military mobilization 
on a scale that matches or exceeds the total war of the early twentieth century. 
Roman law of the regal period was heroic in nature, and was derived from the 
assumption, based on the rights of conquest that “the strong and the weak were 
different in kind.” Consequently, the plebs were originally regarded as being no 
better than slaves. This understanding of the heroic law had been accepted 
from the founding of Rome until the enactment of the Petelian Law, contained 
in the Twelve Tables (451 BCE), which finally freed the plebeians from their 
base status by recognizing their marriages as legal. This change in social 
status was earned by the plebs fighting in the Roman wars and demonstrating 
heroic virtue. In the second century BCE, some 10 percent of the free Roman 
males were conscripted for service in the Roman armies. This made it difficult 
for small- holders to retain their holdings, which fell into the hands of the 
aristocracy. The labor force of these latifundia, as the huge aristocratic estates 
were called, was supplied by slaves captured in the wars of imperial conquest. 
When the legionaries were discharged from military service, they expected 
to be compensated with lands. The failure of the senatorial aristocracy to 
meet these expectations caused soldiers to look to their generals for rewards, 
and thus, diminished their loyalty to the Roman state. The support that the 
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generals increasingly received from their soldiers magnified the political 
ambitions of military commanders such as Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar. 
Augustus smoothed the transition from city- state to universal world- state or 
empire by ensuring the loyalty of the many soldiers discharged following the 
civil wars of the late Republic. He provided grants of land—paying for some 
from his own personal wealth and for others by expropriating the lands of 
small- holders to make way for the discharged veterans. This may have angered 
the small farmers, but it pacified the former soldiers who were armed and 
could have made trouble. Subsequently, the Roman army became a smaller, but 
well disciplined professional force. Julius Caesar had doubled the pay of the 
army, and substantial bonuses were paid to the soldiers upon their discharge. 
Conscription was ended by Tiberius, and this helped to diminish the discontent 
of the small Roman farmers.70
Virgil was an admirer of Julius Caesar, but not necessarily of Augustus. 
He may have borne a grudge against Augustus, because Augustus’s land 
commissioners appear to have expropriated part of the family farm near 
Cremona where he grew up, in order to settle discharged soldiers on it. At the 
end of book I of the Georgics, Virgil sees the bucolic life of the small Roman 
farmer being turned upside down by pervasive war—both internal and on the 
frontiers—during the civil conflicts that occurred at the end of the Republic, 
and he hopes that Augustus can bring peace to Rome. He imagined the wars 
causing the fields to fill with weeds, blood to ooze from wells, wolves howling 
in the cities, and ploughs and sickles being beaten into swords and spears. He 
could not conceive of how the husbandman could survive this upheaval.71
While Augustus had gone to war to acquire glory and to increase his 
popularity, it appears that some of the later Roman emperors had sought to 
maintain peace in order to deny military glory to generals whom they feared 
might become rivals. Or, if war could not be avoided, they might assume 
personal command in the field. This was risky if the emperor had no military 
experience, as was the case for some two centuries of those emperors who 
followed Tiberius. An emperor who went to the frontiers to play general always 
needed to be wary of what went on behind his back in Rome.72
In the popular imagination, the age of Augustus and the expansion of 
the Roman Empire were believed to have inaugurated a new age of peace 
symbolized by the closing of the Gates of War in the Temple of Janus and a 
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return of the Golden Age as described by the poet Hesiod. Virgil hoped that 
this might be true:
Then wars shall cease, and the rude age grow mild.
Quirinus and his brother,73 white- stolled Faith,
And Vesta shall give laws, War’s iron gates
Stand closed. Within, upon her savage arms,
Inhuman Rage will sit, by thousand links
Of brass chained back, and snarl with bloody fangs.74
The policies of Augustus ended the civil strife that had characterized the late 
Roman Republic and achieved internal peace. Edward Gibbon makes the point 
that the Pax Romana meant that the army was stationed on the frontiers of 
empire, and that obedience to the laws and payment of taxes on the part of 
Roman citizens was so habitual that the assistance of the army was rarely 
required, in contrast to the more frequent turbulence and popular discontent 
in the monarchies of Asia. And as so- called barbarians and other non-Romans 
became assimilated and were granted the rights of citizenship, they also 
acquired the habit of obedience to the magistrates. Even though the number of 
slaves in the time of Claudius probably equaled the number of free inhabitants 
in the empire, their servitude was not always perpetual; they were sometimes 
freed, and their descendants had an even better chance of manumission and 
citizenship.75 The expansion of the Roman Empire also came to mean that men 
could travel the length and breadth of the Roman world and not fear brigands 
or pirates provided they accepted Roman law and authority. However, this 
internal peace and the expansion of empire rested on force. The costs of 
operating the Roman state after the accession of Augustus were largely based 
on maintaining an army of some 300,000 men for the next three centuries. The 
size of this army was fairly constant, as was the cost of running the Roman 
state, because the cost of maintaining Roman rule was almost entirely 
accounted for by military expenditure. Rome was always at war, unlike its 
medieval and early modern successor states, which were at war only about half 
the time. Thus, despite the internal peace of the Pax Romana, Rome was 
perhaps the most bellicose state that ever existed in the Western world.76
The Romans were less interested in philosophical speculation than the 
Greeks. For them, war revealed a divine judgment. The strong Roman belief in 
the necessity of providing a justification for going to war grew out of Roman 
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religion and a legalistic frame of mind. The fetiales, the college of priest- heralds, 
regulated interstate or foreign relations; they consulted with the sybils and 
priestesses, and conducted the sacrifices and other religious ceremonies prior 
to going to war as well as making the formal declaration of war. This practice 
was peculiar not only to Rome, but also to the other Italian states that Rome 
conquered or otherwise absorbed. The Romans attributed their success in the 
many wars of expansion to their scrupulous observance of the religious and 
legal niceties, but as Roman expansion continued they developed considerable 
legal and rhetorical expertise in justifying their many wars. It was from these 
ceremonies and practices that the concepts of ius in bello (“rights in war”) 
and ius ad bellam (“right to make war”) derived, which formed the basis of 
subsequent attempts to construct a code of constraints on the conduct of war, 
and eventually, helped to provide a foundation for international law in the 
modern period. Only the state could declare war, and Onasander thought that 
the commander who explained the reasonable and just causes of a war to his 
soldiers did much to enhance the morale and courage of his men when facing 
the enemy.77 The Roman definition of an enemy was based on the distinction 
between who had a right to declare and wage war, and who did not. An enemy 
in a war declared by a lawful ruler possessed a right to certain considerations; 
a brigand, a pirate, or a rebel had no such rights.78
Cicero, who once called himself a man of peace despite the fact that he had 
served in the Roman army in order to qualify for the office of consul, said that 
the use of violence was harmful to justice and law in a constitutional state. 
Nonetheless, he believed that the Roman Republic had rendered a service to 
Rome’s Latin neighbors and that the peace settlements concluding those wars 
demonstrated clemency. All that changed as the wars of expansion continued 
following the Punic Wars against Carthage. Cicero advocated political solutions 
over the use of military force, and believed that war should be undertaken 
only when there was no other way to secure peace. He thought that political 
decisions often required more courage than wielding the sword on the field of 
battle. The goal of those who are entrusted with governing the state should be 
“peace with honour.” This is what makes them fit to govern, and for this reason 
they were honored as aristocrats (optimates) because it is assumed that they 
would not conclude a peace devoid of honor. “Peace with honor” in this 
context meant concord, or domestic peace within the Roman state. Since the 
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Romans ruled most of the known world, their concept of peace did not really 
extend beyond the frontiers of the Roman Empire. If war were to be declared, 
Cicero would insist on a proper observance of the accepted rules of war; 
hostilities were to be formally declared by priestly heralds with no preemptive 
attacks, and the enemy was to be treated as a worthy opponent.79 It has been 
asserted that Cicero was not consistent in urging ethical constraints on how 
wars were fought by citing the maxim inter arma enim silent leges (“the laws are 
silent during wartime”). However, this is often taken out of context. Cicero 
actually uttered this maxim as a lawyer while defending a man in a murder 
trial, and it should be classified as a rhetorical flourish such as attorneys have 
been known to employ on such occasions. Cicero spoke these words, when the 
Roman Republic was dissolving into chaos characterized by conflict between 
armed mobs. It does not refer to the conduct of war against external enemies.80
The Emperor Augustus maintained that his pacification of the Germanic 
tribes north of the Alps was a just war, but then the ruling classes of Greece 
and Rome had always believed that the conquest of so- called barbarians was 
justified. Most Roman commentators, including Tacitus, assumed that the 
acquisition of military glory, the defense of military honor and the suppression 
of mutinies and revolts provided adequate justification for undertaking war 
against barbarians without any discussion of the morality of these issues. 
Although he might recognize good moral qualities in the Germanic tribes and 
perceive the tactical advantage of sometimes pursuing diplomacy instead of 
warfare, Tacitus could still be quite bellicose in advocating the expansion 
of empire.81
Partly as a consequence of the longevity of Rome as a political society 
and her success in defeating rival powers, and partly as an attempt to warn off 
rivals in the latter days of the Roman Empire, Roman writers propagated the 
myth of the Roman martial ability to achieve perpetual victory. This was a 
message that legates always carried to barbarian courts and camps to emphasize 
Roman legitimacy of rule, their martial prowess, and their great good fortune. 
The title imperator, which later came to signify the ruler of a universal empire, 
began as a military title given to a commander after he had won a great victory. 
Thus, from the beginning, the title imperator drew on a culture of victory that 
was acted out in triumphal processions, personified by deities, commemorated 
on coins and statuary, and in athletic games. These triumphal ceremonies 
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continued under the Byzantine Empire, and the propaganda must have been 
quite effective because the enemies of Rome more than half believed in the 
“eternal victory” supposedly enjoyed by Roman military forces.82
Roman concepts of peace
One of the legacies of the classical world is the belief that a secure peace can 
be obtained only through war. Thucydides insisted that “war gives peace its 
security, but one is still not safe from danger if, for the sake of quiet, one refuses 
to fight.”83 Cicero, who was educated in the Greek classics, said: “If we wish to 
enjoy peace, we must wage war. If we fail to wage war, peace we shall never 
enjoy.”84 Polybius thought “that war is a terrible thing . . . but it is not so terrible 
that we should submit to anything to avoid it.”85 This advice was passed on to 
the medieval world by Vegetius, the Roman military writer: “He who desires 
peace, let him prepare for war.”86 The Romans were also believers in the cyclical 
view of history, that is, that periods of war alternated with times of peace. 
When Scipio Aemelianus gazed on the destruction of Carthage, Polybius 
records, he wept for the fate of his enemies, and reflected that all great empires, 
cities, and nations must inevitably suffer the same fate—even Rome—for 
no human society can endure forever.87 The Romans believed that war and 
peace alternated as cause and effect. The civil wars broke out because of 
the extravagance that followed in the wake of earlier wars. The luxury and 
prosperity of the later Roman Republic and Empire, and the enervating 
effects of peace effeminated its citizens and made them the prey of barbarian 
invaders.88 Tacitus states that Roman legions posted to Armenia to fight the 
Parthians had grown lax, and had neglected the exercise of arms because of a 
lack of exposure to war. Peace could cause an army to deteriorate rapidly.89
The Roman concept of peace was fragmented. One way of looking at this is 
to remember that during the regal and republican periods of history there was 
no god or goddess who personified peace. While it is true that Saturn was said 
to have established the Golden Age, a time of perfect peace and harmony, and 
that no war could be declared during the festival of Saturnalia, the Golden Age 
was no more. Peace was an abstract and alien concept that was imported into 
Rome and personified as a goddess.90 At the same time, there were several 
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deities who personified war, such as Mars and Minerva. Diana was the goddess 
of the hunt, which was understood to be closely related to war.
Another way of looking at the slow development of the Roman concept of 
peace is to examine the changing meanings of the word pax. According to the 
Oxford Latin Dictionary,91 pax originally meant a pact between individuals, or 
a blessing conferring freedom from divine anger. It could also mean the 
opposite of war, as applied to the relations between two political entities or two 
gods. The olive branch, now regarded as a universal symbol of peace, originally 
signified no more than a pact between Venus and Neptune. Pax took on the 
meaning of a broad concept or policy only in the time of Augustus with the 
Pax Romana, a state of tranquility within those parts of the empire that had 
been pacified. This broader notion of peace did not exist except with reference 
to the Roman Empire. The personification of peace as the goddess Pax also 
appears to date only from the time of Augustus. It is important to note that the 
classical Roman concept of peace assumed that peace must be preceded by a 
total victory imposed by the victors, which assumes the existence of war. The 
goddess Pax was associated with the end of the civil wars and the expansion of 
empire. Augustus had derived the concept of peace from the Greek goddess 
Eirene, who had been known to the Greeks since the time of Hesiod. Although 
the Greeks had fought their wars ferociously, they, and the other city- states of 
the ancient Greek world, had generally restored peace through negotiated 
peace treaties rather than demanding total victory. A Roman peace treaty was 
imposed on enemies after a crushing victory and was never negotiated. Thus, a 
Roman treaty differed from those agreements employed in the Greek world, 
where the theory was that both parties to the treaty had identical rights and 
there was some room for negotiation. Roman coins often depict Pax linked 
to the goddess Victoria, with the latter wielding a sword and shield and 
displaying war trophies. This reinforced the idea that peace was something to 
be imposed, hence the motto Mars pacifer, which emphasized that victory and 
peace imposed through war achieved unity and agreement. The views of peace 
expressed by Roman poets do not differ significantly from the values expressed 
by the legends and mottos on Roman coins.92 A more limited notion of peace 
can be found in the cult of the goddess Concordia, which may have originated 
in the fourth century BCE as a symbol of social reconciliation between 
patrician and plebeian factions, but became prominent only in the time of 
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Julius Caesar when it was associated with the suppression of military mutinies. 
Thus, Concordia came to personify civil harmony, but had no relation to 
external political entities.93
From the time of King Tarquin in the regal period, the Romans had always 
demanded the deditio or unconditional surrender from their enemies. Polybius 
thought that the Roman methods of warfare were more brutal than those to be 
found in the armies of the Hellenistic kingdoms. The Romans appear to have 
used very severe methods against non-Italian peoples. For example, it was their 
policy to employ terror against the Germanic peoples who lived north of the 
Alps in order to discourage future rebellions. Captives who did not immediately 
surrender when called on to do so were either slaughtered or enslaved. The 
execution of the leaders of such rebellious tribes was part of the rituals of a 
military triumph of a commander on his return to Rome. Livy, in his history of 
Rome, From the Founding of the City, makes a distinction between surrender to 
the power of Rome, which left the defeated forces in an uncertain state, and 
surrender to the good faith of Rome, which assured clemency.94 The Roman 
style of besieging towns was more usually based on terror. For example, they 
might display the heads of captured enemy leaders on spears, or catapult them 
into the public spaces of the besieged town. The Greek philosopher Onasander, 
in his treatise on generalship, advised Roman commanders preparing to besiege 
towns to promise good treatment to the defenders in order to persuade them to 
surrender without a siege. In practice, Roman commanders expected besieged 
towns to take the initiative in this matter. Julius Caesar cultivated a reputation 
for clemency when he believed that it was to his advantage, but he could also be 
quite ruthless. However, most Roman commanders observed the convention 
that cities were sacked only after capture, but not after surrender.95
Rome was a militaristic society animated by a martial culture. Because the 
Romans took pride in their past military successes, war was never unpopular. 
Besides, it brought Roman citizens tangible benefits such as new lands to 
cultivate and slaves to do the labor. Livy thought that since the Romans had a 
past that was distinguished by military glory, it was not unreasonable for them 
to think that they were descended from Mars. Livy also said that the Romans 
believed that Mars was the father of Romulus, the founder of the city of Rome, 
and was their father also. For this reason, they thought that they were destined 
to rule the world. This message was, according to myth, conveyed to a mortal 
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Roman after Romulus had become a god, and he also told the Romans to 
cultivate skill at arms in preparation for this great task.96 Roman military 
leaders who undertook ambitious schemes of territorial expansion also turned 
to foreign gods to act as patrons for their conquests. Sulla had enlisted the 
Cappodocian goddess Ma in his adventures, and linked her to Bellona. Caesar 
claimed Venus as the ancestor of his dynasty. He also revived half- forgotten 
cults and religious titles and offices to support his political ambitions. Augustus 
employed the Greek god Apollo as a god of victory, and adopted Mars Ultor, 
“the avenger of Caesar’s murder” as a dynastic deity.97
This may help to explain why the Roman pantheon contained such a large 
collection of war gods, but no peace god until the time of Augustus. Mars was 
foremost of the Roman war deities, a majestic figure who was second in 
importance only to Jupiter. He was the husband of Bellona and a lover of 
Venus. Only Venus was thought to be able to restrain Mars since when war 
raged he ruled. His epithet, Mars Ultor, means “Mars the Avenger,” and he was 
usually depicted naked with a helmet and a shield. Although he was the 
equivalent in Roman mythology of the Greek Ares, he was held in higher 
esteem, whereas Ares was little more than the personification of bloodlust. 
Another Roman God, Quirinus, together with Jupiter and Mars, belonged 
to the trio of Roman war deities known as the Capitoline Triad, and he was 
third in importance behind Jupiter and Mars. Quirinus had probably been 
a Sabine god, and was usually portrayed as a bearded man in religious and 
military garb.98
The Romans pantheon of war deities also included goddesses. Minerva was 
the virgin goddess of warriors and arms. The worship of this goddess was 
inherited from the Etruscans, who in turn, had derived her from the Greek 
Athena. Like Pallas Athena, Minerva was usually represented wearing a helmet 
and bearing arms. She was particularly associated with heroic endeavors and 
cunning stratagems. Bellona was another ancient war goddess. She appears 
to have been an Etruscan deity, older than Mars, to whom she was married. 
Later, she becomes a minor deity, and is represented wearing a helmet and 
a breastplate and bearing a spear and a torch. Meetings of the Roman Senate 
having to do with military matters were held in the Temple of Bellona. The 
Roman goddess Victoria (or Victory) dates from the third century BCE when 
expansion of the empire increasingly absorbed the energies of the rulers of 
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Rome. She was the Roman equivalent of the Greek Nike, but unlike Nike, 
Victoria was a major deity with many temples erected in her honor. Roman 
generals held ceremonies and triumphs to give thanks for her favors. Statues 
of Victoria were adorned with wings, and she was usually depicted bearing 
the trophies of battle that were so dear to the hearts of Roman military men. 
The Roman religious calendar also featured festivals that were specifically 
military in nature, such as the Equiria in the spring, when cavalry mounts 
were exercised, and the Armilustrium in October, when the blessing of arms 
took place.99
Augustus maintained that he was restoring the Roman Republic when 
he came to power at the end of the civil wars. This was, of course, part of a 
propaganda program that also included the proclamation of the Pax Romana. 
When Augustus returned to the city of Rome in 13 BCE after three years of 
campaigning in Gaul and Spain, he entered the city by night without a formal 
military triumph in order to present the appearance of modesty. He also 
refused the offer to erect an altar in his honor in the senate, but he did consent 
to have one built in the Campus Martius, the military training ground beside 
the River Tiber, known as the Ara Pacis Augustae. Augustus knew better than 
to be too greedy for honors, and besides, he had already allowed an altar to be 
installed in the senate, dedicated to Victoria after his return from the defeat of 
Anthony and Cleopatra in 29 BCE. He also built an important temple in the 
Forum Augustum in 2 BCE where captured enemy standards were placed. The 
new Forum Augustum was intended to celebrate Augustus and his family 
among the founders of Rome, and to link his dynasty with military glory.100
Like many thinkers of the Hellenistic world, the Romans had a cosmopolitan 
notion of human society that extended beyond their empire, but writers such 
as Cicero placed limits on sociability, and distinguished between fellow 
countrymen and strangers and between relatives and friends.
In the whole moral sphere . . . there is nothing more glorious nor of wider 
range than the solidarity of mankind, that species of alliance and partnership 
of interests [utilitates] and that actual affection which exists between 
man and man, which coming into existence immediately upon our birth, 
owing to the fact that children are loved by their parents and the family as a 
whole is bound together by ties of marriage and parenthood, gradually 
spreads its influence beyond the home, first by blood relationships, then  
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by connections through marriage, later by friendships, afterwards by the 
bounds of neighbourhood, then fellow- citizens and political allies and 
friends, and lastly by embracing the whole human race.101
Cicero also made a further distinction within Roman society between those 
who were educated and cultivated, and lived within a social framework of 
family life and affection, and those more lawless elements who tilled the fields 
and lived in “sylvan retreats.” The latter did not bother much with marriage 
rituals and would have had trouble identifying their own children.102
Marcus Terrentius Varro (116–27 BCE), a Stoic who is sometimes classified 
as a Platonist, wrote a treatise entitled Logistoricus de pace, which condemned 
war because Varro insisted that humans must remember that they belonged 
to a larger community comprehending all humankind as well as their own 
kinship group. We do not know the precise contents of this essay because Varro 
unfortunately chose the wrong side in the civil war between the armies of 
Caesar and Pompey, and his library was destroyed when his villa was sacked. 
However, Caesar pardoned him and he spent the rest of his long life engaged 
in scholarship and writing.103 Epictetus (55–135 CE) also maintained that all 
men owe an allegiance to this universal city, which is the brotherhood of man, 
because all are sons of God (i.e., Zeus). This could be taken as an argument for 
universal peace. But, at the same time, Stoics were bound to accept the course 
of human events as the unfolding of God’s will, which made it difficult to deny 
the historical fact that humans devoted much of their time to fighting wars.104
This survey of the literary and iconographic evidence for the origin of the 
concept of peace in the Roman world suggests that peace was not a condition 
characterized by an absence of war, but a consequence of war, won on the 
battlefield.105 Thus, we must look elsewhere for a more fully developed concept 
of peace. Classical and Hellenistic Greece offers more fertile ground for 
exploration. In classical Greece, the concept of a just war evolved as an attempt 
to seek justice and to restore peace. Because peace was that which was sought, 
wars could not be conducted in such a way as to make the restoration of peace 
impossible. The concept of a just war, therefore, incorporated the idea of 
constraints on the way war was waged. Because the Greek city- states were all 
roughly equal in size, arbitration was possible and did occur. But the Romans, 
because of their size relative to other states and the magnitude of their pride, 
did not submit to mediation. Although the Hellenes engaged in perpetual 
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warfare with one another, they did make a distinction between fighting 
with other Greeks within a code of restraint, but this code of conduct did 
not apply to warfare with barbarians. However, the subsequent conquests by 
Alexander the Great spread a cosmopolitanism that enlarged the concept of 
what constituted the civilized world. Thus, people could be Greek in terms of 
culture if not ethnicity, and only those outside the Hellenistic world would 
be considered barbarians. Another test of what constituted civility was the 
degree to which people behaved rationally. This broadening concept of 
cosmopolitanism, combined with Greek Stoicism, would eventually furnish a 
concept of peace that embraced all humankind.106 The Romans were influenced 
by this Greek idea of cosmopolitanism, but the more immediate influence was 
to persuade the Romans that wars needed justification, and since the Romans 
were devoted to war and had a genius for propaganda, they became very good 
at justifying them. Although the concept of a just war was based on a wide 
degree of ethical agreement, a just war could also be based on little more than 
a desire for vindication or revenge.107
The concept of the Pax Romana was an ideological or cultural derivative of 
Roman expansion and part of a wider pattern of violence and war. The Roman 
conquerors believed themselves to be more humane and civilized than the 
barbarians who lived outside the boundaries of the empire. The Roman wars 
of expansion carried across several centuries, but the fighting tended to be 
confined to the frontiers of empire, and therefore, there was a large degree of 
peace within the older parts of the empire. But this peace could be maintained 
only by the exercise of imperium or armed power to suppress revolts, mutinies, 
and banditry within the empire and to repulse those barbarian hordes who 
attempted to penetrate the empire which necessitated extensive garrisons on 
the frontiers.108 This is not to say that the Roman people were not glad of a 
measure of peace, because there must have existed a weariness with war. But it 
helps to put the Pax Romana into perspective to remember the famous passage 
from The Agricola of Tacitus where, on the eve of battle with the Romans, 
Calgacus, the Caledonian chieftain, a man “of outstanding valor and nobility,” 
was supposed to have addressed his warriors and warned them that their 
freedom was threatened by the most insatiable conquerors in the world: “To 
robbery, butchery and rapine, they [the Romans] give the lying name of 
‘government’; they create a desolation and call it a peace.”109
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As the Roman Empire reached its fullest extent, the Roman governing 
classes, although steeped in Stoic philosophy, failed to deal with the problem 
that war, employed as an instrument of imperial expansion, still disturbed 
the peace. We must remember that Stoic philosophers remained skeptical 
concerning how far people could achieve peace in this world. Although the 
Roman state was able to provide considerable freedom from external violence 
during the time of the Pax Romana, Epictetus reminded his readers that it 
could not furnish the kind of internal peace and freedom from personal 
suffering caused by illness, jealousy, emotional turmoil, or personal tribulations. 
An individual could achieve a degree of inner peace by cultivating the values 
of Stoic philosophy, but this was available only to a few through the use of 
reason, which was a gift of God.110 That war could not be totally eliminated, 
Stoic thinkers such as Seneca (c. 4–65 CE) attributed to humankind’s corrupt 
and vicious nature. “If mortals always practice eternal hatred, and if the rage 
which has arisen never leaves their minds; if the fortunate hold to their arms 
and the unhappy prepare for war, wars will leave nothing. To desire to restore 
peace is expedient for the victor and necessary for the vanquished.” In effect, he 
said that Rome’s cultural attitudes condemned individual murders done in 
private, but praised conquering heroes for the mass slaughter of whole peoples. 
These praiseworthy Stoic sentiments, which embodied cosmopolitanism 
and brotherly love, found little application in the real world of governing an 
empire. As Gerardo Zampaglione observes, Seneca’s dichotomy between Stoic 
cosmopolitanism and the raw Roman political world anticipates St. Augustine’s 
distinction between the City of God and the City of Man.111
Early Christian pacifism
Whether the Pax Romana was good or bad depended on who you were and 
where you lived. Origen, one of the Greek fathers of the Christian Church, 
insisted that the expansion of the Roman Empire and the Pax Romana 
facilitated the spread of Christianity, which would have been slower and more 
difficult had there been many states as was the case during the Hellenic and 
Hellenistic periods.112 Indeed, the belief that the Pax Romana was the work of 
Divine Providence was widespread among Christian thinkers even though the 
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first three centuries of the Christian era were, for them, a time of persecution.113 
From the apostolic age to the time of Constantine, most Christians were men 
of peace. This was not because the New Testament disallowed participation in 
warfare or forbade Christians to be soldiers, but because early Christianity 
imposed a new and higher code of values on its adherents that was profoundly 
different from classical Greek and Roman or Hebrew attitudes toward war.114 
Despite the vagueness of the New Testament concerning Christian values 
regarding war, the early Fathers of the Church were more explicit in their 
condemnation of military service. Tertullian held that a Christian could not 
become a professional soldier because warfare was not a proper profession 
for a Christian. Moreover, a Christian who became a soldier in the Roman 
army would have to swear oaths to two masters, and the need to travel to far 
corners of the empire would be inconsistent with Christian family life. Before 
Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire, soldiers might 
well be ordered to participate in the persecution and execution of Christians. 
Furthermore, Roman soldiers were expected to make sacrifices to gods who 
were associated with warfare, and to decorate themselves with laurel and 
myrtle crowns associated with those deities.115
Strictness of observance of these teachings varied from one Christian 
community to another, but there appear to have been few Christians who 
actually served as Roman soldiers before the end of the third century. The way 
to peace was no longer victory at the end of a war with barbarians, but rather 
the Christian path to peace became meekness and an expression of fellowship 
with the gentiles. Yet, in the final analysis, the pacifism of the New Testament 
urged on individual Christians a submissive spirit, not a plan for world peace.116
Pacifism in its purest form, that is, an absolute prohibition against 
participation in war, was an important teaching only in the early period of the 
Christian Church, when hope for an early second coming of Christ remained 
strong. By the time that Christianity became the official religion of the Roman 
Empire in the fourth century, the barbarian invasions posed a threat that could 
not be ignored, and henceforth, pacifism remained an ideal only among the 
clergy. The Christian Church reworked the Roman doctrine of the just war, 
and attempted to direct martial ardor against heathens, infidels, and heretics.117
Perhaps the most important influence on Latin Christian views concerning 
war and peace, as passed down through the medieval world, was provided by a 
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Roman who became a Christian only as an adult. This was St. Augustine, Bishop 
of Hippo in North Africa. Augustine’s ideas were derived, in part, from the Old 
Testament and from the Roman legal concept of a just war. Hebrew culture was 
deeply religious, and peace was regarded as a gift of God, so this left no room 
for a secular concept of peace. People could only trust in God for peace; it could 
not come about through the endeavors of humans. Thus, St. Augustine taught 
that wars were sometimes sent by God to punish wickedness and sin. This, of 
course, provides the basis for a providential explanation of history, which leaves 
no room for secondary or human causation. According to St. Augustine, true 
peace can only exist based on justice and a balance of rights and duties among 
men and between men and God. Mere tranquility does not constitute peace. A 
war that aims at peace by seeking to restore this combination of justice and 
rights is to be regarded as a just war.118
Stoicism and constraints on war
The main source of pacifist thought in classical antiquity was Greek and 
Roman Stoicism, the latter deriving from the former. The meaning of the word 
pax came to mean freedom from “turbulence of mind.” The spread of Stoicism 
introduced concepts of tolerance and tranquility of mind. The Stoics believed 
that the Time of Cronus (later called the Golden Age by the Latin poets) as 
described by Hesiod in his Works and Days was historical and not mythical. 
This Golden Age was a time that was free of war and misfortune, a time of 
abundance when there was no need for private property or slavery. While 
the Stoics did not think that the Golden Age could ever be recovered, their 
belief in it did afford a moral standard by which to judge whether a war was 
undertaken for just causes. Wars might be waged for defense, and vengeance 
might be exacted only in accordance with justice and humanity. While the 
original form of Stoicism tended to be detached and reclusive, the Stoics of 
the Hellenistic world encouraged public service and constancy in the face of 
vicissitudes. They also were advocates of cosmopolitanism, which led them 
to a belief in the brotherhood of man and the natural equality of all men. 
Thus, Stoicism contained a number of beliefs that anticipated the message of 
Christianity. The defeated enemy must be granted clemency unless the soldiers 
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had been bloodthirsty and barbaric in their methods of warfare. Essentially, 
Stoicism urged constraints on warfare; it did not propose to abolish it.119
Some Stoics went further in their views of war and peace; they believed that 
the universe was a rational system and that war was irrational. The Greek Stoic 
philosophers living under the Roman Empire in the time of Augustus had 
no experience of war, and could anticipate no need to fight a war in the 
future. They regarded soldiers, who were no longer citizen- soldiers, but rather 
mercenaries, as socially debased. These Greek Stoics went so far as to condemn 
war, even when fought for liberty or self- defense.120 A number of Roman Stoics 
also rejected the concept of just wars, and especially condemned generals who 
were driven by lust for martial glory. Pliny the Elder thought that of all animals 
only humans were disposed to perpetual war, and therefore, inferior to the 
most frightening wild beasts.121 The Roman grammarian and lexicographer 
Festus speculated that the Latin word bellum (“war”) was derived from the 
Latin belua (“large beast or brute”).122
Perhaps the most well known exponent of Stoic thought was Cicero, a 
Hellenized Roman, who gathered his ideas on these matters in his De officiis 
(On Duties). Cicero, who called himself a man of peace (despite the fact that he 
had to serve in the army to qualify for the office of consul), argued that the use 
of violence was harmful to justice and law in a constitutional state.123 He 
believed that rational and civilized people should be able to settle their disputes 
by peaceable discussion; it was the way of beasts and brutes to resort to force. 
The only justification for going to war was when discussion failed; wars should 
be resorted to only to preserve peace.124 He advocated political solutions over 
the exercise of military power. Cicero further believed that political decisions 
often required more courage than wielding the sword on the field of battle, and 
that war should be undertaken only when there was no other way to secure 
peace. But, at the same time, he never doubted that the gods favored the 
expansion of the Roman Empire.125
Stoicism, in its various guises, was widely accepted by the Greco-Roman 
educated classes, but it remained a personal philosophy rather than forming the 
basis for a political philosophy. However, it did introduce an ethical concern 
with the practical problems of governance and duty that placed some constraints 
on how wars were fought, and the Romans came to display a degree of willingness 
to grant clemency to those who surrendered without putting the Roman armies 
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to too much trouble. Beginning in the Renaissance, the legacies of Stoicism 
and early Christianity would provide a foundation on which Erasmus and his 
circle of Christian humanists could build a more uncompromising concept of 
pacifism.
The Greeks were a wonderfully imaginative people, possessed of great 
intellectual gifts. But they could not imagine a world in the near future in 
which peace reigned. Their poets believed that a golden time of peace had 
existed in the Age of Cronus, but that was in the distant past. The Greeks of the 
late archaic and classical periods were aware that they lived in an iron age of 
pervasive warfare. Unless they wished to appear cowardly and devoid of honor, 
they needed to be prepared, as a duty of citizenship, to be ready to carry arms 
into battle and know how to wield them. While they invested little thought 
concerning why wars occurred so frequently, it cannot be said that they lacked 
explanations for the causes of war: habits of violence and an acquired taste 
for flesh learned from hunting characterized the end of the Golden Age; 
mischief sown by the gods, a lack of justice and fear of enemies, the jealousy 
and ambition of kings and the inflammatory rhetoric of demagogues stirred 
up conflict. The Greeks invested far more thought in how to fight wars and win 
glory than they ever did in imagining a world without war. They never ceased 
to relish tales of heroes, displays of courage, and skill at arms. The decline of 
interpersonal violence that characterized the archaic period may have only 
increased the conflict between the city- states and great empires of the classical 
and Hellenistic periods. The periods of time between declared wars and hard- 
fought battles may have appeared tranquil by contrast, but they actually 
constituted a climate of undeclared war.
The Roman state in the republican period was primarily organized for 
making war, and many centuries later, would provide a model for the early 
modern fiscal- military state. The hierarchical command structure and the 
superb discipline of Roman armies would also furnish a model for the standing 
armies that emerged in the late- sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe. 
The senators and citizens of Rome expected to serve in the army, and they 
grew used to the idea that they must never leave the battlefield until they 
had obtained a decisive victory. The senatorial and equestrian families also 
understood that the pursuit of public careers necessarily involved both military 
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and civil duties, and that a good military reputation was necessary for a 
successful political career. The demand for larger armies kept in the field 
for longer periods of time and in the more distant outposts of empire led 
to a decline in the use of citizen- soldiers. Roman armies became more 
professionalized and increasingly recruited soldiers beyond Rome, and later, 
outside of Italy. Consequently, the Roman Empire became more cosmopolitan 
as the boundaries of the civilized world were extended. The Roman concept 
of peace was at first limited, and was always preceded by a crushing victory 
and unconditional surrender. This concept of peace, which originally meant a 
pact limited in scope, time, and place, gradually took on a wider meaning 
as a consequence of contact with the Greek world. Even in time of war 
constraints came to be placed on methods of fighting, and Roman commanders 
sometimes showed mercy to the defenders and inhabitants of fortified towns 
that surrendered instead of resisting. However, James Turner Johnson believes 
that classical antiquity contributed little to legal restraints on how wars were 
fought and Christianity had little more to add. Both Roman and Christian 
thinkers insisted on the need to fight just wars for the right intentions. The 
Romans did not believe in using more force to accomplish their military goals 
than was necessary, not for moral reasons, but in order to conserve military 
resources. Violence was merely a tool to accomplish a military goal.126
Roman imperial expansion was undoubtedly accompanied by war and 
crushing defeats, but despite frequent barbarian and Persian incursions 
and outbreaks of civil war, the extension of Roman authority and law brought 
a previously unknown degree of security to a wider world. Whereas the 
Carthaginian Empire depended on the institution of slavery, the Roman 
Empire came to be held together by the concept of citizenship. Moreover, this 
Roman concept of citizenship was the most cosmopolitan that the ancient 
world had seen.127 As Bryan Ward-Perkins points out, for five centuries between 
67 BCE, when Pompey the Great at the head of a Roman fleet cleared the last 
pirates from the Mediterranean, until the fifth century CE, when the Vandals 
crossed into North Africa, mariners and merchants could travel the seas in 
safety. And, unlike the medieval and early modern world, Roman cities in the 
interior provinces could be built without walled fortifications.128 Tacitus may 
have been critical of the moral shortcomings of Rome under the emperors, but 
he never questioned the justness of Roman expansion because the rule of law 
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and a settled way of life were preferable to the disordered mode of existence 
that characterized the Germanic and Turco-Mongolic tribes beyond the 
boundaries of the Roman Empire. Tacitus admired certain moral qualities that 
he perceived among the Germanic peoples, but their violent and marauding 
ways together with the arbitrary government of their kings and chieftains 
provided a horrifying contrast to the civilizing influences of the Pax Romana. 
Tacitus wrote a kind of didactic history in which he was capable of praising 
the good qualities of Rome’s enemies in order to underline the defects of his 
own society, but he never doubted that Rome’s contributions to civilization 
outweighed its defects. Prophetically, he predicted that the abandonment of 
the Roman provinces and the collapse of Roman imperial authority would 
bring war and misery.129
As the eastern Roman Empire became more Christianized, a philosophical 
revival of pagan Hellenism occurred that strengthened the tradition of classical 
learning and philosophy, and sometimes led to a dialogue with Christian 
thinkers that ensured that the teachings of the Greek philosophers would 
survive into the High Middle Ages. Christian thinkers showed that they were 
quite prepared to absorb the philosophical teachings of classical civilization. In 
this way, the heritage of the Roman Empire was saved from destruction even 
as its military defenses collapsed.130
The peace which is peculiar to ourselves we enjoy now with God by faith,  
and shall hereafter enjoy eternally with him by sight. But the peace which we 
enjoy in this life, whether common to all or peculiar to ourselves, is rather the 
solace of our misery than the positive enjoyment of felicity.
St. Augustine of Hippo, The City of God, in A Select Library of the Nicene 
and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff, 14 vols. (New York: Christian 
Literature Co., 1886), vol. II, bk. xix, ch. 27
St. Augustine says that the hopes of pagan philosophers, such as Marcus 
Terentius Varro, that peace could be achieved in this world were an idle dream. 
Thus, Augustine reminded his audience that the peace Christ promised was to 
be enjoyed only in the next world and only by those who had been saved. As 
for this world, the earthly city was in a perpetual state of decay. The view that 
warfare pervaded human activity persisted at least until the High Middle Ages. 
John of Salisbury said that periods of apparent peace may occur, but human 
strife and violence will always result in more war.1 The people of the ancient 
world understood well what war was, but they had only a limited concept of 
peace as our age imagines it. The word peace meant different things to different 
people in the ancient world. Among the Greeks, it was simply the absence of 
war, usually accompanied by abundance. The earliest meaning of the Latin 
word pax was a pact by which all signatories agreed not to fight. But, for early 
Christians, peace was a positive and dynamic force, woven into the fabric of 
their religion, which signified not only abstention from war, but also an 
avoidance of all contention and bloodshed, together with a positive injunction 
to love and forgive all.2 However, human frailty being what it is, the pacifism of 
early Christians was less easily achieved in practice.
2
War and Peace in the Medieval World
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The Augustinian earthly city
The severely ascetic Tertullian, who adhered to the Montanist party and was 
regarded by more orthodox Christians as a heretic, insisted that while war had 
been permitted in the Old Testament, Christ had taken away the sword in the 
New Dispensation. Tertullian taught that merely to wear the garb of a soldier—
even that of the rank and file and even if the soldier was not required to make 
sacrifices to pagan gods—was incompatible with a Christian way of life, because 
a good Christian could not serve two masters. Not only were Christians 
forbidden to fight in wars, they were also prohibited from bringing lawsuits.3 
Religion had played an important role in the life of Roman soldiers. As recruits, 
Roman soldiers had to swear loyalty to both the emperor and the gods, and to 
participate in religious rites and make sacrifices to the gods on a regular basis. 
These religious observances were supervised by their officers. This sacralization 
of army life was an important part of Roman military discipline. From the time 
of Constantine, these pagan religious rites were modified and adapted to 
Christian practice.4 Although the first three centuries of the Christian era have 
been regarded as the most pacifistic in the history of Christianity, in fact, there 
is to be discerned a militancy that had a sharp cutting edge. Some early Christian 
theologians tended to demonize non-Christians, such as pagans and Jews and 
even other Christians, whom they regarded as heretical. Martyrdom was eagerly 
sought out as spiritual combat, and the language of Christian devotion in 
St. Paul’s Epistles is sometimes pervaded with martial metaphors.5 Debates 
among Christian theologians were often acrimonious and polarized Christian 
communities. When Christianity became the state religion and the political 
culture was de-secularized, this led to intolerance and violent persecution.6
Pacifist sentiments were unevenly distributed among early Christians in the 
Roman world. Such beliefs seem to have been more prevalent in the Greek-
speaking parts of the Eastern Empire; in the older parts of the Western Empire, 
most Christians had also come to prefer more peaceful ways; but in those 
frontier provinces of the Western Empire where Germanic and Magyar 
invasions were a constant danger, Christians recognized the need for the 
protection provided by the Roman legions. It was among Armenians in the 
East that the first notable group of Christian soldiers was recruited in about 
173 CE to serve in the “Thundering Legion.” Since Roman soldiers were also 
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assigned to other duties, such as service in the constabulary and fire-fighting 
units, some Christian thinkers began to make a distinction between service in 
the Roman army and participation in war.7 The accession of the Emperor 
Constantine ended both the persecution of Christians and the brief period of 
Christian pacifism. The new emperor was viewed as the anointed of the Lord 
after he displayed the Christian cross on his banners and won the battle of 
Milvian Bridge in 312 CE, ending a period of civil war and disputed imperial 
succession. The Christian concept that earthly rulers governed by the grace of 
God would have been familiar to earlier pagan emperors. Yet, Constantine was 
not immediately converted to Christianity after his famous victory; he 
participated in a pagan military triumph on his return to Rome, and he 
remained a catechumen and put off baptism until the last moment of his life. 
Constantine saw no reason not to allow his subjects to erect a temple in his 
honor, although he believed that it was inappropriate for them to offer sacrifices 
to him. He also embodied the restoration of Roman values after a period 
dominated by half-Germanic emperors. Whether Constantine’s victory 
brought a Christian defeat of paganism or a triumph of Roman military values 
is less clear. Christians were now obliged to take up the full responsibilities of 
Roman citizenship. Within a century, only Christians were allowed to serve in 
the Roman army, and even clergy were known to wield weapons against 
invading hordes.8
The theological controversies of the early fourth century CE confused and 
dismayed the Emperor Constantine. He was inclined to be tolerant toward 
pagans because he hoped to reconcile Christians and pagans and persuade 
them at least to share a common monotheism. The officials of the Roman 
Empire retained a strong belief in hierarchical order and consensus in political 
matters and did not understand why theologians could not also work toward 
that end. Constantine promoted the Council of Nicaea in 325 to reconcile 
these divergent views; while most bishops signed the Nicene decrees and creed, 
some zealots preferred doctrinal purity to Christian unity. Later Roman 
emperors were no more successful than Constantine in promoting concord 
and unity within the Christian Church, and they often had to resort to coercion 
in a vain attempt to maintain peace.9
The decision by Constantine’s nephew, the Emperor Julian, called the 
Apostate, to return to paganism appears to have provoked much disorder 
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within the Roman Empire. Anti-Christian riots were particularly severe at 
Alexandria in 362 CE, and were made worse by the provocations of the Arian 
Bishop George, who not only promoted discord within the Christian 
community, but also incited his followers to destroy pagan temples. A crowd 
fell on Bishop George and beat him to death. Although the late-classical 
historian Ammianus Marcellinus was himself a pagan, he disapproved of those 
who promoted strife between pagans and Christians, and advocated toleration 
of all religions as a matter of principle. The Emperor Julian was also a tolerant 
man, but he had to warn Christian bishops that their theological disputes were 
disturbing public order and preventing both Christians and pagans from 
worshiping in peace. “Experience had taught him [Julian] that no wild beasts 
are such dangerous enemies to men as Christians are to one another.” In the 
days when new popes were elected by acclamation of the people of the city of 
Rome, proceedings could be quite violent. Ammianus tells us that in 363–364 
CE, the election of a new pope in the Basilica of Sicinius resulted in rioting 
that left 127 people dead, and the authorities restored order only with great 
difficulty.10
Another symbolic blow to the concept of the Pax Romana came with the 
destruction of the ara pacis. This altar, dedicated to peace and abundance, 
which Augustus had erected on the Campus Martius, traditionally a field 
dedicated to the exercise of arms, seems to have been dismantled when the 
Emperor Theodosius suppressed pagan cults in 391–392. Flooding and 
encroachment had also contributed to its reduced visibility, but there can be 
no doubt that prelates such as St. Ambrose wished to make the point that peace 
came only from Christ, not Roman emperors. The idea that the emperor could 
provide peace and abundance in this world was superseded by the promise of 
peace in the next world for those who were saved.11
It is perhaps understandable that Christians who professed their beliefs 
with such fervor and often displayed the enthusiasm of recent converts, might 
resort to violence. But what were the reasoned views of the early Fathers of the 
Church? John Helgeland insists that it is difficult to discern a coherent doctrine 
of pacifism among the early Church Fathers. Their objections to Christians 
serving as soldiers in the Roman army were largely limited to the pagan 
religious observances that might accompany the discharge of military duties. 
At the same time, it seems that Christians were very loyal to the Roman Empire 
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and accepted the need for an army to protect the borders of the empire. The 
early Church Fathers might have expressed an aversion to war and a 
condemnation of murder, but that does not mean that they did not recognize 
the necessity of self-defense.12
It was St. Augustine who shaped the discussions concerning war and peace 
in late antiquity and in the medieval West. He was already steeped in the 
classics of the Greco-Roman world before he became a Christian. His great 
task was to reconcile Roman legal thinking with the knowledge derived from 
the Hebrew Old Testament and the evangelical message of the New Testament. 
The Old Testament was filled with examples of wars undertaken by God’s 
command to punish and correct the wicked; war was morally justified under 
certain circumstances, which provided justification for the Roman concept of 
a just war. The New Testament did not specifically condemn war, but rather 
provided a guide to personal conduct that made it difficult to envision a 
Christian living the life of a soldier. This was an idea that St, Augustine was not 
comfortable with, since the pacifism associated with the Manichean beliefs 
that he had repudiated when he became a Christian did not accord well with 
his belief that war was a consequence of original sin. Augustine’s one concession 
to what remained of early Christian pacifism was that a Christian could not 
kill in self-defense because that would be inconsistent with the Christian love 
of one’s neighbor. Only rulers and magistrates possessed the authority to 
declare war.13
Because the people of the Roman Empire had largely converted to 
Christianity toward the end of the fourth century, Augustine’s views concerning 
war had changed. While an espousal of nonviolence had been morally 
appropriate for the early Christian era, Augustine became convinced that the 
use of force had become acceptable for advancing and defending the Christian 
religion. But Augustine became disillusioned with this concept in later years, 
and this was reflected in his City of God, which is dominated by the theme of 
war. He had come to apprehend that the Roman Empire was fighting a losing 
battle against imminent political collapse, and that this was leading to a “Hell 
on earth.” In such a situation, a morally wise man would be bound by duty to 
fight to preserve what remained of political society. This was the basis of 
Augustine’s doctrine of “just war.” He thought that war was the price one had 
to pay for peace, and even the most just of rulers could not avoid engaging in 
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war since his more turbulent neighbors would force it on him. This was because 
the basic cause of war was wickedness.14
St. Augustine expanded on Cicero’s concept of just war as compensation for 
lost territory or goods, which led to the status quo ante bellum. The Augustinian 
doctrine of just war went beyond mere compensation and sought punishment, 
not just for injuries done to a people or a nation, but also for violating the 
moral order. Thus, the Augustinian just-war doctrine got into the business of 
punishing sin as well as crime. Moreover, it did not distinguish between 
offensive and defensive wars, it was total and unlimited in scope, and the 
enemy, including noncombatants as well as soldiers, could be punished without 
regard to individual culpability.15
St. Augustine had originally believed that no one should be coerced into 
accepting Christianity or Christian unity. But his experience with the Donatist 
heresy changed his mind. Finding instances of compulsion in both the Old 
and the New Testaments, such as the conversion of St. Paul, St. Augustine 
concluded that compulsion and free will were not mutually exclusive concepts. 
When heretical groups refused to accept ecclesiastical discipline peacefully, he 
asserted that the imperial authorities had a duty to enforce discipline on 
dissident Christian groups, although the use of violence should be tempered so 
as to punish and not destroy those who disturbed the peace and unity of the 
Christian Church. However, it was not easy to enforce conformity on Christians, 
whether orthodox or heterodox, who were steeped in the religious culture of 
martyrdom. We might ask how this differed from the earlier persecutions of 
Christians by the imperial authorities in pagan times. St. Augustine would 
have answered that the application of physical coercion by imperial authorities 
in Christian times was a kind of paternal discipline and was done for the right 
motives.16 Physical coercion of evil doers could provide a degree of peace for 
those who were law-abiding:
Surely, it is not without purpose that we have the institution of the power of 
kings, the death penalty of the judge, the barbed hooks of the executioner, 
the weapons of the soldier, the right of punishment of the overlord, even the 
severity of the good father. All of these things have their methods, their 
causes, their reasons, their practical benefits. While these are feared, the 
wicked are kept within bounds, and the good live more peacefully among 
the wicked.17
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Thus, the possibility of war among Christians was recognized by 
St. Augustine when he endorsed the necessity of punishment of heretical 
Christians by the secular authorities (in this case, the Roman state). Augustine 
did not regard this as civil war, but rather a manifestation of the continual 
conflict between the City of God and the City of Man. Augustine based his 
argument on a study of Exodus 32, where God commanded Moses to order the 
sons of Levi to slay those who worshiped the golden calf. St. Augustine called 
this perpetual struggle a holy war. This doctrine of Augustine was subsequently 
cited by Hildebrand, later Pope Gregory VII, to justify the extension of the 
crusading wars from infidels only to those who were heretical, schismatic, or 
excommunicated. But, whereas St. Augustine had restricted the authority for 
declaring such a war to temporal rulers, Pope Gregory VII claimed the 
authority for proclaiming a holy war for the papacy.18
St. Augustine assumed that living as he did in the earthly city, man’s life 
would always be plagued by discord, and out of discord, war inevitably arose. 
Lasting and universal peace could only be found in Heaven, and would only be 
available to those who were saved. The best that could be achieved in this 
imperfect world was to attempt to limit such conflict to just wars fought within 
certain ethical boundaries. If this could be achieved, humankind might, from 
time to time, experience concord as well as discord. Wars would be fought to 
secure peace, but since peace is such a fragile thing in this anarchical world, 
moments of peace could only be temporary. Just wars come at a heavy price 
and were immensely destructive, because the legacy of just wars was generations 
of bitterness and the possibility of more wars.19 Thus, St. Augustine rejected the 
pacifism and antimilitarism of the earlier Church Fathers. The doctrine that 
some wars were commanded by God, which runs throughout the Old 
Testament, was reasserted, and the teachings of Christ, which took the sword 
of vengeance out of the hands of Christians, were seemingly laid aside.
St. Augustine conceded that “peace is the instinctive aim of all creatures, 
and even the ultimate purpose of war,” but then he qualified this statement by 
adding that everyone desires a peace that is to his own advantage. Even when 
men strove for peace, it remained a contested concept. In this world, after the 
Fall of Man, all creatures, human and animal, wanted peace, but only for their 
own convenience and dominion, which was an unstable foundation for peace. 
If conflict occurs on an almost daily basis in families, households, and 
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friendships, is it any wonder that political society is so frequently disturbed by 
insurrections and civil wars?20 “Peace is a doubtful good, because we do not 
know the heart of our friend, and though we did know it today, we would be 
ignorant of what it might be tomorrow.”21 St. Augustine insisted that the proper 
moral view is that an unjust peace is no peace at all: “It comes to this then; a 
man who has learnt to prefer right to wrong, and the rightly ordered to the 
perverted, sees that the peace of the unjust, compared to the peace of the just, 
is not worthy of the name of peace.”22 St. Augustine’s teachings brought the 
classical Roman concept of a just war into the corpus of Christian thought. 
This concept of just war derived from Roman law and Stoic philosophy. While 
some Christians thought the concept of just war departed from Christian 
teaching, the related concept of holy war could be derived from the Scriptures.23
The sixteenth-century French humanist and historian Jean Bodin thought 
that for St. Augustine to assert that this world will always be devoid of real 
peace was philosophically incorrect because that implied that God could not 
alter the course of events in the world that he governed. However, Augustine, 
mindful of the doctrine of human free will, had anticipated that objection. 
Those who ponder these matters are seemingly forced to believe either that 
Divine Providence does not reach to these outer limits of things or that surely 
all evils are committed by the will of God. Both horns of this dilemma are 
impious, but particularly the latter. For although it is unsound and perilous to 
the soul to hold that anything is beyond God’s control, yet even among men, 
no one is blamed for what he could not do or prevent. The imputing of 
negligence is indeed more pardonable than the charge of ill-will or cruelty. 
Reason therefore not unmindful of piety is in a manner forced to hold that the 
things of this earth cannot be governed by powers divine or that they are 
neglected and unnoticed, rather than hold they are all governed in such wise 
that all complaining about God is inoffensive and blameless.24
Following the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West, Christian thinkers 
had little choice but to accept the legacy of classical antiquity as it applied to 
warfare and statecraft. Although St. Augustine had demonstrated in the City of 
God that the Roman Empire was tainted, it was all that remained to protect 
Christians against barbarian invaders. What was to be learned from the New 
Testament was neither coherent nor helpful in defending Christian society, 
while examples derived from the Old Testament depicted Jews going to war in 
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response to direct commands from God to exterminate heathens living in the 
Promised Land. The political and military theories of the Greeks and Romans 
offered not only more practical examples of how to deal with troublesome 
neighbors, but also the example of a degree of ethical restraint in warfare—
even though both Greece and Rome were bellicose societies. The doctrine of 
the just war enjoyed continued support from the leaders of the Church as the 
early Middle Ages saw continued onslaughts of pagan hordes in northern and 
central Europe and Muslims bent on conquest and jihād from the south.25
Other Fathers of the Church also recognized the need to accept the Roman 
concept of just war, and to work with the Roman authorities to protect 
Christianity from internal and external enemies. St. Ambrose, bishop of Milan, 
who was the first of the Fathers to urge this cooperation, taught that prudence, 
fortitude, and justice were all closely related to the desire for self-preservation. 
The courage to protect the weak and to defend one’s home and country against 
bandits or barbarians was suffused with justice. However, fortitude should 
always be combined with prudence. St. Ambrose reminded his audience that 
David never engaged in war unless compelled to do so, he always prayed for 
guidance before battle and he always offered thanks to God when he won a 
victory, such as when he slew Goliath.26
St. Augustine wrote his City of God following Alaric’s sack of Rome in 410. 
But he was careful to point out that the civil wars between Sulla and Marius 
were cruel far beyond anything perpetrated by the invasions of the Goths or 
Gauls.27 The Germanic and Turco-Mongolic invasions disrupted the unity of 
Rome not only by their violent eruption into the empire, but also by their own 
lack of political unity and stability as well as by their diverse religious views. 
Some of these invaders remained pagans, and those who had accepted 
Christianity were likely to be heretical. The Latin Church began to assume 
some of the temporal functions of the former rulers as the Western Empire 
disintegrated, but the chaos of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages delayed 
and hindered the process of assimilation and civilization. These invasions also 
destroyed what was left of a peace ethic and weakened the concept of a just 
war. The precept that only a legitimate ruler could declare war made no sense 
when tribes and kinship groups replaced city-states and empires. Ultimately, 
the emergence of Christendom as a moral and religious entity would help to 
tame the bellicosity of tribal chieftains and warriors, or at least, turn their 
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aggression outward. With the emergence of feudal monarchies, bishops and 
abbots as feudal lords could be drawn into feuding and warfare, and their 
armed followers sometimes included secular and even monastic clergy. But the 
Church as an institution never approved of this kind of clerical behavor.28
Before he became bishop of Milan, St. Ambrose had been a Roman official 
from a senatorial family, and he derived his moral justification for Christian 
participation in just wars from Ciceronian Stoicism. However, he continued to 
reiterate that the Church had abhorred bloodshed from the earliest part of the 
Christian era. Clerics could not hold an office that would require them to 
pronounce a sentence that prescribed mutilation or death, nor were they 
permitted to bear arms in time of war, although they could accompany armies 
into the field as chaplains. Those persons who served as soldiers after receiving 
baptism could not thereafter be ordained as priests.29
Barbarians, war, and violence
The Roman Empire was quite unprepared for the barbarian invasions that 
occurred after 260 and the accompanying instability. The Mediterranean 
littoral had not seen war for many generations, and the imperial government 
was in the hands of an aristocracy that had grown accustomed to peace over a 
long period. By contrast, the periphery of empire was governed and defended 
by professional soldiers who had to deal with military emergencies at a 
moment’s notice. Germanic, Turco-Mongolic, and Persian peoples made 
repeated incursions. Here, “it was plain,” as Peter Brown observes, that “peace 
was a momentary lull in the laws of nature.” The interior of the Roman Empire 
was one of the few places in history where a great state had attempted to 
establish a zone of peace where civilians ruled instead of soldiers.30
What Christians living within the Roman Empire of late antiquity could 
observe of the Germanic and Turco-Mongolic peoples who came out of the 
Steppes of Central Asia and who penetrated the frontiers seemed to bear out 
what St. Augustine said about the earthly city. Azar Gat argues that the so-
called “Dark Ages,” or the early medieval period, was characterized by a 
“collapse of civilization” because the peoples who overran the Roman Empire 
in the West were so primitive that they were like the Iron-Age peoples who had 
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preceded classical antiquity. Tribal warfare, as found, for example, among the 
Celts and the Germans of northern Europe, was characterized by endemic 
violence, but little in the way of organized war. Hunter-gatherers often raided 
the resources of agriculturalists, and the prizes sought were usually cattle, 
women and children, or sometimes crops. Adult male prisoners were rarely 
allowed to live. Because of high mortality rates among males, tribal societies 
had difficulty replenishing themselves; children were needed to provide 
replacement warriors, and women were needed to perform labor since many 
of the men would have been warriors. By contrast, Roman attitudes toward 
prisoners of war were quite unusual, because they absorbed almost all captives 
into Roman society—even if some were enslaved. In the long run, Roman 
willingness to take in foreign populations and Romanize them undoubtedly 
contributed to the greater demographic resources that they could draw on 
when raising armies.31
Although some Germanic peoples were primarily agriculturalists, in other 
tribes, almost every boy was expected to become a warrior, and every adult 
male as a warrior was expected to follow his tribal chief during the campaigning 
season. There was little difference between warriors and noncombatants, and 
civil and military leadership were fused into one. No concept of just war, such 
as had been developed in the Roman world was to be found in Germanic 
society because every warrior decided for himself whether or not to take up 
arms, but those who followed peaceful pursuits were looked down on. The 
Germanic tribes were therefore largely devoted to warfare and worshiped gods 
in the form of animals such as bears and bulls. Their kings had a divine mission 
to lead their warriors into battle. Unlike the Roman legions, these Germanic 
warriors moved about with their whole families. Because most of the Germanic 
and Turco-Mongolic peoples were semi-nomadic and refused to fight pitched 
battles, preferring raiding and other more mobile tactics, the Romans found it 
difficult to engage and defeat them using Roman methods of warfare. Moreover, 
the costs of sustaining an army to fight the tribal peoples along extensive 
frontiers and to contain their incursions raised taxes to such a level that the 
empire in the West could not survive.32
Peter Heather has argued that the Roman Empire in the West was not 
brought down by social and moral collapse, but as a consequence of penetration 
and conquest by Turco-Mongolic peoples. Even in the late fourth century CE, 
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the Roman army still maintained dominance on all its European frontiers. It 
was the Persian frontier that posed the greater danger, not the northern 
frontier. Along the Rhine-Danube border, the Germanic hosts had coalesced 
into client kingdoms, and the Romans frequently made alliances with them 
and recruited German auxiliaries into the Roman army. In the fourth and fifth 
centuries, Rome still maintained control over this situation, but the recruitment 
into the army of non-Roman elements, whose loyalty and reliability were 
questionable, made it difficult to respond to the greater threat posed by 
Sasanian Persia. The depredations and conquests in the late fourth century by 
the Huns, who came out of the Steppes of Asia, forced very large groups of 
Germanic refugees to throng the Danube frontier, asking for refuge within the 
empire. Because so many troops had to be deployed to deal with the Persians, 
insufficient legions remained on the Danube frontier to control the new 
immigrants as they settled in Roman territory. The Goths went on the rampage 
in the Danube and Balkan regions, and found willing allies among the Huns 
and Alans. The victory of the Goths at the Battle of Adrianople in 378 allowed 
them to range more widely as they pillaged the Balkans. But the Goths were 
not yet ready to overwhelm the empire because they lacked the manpower 
resources and military technology to successfully lay siege to fortified cities, 
and could not feed their hordes, which included women and children, solely by 
pillaging. For the moment, they lacked the economic base to continue fighting.33
The situation was quite different a century later when the barbarian presence 
within the empire had grown larger and Roman economic and military sources 
had diminished. With the removal of the last emperor in the West in 476, 
Roman political culture, characterized by an imperial court and a bureaucracy 
that made decisions for the whole empire and deployed the army for its 
protection, disappeared within a few years. Earlier, in the western part of the 
empire, the senatorial class had withdrawn to their private estates, where they 
continued for some time to live a life devoted to Latin literature and pagan 
rituals. In 260, they were excluded from military command in favor of 
professional soldiers of humble birth. The Emperor Constantine had come 
from this latter background. The senators were untouched by Constantine’s 
conversion, but most of his courtiers were Christians. Although the senators 
were made welcome at Constantine’s court, most of those in the West became 
more rusticated. Loyalty to the emperor remained strong in the East, but grew 
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weak in the West. The West remained economically backward, but the Eastern 
Empire with its numerous towns and a more developed economy prospered 
and could afford to pay the increasingly higher taxes needed to maintain the 
Roman army and bureaucracy. While the senatorial aristocrats in the West 
eventually became Christianized, they made no effort to come to terms with 
the Germanic newcomers who eventually replaced them in positions of 
power.34 Provincial Roman cultures survived in a few places, such as southern 
Gaul, for some time thereafter, but Roman landowners became a distinctly less 
privileged class as tribal kings and their followers established themselves 
during the invasions of 376 and 405/6, which brought substantial migrations 
of Germanic and Turco-Mongolic warriors and their families. These widely 
dispersed incursions of Germanic tribes had been accompanied by the 
expansion of the Huns in the Central Steppes of Asia, and the hordes that 
overran the Roman Empire contained both Germanic and non-Germanic 
groups such as the Iranian-speaking Alans and the Huns. Under Attila, the 
Hunnic conquest had for a brief moment lent a degree of unity to the Western 
Empire, but following the death of Attila in 453, the Western Empire continued 
to disintegrate, and after 476, imperial authority was replaced by a number of 
smaller Germanic and Hunnic kingdoms. In this new world, advancement in a 
person’s career depended on following the king as a warrior rather than the 
extended and expensive education in classical Latin and Greek that had been 
required for a career in the Roman bureaucracy. While some degree of literacy 
among elites persisted, clearly the level of education had declined.35
Christianity and Germanic society
The small degree of unity and concord that fragmented Germanic societies 
possessed came from the conversion of these small kingdoms to Christianity 
by missionaries sent north by the popes in Rome. In this way, the Germanic 
peoples were incorporated into Christendom. The laws and institutions of the 
medieval Church owed much to Imperial Rome, and the clergy and scholars of 
that institution had access to and preserved much of the learning of classical 
Rome. One of the most important legacies of the ancient world was the concept 
of a universal world-state and the Pax Romana that had prevailed within that 
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empire. Given the chaotic circumstances of late antiquity and the early 
medieval period, the task of recovering this legacy was very difficult.
One of the most important approaches to peace in the early medieval world 
was monasticism. Ultimately, it had much to contribute, but in the short run, it 
did nothing to promote an engagement with public affairs in the Ciceronian 
tradition. The monastic approach to peace was ascetic, that is, it was based on 
an inner tranquility that necessitated a retreat from the world. This withdrawal 
from public life in an age of turmoil and political disintegration tended to 
weaken the classical Roman concept of concord in political society. Since the 
time of the Emperor Constantine’s acceptance of Christianity, the Roman 
emperors and their Byzantine, Merovingian, and Carolingian successors had 
hoped that Christian influence and the cooperation of the clergy, with their 
resources of learning and literacy, would assist in governing the empire and 
maintaining unity and peace. But, instead, the monks chose to go into seclusion 
in the desert or the mountains and away from the cities. This monastic 
seclusion was reinforced by the severely ascetic belief of some of the Fathers of 
the Church, such as St. Ambrose and St. Jerome, that the peace of God and the 
false peace of this world would never coincide, and the former could be 
approached only through contemplation, poverty, and chastity.36
Arnaldo Momigliano says that Christianity unintentionally proved to be a 
disruptive force after the Roman Empire was weakened by severe economic 
decline. Wealth was diverted to ecclesiastical building projects and religious 
charities, and prelates came to wield a rival authority that could not but 
undermine secular authority. Hermits and the first monks were rebellious and 
disruptive influences before monastic rules were drawn up by St. Basil in the 
East and St. Benedict in the West. Monasticism, as we have seen, proved to be 
a subversive force by causing monks to withdraw from the duties of citizenship. 
Among the reasons why there was more stability and cohesion in the Eastern 
Empire was that the Greek Fathers of the Church, such as St. John Chrysostom, 
were more supportive of imperial government than St. Augustine and his 
disciples in the West, who strongly criticized the Roman political apparatus. 
The loyalty of the Byzantine clerics and divines stood in contrast to the 
unwillingness of their counterparts in the West, who were more conciliatory 
toward the Germanic invaders than toward Roman pagans. But, most of all, 
the Church as an institution simply replaced the Roman Empire in the West.37
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At the same time, it must be said that it was the Christian Church that 
effected a synthesis of Latin and Germanic cultures by undertaking the 
conversion of the rural population and by preserving something of the Roman 
administrative and juridical systems. The Germanic peoples had never sought 
to destroy Roman culture, and they became willing partners in this synthesis 
even as their incursions destroyed Roman imperial unity. Slavery had been the 
economic foundation of the Roman Empire, but Western monasticism, with 
its emphasis on asceticism, intellectual endeavor, and manual labor for all 
members of the monastic community, pointed in a different direction, and 
gave dignity to manual labor. It also opened up the possibility of technological 
improvements, which made the increasingly scarce resources of labor more 
efficient and productive.38
Although the monks were supposed to lead cloistered lives, Pope St. Gregory 
the Great, the last of the Latin Fathers of the Church, called on a group of 
Benedictine monks to cross the Alps in 597 and convert the peoples of Britain 
and northern Europe. The conversion of the Germanic peoples was largely 
carried out by monastic missionaries, leading to the unity and consolidation of 
what we call Christendom.39 This was not easily accomplished. The Franks had 
a well defined warrior class that spent the campaigning season pursuing feuds 
between families. When they came under the influence of Gallo-Roman 
bishops, such as St. Gregory of Tours, St. Hilary, and St. Martin, these prelates, 
so far from disapproving of their bellistic predilections, merely encouraged 
the Frankish warriors to go after their heretic or heathen neighbors, such as the 
Alans, Visigoths, and Frisians. The Venerable Bede likewise recognized the 
need for a warrior class among the Anglo-Saxons because they still faced 
the enmity of pagan neighbors, and wars of defense against them were morally 
justifiable. However, there were also wars of aggression against neighbors that 
lacked such moral justification. But ecclesiastical authorities could not be too 
strict in their reprimands of these warrior-kings as long as they protected 
their subjects from pagan incursions and assisted the work of Christian 
missionaries. In any case, the pagan Germanic peoples had believed that war 
necessitated cooperation between pagan gods and warriors, and this was a 
cultural disposition that Christian bishops and missionaries found easier to 
adapt to than to eradicate. The ideal Christian warrior-king, whose actions 
were regarded as just and merciful, and who led his people in a Christian and 
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patriotic war to contain the heathen Danish invaders of eastern England, was 
Alfred the Great.40
Anglo-Saxon kings, such as Alfred the Great, Aethelred II “the ill-advised,” 
and Edwin of Northumbria, attempted to make peace with the Danish invaders 
in Anglo-Saxon England, although only Alfred enjoyed much success. The first 
two kings resorted to paying tribute, but discovered that the Danes and other 
Vikings had little to gain from a peace treaty as long as they lived by raiding. 
Only if they could be turned into settled territorial rulers with something to 
lose as well as to gain from the bargain could they then be expected to honor 
the terms of a treaty. Like the original meaning of the word pax, the concept of 
peace, as it was understood by the Vikings, was something quite limited in 
terms of time, place, and people.41
It was usual for early medieval rulers to claim that their governance would 
bring peace to their subjects. This was a customary way of asserting the 
legitimacy of their rule and their determination to preserve social order. It was 
also a way of maintaining continuity with the Pax Romana of the earlier 
Western Roman Empire. The wisdom of Solomon as a judge and peacemaker 
was also invoked by many medieval rulers, but the reality was otherwise. War 
remained endemic in the early medieval world, and the panegyrics and prayers 
of court poets and clerics offered but a weak bulwark against the incursions of 
Vikings, Muslims, Slavs, and Magyars in the West during this period. Although 
Christ was recognized as the Prince of Peace, it was unclear how far the 
example of Christ as a bringer of peace was applicable to the temporal 
government of this world. The political theorists of early medieval Europe 
found that the image of Solomon provided more concrete examples of how a 
peaceful king in this world should rule. Solomon’s name, in Hebrew, meant 
“peacemaker,” and he was also understood to prefigure the coming of Christ. 
He embodied justice and wisdom, ruled over a united Israel, and built the 
Temple. Despite a few character flaws, King Solomon was considered an 
exemplary monarch—especially when contrasted with King Saul or the 
pharaohs. The great Frankish rulers, such as Charlemagne, and the Anglo-
Saxon kings, such as Alfred the Great, all regarded King Solomon as an 
exemplar.42
While the Germanic peoples often settled their quarrels by fighting, there 
were also peaceful ways of resolving their differences. Two important parts of 
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any process of peace-making in early medieval Europe were oath-swearing 
and the exchange of hostages. These customs held true throughout Europe 
from the Danube Basin to the Atlantic. It was understood that divine sanctions 
and the threat of death stood behind these exchanges of oaths and hostages. 
Marriage alliances were also an important means of preserving or securing 
peace, but they were more commonly employed to reinforce peace with 
neighboring tribes and kingdoms rather than to bring an end to hostilities. 
More usually, they were instruments to preserve peace between two political 
entities that shared common cultures, such as between Viking and Anglo-
Saxon kings, but this did not occur until the latter began to regard the former 
as equals rather than marauders. Marriage alliances were also linked to 
concepts of peace because the very notion of peace in the medieval imagination 
grew out of kinship. In early Iceland, which was converted to Christianity in 
about 1000 CE, until about 1260, there was no state capable of enforcing 
judgments, but there was a highly developed system of laws and courts. 
Enforcement of the courts’ judgments was in the hands of the aggrieved party. 
Anthropologists tell us that all cultures develop the means of resolving disputes 
and imposing concord, but Christianity was remarkable for defining the clergy 
as a group that could assist in the resolution of conflicts. This was not so 
apparent in the early medieval world where members of the clergy might still 
retain relationships with chieftains and warriors who were parties to a feud. 
However, despite these tainted kinships many of them did actively seek to heal 
conflicts. They possessed rhetorical resources for encouraging forgiveness, or 
at least, accepting compensation without forfeiting honor by drawing on 
biblical literature and parables. If any of the recalcitrant parties refused to 
accept arbitration, then they could be threatened with ecclesiastical penalties 
and eternal hellfire.43
For the Venerable Bede, Edwin of Northumbria was a model king who 
pursued a policy of peace by suppressing violence within his kingdom and 
who pursued “legitimate” violence against the external enemies of the kingdom. 
Kings who refused to wield the sword for these ends and did not conform to 
this model of kingship were not worthy to wear their crowns and endangered 
the lives of others. One of the principal meanings of peace in the early medieval 
period was internal order—the freedom to travel the king’s highway without 
fear of molestation. In this sense, peace meant no more than enforcement of 
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public order and security of travel. It was a rare commodity in Christian 
Europe, although Bede asserts that a lone woman with a child could travel 
safely during the reign of Edwin, the first Christian king of a united 
Northumbria in the early seventh century. Peace also generally prevailed in 
privileged places such as the households of kings, religious sanctuaries, and 
monasteries—but rarely on the king’s highway except in Edwin’s Northumbria.44
Alfred, the ninth-century King of Wessex, is the only monarch in English 
history called “the Great.” He earned this reputation by defending his subjects 
by the sword against Viking marauders, and also by his endeavors to secure a 
peace settlement with the Danes that was embodied in a formal treaty. In this 
effort he employed the usual early medieval diplomatic tools for obtaining 
peace, that is, exchanging hostages, swearing of oaths, and paying tribute. A 
man of scholarly tastes himself, he also sought the help of the church and 
employed scholars to translate writings from the Roman past and excerpts 
from the Bible that encouraged the cultivation of habits of peace. In the 
Alfredian translation of Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy, he emphasized 
that strong and wise kingship was a guarantee of peace when done in concert 
with the Christian Church. Later generations likened him to King Solomon in 
his wisdom and love of peace.45
Although a longing for peace did exist in the tribal cultures of northern 
Europe before the coming of Christianity, the Nordic and Germanic notions of 
peace seem to have assumed that periods of peace would always be short and 
fleeting.46 Early Christian Ireland, however, affords an example of a native 
peace ethic that was more carefully thought out. As early as the seventh century, 
this concept of peace was identified by the Audacht Morainn (The Testament of 
Moran) with good kingship. The just ruler not only sought to secure peace and 
tranquility within his household and during all hostings and assemblies, he 
also protected his subjects from hostile neighboring tribes and kings. Moreover, 
he accepted that he had a duty to relieve the distress of his subjects following 
natural disasters such as storms and plagues. While it was recognized that a 
just ruler would sometimes have to employ violence in order to preserve the 
peace and keep external enemies at bay, he was admonished to keep bloodshed 
at a minimum. Other Irish writings of this period also reveal a determination 
to reshape notions of kingship in accordance with Christian morality and to 
devalue martial culture.47
War and Peace in the Medieval World 63
Concepts of peace were limited in the early medieval world, and their 
existence was more usually to be found in the imagination rather than in 
reality. They were usually embodied in literary epics, poems, and sermons. A 
ruler would be regarded as a peaceful king if he could unite the adherents of 
his hall or kingdom in the face of external enemies. To have attempted to 
pursue a larger policy of peace against the many and dangerous external 
enemies would have been foolish. The many external threats present in early 
medieval Europe placed limits on the pursuit of peace by rulers. Yet, some 
progress was made toward building a peace ethic, however primitive it may 
seem to us.
Germanic concepts of warfare were influenced by customary rules for 
pursuing a feud, which was a quarrel between kinship groups. One of its most 
striking features was the idea that quarrels could be settled by a monetary 
composition as an alternative to bloodshed. Some of the Germanic tribes were 
not particularly warlike, and Wulfila, one of the leaders in Visigothic Spain, 
refused to permit the Book of Kings from the Old Testament to be translated 
into the Goth language because he thought that it was an inflammatory 
incitement to war. The Lombards in Italy were distinctly more warlike, while 
the Anglo-Saxons were more peaceably inclined—especially within a kinship 
group or neighborhood.48
The Carolingian Empire and feudalism
The assimilation of the Germanic peoples into the Christian world led to a 
reorientation of views on war. In Germanic society, war was a kind of moral 
action, and was more admired than peace. Because the early Christian values 
of love and concord were little esteemed by Germanic warriors and because 
the Church needed the protection and assistance of the Germanic rulers and 
their warriors, the prelates and clergy of the Catholic Church had to 
accommodate the martial values of Germanic culture and society.49
The Carolingian Empire represented an attempt to revive the Roman 
Empire in the West under the tutelage of the Church. It brought a degree of 
political and military unity to most of the former provinces of the Western 
Roman Empire minus Moorish Spain, North Africa, and Britain. It also 
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incorporated Catalonia, Lombard Italy, Saxony, and Friesland. The imperial 
title was bestowed on Charles the Great, or Charlemagne, by Pope Leo III in 
Rome on Christmas Day 800. Although Charlemagne sought to revive the 
Roman administrative system, what he actually got was an embryonic form of 
feudalism because his companions, known as counts, were given land in 
exchange for military and judicial service. The Germanic peoples were ignorant 
of the Roman concept of res publica. Their society was bound together by ties 
of personal loyalty. Charlemagne also did his best to revive learning and 
literacy, and to convert the pagan peoples beyond the frontiers.50
Feudal society was characterized by vassalage, a bond of loyalty between a 
vassus, or warrior companion, and his lord; vassalage predated the Carolingian 
Empire and originated in the followers of the Germanic tribal chiefs. A similar 
system, called companionage, was also found in Celtic societies. Although the 
status of vassalage was originally servile, it gradually took on an honorable 
distinction. From the time of Charles Martel, the grandfather of Charlemagne, 
these bands of warriors coalesced under their chiefs for the purpose of 
establishing peace and order among Christians under the leadership of the 
Carolingian dynasty. Each chieftain or lord was bound to furnish a band of 
warriors for the king when called on to do so, and the bond between the lord 
and his vassi, or warrior followers, was supposed to last a lifetime. In return, 
the king was supposed to bestow gifts on his vassi, including grants of land. 
Charlemagne was generous in the distribution of largesse to his followers, and 
in doing so, he fulfilled the most kingly characteristic of rule in Germanic 
society. The gold that he distributed came from military campaigns that were 
usually justified by the forced conversion of heathens, but which, in reality, 
were thinly disguised expeditions to gather loot.51
Peace was very hard to come by because friendship in premodern societies 
did not exist outside of kinship. Blood relationships were very old and certainly 
predated feudalism. Kinship, along with vassalage, became one of the two 
foundations of the feudal system. Feudal lords, of course, could usually count 
on vassi or liegemen, but it was generally assumed that an ordinary knight had 
no friends except kinsmen by blood or by marriage. Quite simply put, there 
was no neutrality. In feuds or trials by compurgation or by combat, kinsmen 
were the only ones that a knight could rely on for support. This also seems to 
have been true of lesser folk. Following Roman legal principles, only kings 
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were supposed to declare war. All other forms of violence were viewed as being 
akin to banditry. During one ten-year period, armies in the Frankish kingdoms 
were involved in various wars, raids, rebellions, mutinies, civil strife, and other 
instances of large-scale violence on thirty-seven different occasions.52
In the last days of the Carolingian Empire, the perpetual state of war, 
including military expeditions on the frontiers as well as internal conflict, 
caused warriors or vassals to look for protective relationships with lesser lords 
rather than with the Frankish kings. The latter were left without the military 
resources they needed to protect the Church and their subjects, and their 
authority became increasingly meaningless. There were many indications of 
the decline of Carolingian power in the last years of Charlemagne’s life. Two of 
his sons predeceased him, and his surviving son Louis the Pious lacked ability 
as a military leader. Frankish expansion came to an end in Italy and Spain, and 
the threat of a Danish invasion remained great. The poor suffered from 
economic distress; warfare continued on the frontiers. There was discord and 
rebellion among Charlemagne’s vassi, who refused to render military service—
possibly caused by the failure of Charlemagne’s successors to provide booty 
and other rewards through wars of expansion. A general war-weariness existed; 
many wished for a ruler of more peaceful disposition, which they found in 
Charlemagne’s surviving son Louis the Pious. In his last years, Charles the 
Great increasingly turned to asceticism, and in the final disposition of his 
wealth, gave most of it to the Church, leaving his heir destitute. The nobility 
also suffered a decline in wealth. The combination of weak leadership and 
economic decline brought an end to Charlemagne’s great project. Anarchy and 
disintegration followed before a new social and political system emerged.53
The period of peace established by the Frankish empire of Charlemagne was 
short-lived. Louis the Pious, a man of peaceful temperament, had assumed that 
the barbarian raids that had troubled the Carolingian Empire were at an end. 
However, the invasions of Arabs, Magyars, and Scandinavians resumed, and the 
fortifications that had been dismantled had to be rebuilt. Even in the heart of 
the Frankish lands, neither cities nor rural communities were entirely safe. The 
raids depopulated a number of villages and monasteries, but the monastic 
chroniclers may have exaggerated the damage done. Since the Vikings usually 
penetrated the interior by rowing up the rivers, they diminished commerce just 
as the flight from the villages diminished agricultural production, while the 
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disruption of monastic life led to declining levels of literacy and scholarship. 
Gradually, the Franks learned to build better defenses, and the Norsemen, once 
they had settled in Normandy, seem to have driven back the Vikings who 
continued to raid along the northern coast. Because defense against the 
barbarian and Saracen raids became the highest priority, much time and effort 
was invested in fortifying towns and monasteries, and building castles. Since 
the castles were in the hands of the feudal nobility rather than being under 
royal control, royal authority was thereby weakened. Very few of the Christian 
kings of this period were able to organize resistance, and the castles of the 
feudal nobility served as bases from which they could pursue feuds or pillage 
the peasantry rather than fighting the external enemies.54
As a consequence of a quarrel among Charlemagne’s three grandsons, the 
Emperor Lothaire, Louis the German, and Charles the Bald, the empire was 
divided into three parts, Lotharingia, Saxony and Bavaria, and Neustria, by the 
Treaty of Verdun of 843, which effectively recognized the end of the Carolingian 
Empire. The treaty failed to bring peace because Louis and Charles both 
wanted access to the Rhineland and failed to observe the terms of the treaty, 
which in any case, did not correspond to ethnic and racial boundaries. Hence, 
the new political units lacked coherence, and military leadership was divided. 
In Charles the Bald’s new kingdom of Francia and Neustria, his subjects 
included Franks, Bretons, Gauls, Aquitanians (who were descended from the 
Romans), Basque-speaking Gascons, Goths, and Spaniards. Charlemagne’s 
attempt to revive the Roman Empire in the West and to impose unity on the 
lands that he ruled had failed because he never succeeded in curtailing ethnic 
particularism nor curbing his own desire to bestow a throne on each of his 
heirs. Moreover, areas such as Bavaria, Lombardy, and Aquitaine remained 
autonomous regions within the empire, while Gascony and Brittany were 
never incorporated within the Carolingian Empire. Although the King of 
Neustria and Francia appointed royal officials to keep the peace and administer 
the law, collect taxes, and render military service, by the end of the 880s, this 
system had ceased to function, and this part of Charlemagne’s empire had 
disintegrated. That Charles the Bald pursued military adventures elsewhere 
did nothing to restore unity.55
The feudal political units that succeeded the Roman and Carolingian 
empires were at first exceedingly numerous and too weak to maintain peace 
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and stability. Feudal rulers might hold a variety of titles—sometimes vested in 
one person—including emperor or king, prince, duke, prince-bishop, or count, 
and so on. These feudal lords could claim only a limited allegiance from 
vassi or fiefholders, who lived on grants of land held of their lords. These 
fiefholders were drawn from an emerging knightly class. Originally a household 
retainer, the knight’s status grew with the spread of the culture of chivalry and 
the holding of feudal fiefs. Fiefholders owed a limited amount of military 
assistance to their lords as specified in the feudal contract. Some fiefholders 
possessed tenants of their own, an arrangement called subinfeudation. Some 
fiefholders also had landless knights in their households. Since they possessed 
fortified castles, they were in a position to engage in private warfare on their 
own. Many vassi owed allegiance to more than one feudal lord, and the 
uncertainty concerning which lord they would follow in a conflict only 
exacerbated instability. This was largely true of the feudal societies of mainland 
Europe because the Norman variety of feudalism, imposed on England as a 
consequence of the Conquest, did not allow subinfeudation. All fiefholders of 
the Anglo-Norman kingdom were tenants-in-chief of the crown. Since the 
hierarchy in feudal society was military in nature, and was distinct from 
manorial or urban society, there existed a wide gulf between feudal rulers and 
ordinary people.56
Chivalry and warfare
Peace was not thought to be a natural state of affairs in the Middle Ages. 
Chivalry, the knightly code of behavior with its emphasis on performing acts 
of valor on the battlefield, ensured that peace was unlikely to be achieved in 
Europe or its borderlands. Before the advent of chivalry in the Frankish lands 
and the use of mounted knights on the battlefield, warfare in Northern Europe 
often involved great hostings of warriors. The Vikings were particularly given 
to quick raids for booty and ransom of hostages. However, the building of 
strong castles and the use of heavy war horses and expensive armor made 
warfare more static and limited. At the same time, the mentality of the knightly 
class caused war to become a constant activity, even if it was fought on a more 
limited scale. Those who were defeated in battle were more likely to be taken 
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prisoner and held for ransom because the victorious knights saw that there 
was profit to be made in such trade. And, unlike most earlier conflicts, knights 
were now fighting Christians who shared a common chivalric culture.57
The medieval knight was essentially a warrior who insisted on his right to 
dispense violence whenever his sense of honor was offended. Despite the 
propaganda contained in chivalric literature concerning the protection 
afforded to widows, orphans, and others incapable of defending themselves, 
they were the main cause of the violence that created widows and orphans, and 
generally disturbed the peace. In short, many knights differed little from 
common brigands and were responsible for much of the violence that was 
endemic in medieval society. Monastic chroniclers—such as Orderic of Vitalis, 
a twelfth-century English monk in the Norman monastery of Saint-Evroul, 
and Suger, abbot of Saint-Denis near Paris—praised the efforts of monarchs, 
such as William I and Henry I of England, who endeavored to bring such 
“proud and turbulent men” to justice and restore a measure of peace. When 
William Rufus, son of the Conqueror and later King William II, was 
campaigning in Maine in 1098, he released some prisoners on parole. Some of 
his followers protested his leniency. William explained that knights could be 
trusted to keep their word in such matters or their reputations would forever 
be blackened. Orderic commented that a concept of notitia contubernii, or “a 
fellowship in arms,” had emerged whereby prisoners were now captured 
instead of being slain, although they were not freed without being ransomed. 
This was a practice that had emerged in France and was called by Gerald of 
Wales Gallica militia, a new rule of chivalry sometimes practiced in France. 
This chivalric behavior was generally extended to aristocratic combatants, but 
ordinary soldiers sometimes benefitted. Yet, it remains generally true that 
during the High Middle Ages, the violence generated by knights probably 
posed a greater threat to public order than crime or popular rebellion.58 
Orderic, in his Ecclesiastical History, was a severe critic of brutal and ill 
disciplined knights and a defender of Henry I’s efforts to curb the depredations 
in Henry’s Duchy of Normandy. When some rebel knights allied themselves 
with Angevin invaders in an attack on monastic lands and tenants in 1136, 
Orderic contrasted their acts of brigandage, spoliation, and sacrilege with the 
tight discipline that Roman commanders had maintained over their cohorts. 
Clearly, Henry I had great difficulty in persuading the knights within his lands 
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to be guided by the rules of warfare of the new chivalry. Orderic may have 
drawn on the De re militarii of Vegetius for his knowledge of Roman discipline.59
Nobility was thought to derive from prowess; honor came from the 
demonstration of prowess generation after generation, and it could only be 
retained by wielding the sword in battle. The continuing demonstration of 
prowess was the principal characteristic of chivalry. Those who had earned 
the noble status that derived from prowess were privileged to dispense violence 
as their sense of honor dictated. Both chivalric literature and eyewitness 
accounts of battles tell us that knights found the slaughter and mayhem of 
hand-to-hand combat exhilarating. It conferred identity. Jean de Bueil, viscount 
of Carenton and count of Sancerre, who assisted Joan of Arc at the Siege of 
Orleans, proclaimed that war was a “joyous thing” because it allowed a knight 
to perform brave deeds, acquire honor and glory, and enhance his reputation.60 
The display of rage in battle was more highly admired than the exercise of 
restraint. Needless to say, it made it more difficult for commanders to impose 
discipline and to persuade knights to focus on carrying out battle orders and 
securing military objectives rather than seeking personal encounters and 
hand-to-hand fighting. In both chivalric romances and eyewitness accounts of 
battle, knights display a love of tournaments and actual warfare that strikes 
modern sensibilities as distinctly blood-thirsty. A knight believed that he could 
not be respected “until he has taken and given many blows.” We must remember 
that the chivalric values of the medieval warrior held that prowess was 
diminished by peace, and his income was lessened by the lack of opportunity 
to win booty and collect ransom. The distinction between public war (bellum) 
and private war (duellum) is a modern one; the only difference between actual 
war and the tournament in medieval times was that the property of 
noncombatants was not destroyed or stolen in the latter form of combat. While 
the lances used in tournaments had blunt rather than sharp points, mock 
combat was still a dangerous sport, and participants could and did suffer fatal 
accidents. No one doubted that tournaments were a simulation of or a rehearsal 
for war.61
Knights looked forward to war not only as an opportunity to display prowess, 
but also because of the prospect of garnering booty and ransom. They 
understood that war brought widespread destruction to the persons and 
property of noncombatants; this was regarded as natural and not a cause for 
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regret. But, then, chivalry had nothing to do with ordinary people. Armies had 
usually lived off of the land since ancient times, and to leave the lands and 
properties of the subjects and peasants of one’s enemy untouched was to afford 
that enemy an advantage in the struggle. Naturally, slash-and-burn tactics 
would also provoke an enemy to do the like by way of revenge. This bears 
eloquent witness to the values of the code of chivalry, which never really 
extended beyond the small world of knights. Chivalric culture was also full of 
contradictions. While there is evidence that it did place constraints on the 
conduct of war among Christian knights, there are also many instances of sheer 
brutality in the treatment of enemies on the battlefield, including both prisoners 
of war and noncombatants. When warriors and soldiers were captured on the 
battlefield, usually only those nobles who could afford to pay ransom were 
spared and taken captive. For others whom the mounted knight encountered 
on campaign, there was only violence and destruction. Persons of humble birth 
received little or no consideration; this sometimes included well born ladies.62
According to the author of L’Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal, the first 
thing that knights must concern themselves with when wielding the sword was 
preserving their reputation. Then, they must be attentive to defending 
themselves, their families, and friends. Glory would also accrue to those who 
defended their homeland. In last place, they should also remember their duty 
to preserve the peace of the Church. Honor and reputation were always 
foremost in the mind of the medieval knight, and this is revealed alike by 
poetic romances, songs, and narrative memoirs—whether biographical or 
autobiographical. Such a knight was known as a prudhomme, or a man of 
prowess.63
Some thirteenth-century sources such as the Histoire de Guillaume le 
Maréchal suggest that the advent of chivalric culture brought some restraint to 
warfare. However, the wars between the kings of England and France over the 
Angevin territories in France were particularly lengthy and nasty because 
the Capetian monarchs and their knights saw the struggle as a defense of the 
patria. The Battle of Bouvines in 1214 was a hard-fought engagement in which 
the French exacted a heavy toll on the invaders and were little interested in 
taking prisoners. Abbot Suger of Saint-Denis went so far as to suggest that the 
foreign invaders should be treated like Saracens, and their bodies left unburied 
for the beasts of prey to feed on. The chivalric culture that the Normans 
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introduced into England in 1066 mandated the humane treatment of prisoners 
of war of noble status while condoning the harsh treatment of prisoners of low 
status. Duke William of Normandy knew how to be ruthless when enemies or 
subjects broke faith with him, but when he invaded England in 1066, he went 
out of his way to follow the accepted rules of warfare under the code of chivalry 
and to show mercy to the Anglo-Saxons. When his soldiers destroyed property 
or took booty without permission, William made restitution. William I had 
sought the assistance of Pope Alexander II in legitimizing his conquest of 
Anglo-Saxon England in exchange for assisting papal reforms. A group of 
Norman bishops had already drawn up a penitential ordinance reaffirming 
church teaching that soldiers who had killed in battle or during the suppression 
of a domestic rebellion had committed “grave sin” and needed to perform 
lengthy public penance. This also assisted the Conqueror’s efforts to impose 
stricter discipline on his army. Bishop Ermenfrid of Sion was sent to England 
as a papal legate, and confirmed this document, although William himself was 
exempted from the obligation to perform such penance. The pope also granted 
William the right to nominate prelates within his kingdom.64
Whether the pre-conquest Anglo-Saxons possessed rules of war is uncertain. 
They fought mostly defensive wars to ward off foreign invaders, but we know 
that on one occasion, following the Battle of Stamford Bridge in 1066, the 
Norwegian invaders, led by Harald Hardrada, were put to the sword following 
their defeat. When the Normans overcame King Harold Godwinson’s exhausted 
Anglo-Saxon army at Hastings a short time later, the margin of victory was so 
narrow that the Normans decided that they could not spare the lives of the 
defeated Anglo-Saxons if they were to complete the conquest of England. The 
Battle of Hastings was an exceptionally bloody affair, and William did not feel 
that it was appropriate to spare the Anglo-Saxon warriors. Later, William the 
Conqueror did show clemency to rebels when, by English custom, he could 
have exacted harsher penalties. Normandy and England after the Conquest 
were more chivalrous societies than Anglo-Saxon England, where rebels were 
commonly put to death. William’s usual practice was to exile such persons and 
confiscate their estates, but to spare life and limb. However, persons of lower 
status could expect severe punishments from their Norman rulers.65
As Anglo-Norman power extended into the Celtic borderlands of the 
British Isles, a great disparity between the conduct and methods of warfare 
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could be observed in the Norman and Celtic camps. King Edward I was a 
rather poor model of chivalry, and he and the Anglo-Normans did not extend 
the chivalric courtesies to Welsh and Irish prisoners of war because Edward 
regarded them as rebels, and in Celtic warrior society, methods of warfare were 
more brutal and it was still the practice to slay all prisoners and take their 
heads. Also, the Norman commanders believed that severity would deter 
future revolts, raids, and acts of terrorism; they could also claim that they were 
merely paying back the Welsh and the Irish in kind. Yet, there were occasional 
exceptions to this brutality. Following a skirmish between English and Irish 
warriors at Bagenbun Creek in Waterford in 1170, the English took seventy 
prisoners. One of the English knights insisted that the prisoners should be 
killed because foreign countries were never conquered by clemency. However, 
another English knight, Raymond le Gros, argued that the prisoners should be 
spared because “they are no longer our enemies; they are human beings.” In the 
event, the majority of the English knights prevailed and the prisoners were put 
to death. Gerald of Wales, while admitting that it was common practice for the 
Welsh and the Irish to kill prisoners, insisted that the Celts were defending 
their homelands, and that the Anglo-Normans were excessively brutal and 
could have set a better example. It has been suggested that one of the reasons 
that the Celts slaughtered prisoners of war instead of ransoming them was 
because they lacked a monetary economy. Chivalric culture and knighthood 
hardly existed in Wales, and the Welsh practiced guerilla warfare. They could 
capture castles by surprise attacks, but they lacked the expertise and equipment 
for sieges. The Irish also engaged in guerilla warfare that mostly took the form 
of cattle raids on the herds of other tribal chieftains. The Scots were more adept 
in their methods of warfare, and could fight pitched battles and counter English 
heavy cavalry charges.66
The reduction of private war in medieval Europe was a joint effort of the 
Church and the new feudal monarchies. As the recently Christianized 
Germanic tribes were absorbed into the feudal kingdoms of the medieval 
Latin West, they brought with them “a cult of war and belligerence,” which was 
at the core of the code of chivalry. Knights bred in this chivalric culture were 
encouraged to seek adventure and single combat, and later, to joust in tourneys. 
The bellicosity of feudal warriors was also directed against external enemies, 
and received the sanction of the clergy as just-war. The opportunities for 
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adventure and combat in the First Crusade not only helped to rid Western 
Europe of these disruptive individuals, but also bestowed on them the status of 
Christian warriors. Indeed, the encouragement of the Church made chivalry 
into a kind of order or estate that placed the knight who went forth to protect 
the holy places on the same hierarchical level with the priesthood.67
In the High Middle Ages, monarchs—especially those of England and 
France—sought to gain control over warlike manifestations of violence and to 
enforce a royal peace. How far this was successful remains a matter for scholarly 
debate. However, chivalric culture maintained the belief that a knight 
committed no offense against his suzerain if he killed an opponent in seeking 
revenge for offending his knightly honor—provided that he followed all of the 
proper forms prescribed by the rules of knightly combat. Although the chivalric 
code sanctioned individual combat between two knights to settle points of 
honor, it was incompatible with the rules governing blood feuds, where tactics 
and practices such as ambush, mutilation, or the slaying of prisoners were 
usual. This knightly prowess was considered a private right that did not concern 
the king. In chivalric literature, kings were inclined to answer that an offended 
knight had a right to exact revenge, but only after the matter had been decided 
by the king could a judicial combat be allowed. The kings of England and 
France claimed regality with the right to dispense justice at all levels of society, 
including jurisdiction over chivalric disputes. They justified this as necessary 
to permit “the peaceful practice of Christianity.” Thus, the values of chivalry 
and the interests of royal government were quite different.68
Other than the Angevin-Capetian Wars, the conflicts of the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries mostly consisted of violent quarrels among lords and vassals. 
As the feudal monarchs extended their jurisdictions they attempted to gain a 
monopoly on violence within their kingdoms, but this necessarily meant 
persuading the perpetrators of violence to take their fighting elsewhere. 
Whereas the Church sought to impose peace by sending warriors as crusaders 
against the Saracens, feudal monarchs, once they had imposed a degree of 
peace on their own kingdoms, were also able to send larger armies to fight rival 
Christian kings. In the intervals of peace, such as occurred from time to time 
during the Hundred Years War, a problem presented itself concerning soldiers 
who were thrown out of employment in France and roamed the countryside in 
search of adventure and booty. These bands of unemployed soldiers sometimes 
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challenged royal armies or found themselves engaged in secondary wars with 
peasants. In 1346, Edward III of England dealt with the problem by sending 
the Black Prince to Spain to help Peter the Cruel of Castile counter an attempt 
by his half-brother to divert the royal succession and seize the crown. Both of 
the opposing armies were composed of veterans of the wars in France. Thus, a 
measure of peace could be brought to France by mounting a war in Spain. Just-
war theories could also be turned against the Church, as in the conflict between 
King Philip the Fair of France and Pope Boniface VIII.69
Another solution to the problem of bringing internal peace to countries 
plagued by roving bands of soldiers was suggested by Philippe de Mezières, an 
official in the service of the King of Cyprus, who was known for promoting a 
greater awareness of the ideals of chivalry and the duties of knights. He 
proposed taking knights and their men-at-arms into royal armies for 
permanent service. Those who proved to be good soldiers could be retained, 
while those who were interested only in looting could be discharged. Honoré 
Bonet (or Bouvet), a Benedictine monk, and Christine de Pisan, a French poet, 
redefined chivalry in terms of service to the commonwealth; both, along with 
the English cleric John of Salisbury, advocated imposing on royal armies the 
kind of discipline practiced by the Romans and set forth in De re militarii by 
Vegetius, who was widely read during the Middle Ages.70
Honoré Bonet summed up the duties that knights and other soldiers owed 
to their feudal lords. When a vassus swore loyalty to his lord, being a king, duke, 
or count, he was obliged never to do anything that might hurt the interests of 
his lord. However, the vassus was not obliged to fight for his lord, even in a just 
cause, unless his lord paid him wages. But, if the king or lord lacked the means 
to do so, the vassus must assist him—especially in a defensive war.
Medieval just-war theories
The laws of war during the Roman Empire required justification for every war, 
but it was agreed that wars in defense of imperial borders or the pacification of 
non-Roman peoples living on or beyond the frontiers were always a just cause. 
To these just causes of war, the Christian successors of the Roman Empire in 
the Middle Ages added the defense of Christendom against pagans, a category 
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that included Vikings, Magyars, Muslims, and others who invaded Christian 
territory or the Holy Land.71 Thus, the Church continued to preserve something 
of the just-war theory inherited from Roman law and the teachings of 
St. Augustine and the Church Fathers.
Gratian of Bologna, or Franciscus Gratianus, an Italian cleric, reformulated 
the principles of just war around 1148. There had been earlier collections of 
canon-law legislation and opinions of the Fathers of the Church, but Gratian’s 
Concordia discordantium canonum (Concord of Discordant Canons), also 
known as the Decretals, was the first that was systematically organized. It 
became a basic reference for medieval canon lawyers and theologians 
concerned about ethics. Gratian reiterated the Augustinian doctrine that war, 
conducted in a spirit of Christian charity and love of one’s neighbor, was useful 
for persuading the sinner to give up his sinful ways. Consequently, service as a 
soldier was not “inherently sinful.” Insofar as they fought injustice and punished 
sinners, they acted as ministers of God. The same was true concerning corporal 
punishment, mutilation, or execution of thieves, bandits, and pirates. One can 
see that Gratian did not distinguish between sin and crime or between war 
and the administration of justice. Overriding all of this was the admonition 
that the object of war was a return to peace, and once victory had been achieved, 
the soldier or magistrate should be merciful to captives. At the same time, 
soldiers who fought only for pay or booty were explicitly condemned.72
Although Gratian is concerned with the question whether a Christian may 
participate in war, only part of his ideas derive from St. Augustine and the 
Fathers of the Church; other concepts, such as the need for a formal declaration 
of war by a ruler or a magistrate, originated with Cicero and Roman law, and 
were transmitted through the writings of St. Isidore of Seville, an early medieval 
Spanish prelate and doctor of the Western Church. Gratian cites St. Augustine 
to the effect that wars of defense are allowable against enemies of the Church 
in order to avenge an injury by those enemies. To these criteria for a just war, 
St. Thomas Aquinas later added another criterion—that the war so declared be 
fought for the right intention, that is, to punish the transgressor and restore 
peace. We should note that no justification was provided for fighting wars to 
preserve the state since this particular abstract concept, of the political 
community having an existence apart from the person of the king, although 
known to the Romans, was not revived again until the sixteenth century.73
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The Roman emperors had claimed to be lords of the world. The Carolingian 
emperors were content to claim the title “lord of Europe,” but when Gratian’s 
successors, the Decretalists, began to codify canon law in the twelfth century, 
they asserted the idea that there was only one emperor of the world, and he 
could not be an infidel, but rather, had to be a Christian. This authority had 
been bestowed on the Roman emperors of the Christian era after the time of 
Constantine by the popes because, as vicars of Christ, they had a world-wide 
dominion over the souls of men. This would later give them authority to 
proclaim the crusades and to divide parts of the New World among the Spanish 
and Portuguese. Supposedly, the popes could also authorize the conquest of 
non-Christian peoples, not because they were nonbelievers, but because they 
had violated the laws of nature by unnatural acts, such as sodomy and 
cannibalism.74
John of Legnana (1320–83), professor of canon and civil law at the Studium 
in Bologna and vicar general to Pope Gregory XI, was the first jurist to address 
the whole corpus of rights and duties as they pertain to rulers who engage in 
war. His efforts were also the first by a layman to base the primary justifications 
for engaging in war on natural law rather than the law of nations, although he 
does not completely cast aside the justification for war based on divine law. He 
was not much interested in the moral philosophy of war, or more concretely, 
constraints on how war was conducted. He allows that the pope may proclaim 
a crusade against the infidel Saracen to recover the Holy Land, and he may also 
declare war against an emperor or a prince if he is heretical, schismatical, or if 
he usurped “the rights and liberties of churches.”75
Concerning the origins and causes of wars, Honoré Bonet or Bouvet 
believed that war originated in Heaven when God drove out the bad angels led 
by Lucifer. If war originated in Heaven, one should not be surprised to find it 
in this world. Armed conflict also arose out of the contrariness of human 
nature. Battle was viewed as an appeal to the judgment of God. War was 
reasonable and compatible with natural law and man-made law. Nor could it 
be contrary to divine law, since there were occasions in the Old Testament 
when God commanded his chosen people to wage war. The evil that is 
occasioned by the prosecution of war derives from the misconduct of 
combatants who try to make war serve their own ends of revenge, looting, and 
rapine, rather than securing justice. War must always be proportionate to the 
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offense offered. Because God uses soldiers as martial instruments to punish sin 
does not mean that He loves soldiers.76
Most of those who lived in the medieval European world assumed that God 
intervened directly in battles and rewarded one side with victory and punished 
the other side with defeat. Unless the apologists of the losing side could 
plausibly explain how this happened, their rulers risked forfeiting claims to 
legitimacy. This providential explanation of the outcome of battle was 
attributed to an epistle supposedly written by St. Augustine known as the Gravi 
pugna, which asserted that God awards victory to the army whose cause is just. 
Only a minority of clerics, such as Philippe de Vilette, abbot of Saint-Denis, 
recognized that God might, for his own good reasons, award victory to the 
wicked. Or, as the Venerable Bede suggested, this might happen because 
Christian peoples had grown morally lax and God needed to punish them.77
The belief, still widely accepted as late as the fourteenth century, that war 
served no useful purpose except to punish man for his sins, was challenged by 
the revival of interest in Vegetius, who held that war was a means of bringing 
about peace. His De re militarii was read, paraphrased, cited, and translated 
from the Carolingian era into the early modern period. Vegetius, thought to 
have been a Christian who had lived in the fourth century CE, had much to say 
about the practical aspects of making war to restore justice, order, and peace. 
He emphasized that war should be fought for a clear political purpose. War 
must be carefully planned and quickly fought with as little waste of resources 
as possible. It was to be judged only by the achievement of a successful victory, 
and not by the heroic deeds of individuals. Good leadership and experience 
were important for success, and the implication was that such qualities were 
not always to be found in the well born. Moreover, because war should only be 
waged for the common good, there was an obligation of citizenship that 
required that all citizens should undergo military training in order to help 
defend the political community rather than employing mercenaries.78
Influenced as he was by Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas believed that peace 
was the natural condition of mankind, and thus, he rejected St. Augustine’s 
argument that there existed a perpetual conflict between the City of God and 
the City of Man. Nor did he accept the idea that warfare was inevitable between 
Christians and infidels. Although all humans bore the burden of original sin, 
this did not completely obliterate people’s natural inclination to peace, nor did 
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it make war necessary and inevitable. St. Thomas did not care for the motivation 
of the crusades, nor did he think that the divine command to slay idol-
worshipers in Exodus 32 offered a precedent for Christians to follow, although 
he allowed, like St. Augustine, that heretics could be persecuted.79
Aquinas did follow St. Augustine in arguing that the purpose of war was to 
secure peace, and to restore political and social harmony. He laid down the 
conditions that were necessary for securing these ends: in order to be 
considered just, a war must be declared and the army summoned by the 
authority of a ruler rather than a private individual; there must be a just cause 
for declaring the war; and the belligerents must intend either to seek “some 
good” or avoid an evil.80 Just as kings and magistrates have the authority to 
wield the sword of justice to punish criminals or internal enemies of the state, 
so also they have recourse to wield the sword of war against external enemies. 
The power to dispense justice and the power to make war go together.81
Thus, the medieval teachers of law, known as legists, agreed that war was 
lawful, and justification for war could be derived both from divine authority 
and natural reason. The concept of just war, from the time of its Aristotelian 
origins, had remained very flexible. War could not be an end in itself, but a just 
war could be undertaken not only to secure or restore peace, but also to acquire 
glory, or to enslave and govern barbarians or non-Greeks, who, because of 
their inferior status, deserved to be subdued. To this, the Romans added the 
legal concept of redressing an injustice by war. This could include the recovery 
of goods or territory, the defense of the state, or the vindication of honor. The 
Germanic kingdoms, which succeeded the Western Roman Empire, preserved 
the study of Roman law, a belief in the right of self-defense, constraints on how 
war was to be waged, together with a recognition of the need to restrain 
interpersonal violence and feuding. Although warfare was prevalent in 
medieval Europe, in general, warriors accepted the limitations on war imposed 
by the Church.82
By the end of the thirteenth century, we can discern four types of war. There 
was the Roman style of conflict in which the hostile parties usually fought to 
the death and took only a few prisoners, who could be slain or enslaved, 
but could not claim the privilege of ransom. The crusades against the Saracens 
would be an example of this category. The second category comprised public 
war between Christian princes, in which spoil could be taken and noble 
War and Peace in the Medieval World 79
prisoners ransomed. Feudal warfare, the third type of war, was considered 
to be guerre couvert, or covered war, in which the combatants, by custom, 
could kill or wound, but not burn or pillage. The fourth category was the 
state of truce, in which war was merely suspended, but not ended. When 
we look beneath the surface of warfare in the medieval world, the situation 
could be complicated. Maurice Keen gives the example of a ten-year period 
during the Hundred Years War. Besides the war between the two kings of 
France and England, which involved two different conflicts—one in Provence 
and another concerning the succession to the crown of Castile—the king of 
France was also at war with the king of Navarre; the rival houses of Blois and 
Montfort were at war with one another in Brittany; and elsewhere, the counts 
of Foix and Armagnac were engaged in another struggle. At the same time, 
routiers, or free mercenary companies, were pillaging the countryside. In such 
a state of affairs the distinction between public and private warfare seems 
meaningless.83
From the High Middle Ages until the sixteenth century, there existed side-
by-side two distinct just-war theories: the first was the jus ad bellum, a religious 
doctrine that derived both from theology and canon law, and which concerned 
the right to make war; and the jus in bello, which was a secular but ethically 
sanctioned set of rules concerning what was allowable in methods of fighting. 
In the medieval and Renaissance periods, custom required that princes not 
resort to war without justification, but princes and states found that just causes 
were not difficult to discover—no matter how transparently false they were. It 
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that just-war doctrines failed to deter war.84 
The concept of just war was also validated by chivalric culture, which praised 
and romanticized the noble warrior fighting in the service of the Church and 
the prince, and also acting as the protector of the meek and the poor. The 
values of chivalry were also celebrated by the creation of highly select orders of 
chivalry, such as the English Order of the Garter, or in Burgundy, the Knights 
of the Golden Fleece.85
Works of chivalric literature, such as the Morted’ Arthur, sometimes displayed 
the same aversion toward periods of peace that we find in the writers of 
classical antiquity because it was widely believed that peace depleted the 
martial ardor and skill at arms of the warrior. On hearing the news that war 
with the Romans would resume, King Arthur and his court are depicted as 
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rejoicing that they would once again have the opportunity to perform feats of 
arms, for they believed that they had languished in inglorious peace for too 
long.86 English writers of the fourteenth century had experience of war 
throughout their lifetimes, and they did not particularly long for war, but they 
did fear that peace would lead to effeminacy and a decay of martial prowess. 
Certainly, a theme running throughout many chivalric romances is that war 
directed against the sultan and the Saracens was always just.87
The Peace and Truce of God
The early Middle Ages in the West saw instability and widespread violence. 
Toward the end of this period, following the disintegration of the Carolingian 
Empire, several peace movements originated in France and spread from there 
into Germany. One was the Cluniac Revival, a monastic movement that 
emphasized a more strict observance of the Benedictine Rule and which 
originated at the monastery of Cluny in Burgundy. The Cluniac movement 
achieved widespread influence because the abbots and priors of Cluniac 
houses stood outside of the feudal hierarchy, and Cluny was subject to the 
authority only of the popes. Indeed, four abbots of Cluny became popes, and 
their influence contributed to a revival of papal power, which had been 
weakened in the previous years. The other two movements were led by the 
French bishops. The first was the Peace of God, which emerged after about 975 
CE, and was aimed at limiting the depredations of troublesome warriors on 
church buildings and the clergy as well as protecting pilgrims, merchants, 
peasants, and shepherds. The Truce of God, another peace movement, dating 
from the early eleventh century, was also led by the French bishops and sought 
to prohibit conflict among Christians during certain holy days and seasons of 
the ecclesiastical calendar. These movements attempted to achieve complete 
internal peace within Christendom and reached a peak in 1095 when Pope 
Urban II, a former abbot of Cluny, proclaimed a holy war against the Saracens 
at the Council of Clermont. Neither of these peace movements attempted to 
abolish war, but only to impose constraints on feuding, and some of the lesser 
forms of conflict and violence, and to allow war to be declared only by the 
proper authorities. The limitations on the methods of warfare were not 
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observed by the crusaders in their wars against the Saracens and Turks, and 
their religious fanaticism and spoliations shocked the Byzantine Greeks who 
had long fought with their Muslim neighbors without displaying such excesses. 
Moreover, the pacifism of the regular clergy was repudiated by the emergence 
of military monastic orders such as the Knights Templar.88
The Church did sometimes sanction peace movements, such as the Peace 
and Truce of God, but this particular movement enjoyed only limited success 
because it failed to secure sufficient support from the secular authorities, and 
the Church had no effective way of enforcing such a policy. The feudal nobility 
continued to carry on private wars and to pursue vendettas. The church could 
only resort to excommunicating particularly notorious offenders, but such 
spiritual penalties were widely ignored—especially since bishops often 
excommunicated people indiscriminately for trivial matters such as property 
disputes with their neighbors.89
The same peace movement also attempted for a time to ban certain weapons, 
such as crossbows and long bows, which were proscribed by the Council of the 
Lateran in 1139. However, some theologians thought that it was justified to use 
such weapons against infidels, pagans, and heretics. The later introduction of 
gunpowder weapons does not seem to have provoked the same degree of 
condemnation by Church authorities. The prejudice against missile weapons 
appears to have arisen more from chivalric values than from motives of 
Christian charity, and should probably be attributed to a dislike of the kind of 
mercenary soldier who employed projectile weapons. It is also interesting that 
the clergy did not object to blessing swords, lances, and military banners.90
Truces were frequently resorted to in medieval warfare. Although acts of 
violence ceased during the truce, there still existed a climate or condition of 
warfare because it was understood that hostilities would eventually resume. 
Little wonder, for violence was very much a part of daily life in the medieval 
world. Apart from the frequent wars, most ordinary people carried staves when 
they traveled as well as knives for eating. By all accounts, these were frequently 
employed as weapons in quarrels. In societies where feuding was common, 
such as medieval England, feuds were rarely solitary affairs as they might be in 
the later Italian style of dueling in the period of the Renaissance. In medieval 
England, feuds were often carried on with the assistance of friends and kinsmen 
(usually the same individuals), and typically took the form of an assault on a 
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fortified house rather than an individual ambush on the highway. The injury 
inflicted on one person was understood to affect the larger kinship group. The 
more organized form that vengeance took made it difficult to secure lasting 
peace. The assumption persisted into early modern England that a person 
needed friends to survive in a hostile world because the state was too weak to 
protect the individual. It was also assumed that those who were not friends 
must be enemies since there could be no neutrality. This assumption reached 
back to ancient Rome, when Publilius Syrus, a freed slave, said that a person 
should “treat your friend as if he might become an enemy.” Because the people 
who inhabited such societies had a highly developed sense of shame, the 
dispensing of justice and attempts at reconciliation had to be staged with much 
theatricality. Wrongdoers had to be humbled as well punished before a large 
audience. However, public executions and corporal punishments did little to 
deter crime and probably set a bad example for the resolution of conflicts. 
Most people equated justice with vengeance. Yet, it has been observed that in 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the English were more receptive to 
royal attempts to suppress violence than the French, who held on to concepts 
of private warfare and the judicial combat. Subsequently, both realms seemed 
to have suffered from an increase in violent protest and crime as a consequence 
of the Hundred Years War. Feuding was, and remains, characteristic of societies 
with weak or nonexistent governments. The monarchs of this period 
understood that peace began with the suppression of violence and the 
enforcement of public order through the exercise of royal justice, and many of 
their subjects came to share this view. Like the maintenance of domestic public 
order, peace-making between states was never easy.91
The papacy and the crusades
The desire to divert Christian warriors away from feuds and wars with other 
Christians and to bring peace to the Latin West was at least as important to 
Pope Urban II as protecting the Eastern Church and securing the Holy Places 
against the Saracens by proclaiming the First or Jerusalem Crusade. This was 
why the pope, a Cluniac monk, had proclaimed the Peace of God at the same 
time that he promised forgiveness of sins to the crusaders. Urban was following 
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the example of an earlier pope, Leo IV (847–55). After Saracen marauders had 
sacked Rome and desecrated St. Peter’s Basilica in 846, Pope Leo urged the 
Franks to drive them out of Italy with the promise that those who died doing 
so would find their way to a heavenly reward. In effect, this was an early attempt 
to define a war fought against Muslim infidels in defense of the Holy Faith as a 
holy war and to promise forgiveness of sins and immediate salvation. That the 
pope had the authority to issue such a proclamation is questionable, and it 
certainly did not define new doctrine. Nevertheless, subsequent popes would 
repeat this exhortation and promise.92 Subsequently, Pope John VIII (878–79) 
granted an indulgence to those who undertook to fight pagans and infidels, 
and fell on the field of battle. Such soldiers would obtain remission of their sins 
and immediately enter into “eternal life.” Effectively, the bull subsequently 
published by Pope Urban was a proclamation of holy war. This sacralization of 
combat against the Saracens was accompanied by the ritual blessing of the 
crusaders’ armies, their weapons, and banners. John of Salisbury believed that 
just as the secular prince possessed the temporal sword, the pope and bishops 
also possessed a spiritual sword that was to be wielded in cooperation with the 
secular authorities, but always in conformity with God’s will. Preachers such as 
the Benedictine monk Gerald d’Avranches helped to legitimize warfare at the 
time of the First Crusade and to popularize the so-called “warrior-saints,” such 
as Saints George, Mercurius, and Demetrius, who had been Christian soldiers 
in the Roman army and martyrs, and who might intervene in the battles fought 
by the crusaders to ensure Christian victory.93
The crusading concept derived from the earlier practice of undertaking 
pilgrimages to the Holy Land or other sacred places for the purpose of doing 
penance or advancing one’s spiritual growth. Pilgrims enjoyed a special 
protected status in Roman canon law, wore distinctive insignia, and were 
supposed to be afforded hospitality in monasteries. The proclamation of the 
First Crusade combined the pilgrim’s vow to undertake a pilgrimage to the 
Holy Land with fighting a holy war; the crusader also undertook to fight for 
the stated objectives of the holy war, and was promised remission of punishment 
for past sins. The older view that the violence of war involved “grave sin” and 
necessitated public penance following absolution gave way to the practice of 
private penance in the Age of the Crusades. In the Christian lands that he 
passed through on the way to the Holy Land or in undertaking to recover 
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lands lost to conquest by the Saracens, the crusader was to enjoy the special 
status of a pilgrim.94
Those who took part in the First Crusade consisted of a mix of volunteer 
crusaders and paid mercenaries, but we must be wary of making too fine a 
distinction between the two. Both were recruited with the promise of pay from 
the Byzantine emperor and indulgences from the pope. This was a formula for 
rewards that had worked for Pope Leo X in the earlier crusade against the 
Normans in Sicily and in the Roman Schism of the 1060s that resulted in the 
conflict between pope and anti-pope. Furthermore, those popes who preceded 
Urban II had also designated those conflicts as holy wars. Thus, we should not 
be surprised to see that both altruism and self-interest were incorporated into 
the Wars of the Crusades.95
Christians in the Latin West had reason to fear the political and military 
power of the Muslims. The Muslims had conquered the formerly Christian 
lands of Asia Minor, North Africa, and much of the Levant; they dominated 
most of the Iberian Peninsula and threatened the kingdom of the Franks 
before Charles Martel turned them back at the Battle of Tours in 732. Muslim 
pirates had ruled the western Mediterranean, kidnapped travelers, and sacked 
the towns of the littoral while building fortified strongholds in Italy and 
southern France. Although individual Christian kings put up a brave defense 
from Leon and Navarre, Western Christendom lacked the organization and 
military might of the Byzantine Empire, which for long had held off Muslim 
expansion. The papacy blessed the individual knights who began to come from 
all over Western Christendom to do battle with the Saracens, and gradually 
such military expeditions acquired the status of a holy war. Thus, by the late 
eleventh century, the era of the crusades had begun, and this military effort 
acquired a degree of unity under the leadership of the papacy.96
The proclamation of a holy war against the Saracens went well beyond the 
more limited aims of a just war. The popes of this period seemed little 
concerned with limitations on how these wars were fought or the ultimate 
ends of these crusading expeditions. Moreover, it was an inconsistent policy to 
proclaim holy war abroad, while attempting to maintain the ideal of religious 
peace at home. The popes broke this truce themselves when they encouraged 
crusades against heretics and excommunicated persons in the West such as the 
Cathars, and became involved in factionalism when the Great Schism of the 
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Avignon papacy divided the allegiances of faithful Christians, or when they 
failed to remain impartial during the Hundred Years War between England 
and France.97 The practitioners of just war in classical antiquity had sought to 
avoid displeasing their pagan gods, and thus, the Greek and Roman wars were 
not devoid of a religious sanction, but the medieval crusades embodied a 
degree of militancy that owed more to the Hebrew modes of warfare found in 
the Old Testament.98
Pope Gregory VII taught that the feudal aristocracy, from knights to kings, 
had a duty to serve the interests of the Church and fight its wars. This meant 
not just wielding the sword against heathens and infidels, but also serving the 
interests of the see of St. Peter in its struggles with the Emperor Henry IV, or 
whomsoever opposed the interests of the papacy. Again, this necessarily 
brought Christians into conflict with other Christians. This was part of the so-
called Investiture Controversy, which was, at bottom, basically a struggle over 
wealth and power, or whether the pope could appoint clerics to episcopal sees 
on the basis of talent and ability, or whether the emperor could use such offices 
to buy the support of aristocratic families. Gregory VII also claimed the power 
to remove temporal rulers, and he had excommunicated the Holy Roman 
Emperor Henry IV in an attempt to depose him. He had also threatened King 
Philip I of France with the same penalty, and warned him that he would place 
France under the interdict if the king did not behave himself. This would have 
forbidden the ministration of the sacraments to the king’s subjects in an 
attempt to raise a rebellion against him, which probably would have provoked 
a civil war. In short, Pope Gregory VII came to look on the feudal nobility as 
vassi of the papacy, and in return for fighting his battles, Gregory promised 
them remission of the punishment due to their sins.99
Whether knightly aristocrats were suitable instruments for the exercise of 
papal power is open to question. Before the late eleventh and early twelfth 
centuries, theologians had difficulty seeing how a knightly career could be 
compatible with following the path to salvation. The code of chivalry had taken 
over pagan and barbarian attitudes regarding dueling, feuding, warfare, and 
courtly love that were difficult to reconcile with Christian morality. So evil and 
violent were some of these values that a knight could achieve salvation only by 
abandoning knighthood for the monastic life, so it was thought. The papal 
proclamation of the Wars of the Crusades, however, not only made the 
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profession of arms respectable, but conferred on knighthood the status of an 
order comparable to the priesthood or the monastic life. Jean de Bueil, in his 
Le Jouvencel (c. 1481), asserted that the knight who fights for a good and 
just cause is as blessed in the sight of God as a monk who follows the 
contemplative life. The profession of arms now became a path to salvation 
sanctioned by the Church.100 The shared martial and religious experience of 
the First Crusade became a justification for subsequent crusades, and was 
readily adaptable to the martial ethos of the Germanic peoples. At the same 
time, because books of chivalry advanced other goals, such as the pursuit of 
honor, glory, and adventure, it became harder to recruit knights to participate 
in the wars against the Saracens when they could win honor, glory, and profit 
closer to home.101
One of the foremost advocates of Gregory VII’s holy war against infidels, 
heretics, and other enemies of the Church was St. Bernard, the founder and 
first abbot of the Cistercian monastery of Clairvaux. Although he agreed that 
clerics could not bear weapons, he made an exception for the military monastic 
order known as the Knights Templar. Bernard believed that monastic peace 
was purely ascetic and consisted of an inner peace that was obtained by 
withdrawing from the world and taking the vows of poverty and chastity. The 
secular clergy lived in and had a duty to promote peace in this world, although 
St. Bernard did not believe that the peace of the kingdom of Christ could ever 
be achieved in this life.102 St. Bernard was most insistent that Christian rulers 
were never to enter into alliance with Muslims until their political power and 
religion were first destroyed. He did not believe that non-Christians should be 
killed unless they molested Christians, but he added that where the two lived 
in close proximity, Muslims were likely to display aggression toward Christians. 
As for those who took up the crusader’s white cross, Bernard proclaimed that 
“the Christian glories in the death of the non-Christian, because Christ is 
glorified.”103
There were both clerics and laymen who questioned the papal policy of 
holy war. Whereas the proponents of the papalist position, that is, the assertion 
of the temporal as well as spiritual supremacy of the pope, taught that concordia, 
or peace in this world, came from God and flowed down through the spiritual 
hierarchy, Marsilius of Padua’s use of the term pax, or peace, in the title of his 
treatise, Defensor Pacis, meant “civil peace or tranquility,” and referred to a state 
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that functioned properly and smoothly; it had nothing to do with peace 
between states. Marsilius also makes an oblique reference to Italy, which had 
possessed unity when it was part of the Roman Empire, but now was disturbed 
by the Bishop of Rome, as Marsilius always calls the pope. Marsilius had been 
rector of the University of Paris, usually a bastion of theological orthodoxy, but 
after the papal condemnation of his Defensor Pacis in 1326, he was forced to 
flee and continued to be widely regarded as a heretic. Besides its attack on 
papal power and the mischief that it caused, the Defensor Pacis is noteworthy 
for its secular approach to the origins of the state and its sources of authority. 
Marsilius insists that the state is purely a product of human reason invented to 
wield coercive power to resolve conflicts, and its authority derived from the 
consent of the people. The state was not a moral entity dedicated to cultivating 
virtue; it was simply an instrument for dispensing justice by arbitrating 
disputes between individuals and groups. The ecclesiastical hierarchy had no 
business interfering in the government of the secular state because the people’s 
will is the supreme authority. The role of priests is simply to provide moral 
guidance; they do not possess coercive authority, which belongs exclusively to 
secular rulers. Marsilius carries this a step further and insists that in matters of 
church-state relations, the temporal ruler is supreme.104
Another critic of the exercise of temporal powers by the popes was the poet 
Dante, born a generation before Marsilius. Being an Italian and well steeped in 
classical literature, Dante was always an admirer of universal monarchy 
modeled on the Roman Empire. This form of government reflected the unity 
of God, and was conducive to peace and harmony; it found its best 
approximation in the Holy Roman Empire. The existence of two or more 
monarchs, who did not recognize one another’s authority would necessarily 
make the settlement of disputes very difficult, if not impossible. This universal 
monarch must be someone “who brings out the best of others” by his example 
rather than his words. This method of government would allow each citizen to 
seek his or her own best interests and would make governing by force 
unnecessary. The political society that Dante believed would result would 
display the virtues of peace, order, and justice. Its model in classical antiquity 
was St. Augustine’s earthly city rather than the heavenly city because Dante 
clearly preferred the dominant influence in the world to be the emperor rather 
than the pope. Dante had personal reasons for disliking papal power since 
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Pope Boniface VIII had meddled in the politics of Dante’s native city of 
Florence and caused Dante to be driven into exile.105
The papal policy of sending bellicose rulers and knights to fight the Saracens 
in the Levant may have brought a degree of peace to the Latin West. But once 
the popes got in the habit of thinking that these knights and crusaders were 
their vassi, and could be sent to make holy war against other Christians, whose 
orthodoxy was suspect, or believing that they could intervene in the politics of 
Italian towns or the affairs of the Holy Roman Emperor, they promoted new 
divisions within Christendom. This was especially true in their relations with 
the Byzantine emperors and the prelates of the Greek Orthodox Church, who 
did not accept the papal concept of holy war.
War and diplomacy in the Byzantine Empire
One of the objectives of the crusaders was to bring much-needed assistance to 
the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine, or Eastern Roman Empire, with its 
capital at Constantinople, did not possess a strong martial culture as did the 
Western Roman Empire and its medieval successors. The Eastern Father of the 
Church, St. Basil the Great, condemned warfare in the strongest of terms. 
While he admitted that a soldier must obey orders, St. Basil declared that 
anyone who slew another in battle must abstain from receiving communion 
for three years. To be a warrior did not confer status or earn glory as it did in 
the West. As the heir to a strong legal tradition, the Byzantine Empire continued 
to apply the Roman concept of just war to defend its territories or to reconquer 
lost lands. What particularly distinguished Byzantine rulers and generals from 
their Roman predecessors, however, was their consistent attempt to employ 
diplomacy to avoid war wherever possible, and to marshal legal arguments for 
declaring war when bloodshed could not be avoided. If war could be avoided, 
the Byzantine emperors were even prepared to pay tribute to their enemies. 
The practice of paying tribute money to their Persian, Arab, and tribal 
neighbors avoided some of the devastation of war. The Byzantines also sought 
to reduce conflict with tribal groups, such as the Serbs and Bulgars, by 
attempting to Christianize them. Their efforts to convert such ethnic groups 
were often successful, but this did not always put an end to hostilities. When 
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the Bulgars continued to be troublesome, Byzantine diplomats persuaded the 
Magyars to attack the Bulgars from the rear. The Frankish crusaders regarded 
these practices as mere cowardice.106
The Byzantine Empire claimed to be a continuation of the Roman Empire 
in the East, and its rulers called themselves “emperors of the Romans.” The 
Emperor Justinian, mindful of the unity that once existed throughout the 
whole empire, undertook to reconquer the most important of the lost western 
provinces by driving the Visigoths, Ostrogoths, and Vandals out of Spain, Italy, 
and North Africa. This proved to be a heavy drain on Byzantine resources. 
When the Muslim expansion of the eighth century deprived Byzantium of 
these territories together with the important resources of men and treasure in 
Anatolia, the Byzantine Empire was thereafter reduced to little more than one 
of a number of successor states of the former Roman Empire. This great loss 
was brought about not only by civil war and political instability; the enserfment 
of free peasants in Anatolia had undercut the economic prosperity and tax 
base of the Byzantine Empire, and this also contributed to military collapse. 
Unreliable mercenary soldiers had replaced native Anatolian soldiers in the 
Byzantine army. Moreover, the intolerance of the Byzantine Church led to 
persecution of Armenian, Egyptian, and Syrian Christians for their resistance 
to Greek Orthodox beliefs. It increased the hatred between Armenians and 
Greeks, and made dissident ethnic and religious groups willing to consider 
alliances with the Turkmens, who already served as mercenary troops within 
the empire. Both Christians and Jews who lived in the parts of the Byzantine 
Empire that were conquered by the Muslims were content to live under their 
conquerors because the Muslim discrimination against Jews and heterodox 
Christians was less onerous and the taxes were lighter than living under the 
Byzantines. Moreover, they were also exempted from military service. To the 
west, the Normans of Sicily and southern Italy also wished to acquire Byzantine 
territory and were better organized than the Turks. As Greek authority 
disintegrated in Anatolia, Turks, Persians, and Arabs migrated into the region, 
and Muslims were successful in converting most of the native population, who 
also became Turkified. Those Christians who held out against the process of 
Islamization were increasingly isolated from other Christians.107
In matters of secular government, Byzantium was one of the more peace-
loving states of the ancient and medieval worlds, but surrounded as they were 
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on all sides by hostile tribes and powers, the Byzantines had no illusions 
about the need to resort to war to achieve peace and promote stability. 
While Byzantium was frequently at war with its belligerent neighbors, the 
Byzantine emperors expressed a desire for peace for their subjects and insisted 
that they wished for peaceful relations with the Turks, Arabs, and other powers. 
At the same time, the emperors, as the successors of the ancient Greek and 
Roman states that had preceded Byzantium, did not let their enemies forget 
that they were not afraid of war, and were prepared to wage war. Such ideas 
reflected the Byzantine Christian heritage; they thought that wars were caused 
by the devil and were contrary to man’s peaceful nature. Consequently, the 
only just wars were defensive wars. By contrast, the Western European concept 
of just war also encompassed wars fought to avenge injustices. Some of the 
neighbors of Byzantium, such as the Arabs, Turks, and the crusaders, had a 
concept of holy war to defend and expand their religious societies. These 
holy wars were proclaimed by religious authorities such as the caliph of 
Baghdad and the pope of Rome; by contrast, the wars fought by Byzantium 
were declared by the emperor, a temporal ruler. Despite the danger presented 
by Islamic expansion and jihād, the Byzantine Christians never espoused 
the concept of holy war against the Saracens. The Byzantines had a secular 
concept of just war, and insisted that they fought only in self-defense, for 
recovery of territory forcefully and wrongfully taken, and because treaties had 
been broken by other powers. The object of their wars, so Anna Comnena, 
the daughter of the Emperor Alexius I, insisted in her Alexiad, was always 
the restoration of peace. This included the recovery of territory that had 
belonged to the Byzantine Empire in about 1100 CE; Anna did not contemplate 
the reconstitution of the Roman Empire as it had existed at its greatest extent. 
The moral foundation of Anna’s ideas about just war derived from her 
knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy, Roman jurisprudence, and the ideas of 
St. Augustine. In other words, she had a good understanding of the criteria for 
determining when war was justified in both the ancient and medieval worlds 
of thought.108
The Byzantines viewed the Turks as barbarians rather than as Muslim 
infidels. Warfare between the two was endemic, but the Byzantines, who knew 
their Muslim neighbors better than the Frankish crusaders or the popes, did 
not fear being overwhelmed by the Arabs and the Turks the way the Latin 
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Christians did. Except in times of crisis, the leaders of the caliphate and the 
Byzantine Empire did not try to forcibly convert one another’s subjects, and 
they were more tolerant than was the case in the Latin West. The Byzantines 
believed that God would ultimately allow them to triumph over their enemies, 
but understanding that their enemies surrounded them and had the advantages 
of geography, greater manpower and greater resources, they could never hope 
for more than to employ clever stratagems, catch their enemies off guard, and 
win small victories. They also had to learn to accept something less than the 
total and crushing victory that the traditional Roman martial ethos had once 
demanded in the days of the republic and early empire. They must sometimes 
be prepared to negotiate the terms of peace in order to end a war. Hence, the 
Byzantines came to value diplomatic skills as much as military expertise. 
Consequently, avoiding battle was frequently part of the Byzantine strategy. 
Constantly beset by enemies, the Byzantine emperors could lead their soldiers 
into war or speak the language of diplomacy. They knew how to employ the 
rhetoric of war, but adhered to the moral assumption that peace was always 
preferable. Anna Comnena thought that unnecessary bellicosity or provoking 
the enemy was quite simply a display of bad military leadership. War was 
regrettable, but it was also part of everyday life.109
When the Frankish crusaders arrived at the court of the Emperor Alexius I, 
Anna Comnena says that they did not need a pretext for engaging in duels 
or war. One of the Franks boasted to the emperor of how he used to go out 
and wait at a certain crossroads near his dwelling to which quarrelsome 
knights customarily resorted and anxiously awaited an antagonist with 
whom he might engage in single combat, but none ever showed up because of 
his reputation for bravery and skill at arms. The emperor thought it well to 
send this Frankish knight off to help recover the Holy Places as quickly as 
possible.110
Before the rise of Renaissance sovereign states, for as long as Latin Christians 
thought of themselves as belonging to a single Christian commonwealth, 
the practice of diplomacy hardly existed in the West, and was probably 
incomprehensible to the warrior mentality. Frankish knights lacked 
understanding and appreciation of the Byzantine practice of exchanging 
ambassadors with their enemies among the Turks and Arabs. This had long 
been a Byzantine practice, by which they gathered intelligence, exchanged 
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prisoners, and sometimes avoided war. To Latin crusaders, this furnished proof 
that the Byzantines were treacherous, duplicitous, and effeminate. They made 
unreliable allies, and these stereotypical views of the Byzantine rulers helped to 
justify the sacking and conquest of Constantinople and the establishment of 
the Latin Empire there. All of this poisoned relations between Latin and 
Orthodox Christians, and helped to perpetuate the schism between the two 
churches.111
As members of loosely organized military expeditions, the crusaders were 
volunteers who tended to be contentious, self-willed individuals who were not 
very amenable to military discipline. Those knights who participated in the 
Fourth Crusade (1202–4), which was preached by Pope Innocent III, had 
taken a pilgrim’s vow to make their way to Jerusalem to secure the Holy Places. 
They had a falling-out when the Venetians, on whom they were dependent for 
transport by sea, attempted to persuade them to attack the Dalmatian city of 
Zara—then in Hungarian hands—to satisfy their unpaid debts. A dissident 
minority of the crusaders felt bound to fight the Saracens rather than fellow 
Christians. Yet another crisis occurred when Alexios Angelos, the pretender to 
the Byzantine throne, sought to persuade them to descend on Constantinople 
and help him seize the throne and depose the usurping Alexios III, who had 
deposed and blinded the previous emperor, Isaac II. Again, the crusaders 
would be fighting fellow Christians, although some of the Latin prelates 
insisted that the current regime in Constantinople was schismatic and offensive 
to the papacy, and the installation of Alexios would reunite the Latin and 
Greek Orthodox Churches. This the crusaders found more persuasive. They 
helped Alexios Angelos depose Alexios III, and the former became Alexios IV, 
but when he was unable to pay the expenses of the crusaders, he himself was 
deposed and murdered. His successor, Alexios V, ordered the crusaders to 
depart and menaced them; so with the blessing of the Latin bishops, the 
crusaders attacked and looted Constantinople for five days. Then they crowned 
Baldwin, count of Flanders as the new Byzantine emperor, and installed a Latin 
Catholic as patriarch of Constantinople.112
That the efforts of the Frankish crusaders to recover the Holy Places and 
protect Eastern Christianity against the Saracens proved to be so very 
destructive should cause little surprise; political thought and practice in the 
Latin West remained primitive compared to that of the Byzantines, and the 
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crusader armies were ill disciplined. War was one of the main functions of the 
medieval state in the West, and images of kings who pursued peace are few in 
number in the medieval world. This is reflected in the martial ethos of those 
warriors who came to be known as knights. Miles, the medieval Latin term for 
knight, first appeared in about 970 in France to describe a mounted warrior of 
superior social status, and became widely used within the next sixty years to 
describe a coherent group associated with certain aristocratic families. The 
emergence of this knightly class also coincided with the decline of the 
Carolingian monarchy and the need to provide protection for the poor and 
the innocent. Because knights did not always live up to these ideals, many 
churchmen continued to distrust them until the papacy employed them in the 
crusades and made knighthood respectable.113 Combat offered the only way to 
test the mettle of a knight, and chivalric culture made no distinction between 
bellum, or public war, and duellum, or private combat. Besides spilling much 
blood, this constant effusion of chivalric belligerence could be sustained only 
by a tremendous expenditure of wealth and human energy. The Church had 
coopted the culture of chivalry and the concept of knighthood, and had sought 
to direct this bellicosity outward during the crusades, but the knightly class did 
not become less ferocious. This chivalric culture or warrior ethos was partly 
inherited from classical antiquity, but had been reinvigorated by the 
development of new cavalry tactics based on the introduction of the stirrup, 
which allowed the mounted warrior to wield his weapons more effectively 
from the saddle. Of course, not all knights took up the vocation of crusading 
in distant lands, and the concentration of martial energy in royal armies 
presented a strong temptation to use such forces against other Christian 
princes. As these medieval monarchies developed, the wars among the 
Christian kings of Europe became more extensive.114 Clearly, the themes of 
chivalric literature were not consistent with maintaining the Peace and Truce 
of God in the West. Such writings often placed considerable emphasis on the 
maintenance of honor or the need to go to the aid of vassi, lords, and allies in 
pursuit of feuds, or fighting for suzerains in the numerous wars between 
Christian kings. Thus, participation in crusades in the Holy Land would have 
to compete with these other activities, which in any case, were not consistent 
with maintaining the Peace and Truce of God in the West. This merely 
confirmed the belief that peace would never last very long in this world.115
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The Hundred Years War and papal diplomacy
The so-called Hundred Years War actually lasted 116 years and consisted of a 
series of wars. The cause of the conflict was that the kings of England had 
possessed lands in France ever since the Norman Conquest, and were, for that 
reason, technically vassi of the kings of France for those possessions. However, 
King Philip VI of France considered Edward III to be a disloyal vassus and 
attempted to confiscate the latter’s French possessions in 1337. Although this 
was a conflict between two sovereigns and should be considered an interstate 
war, it also contained elements of feudal and dynastic conflict and provoked 
violent popular protests.116
There were inherent contradictions in the nature of these late medieval 
monarchies of France and England. One of the main duties of the monarch 
was to preserve the king’s peace, and that helped to define both medieval 
kingship and the early modern state. A king’s subjects looked to him for peace 
and protection. Peace with political entities that were not part of the king’s 
realm could be established only by formal agreements between parties whose 
status, from a modern point of view, had yet to be established, just as the 
distinction between private combat and public war began to emerge slowly in 
the early modern period, and was accepted even more slowly by members of 
the aristocracy, who were more concerned with honor than legal distinctions. 
In the early modern period, as the sovereign state established itself more 
completely, the language and practice of diplomacy also developed slowly—
partly because the phenomenon was so new that statesmen lacked a vocabulary 
for foreign relations, international relations, and diplomatic practice. In the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the task of making peace between England 
and France was largely undertaken by the papacy, which could draw on the 
resources of clerical scholars who staffed the papal secretariat. During part of 
this time the popes were resident in Avignon—a period known as the Great 
Schism—and their influence was diminished. In the task of making peace 
between England and France, the popes failed, but their efforts are worth 
discussing.117
One of the problems that hindered negotiations for peace between England 
and France during the Hundred Years War was that England’s embryonic 
diplomatic service was more advanced than that of France. The English 
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recognized early on the need to maintain an archive of treaties and 
correspondence, and to have diplomats who were experienced and possessed 
a knowledge of canon and civil law. When envoys of Henry V of England 
entered into negotiations in 1418 with the French, they discovered that the 
latter were unfamiliar with the earlier Treaty of Brétigny of 1360 and possessed 
only a vague knowledge of the geography of their own country. Gradually, it 
came to be realized that, although diplomatic missions needed to be led by 
persons of high noble status, their staffs had to include clerks who had studied 
civil and canon law at a university. The French government was much slower 
to develop an archive with easily retrievable information at this time, and 
French diplomats had to rely on polemical tracts and propaganda for 
summaries of the king’s negotiating points. In any case, diplomacy during the 
late medieval period was viewed as a legitimate weapon of war; if conditions 
for concluding an alliance, a peace, or a truce were refused, this provided a 
legitimate reason for proceeding to a resumption of hostilities.118
Like the Romans, most of the French kings believed that rulers could not 
achieve peace if they did not make war. But, by the fifteenth century, many 
people in France thought otherwise. Bishop Jean Juvénal des Ursins, who was 
a pacifist, thought that the French people were quite tired of perpetual wars, 
and “would have accepted a Saracen as king if only he had given them peace.” 
Charles V, “the wise,” was at least one monarch who thought that the king of 
France should, with divine assistance, work for peace. The Jacquerie of 1358 
was essentially a protest against the exactions levied on the peasantry to pay 
for the war with the king of England. From their point of view, it was never 
very clear who the enemy was. The term might include the English, the 
mercenary soldiers employed by the king of France, or the French nobility, 
who engaged in feuds and private warfare among themselves. While the 
concept of peace was certainly admirable, among the problems encountered 
when agreeing to a peace was how to restrain unemployed soldiers. War often 
provided a cover for bands of criminals, who in peacetime, devoted themselves 
entirely to robbing and pillaging. Travel on the highways in France during the 
Hundred Years War could be more dangerous during the time of a truce than 
when war was actually being waged.119 Yet, there remained many reasons why 
peace between England and France was desirable. The Hundred Years War 
contributed to perpetuating the Great Schism between the Roman and the 
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Avignonese lines of popes. The peasant revolts in both England and France 
were popular reactions to devastation and high taxes brought on by war; the 
English Parliament wished to see the war ended; and Christendom was under 
siege by the Ottoman Turks. Many English subjects thought that their 
Plantagenet rulers were more interested in their French possessions and 
neglected their duties in their English kingdom, but the Plantagenets persisted 
in laying claim to their possessions in Gascony.120
The people of the medieval world often looked to the papacy to promote 
peace within Christendom. This was not easy during the Great Schism 
when there were two lines of popes, one living in Rome and the other 
living in Avignon, a papal enclave in the Rhone Valley. Although the papal 
enclave at Avignon was technically not part of the kingdom of France, the 
Avignonese popes were usually French born, and it was difficult for the 
rulers of England not to view them as puppets of the king of France. For 
that reason, the English usually looked on the Italian popes as the true 
successors of St. Peter. Nevertheless, Avignonese popes, such as Innocent VI 
and Clement VI, did actively promote peace between the kings of England and 
France during the Hundred Years War. Clement VI, when he tried to bring 
Edward III of England and Philip VI of France to agreement, was well 
informed concerning who the important decision-makers and advisers to the 
kings of England were among the members of the royal family, the royal 
council, the English nobility, and the Corporation of the City of London, and 
he bombarded them all with letters in an attempt to bring the war between the 
two kings to a final conclusion. It was not easy for late-medieval monarchs to 
accept papal arbitration because concepts of royal sovereignty were already 
well developed, and these kings did not want to be regarded as papal vassi. In 
1356, Hélie de Talleyrand, Cardinal of Périgord, dean of the College of 
Cardinals and diplomatic representative of Pope Innocent VI at Avignon, 
attempted to secure a truce between King John II of France and Edward, 
Prince of Wales, the “Black Prince.” The forces of both sides were drawn up for 
battle at Poitiers, and both were, at first, agreeable. The cardinal repeatedly 
crossed between the two battle lines trying to reach an agreement, but found 
the king of France unwilling to compromise unless the English surrendered 
without fighting and allowed the French to take as prisoners and hold for 
ransom four out of every five English knights—some 100 in all. The English 
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understandably refused, and the battle went forward. The English won, and 
King John II himself was taken prisoner.121
The former French crusader, Philippe de Mézière, who, after his return from 
the Holy Land, had entered the service of King Charles V of France, and 
subsequently, that of his heir, Charles VI, did much to promote crusading 
efforts and to send assistance to the Byzantines and the other Christians of the 
East. He remained convinced that the Hundred Years War between England 
and France must first be concluded in order to end the scandal of the Great 
Schism and restore unity to the Latin Church; only then could substantial 
Western military assistance be directed to the fight against the Turks. Only in 
the latter part of his life, after he had joined the religious order of the Celestines, 
when Mézière and his disciples acted as diplomatic intermediaries between 
Charles VI of France and Richard II of England, did his idealism find 
acceptance in both realms. One of his followers, Robert the Hermit, also a 
former crusader, was dispatched to Rome and Avignon in an attempt to 
persuade the two popes to resign and end the schism, and also to Richard II at 
Eltham Palace to plead for peace between England and France.122
The French ultimately prevailed in these conflicts, but the Hundred Years 
War left a legacy of hatred and bitterness between England and France. The 
various peace treaties of Brétigny (1360) and Troyes (1420) that punctuated 
the various phases of this long conflict settled very little and contributed to a 
resumption of the fighting. After 1453, when the king of England lost English 
Gascony, France increasingly became an absolute monarchy, while England 
traveled down the road to civil war. It was now very clear that the papacy’s 
influence in arbitrating peace had declined. Thereafter, the most fruitful ideas 
on how to achieve peace in this world tended to come from the lesser clergy or 
from laymen.
Emergence of a peace ethic
Late-medieval critics of the martial ethos pointed out the limitations of 
chivalric culture. Honoré Bonet condemned acts of individual bravado 
undertaken without the permission of the knight’s commander. He 
reprimanded those who acted out of anger, vainglory, and undue concern for 
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personal honor, and reminded knightly warriors that they were always to 
submit to the discipline of their commanders. As royal armies came into 
existence, the emphasis on discipline tended to run counter to the anarchic 
individualism of chivalric culture because such individuals did not usually 
think in terms of duty or the good of the commonwealth. Bonet particularly 
condemned looting and pillage, and reminded knights of their obligation not 
to prey on poor laborers, widows, and the poor, or to wantonly lay waste to 
dwellings and churches. Bonet recognized that the law of arms, although never 
codified like canon and civil law, did usually restrain how knightly warriors 
treated their enemies. But there were limitations on how far the law of arms 
applied to prisoners of war. Such courtesies applied only to knights and 
members of the nobility and not to members of the commonalty or non-
Christians, so members of the aristocratic warrior class were always careful 
never to surrender to those who were not bound by the same rules.123 Honoré 
Bonet insisted that there was no law that allowed Christian princes to make 
war on the Saracens because they were infidels, nor did scripture permit the 
use of force to convert nonbelievers or to take their possessions. But Bonet did 
maintain that the Holy Land had become the lawful possession of Christians 
because that was where the passion of Christ had occurred, and consequently, 
the Saracens had seized it wrongfully.124
The English poet and gentleman, John Gower, condemned the clergy in 
general and the popes in particular for stirring up wars. In his Vox clamantis, 
Gower accused the pope of disturbing Christian concord by siding with the 
French in the Hundred Years War. Many of the clergy not only fanned the 
flames of war, but also actually bore arms against other Christians instead of 
tending to the cure of souls. In his Confessio amantis, in which Gower poses a 
question about the morality of the crusades, the priestly confessor answers that 
it is permissible to preach the faith to non-Christians and to suffer martyrdom, 
but not to slay non-Christians in a holy war. That was not how the Apostles had 
spread the Christian faith.125 Gower was certainly no pacifist and believed in 
the concept of just war, but he also became a critic of decaying chivalric culture 
during the Hundred Years War because he thought knights were not adhering 
to their code to protect widows and orphans, to defend the Church, and fight 
for the common good. They were a violent and disputatious lot, and went to 
war out of pride or the pursuit of booty. Just as often, they failed to fight in wars 
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when duty compelled them to do so, stayed at home, and violated their 
oaths by oppressing the poor. As the Hundred Years War dragged on, Gower 
ceased to believe in the justness of Edward III’s claims in France, and he 
thought that many who participated in that conflict had dishonored the 
profession of arms.126
Disapproval of the way that wars were fought, and indeed, of the very 
concept of armed conflict, was not limited to the monastic clergy. For example, 
John Wyclif, a secular priest and theologian, quoted the words of Christ from 
the New Testament to show that differences should be settled by peaceful 
means and the exercise of patience. John Bromyard, a fourteenth-century 
Dominican friar, said that both Holy Scripture and history demonstrated that 
wise rulers who contemplated going to war, should fast, pray, and examine 
their consciences before deciding to unfurl their banners in declaration of war, 
and should always heed good counsel. Pacifist concepts were espoused mostly 
by individuals and a few religious communities. Such persons usually refused 
to be drawn into war even in defense of their possessions and property. One of 
the reasons that St. Francis of Assisi (1182–1226) insisted on complete poverty 
for his mendicant friars was that he viewed the possession of goods and 
treasure as a source of war and conflict among men. St. Francis longed for a 
restoration of the Golden Age, a concept derived from the Book of Genesis as 
well as pagan philosophers such as Hesiod, Ovid, and Lucretius. Declarations 
of pacifism by lay confraternities, such as the Penitents in Italian cities or the 
Beguines in Flanders, could not count on papal support. Pope Nicholas IV 
declared that they ought to be prepared to defend their own religious 
communities or the towns in which they dwelled. Although they were 
technically laymen, the members of these confraternities claimed clerical 
status in their refusal to bear arms, and they were offended by insensitivity to 
their principles on the part of ecclesiastical authorities. The civic authorities 
also treated them as laymen and showed little respect for their intransigence in 
the face of marauding armies or rioting townsmen. Moreover, these lay 
confraternities were often regarded as being tainted by heresy. The belief that 
an ideology of pacifism could change the world is a modern phenomenon, 
which was first enunciated by Erasmus and his circle of Christian humanists. 
Even then, their influence was quite limited. In the medieval and early modern 
periods, the expression of pacifist sentiments continued to be associated with 
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heresy. The medieval Church was more concerned with defining when war was 
justified or bestowing blessings on crusades and crusaders than with restraining 
warfare. The Church was more usually to be found in a militant posture than 
in a passive stance.127
Religious communities officially designated as heretical were often pacifist. 
In southern France, the Cathars, or Cathari, whose progenitors were thought 
to be disillusioned crusaders who had picked up their ideas from an obscure 
sect in Bulgaria on their return from the Holy Land, but probably had 
originated in Western Europe, rejected war except in self-defense. The 
Waldensians, who originated in thirteenth-century Burgundy and Piedmont, 
claimed exemption from military service. Like the Montanists, their second-
century predecessors of Asia Minor and North Africa, the Waldensians wished 
to withdraw from secular society, which they particularly associated with 
cities; they sought refuge in a rural hinterland in order to live a more simple 
life. In a number of ways, pacifistic movements such as Waldensianism, which 
had been founded by Peter Waldo, a wealthy merchant who had once lived in 
Lyons, paralleled monasticism; but whereas the monastic orders never posed a 
challenge to ecclesiastical authority and enjoyed the approbation of the 
Church, the Waldensians constituted a radical religious sect that challenged 
papal authority, or more specifically, what they called “Constantinianism,” the 
papal claim to wield the temporal sword and to employ force to correct errant 
temporal rulers, heretics and infidels. The Waldensians at first tried to remain 
within the church structure, but after their excommunication in 1184, they 
sought refuge in the Alpine valleys of Lombardy. The Hussites of Bohemia also 
had a pacifist wing led by Peter Chelciky, who argued that the pacifism of the 
early Christians had been repudiated after the Emperor Constantine promoted 
a union of the Roman state and the Christian Church. Chelciky thought that 
the state existed only to correct sinners, and that good Christians should hold 
neither military nor civil office. Eventually, the bellicose wing of the Hussites 
prevailed, and the Bohemian peasants made war against the Holy Roman 
Empire.128
In the latter part of the fourteenth century, the wars in France were going 
badly for the English, and this probably helped to stimulate a reevaluation of 
accepted attitudes toward war and peace. Preachers were quite sure that the 
cause of these misfortunes was an abundance of the sins of lechery and luxury 
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among the aristocracy. Thomas Walsingham, a monk at St. Albans Abbey, in his 
Chronicon Angliae, was especially critical of John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster 
and King Edward III in his declining days. The chroniclers and political 
commentators of this period always perceived a link between morals and 
political events, and their audience would have recognized the parallels with 
biblical passages. A prophecy, probably by John Erghome, asserted that the 
king’s association with his mistress, Alice Perrers, had effeminated him, and he 
had lost his zest for war.129
John Wyclif ’s efforts to build a “peace ethic” mark a distinct break with 
medieval clerical thinking about war and peace. He rejected much of the 
teaching of St. Augustine about the inevitability of war and sought inspiration 
in the early Christian teachings which predated the Emperor Constantine. 
Wyclif also refused to accept the concepts of just war and holy war as 
proclaimed by the papacy, and he accused the pope, at that time residing in 
Avignon, and the bishops of sowing discord and fomenting war among 
Christian princes in order to enhance papal power.130 That Wyclif stood outside 
the mainstream of medieval theological and political thought concerning the 
exercise of civil authority can be seen in his assertion that the origins of civil 
dominion were to be found in human sinfulness, and the very exercise of such 
authority unavoidably involved the bearer of the swords of justice and war in 
the commission of sin. Wars could be fought only for motives of Christian 
charity and not for temporal gain, although Wyclif does allow for the invasion 
of the lands of non-Christians in order to convert them to the true religion or 
to punish them for inflicting injuries on Christians. Wyclif does not accept the 
examples from the Old Testament of the Hebrews making war against other 
peoples by divine command because God no longer issued such commands, 
and Christians were instead to follow Christ’s example of humility and 
charity.131
John Gower also became disposed to a policy of peace because he had 
ceased to believe in the concept of just war when two Christian kings prolonged 
the war between England and France—the conflict that we know as the 
Hundred Years War. Gower, who had enjoyed the patronage of Richard II, was 
at first inclined to excuse the king’s misrule because of his youth and lack of 
experience, but when Richard continued to place his confidence in supporters 
who pursued their own selfish and destructive interests, Gower began to 
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despair in Richard’s will to accept reforms, and transferred his allegiance to 
Henry of Bolingbroke, earl of Derby, who succeeded as Henry IV in 1399.132 
Gower viewed Henry IV as a divinely ordained bringer of peace both at home 
and abroad. He wrote In Praise of Peace and other works to support Henry’s 
candidacy for the throne during the parliamentary proceedings that led to the 
bestowal of the crown on him. In his poetry, Gower told the new Lancastrian 
king that although monarchs had a legal and moral right to declare war as long 
as their objective was the ultimate restoration of peace, it was better to avoid 
war between Christian kingdoms in the first place because “peace is best, above 
all earthly things.”133 Ironically, one of the reasons why Richard II had been 
overthrown was because members of the aristocracy believed that he intended 
to conclude peace with the king of France. Aristocrats such as Thomas, Duke 
of Gloucester, led an anti-French and pro-war faction because his followers 
had profited from the war, and they believed that Richard did not project the 
image of a warrior-king and indulged himself only in pleasure.134 Gower 
continued to admire Henry IV, but the new king’s ability to maintain peace in 
his kingdom and lordships was weakened by his usurpation of the throne—
despite the support of most of his subjects. He faced rebellions and civil 
disturbances in England and Wales as well as conflicts with Scotland and 
France. Sixty years later, during the reign of Henry IV’s weak and inept 
grandson, Henry VI, Richard, Duke of York, attempted to advance his claim to 
the throne before Parliament by reminding his audience that the Lancastrians 
were a usurping dynasty. A few months later, York was killed at the Battle of 
Wakefield, which was part of the first of the three conflicts that made up the 
Wars of the Roses.135
Despite the official propaganda about the blessings of Tudor rule and the 
fictions introduced by Shakespeare in his cycle of history plays, which depicted 
the Wars of the Roses as one continuous war instead of three separate and 
somewhat shorter conflicts, the baronial and dynastic wars of the late fifteenth 
century were not nearly as bloody as is generally supposed. The French 
historian Philippe de Commynes thought that English commanders and 
soldiers showed more restraint than was the case in mainland European wars, 
and avoided killing prisoners or plundering the countryside because they cared 
about public opinion. Despite the dynastic conflicts of the fifteenth century, it 
was probably a more peaceful time in which to live than the sixteenth century 
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with its religious conflicts and persecutions and economic upheavals. Indeed, 
John Gillingham believes that “England in the fifteenth century was the most 
peaceful country in Europe.” It was not heavily taxed, and unlike many states of 
mainland Europe, it was not burdened with a standing army and did not need 
to spend the huge sums expended elsewhere on municipal fortifications. Also, 
England was not as militarized as comparable states, and it was backward in 
military technology, and remained so until the sixteenth century.136
Among early Christians, a full acceptance of the peace ethic seems to have 
been limited to groups whose orthodoxy was open to question. Within the 
Roman world of late antiquity, pacifism was more widespread among Greek-
speaking Christians than in the Latin West, and hardly existed at all in the 
outposts of empire. As long as Christians pursued proselytizing activities, 
debated abstruse theological doctrines or enthusiastically sought martyrdom, 
there always existed the possibility of conflict. Christian theology bred dissent 
and heresy from the beginning, and ecclesiastical politics has never been a 
game for the faint of heart. Paganism disappeared slowly, and while many 
pagans were tolerant of other beliefs, Christians grew increasingly intolerant 
of the old beliefs. Once Christianity became the official religion of the Roman 
Empire, Christians were obliged to take up the duties of citizenship which 
could include military service.
There was more than one theological school of thought in the early Christian 
Church, but it was the Augustinian tradition that remained dominant through 
much of the medieval period. St. Augustine of Hippo associated pacifism with 
the heretical sect that he had broken with when he converted, and he never did 
succeed in reconciling pacifistic inclinations with his belief that God used war 
to punish man’s sins. Moreover, as a practical matter, he could see no other way 
of suppressing heretical groups and repulsing barbarian incursions, which 
raised the possibility of war among Christians as well as between Christians 
and non-Christians. A just war was to be preferred to an unjust peace. As the 
boundaries of empire retreated in late antiquity, the problem of defending 
Christendom fell into the laps of the ecclesiastical authorities, and in the 
absence of city-states and emperors in the former Roman Empire in the West, 
the clergy had to provide a lead in fending off the enemies of the Church, 
maintaining a degree of stability and furnishing an example of constancy.
War and Peace in the Western Political Imagination104
Insofar as a peace ethic survived in late antiquity and the early Middle Ages, 
it was to be found in monasticism. But monasticism was a severely ascetic 
movement that sought refuge in that inner peace that was consequent on 
withdrawal from the world. However, the monastic movement took a different 
direction when the Papacy called on a group of Benedictine monks to undertake 
the conversion, or reconversion, of Britain and northern Europe. This effort did 
ultimately bring a degree of peace to Western Europe by incorporating those 
Germanic kingdoms and tribes into the larger entity of Christendom. The 
acceptance of Christianity was perhaps less than complete because the warrior 
culture of the Germanic peoples could only be contained and not eliminated. 
Rather, their bellicosity was directed outward against heathens, heretics, and 
infidels. This led to the papal proclamation of the Wars of the Crusades, which 
sought to recover the Holy Land and drive the Moors out of the Iberian 
Peninsula. A by-product of the effort to tame the martial tendencies of the 
warrior class was the emergence of a chivalric culture, which imposed some 
constraints on how wars were fought and how prisoners and noncombatants 
were treated, but which at the same time, perpetuated a martial ethos.
The Augustinian view that war was intended as a divine punishment for 
man’s sins was challenged by St. Thomas Aquinas, who believed that peace was 
the natural condition of mankind—including both Christians and non-
Christians alike. There also occurred a revival of interest in Vegetius’s De re 
militarii, which held that war, quickly and efficiently executed, could secure 
peace. This required a clear focus on military and political objectives, and 
undermined the view that wars provided the opportunity to validate honor 
and win glory for aristocratic warriors. This perhaps contributed little toward 
the establishment of a peace ethic, but it did reinforce the idea that wars needed 
a moral and legal justification that should be based on natural law. This 
approach to the concept of just war necessitated the study of both Roman and 
canon law in order to maintain constraints on how wars were fought. However, 
princes seldom failed to present compelling arguments for the justness of the 
many wars that they fought. Despite the many writers who sought to establish 
a peace ethic, at the end of the Middle Ages, there still remained a strong 
aversion to prolonged periods of peace, and the prejudice persisted that peace 
bred effeminacy and made it more difficult to find valiant soldiers.
Then standing inside the gate of the camp, he said: If any man be on the 
Lord’s side let him join with me. And all the sons of Levi gathered themselves 
together unto him.
 And he said to them: Thus saith the Lord God of Israel: Put every man his 
sword upon his thigh: go, and return from gate to gate through the midst of 
the camp, and let every man kill his brother, friend and neighbour.
And the sons of Levi did according to the words of Moses, and there were 
slain that day about three and twenty thousand men.
Exodus 32:26–8
And the Lord said to the servant: Go out into the highways and hedges, and 
compel them to come in, that my house may be filled.
Gospel of St. Luke, 14:23
When the sacred months are passed, kill the idolaters wherever you find 
them, and lie in wait for them in every place of ambush; but if they repent, 
pray regularly, and give the alms tax, then let them go their way, for God is 
forgiving, merciful.
Koran, sura, [chap.] 9:5
Scriptural religions, in varying degrees, are necessarily dogmatic. Believers are 
bound to accept certain beliefs. The Israelites were told by Moses that they 
were not to tolerate idolatry; those who sinned against this commandment 
were to be slain—even if the offender was one’s own brother or friend. The 
verse from St. Luke in the New Testament was sometimes used from the time 
of St. Augustine of Hippo to justify coercion—even holy war—against 
heterodoxy, which led to wars against infidels or other Christians.1 The 
3
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quotation from the Koran, from one of the “sword verses,” places an obligation 
on the true believer to wage jihād, or holy war, against idolaters and nonbelievers, 
but urges mercy and restraint toward those who convert and toleration for 
Jews, Christians, and those “people of the book” who humbly submit themselves 
to Islamic authority and pay tribute.2 However, scriptural justifications and 
the injunctions of religious leaders alone are not sufficient to explain the many 
holy wars and religious conflicts that have occurred in the past; traditions of 
tribal warfare, ethnic rivalries, the pursuit of honor and glory, dynastic 
ambition, greed, and expansionism must also be taken into account. In 
addition, Christian and Muslim religious leaders of holy wars simply could not 
imagine a concept of peace extending beyond a temporary truce.
Holy war in the Bible
All of the empires, kingdoms, and states of the Mediterranean world and the 
ancient Near East possessed gods of war, which rulers always invoked before 
going into battle. It was believed that these gods and goddesses would intervene 
in battle, favoring those deemed worthy and striking down those deemed 
unworthy. Homer’s Iliad (iv. 128) states that Athena deflected an arrow aimed 
at King Menelaus during a battle. Although religion was always a part of war in 
the ancient world, such wars were fought for what we would call political 
reasons, but religious ideas contributed much to official propaganda. These 
wars may be regarded as holy wars because their rulers had special access to 
the gods of war, which lesser folk lacked, and they justified these wars on the 
basis of divine commands. Holy wars were characteristic of scriptural religions, 
and the concept obliged believers to fight.3
The Old Testament or Hebrew Bible is filled with hundreds of stories of 
unspeakable violence. However, it must be said many of these stories cannot be 
verified by archaeological research or the historical records of contemporaneous 
civilizations. These tales are drawn from the literature of pastoral societies, and 
are allegorical and filled with ambiguities and hyperbole. Insofar as a message 
can be deciphered from the biblical text, it is that God was displeased with his 
chosen people—not for particular transgressions, but because of their general 
infidelity. The main message seems to be that murder and violence are the 
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greatest and most widespread of human sins. Because of the original sin of 
disobedience of Adam and Eve, God hid his face from their descendants, and 
they became subject to death by violence. War and violence are therefore the 
consequence of sin. This is the explanation that many theologians and biblical 
scholars have given us, although it offers small comfort to the devout. While 
much of the Old Testament is poetic myth and is hardly an accurate 
representation of the history of the Israelites and their antecedents, we must 
remember that these myths did much to shape the religious and national 
identity of the Jewish people.4 Also, more literal readings of these biblical tales 
provided justification for the prophet Muhammad and Christian leaders, such 
as the popes and the Protestant reformers, to proclaim their crusades or holy 
wars and wars of religion.
In the Jewish Bible, holy war involved a struggle between the believers and 
the nonbelievers in which the faithful triumphed through divine intervention 
and assistance. The glory gained thereby belonged to God. This distinguished 
the war- making of the Israelites from the wars of other Near-Eastern rulers 
who used religious propaganda, but claimed the glory for themselves. In 
nomadic societies, all able- bodied men were warriors and were expected to 
fight under the leadership of their tribal leaders, as was the case with the 
Israelites before they came into the Promised Land. During the time that they 
wandered in the desert, the whole of the Israelites constituted a military 
expedition and camp. They were summoned to war by the blast of the trumpet, 
and intimidation was sometimes used to compel attendance. The weapons 
they bore usually included no more than a sword and a sling. Lances and 
shields were carried only by their leaders, and they went into battle without 
helmets or armor. Their tactics included raids and ambushes; because they had 
no staying power, they avoided pitched battles and sieges. Armored chariots 
filled them with terror. Considering the risks of fighting with such an 
undisciplined and poorly trained force, their leaders preferred smaller groups 
and sent home those who were apprehensive or faint of heart. Small forces and 
surprise, combined with stratagems such as making a great deal of noise, often 
worked against their enemies. Some battles were settled by single combat 
between two champions.5
War was a common occurrence among the early Israelites, but not all the 
wars mentioned in the Jewish Bible were holy wars fought against idolaters. 
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Some were wars of territorial conquest, and some were wars of defense. The 
war narratives of the Old Testament tend to be stylized, and the ancient 
Hebrews were confident that Yahweh aided them in battle. The wars by which 
the Israelites took possession of the Promised Land were wars of conquest. The 
Israelites were convinced that they were participating in a divine activity under 
the leadership of Yahweh. Thus, Yahweh’s armies consisted of both earthly and 
heavenly hosts. The holy war took on a sacral quality and necessarily involved 
the ministrations of priests in purifying the camp and the warriors, and also 
undertaking preparations for carrying the Ark of the Covenant before the 
people into battle. The details concerning the deployment of the astral armies 
tend to be vague, but a great psychological advantage was gained over the 
enemy when they discovered that there were visitations of plague and 
pestilence in their camp, while the camp of the Israelites was spared. As long 
as the Israelites trusted in Yahweh, victory was assured, but that did not mean 
that the Hebrew warriors were spared heavy fighting. The action of battle was 
chaotic, but the Israelites knew that they fought to preserve order. When 
victory was achieved, the Israelites were reminded that the spoils of war, both 
prisoners and booty, were reserved for Yahweh.6
In the early parts of the Jewish Bible, those who worshiped idols or were 
rebellious were punished by God directly by famine, plague, serpents, earthquake, 
and fire (Numbers 11:1, 11:4–34, 16:5–6). But in Exodus 32:26–28, God ordered 
the sons of Levi to take their swords and go throughout the camp and slay those 
who practiced idolatry. On this occasion, God used human agency to punish the 
wicked, and this is taken to be an example of divinely sanctioned holy war. In the 
Book of the Prophecy of Ezechiel, Yahweh is imagined as a warrior marching 
across the land to seek vengeance against nonbelievers who had invaded the 
territories where the Israelites had lived in peace. In this terrible struggle, Yahweh 
vanquished Prince Gog of the land of Magog and all the forces of evil so that all 
would acknowledge His power and glory.7
The evidence concerning when the Israelites conquered the Promised Land 
presents problems. There is an alternative explanation to the Book of Exodus 
and its narration of the Hebrew people under Moses returning from Egypt to 
the Promised Land and effecting a divinely sanctioned conquest. According to 
this hypothesis, the chosen people never were in Egypt, but were a rural 
population of pastoralists who lived at a higher elevation than the cities where 
Holy Wars, Crusades, and Religious Wars 109
the Amalkalites and Canaanites lived. They had recently converted to Yahwism 
and rebelled against the local city- states subject to the hegemony of the 
Pharoahs, whose governance they found unbearable. Although the various 
biblical narratives agree that the people of Israel came from somewhere else 
and possessed the Land of the Canaanites by conquest, a small number of 
biblical scholars assert that the Israelites had always lived in the land that came 
to be known as Israel, and they see the conquest of Canaan as a peaceful 
penetration of a thinly populated land. Thus, they deny that the ancient 
Hebrews ever practiced holy war.8
The early Hebrew laws of war are set out in the Book of Deuteronomy: 
When the Hebrews approached an enemy camp, they were to offer them peace. 
If the enemy accepted the offer of peace, all of them were to be enslaved and 
forced to labor. If the offer of peace was rejected, then war was to be waged. If 
Yahweh bestowed victory, then all males were to be put to the sword, but the 
women, small children and cattle were to be spared and appropriated. The 
warriors who willingly surrendered were to be allowed to live, but as slaves. 
The purpose was to utterly destroy the enemy host and community, but 
interestingly, fruit trees that still bore fruit were to be spared. The object of 
destroying the warriors and community of the people of Canaan was to 
prevent them from contaminating the Israelites with their idolatry.9
According to the Hebrew Bible, the Israelites undertook holy war by God’s 
commandment; they were associated with God in the struggle, and fought 
alongside the hosts of warrior angels in a cosmic battle. They were to destroy 
the persons and property of the enemy. But such tactics were to be limited by 
a sense of proportion. Even in divinely sanctioned holy wars, as described in 
Joshua 11 and Deuteronomy 20:19–20, there were limits placed on the 
destructiveness of warfare, and the holy warriors needed to carefully distinguish 
between those among the enemy who had actually taken up arms and those 
who were noncombatants.10
The concepts of holy war
Many—probably most—present- day Jews do not believe that holy war 
was practiced by the ancient Israelites, and we do have to admit that in 
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most accounts of the wars fought by the Israelites, the nature of that 
warfare was largely defensive. However, these Old Testament biblical passages 
were certainly among the sources that later proponents of holy war such as 
St. Augustine of Hippo and Muhammad drew on. The early Christians, 
although they knew what profane war was, would have failed to recognize 
the concept of holy war as it emerged during the medieval period among 
Christian crusaders and Muslim jihadists. Perhaps the earliest Christian 
understanding of holy war was that described in the Book of Revelation 
(otherwise known as the Apocalypse of St. John the Evangelist). The end of 
time would be characterized by a holy war in which supernatural agents rather 
than mortal men would wield the sword and bring plague, fire, and brimstone 
to punish the wicked. There would be an internecine war in which fiends and 
beasts would slay a large part of humankind. The prophecies contained in the 
Book of Revelation predicted the overthrow of pagan Rome, but Christians 
were to take no part in this strife. The proper role of believers was to offer no 
resistance.11
The early Christians did not believe that they could serve as soldiers. The 
Christian clergy abhorred all bloodshed as sinful; and later, after Christians 
actually began serving in the armies of Rome, they believed that soldiers, even 
fighting in a just war and obeying legitimate commands and having killed 
infidels in battle, still needed to perform penance. The Christian clergy in both 
the Latin West and the Greek East continued to adhere to this early pacifist 
tradition for nearly a millennium. Yet, Christianity was ambivalent about war 
in the early centuries. While Tertullian represented a completely pacifist 
position, it must be remembered that Christianity spread during the expansion 
of a militarist empire, and could hardly remain uninfluenced by the Roman 
world. Gradually, Christian thinkers after the time of the Emperor Constantine 
became aware of the holy war tradition as recorded in the Book of Joshua. 
St. Ambrose, a former Roman official, accepted the Roman arguments for 
fighting defensive wars, and St. Augustine drew on Stoic philosophy and 
Roman law as well as the Old Testament tradition of holy war. Although St. 
Augustine was not an advocate of the concept of holy war, it has to be said that 
later writers could find an abundance of ideas in his writings, which taken out 
of context, could justify the crusades, or also assert that war and conflict were 
characteristic of human society. St. Augustine’s views on just war were 
Holy Wars, Crusades, and Religious Wars 111
particularly influential in shaping medieval attitudes toward war. Such ideas 
were also acceptable to the Germanic warrior elites who saw warfare as their 
raison d’être, while the Byzantine East viewed war as a social duty.12
Christians served in the Roman army from the fourth century onward, but 
the leaders of the Church did not consider waging war in the name of 
Christianity before the ninth century. St. Augustine and Pope Gregory I 
(p.  590–604) could envision two kinds of holy war: an internal war fought 
against heretics to preserve the pure beliefs of the Christian Church, and an 
external war to spread Christianity by force. However, heresy was not a serious 
problem in late antiquity and the early Middle Ages, and the Church was 
usually able to Christianize the Germanic tribes by peaceful missionary 
activities alone. There were, of course, pagan peoples further to the east who 
might have offered the opportunity for a war of forced conversion, but as Carl 
Erdmann points out, the warrior had first to be persuaded that the main motive 
for fighting such wars was to convert heathens and infidels. The Germanic 
kingdoms of this period were not yet prepared to accept such an ideology, and 
most of the clergy were unwilling to condone such violence toward even pagan 
infidels except in self- defense. The ideal milites Christi, or soldiers of Christ, 
were still understood to be those who fought spiritual battles in monasteries. 
The weapons of profane war were forbidden to them.13
The Christian concept of holy war emerged in the ninth century, when all of 
Europe was beset by invaders and immersed in war. The British Isles, northern 
France and Moorish Spain were subjected to continuing raids by Norsemen, 
who established a permanent settlement in Normandy in 911. Arabs from 
North Africa raided the Italian peninsula and southern France, and established 
colonies in Sicily and Provence. The Magyars—sometimes mistaken for 
Turks—also raided as far west as France, but mostly troubled the Danube 
Basin and the Adriatic. It was the Muslim Arabs—the Saracens—whom the 
clerical and monastic chroniclers regarded as especially cruel and devastating. 
The popes could not forget that the Arabs had attacked Rome in 846 and 875, 
and had dared to enter, loot, and deface St. Peter’s Basilica itself. The papal 
proclamation of holy war against the Saracens grew out of a genuine threat to 
Rome, the Italian peninsula, and the islands. This proclamation of holy war 
broke with a centuries- old policy of avoiding bloodshed in Christ’s name. 
Although Charlemagne sent into Spain an expedition that skirmished with the 
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Moors, his concept of holy war was limited to fighting the Saxons, which nicely 
coincided with his dynastic ambitions.14
In the medieval world, war was viewed as an instrument of Divine 
Providence and a manifestation of God’s justice. But some conflicts were 
thought to be more closely aligned with divine purpose, and were specifically 
designated by religious authorities as holy wars; they were directed against 
enemies who were thought to be in league with the devil. Those who volunteered 
for these sanctified wars were called crusaders, and were granted special 
benefits such as indulgences or privileged entry into Paradise. Among 
historians of Europe, the crusades and the Wars of Religion of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries are the leading examples of holy wars, but the 
concept had been employed among the ancient Israelites and continued to be 
used in the Islamic world.15
The Byzantine acceptance of the concept of holy war was slow and reluctant 
because the Orthodox Church had taught that killing for religious beliefs was 
a sinful act. But, from the time of the first contact with Islam, those who 
defended the imperial frontiers against the Muslims believed that their struggle 
represented the defense of Christendom. The Byzantine army considered the 
Muslims to be blasphemers against Christ, and they believed that the Blessed 
Virgin guided them in battle. The Byzantines were also aware of the precedents 
of holy war in the Old Testament. After the Persians captured Jerusalem in 614, 
it was difficult for the Byzantine soldiers not to view the recovery of Jerusalem 
and its relics, such as the Holy Cross, as a struggle that was divinely blessed. 
Beginning in the tenth century, the Byzantine rulers attempted to persuade the 
Orthodox clergy to accept the doctrine of holy war and to recognize that 
killing the infidel was not sinful. Generally speaking, the religious leaders and 
crusaders of the Latin West were disappointed in the response of the Greek 
Orthodox Church in failing to view the fight against Islamic expansion as a 
holy war. The Byzantine resistance to Muslim conquests, however, was not 
totally devoid of religious sanction. The Greek Church did view the military 
victories of the Byzantine emperors against barbarian peoples as a gift of God 
because of the justness of the Byzantine cause in the eyes of God.16
The Muslim tradition of holy war was not very different from that of the 
Jewish Bible or the religious motivations of the medieval Christian crusaders 
and the teachings of many of the Protestant and Catholic divines and soldiers 
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during the Wars of Religion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
Muhammad commanded that holy war was to be waged against nonbelievers: 
“When you meet the unbelievers, smite their necks, then when you have made 
wide slaughter among them, tie fast their bonds; then set them free, either by 
grace or ransom, till the war lays down its loads.” Mercy could be shown after 
complete victory over unbelievers, and the people of the book had submitted 
themselves to Islamic authority.17 This element of triumphalism bears 
comparison to Roman rituals associated with celebration of military victories.
Islamic holy war
The first Muslims were Arabs who lived in a political void where there was no 
authority to restrain conflict except that of the tribe. Consequently, various 
levels of violence were pervasive. This violence mostly took the form of raiding 
the herds of other tribes and securing possession of wells and grazing grounds. 
The only restraint on this conflict over very limited resources was the lex 
talionis, the threat of retaliation in kind. As revealed in contemporaneous Arab 
poetry, this tribal society was pervaded by a warrior ethos emphasizing revenge 
and honor that was not very different from that found in the classical 
civilizations of Greece and Rome, and the feudal society of medieval Europe. 
The virtues that were most admired were loyalty, generosity (which extended 
only as far as the enhancement of reputation), and martial prowess. This pre-
Islamic martial ethos continued after the time of the Prophet, although it was 
combined with Islamic piety. Islamic religious culture was quite open to pre-
Islamic and non-Islamic influences, such as those of ancient Persia and India 
in matters of weapons, strategy, tactics, and more generally, how to conduct 
warfare. The Koran states that “men are the enemies of each other.” Because of 
these warlike propensities, Ibn Khaldun, the fourteenth- century philosopher 
and historian, thought that men needed to be restrained by some force that 
would keep them from attacking one another. He also thought that secular war 
was evil, and good Muslims should undertake war only for religious purposes. 
Among other foreign influences on Islamic thought about war and violence 
was the apocalyptic literature of Jewish and Christian scriptures from whence 
the Prophet derived the notion of Jihād or holy war.18
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Muslims were empire builders from the time that Muhammad began to 
preach that he was the messenger of God sent into the world to convert all 
humanity. Islam spread rapidly because it filled a void on the Arabian Peninsula 
beyond the reach of rulers and states, and Mecca and Medina sat astride trade 
routes leading to more established political societies in the Byzantine and 
Persian empires as well as in India and Southeast Asia. Christianity had grown 
slowly in the already well established political society of Rome. Moreover, 
Christians had always recognized the political obligations that they owed Caesar. 
Islamic society, however, combined religious and political functions in one 
entity, and developed pronounced expansionist tendencies from the beginning. 
Muslims were not as driven by a desire to convert others as were Christians, but 
they did mean to require everyone to submit to Islamic authority. They aspired 
to universal peace within the dar el- islam or “Islamic world,” but beyond this was 
the dar al- harb, the “world of war” where strife always prevailed. With those who 
refused to accept Islamic authority, there could never be peace, and the Islamic 
empire expanded more rapidly than had the Roman Empire.19 Islamic legal 
theory, however, was more insistent about total conquest. It maintained that war 
had always existed and would always continue between Islam and non-Islamic 
societies until the Islamic world had conquered the non-Islamic world and all 
non-Muslims had converted or submitted. Meanwhile, until this permanent 
state of peace was achieved, Muslim rulers were not allowed to make peace 
treaties that would exceed ten years. The Islamic law of peace was never regarded 
as anything but a temporary measure to be employed when holy war between 
the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds was temporarily in abeyance. However, in 
later periods Islamic societies sometimes found more permanent peaceful 
relations were desirable.20
The long conflict between Islam and Christendom had its origins in the 
rivalry between Byzantium and Persia, both of which sought to expand their 
influence in the Near East—especially in Arabia. The Byzantines and the 
Persians had each hoped to gain control of Mecca and other commercial 
centers near the Red Sea coast of Arabia leading to the Mediterranean. 
Following the decline of Persian power in the seventh century, some of the 
Arab supporters of Persian influence turned to Muhammad and became 
Muslims. His influence was originally exerted among the merchants of Mecca, 
but later spread to the desert tribes from whom the merchants had sprung in 
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earlier generations. These bedouins, who were divided into tribes, had been in 
the habit of raiding one another’s encampments because they never produced 
enough food to feed themselves. Muhammad’s message was at first met with 
resistance and accompanied by strife among the tribes of the Medina oases. In 
conflicts with members of his own tribe, who refused to accept his religious 
message, Muhammad and his followers became convinced that God and his 
angels, dressed in white turbans, fought on their side. Muhammad insisted that 
all Muslims regard one another as brothers, but they were to fight all others 
until they acknowledge that “there is no god but Allah.”21
Once one had uttered these words, he immediately became a Muslim and 
was admitted to the umma, the indissoluble and universal Muslim community. 
To this brotherhood he owed loyalty and he could not leave it without 
committing the capital offense of apostasy, and as the Prophet himself insisted, 
he also became obliged to pay the zakāt, or religious tax, to this community. 
Following the death of Muhammad in 632 CE, some of the more outlying 
Arab tribes believed that his demise ended the treaties that obliged them to 
pay the zakāt, but Abu Bakr, Muhammad’s father- in-law and the first caliph, 
undertook the War of Apostasy against them to compel the payment of those 
taxes. Although the indissoluble character of the umma was viewed as a means 
of creating peace within the Muslim community, its focus was on Arab loyalty. 
It was this concept that brought the Islamic community into seemingly endless 
conflict with Christianity. Christians and Jews living within the Muslim world 
were always obliged to submit to Islamic authority. While recognized as people 
of the Book, they were compelled to pay the jizza, the poll tax or tribute 
imposed on them, as a sign of their humiliation and submission. These taxes 
were levied by command of the Prophet himself, and as the messenger of God, 
his commands were absolute and not to be disputed. In the time of Muhammad, 
the Prophet was the leader of an integrated religious and political society, and 
subsequently, the caliphs also exercised this authority. Although the Byzantine 
emperors and the medieval papacy had aspired to such authority, the world 
that followed the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West came to be 
characterized by a distinction between temporal and ecclesiastical authority 
that worked against the emergence of theocracies.22
Muhammad waged war against the polytheistic nonbelievers of Mecca, but 
he sometimes also made war against Jews and Christians even though he 
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acknowledged that they were “people of the Book”; in Byzantine Syria, war was 
waged against Christians and Jews “until they paid tribute or utterly submitted.” 
(This was done with the nice distinction that it was “mere war” and not holy 
war that was being visited on these Byzantine communities.) Mostly, however, 
the Islamic community of the Arabian Peninsula made holy war on neighboring 
states to impose Islamic authority. It was not originally the intention to compel 
conversion, but rather to persuade Jews, Christians, and pagans to accept 
Muslim teachings of their own free will. Indeed, in the early years of Muslim 
expansion, the costs of military conquest were paid by the taxes on non-
Muslims, so it was not fiscally desirable to convert the whole non-Muslim 
population unless they could assist as soldiers or serve in some other useful 
capacity. During the first two centuries of Muslim expansion, nonbelievers 
remained a majority of the population. Moreover, the first converts to Islam 
were regarded as inferior in status to Arabs and could retain title to their 
property only if confirmed by treaty.23
Muslim holy war began in the last days of the Prophet Muhammad, when 
he called on the major rulers of the time to acknowledge his message; he then 
dispatched military expeditions to the frontiers of the Byzantine Empire. 
Muhammad’s successor Abu Bakr, the first caliph or leader of the political- 
religious community of Islam, continued this military pressure on the 
Byzantine Empire. Before the second caliph ‘Umar ibn Abd al-Khatteb died in 
644, all of Arabia had been conquered as well as Egypt and Persia. The reasons 
why such large conquests were made so quickly were much the same as 
historians have used to explain the decline of earlier great empires such as 
those of Rome and Persia—barbarian incursions, incessant wars, plague, 
agricultural decline, diminished population and resources, and shrinking 
urban settlements. The people who lived in these newly conquered areas 
sometimes found the caliph’s regime easier to accept because the tax burden, 
although discriminatory, was usually lighter than under Byzantine rule, and 
Christian heterodox minorities were not persecuted as much as they had been 
under the Greek Orthodox Church.24
The original meaning of jihād, as pronounced by the prophet Muhammad, 
was a personal moral endeavor to carry out the will of God and a struggle 
against nonbelievers who interfered with the dissemination of the Prophet’s 
message or persecuted his followers. The secondary meaning of jihād, or “the 
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greater holy war,” consisted of the internal struggle to purge one’s soul of 
impurities. Some jurists thought that this “greater” expression of jihād was the 
true path to martyrdom, but most Islamic scholars argued that internal and 
external jihād were inseparable. From the time of the battle for the wells at 
Badr, near Medina, Muslims came to believe that when they fought holy war 
against infidels, they were the winners whether they actually achieved victory 
over the enemy or died in battle. In the latter instance, they became martyrs 
and entered Paradise. Muhammad’s preaching aroused a great deal of turmoil 
in Mecca, and after he had fled that city to seek safety with his kinsmen in 
Medina, the concept of jihād took on a more emphatically military meaning. 
While Muhammad thought that killing was a terrible thing, he believed that 
persecution of believers was worse, and therefore, a war against nonbelievers 
and persecutors became a sacred duty for his followers. Jihād was considered 
to be a just war, carrying with it the sanction of Allah and requiring a formal 
declaration of war. It was also considered to be a permanently declared war. 
Indeed, following the example of the prophets of the Hebrew Bible, Muhammad 
insisted that God sometimes sent heavenly hosts dressed in white turbans to 
assist his followers in the holy war against nonbelievers. When the aggressors 
and nonbelievers had submitted and accepted God, then mercy could be 
shown. The survival of the Islamic community in the early days depended on 
the ability of Muslims to remain in a military posture, and those who were 
unwilling to fight were assigned an inferior status.25
It was the opinion of jurists that the principal collective obligation of the 
umma, or Islamic community, was to exalt the word of God as laid down by 
the Prophet, and to preserve the unity of the umma. This seemingly involved 
the caliph or imam, as the ruler of the Islamic religious state, in the duty of 
making perpetual holy war against nonbelievers until they submitted. This 
notion of Islamic unity and perpetual jihād, as Fred Donner says, could 
“logically lead to empire building.”26 However, the term jihād includes rhetoric 
as well as Islamic legal doctrine. Islamic scholars recognized a difference 
between holy war and the usual sort of war that had occurred throughout 
human history, which was often caused by the ambitions of rulers or a desire 
to despoil neighboring states. The latter were unjust and unlawful. However, 
wars fought against those Muslims who attempted to secede, rebel, or promote 
civil war were both just and holy wars. As the Muslim world became more 
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stable and peaceful, the practice of jihād was largely confined to the borders 
with the Byzantine Empire. The decline of Byzantine power in the western 
Mediterranean opened up Italy and the Iberian Peninsula to Muslim attacks 
from North Africa. These attacks were notable because the Muslim warriors in 
this region were experts in sea warfare, unlike the desert Arabs who knew only 
cavalry warfare. The terrible sack of Rome came in 846, and the attacks on the 
Italian peninsula continued for the next century. The ninth and tenth centuries 
saw the Moorish invasion of Spain and an attempt to penetrate the kingdom of 
the Franks. The Muslim warriors who fought in these border clashes with the 
Byzantine Empire and Latin Christendom believed that they were mujahidin, 
or fighters of holy war, while those who died in these struggles were regarded 
as martyrs. Like the scholar- soldier, Asad ibn al-Furat, vizier to the Aghlabid 
rulers of Kairouan in Tunisia, who launched the invasion of Byzantine Sicily in 
827, many of the mujahidin were non-Arabs from other parts of the Islamic 
world, such as Khurasan in the Steppes to the east of modern Turkey. These 
Turkish tribesmen played an increasingly important role in the military service 
of the caliphates. Concentrations of such Turkish warriors in Asia Minor led to 
the emergence of the Seljuk Empire.27
After the remarkable expansion of the seventh century led to the 
establishment of the great Muslim empires, the concept of holy war became 
somewhat inconvenient to the ‘Ummayad caliphs and other Muslim rulers, 
who became more concerned with maintaining political stability. Instead of 
continuing to pursue military expansion, holy wars of defense seemed to make 
more sense. Some of the Islamic rulers failed to heed the opinions of the 
Islamic jurists and even entered into treaties with the rulers of nonbelievers 
and engaged in trade with their neighbors, including the Byzantine Empire—
although these arrangements were always thought by Muslims to be temporary. 
When the ‘Ummayad caliphs completed their conquest of the Persian Empire 
at the end of the seventh century, they began developing sea power in order to 
extend their conquest to the European shores of Byzantium.28
The armies of the early ‘Ummayad period under the caliphs of Damascus 
resembled the hostings of barbarians. Military leaders were selected from 
among tribal aristocracies because of their ability to gather warriors, who 
would be loyal to the regime of the caliphs, but there was no structure of 
command. Discipline and loyalty to the caliphs was enforced by a kind of 
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primitive military police. At the end of this period, the ‘Ummayad armies 
began to show signs of professional training, such as the construction of well- 
planned rectangular camps with earthen and stone ramparts, watch towers, the 
digging of trenches, the use of caltrops as well as the deployment of kneeling 
spearmen to repel cavalry charges. They began to develop sounder tactics and 
to understand the value of good defense, and came to appreciate the 
interdependence of cavalry and infantry in battle.29 However, they failed to 
develop the naval resources to challenge the Byzantine Empire on the European 
side of the Bosphorus.
When the ‘Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad came to power in the later eighth 
century following the failed ‘Ummayad attempts to take Constantinople, the 
expansion of the Islamic state was limited to warfare on the frontiers of the 
Byzantine Empire. Border raiding was confined to the summer, and this was 
sometimes little more than a seasonal ritual that provided an outlet for those 
who wished to participate in holy war. At other times, the campaigns were 
more extensive. This level of warfare was sufficient to maintain the reputation 
of the caliphs, provide opportunities for booty, and also served the function of 
providing opportunities for military training. Despite the provision for medical 
care, the volunteers, who came from many ethnic groups, often paid a heavy 
toll in battle casualties and deaths from disease.30
Crusades against the Saracens
The concept of holy war as practiced by both the Muslims (or Saracens, as they 
were called in the Latin West) and the Franks (as the Muslims called the 
crusaders) left little room for constraints on how wars were fought. The Greeks, 
the Romans, the Arabs, and the Syrians had all thought of one another as 
“barbarians,” which simply means that they regarded one another’s culture as 
strange and alien. The Latin crusaders thought of themselves as the heirs of the 
ancient Greeks, Alexander the Great, imperial Rome, and Judas Maccabeus, 
the latter of whom had come to represent the ideal Christian knight. The 
crusaders did not observe any rules of war in their dealings with Muslims. The 
Muslims would spare Christians from death or slavery only if they converted 
to Islam, and the Frankish crusaders would spare only those Muslims who 
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became Christians. Both sides would also grant mercy to those who were 
wealthy enough to pay a ransom.31
The Arabs called the crusaders “Franks” because there was no Arabic word 
for crusader at that time. Strictly speaking, the war against the Franks was not 
the jihād to expand the boundaries of the dar el- islam at the expense of 
nonbelievers that Muslim jurists had in mind. Rather, as fought by Nur al-Din 
and Saladin, this war had the more limited goal of defending the unity and 
territorial integrity of the Islamic community. This view allowed Saladin to 
conclude a negotiated peace with the Franks. Saladin was aware that since he 
was not the caliph, he lacked the authority to declare and wage jihād against 
Christians. Islam was politically fragmented during the Wars of the Crusades, 
so the wars that individual Muslim rulers, such as Saladin, fought were 
something less than holy wars, although they did not hesitate to use the concept 
of jihād as a propaganda tool. However, the actual prosecution of the war was 
in the hands of professional soldiers, not fanatical amateurs. This helps us to 
understand how Muslim rulers and military commanders could agree to 
temporary truces. Sometimes these truces actually led to proposals for 
marriage between Muslims and Christians, but the Christian clergy would 
always frustrate such alliances. Clearly, the leaders of both camps saw room for 
diplomatic maneuvers to end hostilities, and were willing to permit pilgrimages 
and encourage commerce. At the same time, frequent violations of treaty terms 
were always at hand to provide the pretext for a renewal of fighting. Muslim 
scholars and military leaders also used Friday prayer services to whip up 
enthusiasm for the declaration of jihād. This not only had the effect of 
furnishing wider popular support for the war effort against the crusaders, but 
it also made life more difficult for Arab Christians (or polytheists as they were 
sometimes called because of their belief in the Trinity), and Christian churches 
were often seized as a consequence.32
The periods of peace that interspersed the Wars of the Crusades were 
difficult to arrange because the Muslim and Latin Christian worlds had 
different concepts of peace. Peace was an ideal in both religious cultures. In 
Islam, it could result only from victory that brought justice, but war had to 
come first. In the Latin Christian view, as exemplified by the teachings of St. 
Augustine, universal and permanent peace must first be preceded by the end 
of the world and the day of last judgment. Both Muslims and Christians aimed 
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at the destruction of one another by jihād and crusade. Muslim legal scholars 
could conceive of peace among Muslims, but with nonbelievers, peace could 
be purchased only through conversion or paying tribute. In other words, holy 
war must continue to the end of time. However, jihād was a collective obligation; 
it did not bind each individual Muslim, and later Islamic scholars such as Ibn 
Rushd (Averroes) did allow for truces under compelling circumstances. Both 
Muslim imams and Catholic popes and prelates generally thought that truces 
and treaties with one another were evil—even when they were dictated by 
political circumstances—and could only be temporary.33
Non-Muslims tended to associate Muhammad’s teachings with private 
vengeance and political assassinations to a greater degree than the Prophet 
intended. The duty of Muslims to engage in jihād seemed to the Latin West to 
be the worst sort of aggression. They did not understand that, for the Muslim, 
holy war also implied an inner moral struggle. Despite the horror expressed 
concerning one another’s concepts of holy war, it is worth comparing Muslim 
and Christian concepts of holy war because the two reveal certain similarities. 
Islamic jurists taught that jihād could be waged against bad Muslims and rebels 
as well as nonbelievers. Many Catholics also believed that holy war could be 
waged against Christian heretics and rulers who disagreed with papal policy.34 
With the rise of the feudal monarchies, Catholic theologians came to accept 
that war could be a way of maintaining peace and dispensing justice. But there 
remained from an earlier age an abhorrence of bloodshed and killing—even in 
a just war—as penitentials, or manuals prescribing penance for certain sins, 
indicated. Bishop Burchard of Worms insisted that soldiers needed to perform 
penance if they had killed someone in battle. Burchard did admit that the 
performance of penance and fighting the heathen could be combined, but the 
shedding of blood still required penance. This moral stricture seems to have 
been widespread in local church law, yet it did not derive from any church 
council or papal decree. The Gregorian reforms were hostile to the idea of 
performing penance in a just war that enjoyed papal or episcopal approbation, 
because no guilt attached to such actions provided they were performed for 
the right motive and not to seek glory or acquire booty.35
The crusade was a species of holy war that was recognized in civil and canon 
law by the special status granted to individuals and expeditions by papal bull. 
It was a sanctification of war that combined the elements of just- war theory 
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with penance and pilgrimage. The crusader was granted a plenary indulgence, 
or full remission of all sins, for his participation or death in battle. The visible 
symbol of this special status was the white cross that the crusader wore. The 
crusades also represented an attempt to bring about peace among Christians 
by ending private feuding and war among Christian princes. Another function 
of crusading bulls issued by the papacy was to allow crusading expeditions to 
solicit contributions from both clergy and laity. Originally intended to liberate 
the Holy Land from the Saracens, the crusading concept was later applied to 
military expeditions sent to Syria and Morocco, against pagans in Prussia, 
Lithuania, and Finland, and also against heretical and schismatic Christians in 
the Byzantine Empire and southern France. The papacy also practiced a kind 
of economic warfare against its enemies and imposed sanctions that prohibited 
trading with Saracens, Moors, Mamluks in Egypt, and pagans in the Baltic 
region. The crusades led to a mentality in which the interests of the Catholic 
faith and the institutional Church were to be defended against heretics and 
schismatics or those who did not immediately submit to papal directives. This 
reinforced the concept of crusades against other Christians.36
The crusades were also penitential pilgrimages, comparable to the inner 
struggle of the Islamic jihād, which were meant to purge sinfulness on the part 
of the knights, clerics, and lay folk. It was public penance performed with all 
of the attributes of theater, and foremost among these histrionic displays was 
the emphasis on unrestrained violence. The apologists for the Wars of the 
Crusades employed the holy war rhetoric of the Old Testament to justify 
their assault on the Saracens by likening themselves to the Israelites entering 
the Promised Land and slaying the Canaanites, but at the same insisting that 
their motives were purer than the Hebrews because they were recovering the 
Holy Places and relics for the glory of God rather than merely acquiring 
territory. The historical record of the exploits of the crusaders and pilgrims 
was set down largely by monks who emphasized that the Wars of the Crusades 
were conflicts between good and evil. Those who died in these wars were 
martyrs for the faith, and this was part of the effort to justify the conflict as a 
holy war.37 Susanna Throop argues that the motivations of the Latin crusaders 
extended beyond the more familiar concepts of pilgrimage, penitence, just war, 
and holy war to a more fundamental urge to seek vengeance. This was not a 
secular idea that originated in a primitive lay society characterized by acts of 
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violence and feuding; it derived from the concept of an act sanctioned by 
divine and moral authority that combined judicial punishment with vengeance, 
and as such, was commended by religious writers such as St. Bernard of 
Clairvaux, Peter the Venerable, and others who represented vengeance as 
“almost a Christian virtue.” Such sentiments were not characteristic of all the 
clergy, and many continued to urge that justice and vengeance be tempered 
with mercy.38
The prelates and clerics who accompanied the crusaders became 
militarized—especially those from the German- speaking lands. No fewer than 
twelve archbishops and bishops accompanied the Emperor Henry VI on his 
crusade of 1195–96. These prelates did not shy away from wielding the sword, 
and often led their vassi into battle. The Third Crusade of 1187–92 had included 
abbots as well as bishops who won their share of military glory. The popes were 
tolerant of such clerical bellicosity. The priests who accompanied the crusades 
made themselves available on the battlefield to hearten the warriors by their 
preaching. That the crusades were both holy wars and holy pilgrimages can be 
seen in the large numbers of humble folk—women, children, and the elderly—
who accompanied most of the crusades. The crusaders were admonished to 
protect and feed these pilgrims, but some of them were abandoned on the long 
journey to the Levant because of sickness and inadequate provisions.39
The regular clergy played a significant role in preaching the crusades. Some 
of the monks belonged to military orders that fought in the wars. Among the 
early purposes of the mendicant Franciscan and Dominican friars was the 
charge to undertake missionary work among the Muslims. St. Francis of Assisi 
actually went to Egypt in 1219 in an attempt to convert Sultan al-Kâmil. The 
sultan received St. Francis courteously and listened to what he had to say 
before allowing him to return under safe conduct. Another band of Franciscans 
went to Morocco to preach conversion, but insulted Islam and brought about 
their own martyrdom. This was not the only instance of Catholic clergy in 
Muslim lands verbally abusing Muhammad and Islam, and inciting violent 
retribution.40
It must have appeared to many Muslims that the crusaders and their clerical 
supporters had designs on more than the Christian holy places in Palestine. 
One Muslim ruler and soldier who was aware of how vulnerable the fragmented 
polity of Islam was to the crusaders was the Kurdish sultan of Fatimid Egypt, 
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Saladin. He believed that he would need to conquer Syria in order to unite the 
Islamic community before attempting to recover the lands occupied by the 
Christian crusaders. This task he began by laying siege to Kerak, or Krak les 
Chevaliers, the great crusader castle in Syria. His first siege in 1153 was repelled, 
but he returned four years later after Reginald of Châtillon violated the terms 
of a truce between Saladin and Baldwin IV, King of Jerusalem, by attacking a 
caravan carrying Saladin’s sister. Baldwin sought to compel Reginald to make 
amends, but the latter refused to do so. This gave Saladin the excuse to resume 
the war, and he gathered his forces to meet the crusader army near the village 
of Hettin on July 3, 1187. The Frankish crusaders were routed in perhaps the 
most important encounter of the Wars of the Crusades—a battle that continues 
to hold great significance for present- day Muslims. Reginald was executed by 
Saladin himself, two hundred Knights Templar and Hospitallers were 
massacred, and the rank and file of the crusader army were sold into slavery. It 
was only a matter of time before Jerusalem fell. The Christian governor of the 
city decided to strike a bargain with Saladin. If Saladin would allow the 
Christians to pay a ransom to be spared, he would yield. If not, he would put to 
the sword all of the Muslims of the city. Saladin agreed, and the Syrian 
Christians were allowed to keep their holy places. Saladin had a reputation for 
chivalry and was tolerant of Jews and Christians within limits, but at the same 
time, was determined to destroy the power of the Frankish crusaders.41
Another example of a Christian crusader who was prepared to negotiate with 
Muslim rulers and commanders was the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II. 
Frederick had been educated in Sicily where he had been personally 
acquainted with Muslims, and he spoke Arabic himself. He also employed at 
his court the astrologer and scholar Michael Scot, who had been one of the 
translators of Aristotle from Arabic texts at the cathedral school of Toledo in 
Spain. When Frederick went to the Holy Land to lead the Fifth Crusade, he 
carried with him the assumption that much wisdom and knowledge could be 
acquired by contact with the Arab world. Frederick had looked forward to 
leading a bloodless crusade in which he hoped to negotiate a truce with the 
Saracens. When Frederick reached Acre in 1228, he entered into talks with the 
Sultan al-Malikal of Egypt, who was of the same mind. The sultan actually 
offered Frederick and the Christians access to Jerusalem, which no longer 
possessed any strategic value since the razing of its walls, but Pope Gregory IX 
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and the papal legate on the crusading expedition objected to a truce and 
excommunicated Henry, while Muslims took to the streets in the cities of the 
Levant to voice their outrage at the idea of a compromise with the Franks after 
being incited by their muezzins. Among the crusaders, the Knights Templar 
plotted his assassination. There was little popular support for diplomatic efforts 
at peace- making on either side.42
As far as Latin Christendom was concerned, the most obtrusive presence of 
Muslims was to be found in the Iberian Peninsula. The Moors, as the Muslim 
Berbers of North Africa were called, had invaded Iberia in 711 under the 
leadership of the Arab general Târiq ibn Ziyâd and destroyed the short- lived 
kingdom of the Visigoths. There was little resistance to the Moorish occupation 
of Visigothic Spain, which encompassed some four- fifths of the peninsula by 
720, because the new regime proved to be tolerant of Christians and Jews. 
Although the reconquista was not officially designated a crusade until 1212 by 
a papal bull of Innocent III, clearly the idea of a holy war or crusade sanctioned 
by ecclesiastical authorities with the usual grant of indulgences first emerged 
in eighth- century Iberia. The reconquista, or Christian reconquest of Spain, 
continued until 1492, when the kingdom of Granada, the last Moorish 
stronghold in Spain, fell to the armies of Ferdinand and Isabella. In the interim, 
for seven centuries, al-Andalus, or Andalusia, had been part of the dar el- islam, 
and Christian warriors from the northern part of Spain, the kingdom of 
Asturias, fought their version of a holy war to drive the Moors from Spain. The 
reconquista and the conquista, the Spanish conquest of the New World, signaled 
a revival of the crusades called for by the pope after the Ottoman conquest of 
Constantinople. The reconquista provided an excuse for the king of Castile to 
tax his subjects and an opportunity for glory and booty for hidalgos as well as 
ordinary Castilians to migrate to the rich lands of southern Spain. The initial 
policy of tolerating Muslims in the newly conquered territories was 
subsequently abrogated. When the monks of Cluny in Burgundy took control 
of the pilgrims’ route from France to Santiago de Compostela, Spain became a 
place that attracted pilgrims as well as crusaders from all over Western Europe.43
The Spanish and Portuguese holy war against the Moors carried over into 
North Africa, and later provided the driving spirit for the founding of overseas 
colonial empires. Following the end of the Portuguese War of Independence, 
the younger Portuguese noblemen and knights were looking for other frontiers 
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where they could seek honor and wealth in battle. Prince Henry‘s military 
expedition to seize the Moroccan port of Ceuta in 1415 provided an opportunity 
for military adventure in a crusade against the Muslims comparable to the 
opportunities afforded Castilian knights on the frontier with the Muslim 
kingdom of Granada. Prince Henry pressed his case for invading Ceuta with 
his father the king. Although King John appeared to hesitate to grant permission 
until he could assure himself that an invasion of Morocco constituted a just 
war, in actuality, the Portuguese kings had always accepted the papalist 
argument that any war against Muslims, pagans, or infidels could always be 
considered a just war. Despite their protestations of crusading zeal, the 
Portuguese conquerors were more intent on plundering Ceuta’s merchants, 
both Muslim and Christian. Prince Henry and his followers were also aware 
that this foothold in Africa opened up the prospect of exploiting the Atlantic 
coast of Africa for colonization and trade.44
Prince Henry was the son of King John I of Portugal and Philippa of 
Lancaster, and his descent from the English royal house of Lancaster made 
him aware that he was the heir of a notable chivalric tradition. He saw himself 
as dedicated to the tradition of crusading against the Moors. During his 
boyhood, the new Portuguese nobility, created after the old Portuguese nobility 
had sided with the Castilian invaders in Portugal’s War of Independence 
from Spain, were dedicated to the proposition that war brought honor and 
profit; Henry’s enthusiasm for exploration and trade as a source of wealth 
came later. His projects for the exploration of Guinea showed a rational mind 
at work: Henry was well educated and quite capable of planning such an 
expedition in detail; his approach to crusading, on the other hand, was 
emotional and less rational. As a crusader, Prince Henry kept the new 
Portuguese nobility busy fighting Moors or engaging in chivalric displays. He 
was quite aware of the maxim that the honor of a family could be maintained 
only by demonstrating prowess on the battlefield in each generation.45
The Turkish holy war against Christendom
As the jihadist spirit waned among the Arabs and the Moors, another ethnic 
group emerged from out of the Steppes of Central Asia to lead the Islamic holy 
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war. These were the Turks, and their ambitions would extend to converting all 
Christians and conquering Europe as far west as the Atlantic. This change in 
the leadership of the Islamic world extended over several centuries and began 
when the ‘Abbasid dynasty of caliphs succeeded the ‘Umayyids in the middle of 
the eighth century. The new rulers of the Islamic world came to power with 
Persian assistance, and established a more centralized and absolute monarchy, 
as contrasted with the network of tribal alliances that characterized the 
government of the ‘Umayyids. The ‘Abbasid caliphs and their ministers were 
frequently men of humble birth and were often non-Arabs. The caliphate was 
moved from Damascus to Baghdad in the eighth century. The soldiers who 
were quartered in the military camp at Baghdad came from Kurasan on the 
northeast frontier, a region that had been part of the Sasanian Persian Empire. 
They were drawn into the city’s factions, and civil war followed. The need to 
find a more loyal army caused the caliphs to recruit another military force that 
was increasingly drawn from the nomadic Turkish- speaking tribes of Iranian 
Transoxiana who originally came from the Steppes. The court and the army 
camp moved northward to Samarra on the River Tigris to get away from the 
factionalism of Baghdad. The Turks, who were skilled cavalrymen, constituted 
an elite group and lived in their own quarters. Eventually, they came to 
dominate the caliph’s government. From that point on, Turkish became the 
language of the army and the caliph’s court in the eastern half of the Islamic 
world. The Arabs who remained in the caliph’s army played a diminishing role 
and mostly served as foot soldiers.46
The nomadic Turks who constituted the elite troops at Samarra were used 
to spending as much time in the saddle as on foot. Although some of them 
were recruited as Mamluks, or slave soldiers, the Turks were brave and 
formidable fighters who came to enjoy free status and to regard themselves as 
superior to the caliph’s other troops. They introduced new tactics and were 
skilled horse- archers. At first they had no particular loyalty to the predominantly 
Arab state of the caliphs and were not enthusiastic practitioners of holy war. 
They were recent converts to Islam, and what they sought was booty.47
The migration of the Seljuk Turks from Transoxiana into the Near East in 
the eleventh century led to the conquest of Persia and the caliphate of Baghdad. 
The Seljuk Turks then turned their eyes toward the Byzantine territories in 
Anatolia, and after the defeat of the Byzantine forces at Manzikert (1071), they 
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colonized Anatolia to the point where Turks and Muslims became the 
dominant ethnic and religious group. The Turks were originally nomadic 
pastoralists, but thereafter, they gradually established themselves in the 
agricultural villages of eastern Anatolia. In the time of the Seljuk dynasty, from 
the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, Persian culture was dominant in the 
court and cities of the Turkish Empire. The frontiers, however, were settled by 
many Turcoman dervishes, who had migrated from the Steppes more recently. 
These semi- nomadic frontier peoples were adherents of a mystical sect and 
were regarded as heretical by orthodox Muslims. They were especially devoted 
to continuous holy war and the conversion of Christians on the other side of 
the frontier. In the thirteenth century, the Seljuk Turks were overrun by the 
Mongols, and they became the vassals of the Mongol khan. The Mongols 
displaced many of the Turks of eastern Anatolia, and the latter were forced 
westward. This migration ended Byzantine rule in western Anatolia. Thereafter, 
the ruling class, formerly Persian- speaking under the Seljuks, became Turkish 
and Muslim. By the end of the thirteenth century, the Ottoman dynasty had 
replaced the Seljuks.48
The original concept of jihād as expounded by Muhammad and the Islamic 
jurists was to expand the Islamic community in all directions in order to 
spread the message of the prophet. During the Wars of the Crusades, this came 
to include defending the Islamic community against the incursions of the 
Frankish crusaders in Palestine and the Levant. With the rise of the Turkoman 
principalities in the thirteenth century—most notably the Ottomans—a new 
form of holy war emerged in the ghazâ, which focused on the efforts of the 
ghazis, or Islamic warriors, in conquering the Christian West, including the 
Byzantine Empire. This strategy involved the conquest of Byzantine Anatolia 
and Constantinople and the Balkans, gaining control of the Mediterranean 
and its commerce as well as the former territories of the western part of the 
Roman Empire. Thus, the ambition of the Turkish sultans extended to claiming 
the caliphate, a title assumed by Murad I in the latter part of the fourteenth 
century, which gave the sultans the authority to wage holy war against the 
Christians and other infidels, as well as the Roman imperial title formerly 
borne by the Byzantine emperors prior to the fall of Constantinople in 1453 
and by the emperors of Rome prior to the founding of Constantinople. The 
rise of the Ottoman Turks also changed the orientation of the Christian 
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crusading movement because from the crusaders’ point of view these wars 
ceased to be an attempt to reconquer Palestine and convert by the sword, and 
instead, became a desperate attempt to defend Europe from Turkish expansion. 
The sultan’s exclusive claim to the caliphate also involved the Ottoman Turks 
in eliminating rival sultans and caliphs in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria. The 
proclamation of ghazâ, or holy war, by the Ottoman Turkish sultans implied 
that they were the successors of all caliphs and imams going back to the 
Prophet himself.49
The primary source of the sultan’s authority was his military leadership. 
During the fourteenth century, the Ottoman military force had changed from 
a group of raiders (the original meaning of ghazi was raider) to a disciplined 
army capable of mounting sieges and engaging in pitched battles. The two 
most important branches of the Ottoman army were the cavalry, the members 
of which held a timar, a kind of feudal fief, which freed the cavalryman from 
dependence on pillaging in exchange for military service when called on, and 
the Janissaries, a skillful body of guards with a strong esprit de corps. These 
two groups were the basis of the Ottoman standing army. Because they served 
on a contractual basis, the sultan could raise a predictable number of soldiers 
every year. The corps of Janissaries (which means “new army” in Turkish) was 
the first standing army in Europe. They were the enslaved children of non-
Muslims who were acculturated and enrolled in the Ottoman army as a distinct 
corps paid by the treasury and served directly under the command of the 
sultan. The Ottoman army also began using gunpowder weapons during the 
fourteenth century. The Ottoman artillery was manned by mercenary soldiers, 
and constituted the first standing corps armed with cannons in Europe. These 
Ottoman units were a highly disciplined force in contrast to the crusader and 
other Western armies in which mounted knights and other members of elite 
cavalry corps showed an obsessive concern with individual honor that 
frustrated the attempts of their commanders to maintain cohesiveness when 
engaging the more tactically innovative Turkish light horse, who easily picked 
off knights who broke formation to engage in single combat. The sultan’s army 
achieved a notable victory when it defeated the French crusaders at the Battle 
of Nicopolis in 1396.50
Since the Ottoman Empire was essentially a military organization, the 
sultan’s command of an effective and well disciplined army afforded him a 
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distinct advantage, and enabled him to hold together a conglomeration of 
diverse nationalities and religions. Islam was, of course, the official religion, 
although Christians and Jews sometimes held minor offices. To Machiavelli, the 
sultan appeared to be an absolute monarch by virtue of his political and military 
leadership, but in fact, there were a number of limitations on his power. He 
could not alter Islamic law, which was immutable; the strength of custom was 
such that his law- making powers were quite limited. As long as the sultans led 
their armies in the field, their military power was extensive, but maintaining 
discipline among the corps of Janissaries, the sultan’s household infantry, could 
be a problem because they mutinied frequently when their demands for 
rewards or booty were not met. Also, the very complexity of Ottoman 
government gave viziers, court officials, and bureaucrats some degree of 
influence—especially after the sultan ceased to attend meetings of the imperial 
council in the mid- fifteenth century. And, of course, the tendency to solve the 
question of succession among the sultans’ many sons by fratricide was bound 
to introduce a certain degree of instability. A sultan with a strong personality, 
however, could prevail in the face of these limitations on his power.51
When the Ottomans under Sultan Mehmet II were making preparations to 
invest Constantinople, the Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI sent an urgent 
plea to Pope Nicholas V asking for help in defending the Byzantine capital. The 
pope did supply some aid to the Knights of Rhodes, Cyprus, and the kingdom 
of Hungary, but he refused assistance to the Byzantines unless the Orthodox 
Church entered into union with Rome. Nicholas V, it would seem, had intended 
to help the Greeks, but he had used the issue of schism as a bargaining chip; he 
was quite shocked when Constantinople fell to the Turks, and his reputation 
suffered much as a consequence. He issued a crusading bull when he realized 
that the sultan had designs on Italy. However, at that time, the rulers of 
Renaissance Europe were too divided and absorbed in their own problems to 
undertake a war against the Grand Turk.52 Also, the Turkish massacre of 
Christian prisoners of war following the Battle of Nicopolis in 1396 had shaped 
Western views of Turkish cruelty and discouraged many would- be crusaders 
for years to come.53
Following the successful Ottoman siege of Constantinople in 1453, 
commentators in the Latin Christian West were unable to recognize and 
appreciate Turkish military prowess, organization, and discipline because the 
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Turks were infidels. The humanist Aeneas Sylvius Piccolimi, the future Pope 
Pius II, who lamented the death of Greek letters, asserted that the Turks were 
effeminate and lacking in martial prowess. Many Christians who believed that 
Divine Providence was the first and only source of causation in history, thought 
that the Turks had been sent by God as punishment for the sins of Christians; 
they could undo this calamity only by repenting and mounting a strong 
defense of their faith and the integrity of Christendom. At the end of his life, 
Pius II sought to lead a crusade against the Turks in 1463, but he died before it 
could be brought to fruition.54
Having conquered Constantinople, Mehmet II saw himself as the greatest 
Islamic ruler since the first four caliphs, the successor of the Roman emperors, 
and the upholder of the Roman, Islamic and Turkish claims to universal 
sovereignty. Selim I (1512–20) also claimed to be the protector of the Jews and 
the Greek and Armenian churches, and appointed the patriarchs of those 
churches. With the incorporation of the Arab lands into the Ottoman Empire, 
Selim also became the protector of the pilgrim routes to Mecca and Medina 
and of all Muslims. As gazi sultans, they were devoted to making continuous 
holy war, and such a policy also had the benefit of providing wealth for the 
Ottoman treasury.55
The expansionism of the Ottoman Turks led to a revival of the crusading 
ethos in Western and Central Europe. The grand master of the Knights 
of St. John of Jerusalem warned that Mehmet II intended to conquer all 
of Europe. The Venetians were especially alarmed by this news because of 
their trading interests and ports in the eastern Mediterranean, and they 
begged the pope and other Western rulers for assistance. Pope Nicholas V, 
regretting his miscalculation concerning the threat that the Turks had posed to 
Constantinople, hoped to bring about peace in Europe so as to gather forces to 
repel the expected Turkish advance. Other prelates and clerics also came 
forward to preach another crusade and to remind their audience of Turkish 
cruelty. When an appropriate response failed to materialize in the Latin West, 
a number of bishops lamented the lives of soldiers wasted in civil conflicts, 
such as the Wars of the Roses, when they could have been fighting the Turks. 
As we shall see, there were other crusading efforts in the late medieval period 
in the Baltic Sea area, the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean islands, and the 
Iberian Peninsula, but without the formidable Turkish threat, there probably 
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would not have been such an emphasis in the Latin West on the continuing 
importance of religious war. With the exception of Portugal and the Balkans, 
other late medieval crusades in the Baltic and Spain were subsiding.56
The most notable attempt to halt the westward advance of the Ottoman Turks 
in the Balkans was the Crusade of Varna, which involved several battles fought 
in 1443–45.57 The politics behind the various military and naval campaigns that 
constituted this crusade were more complicated than the religious conflicts 
between the Muslims and the Latin and Orthodox churches. The Genoese were 
allies of the Ottomans, as was the Christian ruler of Athens. The enemies of 
the Ottoman sultan comprised not only the Byzantines, the Venetians, and the 
Hungarians, but also the Muslims of Karaman in southern Anatolia, where 
the Mongol ruler Timur had earlier restored the khanate in opposition to the 
Ottomans. The involvement of the Genoese and the Venetians, often inveterate 
enemies, together with the Burgundians, provided a naval dimension to these 
struggles. The main battle of the crusade was fought between the Ottoman and 
Hungarian armies on November 10, 1444, at Varna on the Bulgarian coast of the 
Black Sea. At first, it appeared that the Hungarians would prevail because of the 
devastation wrought by their artillery on the Turkish army under the command 
of Murad II, but Vladislav III, king of Hungary and Poland, foolishly charged 
ahead of the ranks of his army and was killed by the sultan’s Janissaries. This 
decided the battle, and the failure of the Crusade of Varna delivered the 
predominantly Orthodox Balkan Peninsula into the hands of the Ottoman 
Muslims rather than the Catholics. With allies as disparate as Hungary and the 
khanate of Karaman, it is little wonder that the opponents of Sultan Murad II 
failed to coordinate their military efforts. The collapse of the Hungarian Army at 
Varna and the quarrels between Venice and the papacy made it impossible to 
continue the crusade. There were a few more skirmishes as the ships of the 
Burgundians resorted to piracy in the Bosphorus and the Black Sea.58
From their victory at Varna, the Ottoman Turks had turned their attention 
to capturing Constantinople, the great center of Eastern Christianity. They 
then besieged Rhodes and advanced up the Danube Valley, capturing Belgrade 
in 1521 and defeating the Hungarians at Mohacs in 1526. Not until after 1683, 
when the Siege of Vienna was lifted, did the Turkish threat begin to subside. 
The fall of Constantinople was a great loss to the world of humanist learning; 
it also raised the possibility of the eradication of Christianity. That was why the 
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papacy responded with a crusade to defend Christendom and to reinforce its 
defenses in borderlands such as Hungary, Transylvania, Cyprus, Malta, Rhodes, 
and the outposts of the Venetian Empire along the Adriatic. In order to 
encourage soldiers to volunteer for this crusade, every effort was made to 
demonize the Turks and depict them as barbarians, like their alleged ancestors 
the Scythians. Others called on Biblical prophecies that identified the Turks 
with Gog and Magog of the apocalyptical Last Battle.59
Fernand Braudel considered it significant that Christendom should have 
built formidable defenses mounted with heavy ordnance against Islamic 
expansion along its eastern frontier in Austria, Hungary, and the islands in the 
Aegean and eastern Mediterranean seas that were held by the Venetians and 
the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, while the Turks, who built no such 
defensive line, gloried in wars of aggression against the Christian West and 
pursued those holy wars to the gates of Vienna. Braudel thinks that one of the 
motives of the Turks, besides their endless pursuit of holy war, was that the 
Turks needed to acquire knowledge of Western military technology such as 
improved gunpowder weapons and naval shipbuilding from the Christians to 
employ against their Persian enemies to the east. The Christian powers, Spain, 
the Holy Roman Empire, the Poles, the Venetians, and their allies continued to 
defend the frontier against the Turks until the latter were beaten back from 
Vienna and were driven out of Hungary in the seventeenth century. The 
Western determination to mount offensive crusading wars against the Turkish 
Empire, however, ended in the wake of the defeat of the Turkish naval fleet at 
the Battle of Lepanto of 1572, which was not as great a victory for the Christian 
powers as it is sometimes represented. Following Lepanto and the Turkish 
conquest of the Venetian outpost on the island of Cyprus in 1570–71, the 
Turkish advance was slowed and they entered a period of decline and retreat 
from their earlier conquests in Europe. Thereafter, the war in the Mediterranean 
continued at the level of piracy and brigandage.60
Crusades against Christians
Crusading had begun as an ideology based on the determination of the papacy 
and other Latin Christian powers, the Byzantine emperors, and their Orthodox 
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allies to halt Muslim expansion as well as to recover the holy places of 
Jerusalem. Muslims remained the chief enemy, but in later crusades, other 
enemies of the Church or papacy were also pursued, such as Christian 
heretics, schismatics, and pagans. Pope Gregory IX had established the 
Roman Inquisition in 1231 to conduct inquiries concerning heresy and to try 
individual heretics, but it was not capable of dealing with heresy on such a 
large scale. For this reason, crusades against heretical Christian sects were 
proclaimed under papal authority, but required the participation of Christian 
kings and knights, whose cooperation could be procured only if these military 
campaigns also served their secular interests. Expansionism and dynastic 
ambitions were always an integral part of the holy wars of both Christendom 
and Islam.61
Honorius II was the first pope to declare a holy war against a Christian 
ruler, Roger, the Norman Count of Sicily, whom the pope labeled “a semi- 
pagan tyrant.” Roger had supported the anti- pope Anacletus, and employed 
Muslim courtiers and soldiers. Honorius promised the Normans of Apulia, 
who undertook to fight Count Roger full forgiveness of their sins if they died 
in battle; those who fought and survived were allowed a half remission of their 
sins. The papal crusade against Count Roger resulted in a victory for Pope 
Innocent II, who had succeeded Honorius. This first holy war against Christians 
followed the model of the First Crusade, which had been proclaimed by Pope 
Urban II at Clermont in 1095. One of the precedents for employing holy war 
against other Christians was the Peace and Truce of God movement, which 
was directed at violent and lawless bands within Christendom. A number of 
bishops had organized groups of the faithful in the eleventh century to compel 
lawless individuals and gangs to behave themselves, and they administered 
oaths to these prototype parish constables to enforce the peace. Such peace 
militias, organized by parishes, with the priests bearing banners before them, 
were sent against robber- barons such as Thomas of Marle, who had terrorized 
a whole province from his castle of Crécy- sur-Serre in northern France. Before 
assaulting Crécy, the parishioners were absolved of their sins, and told that 
their penance was to lay siege to the castle. In southern France, a region much 
troubled by routiers, or roving bands of mercenary soldiers, and a region where 
the king of France’s authority and reach were less sure, peace edicts were also 
used to raise peace militias by various prelates. The use of such peace militias, 
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the members of which were promised indulgences, was also a precedent for 
the later crusade against the Cathars or Albigensians, and there was some 
popular confusion of the routiers with the Albigensians.62
In 1208, Pope Innocent III attempted to stop the spread of the Cathar 
heresy in Languedoc by preaching and by appeal to King Philip Augustus, but 
the French monarch was more interested in fighting wars with other Christian 
kings. The pope then decided to appeal to Christian knights from other parts 
of France to launch a holy war or crusade against the Cathars by promising 
that such a crusade would make participants instruments in God’s work by 
granting them absolution of sins. Those who died in such an undertaking 
would be regarded as martyrs just like those who had participated in the 
crusades to recover the Holy Land. The papal blessing on wars directed against 
fellow Christians was supported by a radical reorientation of Christian 
thinking in the eleventh century that made it acceptable to employ violence in 
carrying out God’s work when peaceful means had failed. Not all theologians 
and canonists supported this granting of indulgences and absolution of sins to 
crusaders, and Sigebert of Gembloux wondered where the popes got this 
authority to wage war—especially against Christians. Pope Leo IX had actually 
declared war against the Normans in Sicily by claiming that they were worse 
than pagans. Such holy wars proclaimed and waged by the papacy might have 
gained more support if they had been more successful; their usual lack of 
success raised the question whether God had actually authorized these wars.63
The war against the Cathars, also known as the Albigensian Crusade or the 
Occitan War, was viewed as a war fought to protect the Church from heretics 
or internal enemies, and thus, was construed as a just war. This argument was, 
however, rejected by many of the leaders and inhabitants of Languedoc, such 
Raimon-Roger, Count of Foix. In the event, the knightly code of chivalry as 
well as Christian ethics, provided few, if any, of the customary constraints of 
how the Occitan War was fought, or indeed, any of the informal rules of war 
observed in the conflicts between Christians and Muslims. By any measure, 
the Albigensian Crusade was an exceptionally brutal war in which prisoners, 
civilian and military, men, women, and children, were mutilated and massacred 
in the cause of eliminating heresy. Such atrocities were not committed only for 
religious reasons, however; also involved were rivalries based on conflicting 
feudal jurisdictions and allegiances.64
War and Peace in the Western Political Imagination136
It is now generally accepted among medievalists that combat between 
mounted knights on the battlefield was rare during the Middle Ages, while 
sieges of strongly fortified towns and castles as well as raiding were more usual. 
The nobility of southwestern France raided one another frequently before the 
beginning of the Albigensian Crusade. The crusaders, on the other hand, 
demonstrated a willingness to engage in devastating and costly siege warfare. 
Although the crusader armies in the Languedoc region always included some 
knights who served their feudal lords, most of the soldiers fought for pay. 
These included many routiers who were mercenaries who lacked political 
allegiances and who were feared because of their utterly ruthless methods of 
war. If captured as prisoners in the Occitan War, they were often massacred.65
Holy war against Christian heretics had thus become an instrument of 
papal policy. The militia Christi, the knights of Christ, were originally conceived 
of as a purely spiritual force, devoted to prayer and ascetic practices. Pope 
Gregory VII (the former Hildebrand) began to put a more military construction 
on the term and began to conceive of the knights of Christ going out into the 
world and engaging in actual combat on behalf of the Church and the 
patrimony of St. Peter. He inaugurated the practice of appealing to temporal 
monarchs and knights to wield the sword on behalf of the papal states. Thus, 
pious devotion was interwoven with the feudal obligation to render military 
service as a papal vassal. Pope Gregory was moving in the direction of holy war 
as an instrument of papal policy against those temporal rulers such as the Holy 
Roman Emperor Henry IV, who had incurred papal displeasure and was 
excommunicated. One of the most ardent defenders of the Gregorian doctrine 
of war against heretics, Bonizo of Sutri, stated that it was the duty of all 
Christians to fight heretics by means appropriate to their status: priests by 
spiritual means, and knights with weapons of war. Moreover, Christians should 
fight heretics more fiercely than pagans or unbelievers.66
While many of the supporters of Pope Gregory VII and his predecessor 
Pope Leo IX, who had proclaimed holy war against the Normans in Sicily, held 
that the use of violence and war in defense of the faith was laudable, there were 
papal advisors, such as Peter Damian, Cardinal Bishop of Ostia, who were 
opposed to using force against heretics. Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury, 
was also opposed to the papal proclamation of the crusade because he thought 
that all war was profane and immoral. But those who supported the concept of 
Holy Wars, Crusades, and Religious Wars 137
holy war could draw on the example of the military heroes of the Old 
Testament, such as Joshua, David, and Judas Maccabeus, and the mythical or 
actual warrior saints such as Sebastian, Maurice, George, Denis, Theodore, and 
James (the Spanish Santiago), whose patronage and protection were widely 
believed to bring victory in battle.67
In the twelfth century, the papal concept of holy war was also extended to 
northern Europe. The Northern Crusades, which were at first directed against 
pagans in the Baltic Sea region, were recognized as holy wars by papal bulls issued 
between 1147 and 1505. The Danes and the Swedes, later joined by the Teutonic 
Knights, attempted to pacify and Christianize the Prussians, the Lithuanians, the 
Latvians, and other peoples called Balts, who had been in this region since before 
Roman times. This lent legitimacy to a war of territorial conquest by drawing on 
crusader and chivalric traditions, and this helped to attract contributions and 
volunteers from a wide area of Central and Western Europe. In their continuing 
quest for territory and trade, the Teutonic Knights did not hesitate to go up 
against nations with older Christian traditions such as Poland.68
The Slavs, or Wends, as the Germans called them, were more recent arrivals 
than the Balts. The Baltic Slavs were quite militarized because, as they moved 
into the Baltic region in the ninth and tenth centuries, they had to be able 
to defend themselves against the Vikings and the Germans. They had a 
warrior class, supported by peasants, and they quickly learned how to build 
fortifications and to fight on the sea as well as land. They lived in fortified 
village communities clustered along rivers and estuaries. The dense forests and 
impenetrable bogs made settlement on land away from the rivers and estuaries 
difficult. The Baltic Slavs were slow to accept Christianity, and clung to 
their pagan holy places long after their nominal conversion, but so did the 
inhabitants of Denmark and Sweden. Even after the ruling classes had accepted 
Christianity, the rural areas saw continued resistance to Christian belief. Of all 
the various Baltic peoples, the Lithuanians put up the most cohesive struggle 
against the aggressions of their Christian neighbors because they had a line of 
princes that provided strong leadership. The tendency of the Balts and the 
Slavs to fortify their communities, and to fight back and to resist Christianity 
provided a challenge to crusaders from Germany and the West.69
The first of the Northern Crusades was the Wendish Crusade of 1147. This 
supposed holy war in the lands along the frontier to the east of Hamburg and 
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the Elbe River began when the land- grabbing Saxons overran the lands of the 
Wends. The Saxon warriors and their chiefs had lived as raiders and mercenaries, 
and were hardly more civilized than the Wendish chiefs whom they displaced. 
The crusading phase began when a bishopric was established at Lübeck, and 
priests were called in to convert and tame the supposedly more savage Slavs. 
German invaders of Slavic lands had previously been content to levy tribute 
money, but the Slavic peasants were now rounded up and forced to live in 
fortified stockades dominated by wooden blockhouses, where they could be 
exploited more effectively. The Wendish Crusade of 1147 involved both the 
Saxons and their Danish allies, and was recognized in a bull issued by Pope 
Eugenius III. Paying tribute to the Germans was no longer sufficient; Slavs 
were now compelled to convert to Christianity or die. However, in all 
subsequent Northern Crusades, conversion remained subordinate to the 
acquisition of land and collecting tribute. This became a cause of contention 
between the Saxon nobles and the numerous bishops from other German 
cities who also participated in the Wendish Crusade.70
The Teutonic Knights were the most successful of all the major monastic 
military orders of crusaders. Like the Knights Templar and the Knights of 
St. John of Jerusalem, they began their operations in the crusades to recover 
the Holy Land. After their expulsion by the Turks, the Teutonic Knights 
transferred their operations to the Baltic, where they combined fighting pagan 
Prussians and Lithuanians with the opening of the Baltic hinterland to trade 
and the exploitation of raw materials. In the process, the Teutonic Knights 
built an extensive territorial state, ruled as an Ordenstaat,71 and were able to 
recruit many members of the lesser nobility of Germany, who were eager to 
acquire land. In 1309, the order established their headquarters at Marienburg, 
just as the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, also expelled from the Holy Land 
by the Turks, had moved to Rhodes. They justified their acquisitions of territory 
by the need to extirpate paganism in Prussia and Livonia, quite ignoring the 
fact that some of the lands that they grabbed belonged to Christian Poles and 
Livonians. Prussia was extensively resettled by immigrant Germans. Livonia 
and Poland then served as bases from which to conquer pagan Lithuania. The 
Lithuanians tried to head off conquest by the Teutonic Order by opening 
negotiations directly with both the papacy and the Russian Orthodox Church 
concerning their possible conversion to Christianity. This was only a ploy, and 
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the conquest of the Lithuanians, a martial people, involved a long and bitterly 
fought war during the fourteenth century in the most difficult of terrain. These 
Reisen, or summer and winter campaigns of the Teutonic Knights, which were 
undertaken against the heathen Lithuanians, were particularly popular with 
noblemen and knights from England and France, and gave them something to 
do during the intervals of peace in the Hundred Years War. Prussia acquired 
the reputation as a place where one could gain unique expertise in the exercise 
of arms.72
The Teutonic Knights continued to insist that their efforts to conquer and 
convert the pagan Lithuanians in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
constituted a holy war. This argument, however, was undercut when the 
Lithuanians became Christians. In 1386, Jadwiga of Poland married Jogaile of 
Lithuania just after the latter had been baptized a Christian and accepted the 
new name of Wladyslaw. Since the territories of the two greatest enemies of the 
Teutonic Knights’ Ordenstaat had been united and the Lithuanians were 
nominally Christians, the Teutonic Order no longer possessed a justification 
for launching crusades. Internal strife in Lithuania made it difficult for the 
Lithuanians to take the field against the Teutonic Knights. Many among 
the Teutonic Knights and their supporters remained unpersuaded that the 
Lithuanians had sincerely accepted Christianity, and more military campaigns 
were sent against the Lithuanians, who had territorial ambitions of their own. 
They and the Poles sometimes called on the Russians and the Muslim Tartars 
for military assistance. The Teutonic Knights suffered a major defeat at the 
Battle of Tannenberg in 1410. Although the Teutonic Knights survived, the 
order had lost its crusading appeal and fewer Westerners volunteered for their 
Reisen. Moreover, when these issues were debated at the Council of Constance 
in 1415, it was charged against the Teutonic Knights that they were more 
interested in territorial aggrandizement than converting the pagans of the 
territories that they had conquered. Clearly, the Baltic Crusades were no longer 
regarded as holy wars, since the Reisen were now directed against Christians. 
For a time, the Teutonic Knights attempted to maintain their status as crusaders 
by fighting the Hussites and defending part of Transylvania against the 
Ottoman Turks. When volunteers ceased to come from the West, the order 
began hiring mercenaries, who proved difficult to manage, while their own 
subjects became unhappy with the governance of the Knights, and they faced 
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the continuing enmity of the Poles, and later, the Russians. The knights 
gradually began to abandon their monastic rules and to secularize themselves, 
a process that was completed at the time of the Lutheran Reformation when 
the grand master of the Teutonic Knights, the Margrave Albert of Brandenburg-
Anspach, transformed the Ordenstaat into a dynastic secular state in 1525. The 
Teutonic Knights lost governance and Prussia became a duchy.73
Some of those who attacked the sacred violence of crusades and holy wars 
as proclaimed by the papacy were members of heretical sects. The Hussite 
heresy in Bohemia posed a particularly severe threat to orthodoxy and 
Christian unity because it was fed by Czech nationalist feelings. The papacy 
was unable to deal effectively with the Hussites through the Inquisition because 
the Great Schism and the corrupt practices of the papal court had diminished 
the reputation of the Church and the authority of the popes. The Hussite 
movement was strengthened by the support of the Bohemian nobility, the 
intellectual coherence of its beliefs, which derived from the teachings of the 
English heresiarch John Wyclif, and the hatred of the Germans on the faculty 
of the University of Prague. The leader of this Czech reform movement was 
John Hus (c. 1369–1415).74 Hus was a vigorous and prolific preacher who 
reached a large audience because his sermons were delivered in Czech. 
Whereas the Wycliffite heresy in England was largely suppressed, the Hussite 
heresy was more difficult to deal with because King Wencelas IV manipulated 
the movement to pursue his anti-Habsburg agenda. Those clerics who were 
sent by the Roman pontiff to preach against the Hussite movement were 
ignored, and the archbishop of Prague, having failed to enforce obedience to 
Rome, resigned. Hus’s attempt to defend his views at the Council of Constance 
led to his condemnation and execution as a heretic in 1415. This only served to 
make Hus a martyr and to strengthen popular support for his teachings. The 
resulting conflict led to two civil wars in 1424 and 1434. The inability to control 
the Hussite Revolt moved Pope Martin V to proclaim a crusade, which was led 
in 1420 by the emperor- elect, Sigismund of Hungary, and a number of German 
princes and prince- bishops. The crusade was defeated by the Hussite armies, as 
was a second crusade in 1421 and a third in 1422.75
The Hussite reform movement consisted of many factions, ranging from 
conservative reformers, who were found among the Bohemian and Moravian 
nobility and the faculty of the University of Prague, to social radicals who 
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wished to turn the world upside down. The latter included Taborites, so called 
after the town of Tabor, where many of them had migrated to share their 
unorthodox and revolutionary ideas, which struck terror in the hearts of 
ecclesiastical and temporal rulers throughout much of central and Western 
Europe. So great was the fear of the Taborites and other Bohemian radicals 
that there was perhaps more enthusiasm for crusades sent against them than 
those launched against the Turks. For their part, the Taborites put forward the 
brilliant and capable leader of the Hussite forces, John Žižka. Žižka’s leadership 
of the Hussite armies was characterized by brilliant tactics and strong discipline 
together with religious zeal. Some of the anti-Hussite crusaders came from as 
far away as England and Burgundy, and one crusade was led by the English 
prelate Henry, Cardinal Beaufort. When they were not repelling German, 
English, and Burgundian crusaders, the Bohemian Hussites fell out among 
themselves because the nobility feared the radical groups that emerged during 
the Hussite Reformation such as the Taborites. In retaliation for foreign 
intervention, some Hussite military forces raided Saxony, Franconia, and the 
Upper Palatinate in southern Germany. Another crusade, sponsored by the 
pope and Julian, Cardinal Cesarini, and Albert V, Duke of Moravia, also failed 
to crush the Hussites. The mounting of crusades against Christian heretics, 
such as the Hussites and the Waldensians in the Alpine regions of France 
and Savoy, were failures and both sects survived into the sixteenth century 
when they merged with the Protestants. At the same time, the papacy and 
the Habsburgs needed to be wary of the continuing westward advances of the 
Ottomans.76
Generally speaking, the religious wars of Europe were confined to the latter 
part of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries. However, 
Bohemia experienced two centuries of confessional conflict that began with 
the Hussite Revolt and the execution of that precursor of the Reformation, Jan 
Hus, in 1415. Within four years of Hus’s death, Jan Želivský, a priest and 
follower of Hus, led a crowd to reclaim the church where Želivský had been 
deprived of his benefice, and expelled the orthodox Catholic priest and 
congregation. From there, the angry crowd followed him to the New Town 
Hall to release a number of Hussite prisoners. When the Prague magistrates 
did not comply, the Hussites threw them from the top of the tower to the 
pavement below. This anticipated by two hundred years the more famous 
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defenestration of Prague of 1618, when several Habsburg officials were thrown 
out of a high window, which was followed by the Thirty Years War. The two 
centuries between these two defenestrations were filled with half a dozen 
anti-Hussite crusades and a full- scale revolt during which the Bohemian 
Hussites elected their own king, George of Poděbrady. This led to conflicts 
with Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus and with the Catholic Bohemian 
dynasty, the Jagiellonians. The Habsburgs became kings of Bohemia in 1526 in 
the person of Ferdinand I, who subsequently tried to reconvert his Czech 
subjects to Catholicism and who later invited the Jesuits to assist in this 
endeavor. Confessional clashes between the Hussites, some of whom displayed 
Lutheran sympathies, and the Catholics continued into the seventeenth century. 
The defeat of the Hussites and the German Calvinist prince, Frederick V, 
Elector Palatine, whom they had elected as king of Bohemia, at the Battle of 
White Mountain outside Prague began the Thirty Years War and the most 
thorough- going recatholicization undertaken anywhere during the Counter-
Reformation.77
Wars of the Reformation
Protestant thinkers generally condemned the Wars of the Crusades. Thomas 
Fuller, in his History of Holy War (1639), stated that they were excessively long, 
cruel, and costly. He had doubts about whether these incursions into the Holy 
Land could be regarded as just wars, and he suggested that an argument could 
be made that the Saracens possessed a legitimate title to the lands that they 
ruled. The only possible argument for calling the crusades a just war was that 
they were defensive in nature, which Fuller doubted. Sir Walter Ralegh stated 
that the Muslims had also put forward a similar argument. Both Fuller and 
Ralegh objected that one of the main goals of the Wars of the Crusades was to 
convert Muslims to Christianity by the sword, which they regarded as 
repugnant. Protestants generally saw the concept of holy war in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries as an attempt by the papacy to undermine the power 
of princes.78
It is no longer thought to be accurate to label the Wars of the Reformation 
as crusades. The preferred term is religious war. A religious war is a conflict in 
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which at least one of the belligerents bases its claim to be fighting a just war on 
religious law or beliefs. The use of the term religious war in early modern 
Europe was based on a claim to legitimacy, not on actual motivation, which 
was likely to be much more complicated and difficult to discern—especially 
considering that there were something like 250 wars in Europe between 
the late fifteenth century and the end of the eighteenth century, with at least 
500 distinct belligerent parties participating. The term religious war seems to 
be more applicable to those wars fought after the middle of the sixteenth 
century.79
Despite the wide influence that Martin Luther had on the settlement of 
religion and the emergence of more assertive secular governments in the Holy 
Roman Empire and Scandinavia, it cannot be said that he was a systematic 
thinker or that he was possessed of political imagination. His passions too 
often got the better of him and caused him to overreact—however sincere his 
desire for reform. He was notably consistent on one doctrine: that it was the 
duty of all Christians to obey constituted authority and never to resist it. 
Although true Christians did not need to be restrained and punished by the 
sword, Luther maintained that there were few true Christians in the world. 
The true Christian, however, submitted himself to the secular power and 
performed duties required by the prince because the sword was needed to 
preserve peace in the world and to restrain the wicked. Princes and magistrates 
were needed to maintain order, and only when peace and order reign could 
the word of God be preached and spread. In his pamphlet Concerning 
Secular Authority (1523), Luther stated that while the ruler also possessed the 
authority to reform the Church, he could not compel men to accept specific 
beliefs that were not sanctioned by Scripture or to worship in a certain way 
contrary to the same.80
In his To the Christian Ruling Class of the German Nation (1520), Luther 
rejected the traditional Catholic teaching that secular rulers have no 
jurisdiction over the Church or that only the pope could summon a church 
council and that the pope possessed authority to depose princes. Luther also 
denied that there was any distinction between clergy and laymen because 
baptism consecrates all Christians and makes them all priests. Bishops and 
priests can baptize and consecrate only because the whole Christian 
congregation has delegated to them that sacerdotal authority that belongs to 
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all Christians. Princes and magistrates were ordained by God “to punish evil- 
doers and to protect the law- abiding,” and this authority to correct extended 
over the clergy as well as the laity, and could be exercised without hindrance 
from popes, bishops, and priests. This gave the princes the authority, from God, 
to reform all things pertaining to religion as long as they abided by sacred 
Scripture. Luther believed that those portions of canon law that decreed 
otherwise were devised by the “archdevil himself.” Luther was too naive to see 
that the princes would not always act in the best interests of the Christian 
community. Accepting Luther’s invitation to reform the churches within their 
jurisdictions, the German princes established Erastian churches. Although 
Luther thought that princes were often fools, he recognized his dependence on 
them when the Peasants’ Revolt broke out in May 1525. Luther actually 
witnessed some of the violence on a journey through Thuringia, and he 
subsequently wrote a ferocious pamphlet entitled Against the Robbing and 
Murderous Hordes of Peasants (1525), in which he urged the princes to crush 
the rebellion with whatever means were necessary.81
Theological and political discourse in sixteenth- century Europe had moved 
beyond the confines of the academic world, and became abusive and incendiary. 
In Germany during the early stages of the Reformation, there had been 
attempts to keep the debate within an academic setting and in Latin. But the 
Protestant and Catholic reformers, even if they came from an academic 
background, could not resist the temptation of playing to a popular audience 
by way of sermons preached and books published in the vernacular—the latter 
of which took advantage of the printing press and lower costs of production. 
Like medieval popes and inquisitors, they staged book burnings to catch the 
attention of the public. The debate grew especially acrimonious in France 
where royal authority was weakened in the second half of the sixteenth century, 
and as Andrew Pettegree says, the Protestants “encouraged disobedience and 
disorder within families” and opened divisions within French society that led 
to religious and civil war. The Catholic polemicists, for their part, depicted 
heresy as such a monstrous thing that popular outrage and violence led almost 
inevitably to such events as the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in Paris.82
Considering what had happened in Bohemia during the Hussite disturbances 
of the fifteenth century, it is small wonder that the Lutheran Reformation 
unleashed forces of social and economic unrest. Religious protests provided a 
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degree of ideological unity to disparate social and economic grievances that 
troubled the feudal and seigneurial societies of the German states as well as 
those lands within and bordering Habsburg Austria, the Holy Roman Empire, 
and the Swiss Confederation. Rural and urban communities both suffered from 
population pressure and inflation, and wages and rents had not adjusted to these 
changed economic conditions. The imperial knights, or the lesser nobility of 
the empire, were losing power and influence to the territorial princes and the 
imperial free cities, and their lawless and undisciplined habits did not accord 
well with the new political and military order. Many served as mercenary soldiers 
to eke out a living, while others lived as robber barons. The problem was especially 
acute in southwestern Germany where Franz von Sickingen led the Knights 
Revolt of 1522–23. Their armed protest failed, and when they retreated to their 
castles for a last stand, their outmoded defensive walls were easily demolished by 
artillery.83
The peasants’ situation was even more desperate. Increasing population had 
made their labor less valuable than it had been in the fifteenth century when 
the workforce was still contracting following the fearful mortality that resulted 
from the Bubonic Plague. They faced the threat of enserfment and greater 
demands on their labor, higher rents, and seigneurial dues, together with a 
diminishment of rights of common in pastures and woodlands. As so many of 
their ancestors had done before them in the medieval period, they vented their 
rage against these injustices by banding together in localized peasant revolts. 
In the period 1513–17, larger peasant leagues began to emerge in southwestern 
Germany and Switzerland such as the German one employing the Bundschuh, 
or laced peasant’s boot, as a symbol of unity in protest against seigneurial 
exactions. In 1525, the Swabian peasants joined in a league and put forth their 
“Twelve Articles” protesting such matters as excessive rents and dues, game 
laws, loss of rights of common, and payments of church tithes, which revealed 
more explicitly the influence of religious reforming movements. The most 
serious combination of peasant social and economic unrest, together with 
religious protest, erupted under the leadership of Thomas Münzer of Zwickau, 
who preached social revolution and hatred of both Catholics and Lutherans, 
and became the leader of the peasants’ army in 1525. He was executed after the 
Battle of Frankenhausen when the peasant army was defeated. Following 
the brutal suppression of the participants in this uprising, Luther regretted 
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some of the harsh words he had written earlier, when he had urged the German 
princes to put down the peasants’ revolt.84
Pope Leo X was so distracted by the threat of renewed Turkish expansion 
into Europe under the leadership of Suleiman the Magnificent that he 
overlooked the danger to Christian unity posed by Martin Luther. Unlike earlier 
challenges to Catholic orthodoxy, the Lutheran Reformation spread rapidly by 
means of inexpensive printed books and pamphlets, and German princes who 
wished to challenge imperial authority also took advantage of the need of both 
papal and imperial authorities to worry about the Turks who had pushed their 
way as far as Belgrade in 1521 and were laying siege to Vienna in 1529. Thus, the 
Turks and the Lutherans were unwitting partners in diminishing papal power 
and allowing Protestantism to expand. For their part, Luther and his followers 
were little interested in joining a crusade against the Ottoman Turks that would 
be proclaimed under papal authority and led by a Catholic prince.85
The Holy Roman Emperor Charles V was a steadfast enemy of Lutheranism 
and an upholder of Catholic orthodoxy, but the necessity of diverting his 
attention to the communeros rebellion of 1520–21 in Spain, the wars with 
Turkey and France, and the arduous task of governing a vast and incoherent 
dynastic empire prevented him from dealing more effectively with the spread 
of Lutheranism and the recalcitrance of the many German territorial princes 
within the Holy Roman Empire who chose to become Lutheran. The Lutheran 
states had trouble reading the emperor’s intentions, and in 1531, formed a 
defensive alliance called the Schmalkald League, which was intended to 
prevent the enforcement of the Edict of Worms that aimed at stopping the 
spread of Lutheran ideas. The resolve of the Lutheran states and cities was 
stiffened when they learned of the formation in 1533 of the Halle League, 
made up of Catholic states and towns. There were also other distractions. 
Religious warfare had already shattered the peace in Switzerland, and the 
advance of the Turks on Vienna compelled Charles V to agree to a truce in 
Germany. Because of numerous delays and attempts to work out a compromise, 
war did not actually break out between the Schmalkald League and the 
Catholic and imperial forces until 1546, and by 1547, the emperor had defeated 
the Lutheran states’ armies. By this time, of course, Luther was dead. After a 
generation of Lutheran evangelization, Catholic unity was destroyed. There 
was no going back, and both Lutheran and Catholic states were disposed to 
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accept the status quo, which was embodied in the Religious Peace of Augsburg 
of 1555. While other European rulers and governments also attempted to 
impose religious settlements on their territories requiring adherence to a state 
church and providing punishments for those who did not conform, such as 
Spain, Portugal, the Italian states, and the British kingdoms, the religious 
situation in the Holy Roman Empire (including the German lands and much 
of Hungary), Switzerland, and France was too complex to admit of a similar 
solution. In general terms, the Peace of Augsburg brought a limited amount of 
religious toleration to Germany; the treaty specified that only one religion, as 
authorized by the ruler, could be practiced in each state or city. Anabaptists, 
Zwinglians, and Calvinists were excluded from the terms of the peace.86
But the Treaty of Augsburg did contain some exceptions to the rule of one 
religion only in one jurisdiction. In a number of German towns, Catholics and 
Protestants were forced to accept one another as neighbors however much 
they disliked one another’s religion. One such town was Biberach in Upper 
Swabia, a cloth town, where the Emperor Charles V in 1548, following the 
Schmalkaldic War, compelled the majority Lutherans to share the one parish 
church with the minority Catholics. This was one of a number of Simultankirken 
in Germany. Each held their own liturgies conducted by their own clergy in the 
church, but by imperial decree, at different specified times. The church interior 
had a clock that rang out the hours to ensure that the allotted times were 
precisely observed. The Peace of Augsburg settled this issue permanently, and 
required the two groups of worshipers to cooperate. Other biconfessional 
towns included Ulm, Ravensburg, Dinkelsbühl, Donauwörth, Aachen, 
Augsburg, Colmar, and the Dutch city of Maastricht. Biconfessionalism was 
also guaranteed in hundreds of urban and rural communities in France by 
the Edicts of Nantes. In Augsburg, the largest of the biconfessional cities, 
antagonism between the two religious factions was especially fierce, and they 
continued to be confrontational well into the eighteenth century in an attempt 
to maintain their confessional identities; yet, the Lutherans and Catholics 
obeyed the law and managed to govern the city together because the right of 
each to hold municipal and guild offices as well as to worship separately was 
guaranteed by law. The consequence of the Peace of Augsburg was political 
fragmentation carried to an extreme, but it ended violent religious conflict in 
the German states for more than half a century.87
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There were always those who rejected force as a means of maintaining 
Christian unity. Georg Wetzel was a German priest who followed Luther for 
nine years before returning to the Catholic Church. He was opposed to 
religious war because he thought it was incompatible with Christianity, and 
declared that “it behooves the wise man to try all things rather than weapons.” 
Wetzel was a Christian humanist and an admirer of Erasmus who devoted his 
career to attempting to reconcile Lutherans and Catholics. He was very much 
a Catholic reformer, but in his own way. He sought to strip away the dogmatic 
and liturgical accretions of the centuries, and return to the simple liturgy of the 
second century, which would have incorporated sermons based on the Gospels, 
communion in both kinds, and prayer in the vernacular language—all of 
which were features that would have appealed to Lutherans and other 
Protestants. Wetzel remained convinced that dialogue could reunite Christians. 
There were also Protestants, such as Philip Menlanchton and Martin Bucer, 
who were prepared to engage in dialogues or colloquies, such as the one held 
at Regensburg in 1541 with Cardinal Contarini.88
But other voices prevailed. The Lutheran and Zwinglian attacks on Catholic 
doctrine and worship provoked a Catholic reaction known as the Counter-
Reformation or the Catholic Reformation. This movement was based in part on 
decrees issued by the Council of Trent (1545–63), but it also incorporated older 
reforming efforts. The Counter-Reformation was spearheaded by the founding 
of new religious orders such as the Jesuits, the Theatines, and the Capuchins, or 
reformed Franciscans. Although persuasion may have been the dominant thrust 
of the Counter-Reformation, force always lurked in the background. The half 
century of peace that followed the Peace of Augsburg was undermined by the 
militancy of the Emperor Ferdinand II, who had been taught to hate 
Protestantism by his Jesuit tutors. Ferdinand’s Jesuit confessor, William 
Lamormaini, thought that the emperor had a divine mandate to restore 
Catholicism in Germany and the Habsburg lands. Lamormaini derived this idea 
from the Old Testament notion of holy war. Ferdinand began to extirpate 
Protestantism when he was entrusted with the government of the Austrian 
province of Styria, and next he turned his attention to Bohemia as king of the 
Bohemians. As ruler of that country, Ferdinand instructed the papal nuncio, 
Giovanni Caraffa, to close all Protestant schools, purge the University of Prague 
of all Protestants, and compel townsmen, landowners, and peasants to become 
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Catholics or suffer fines and imprisonment. Probably a quarter of the landowners 
and townsmen left Bohemia rather than convert to Catholicism. Ferdinand’s 
views were shared by Maximilian of Bavaria, who was his chief ally at the 
beginning of the Thirty Years War. One of Ferdinand’s most provocative acts was 
the Edict of Restitution of 1629, which sought to recover all lands of the Catholic 
Church that had been secularized or had fallen into Protestant hands since 
1552.89 During the reign of Ferdinand II and continuing through the reign of 
Charles VI, much of Bohemia, Austria, and the German lands of the Habsburg 
Empire were reconverted to Catholicism. The methods used were to isolate 
Protestant communities, to sever their communications with Protestant centers 
elsewhere, and to prevent stubborn individuals from emigrating, a right 
guaranteed under the Peace of Westphalia. Protestant congregations were placed 
under the supervision of Catholic prelates, and individuals were conscripted 
into military service or forced labor and denied the right to hold public office. 
Some were sent to regions farther to the east on the Turkish-Hungarian frontier. 
The Jesuits preached their sermons with soldiers in the background, and the 
result was often no more than outward conformity.90
The impact of the Counter-Reformation was delayed in France by the 
religious and civil wars and by royal hostility to ultramontane influences, but it 
flourished in the lands ruled by the Habsburgs, where it was skillfully harnessed 
to further dynastic ambitions. The Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis of 1559 favored 
the Habsburgs—especially the Spanish branch: it established Spanish hegemony 
in Europe, terminated the illusion of papal political power in Italy, and put an 
end to France’s hegemonic ambitions as well its role as an ally in European 
politics of the Ottoman Turks. The political landscape of Italy had also changed 
in the years preceding the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. The Spanish Habsburgs 
had consolidated political control in the Italian peninsula despite French 
efforts to prevent this. Milan had become a military base to supply the Spanish 
Army of Flanders by way of the “Spanish Road,” an overland supply route 
between northern Italy and the southern Low Countries. Under Spanish 
hegemony, the rulers of the Italian states such as Florence constructed very 
powerful absolutist states with the instruments of finance and military force.91
War and rebellion dominated the politics of the Spanish Empire. Whereas 
Charles V, like a medieval king, had led his soldiers into battle, his son Philip II 
was a monarch who ruled and made war through a bureaucracy. Being 
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unfamiliar with the unpredictable nature of warfare, he assumed that the end 
of the wars with France after the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis afforded him the 
resources to make war on the Ottoman Turks instead of going ahead with 
plans to seek a truce. Philip did not believe in negotiating with rebels or 
heretics. He was unable to compromise or negotiate, and was extremely 
inflexible. This apparently arose out of his fear of appearing weak. This was a 
dangerous strategy considering the growing strength of Calvinism in France 
and the Low Countries. His policies for governing his subjects also led to 
rebellion and civil war. However, as conscientious a monarch as Philip was, his 
choice of Madrid as his capital city and his preference for employing Castilians 
as councillors encouraged a growing animosity between Castilians and 
Aragonese, Catalans, and other subjects who lived in places as separated as 
Naples, the Low Countries, New Castile, Portugal, and Brazil.92
The political landscape of Italy had also changed in the years preceding the 
Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. Believing that the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis 
had brought peace to northwestern Europe, Philip II turned his attention to 
the Mediterranean and the Turkish foes. In planning his strategy, he 
overestimated Spanish resources for making war on the Turks and exaggerated 
Turkish decline. When he committed a major part of Spanish fiscal resources 
to the Mediterranean war effort, he left the Spanish viceroys in the Low 
Countries with insufficient means to deal with the Dutch Revolt. But he could 
not ignore the fact that the Turks were on the march, and that Italy and the 
islands of Malta and Cyprus were the principal barriers against Turkish 
expansion in the western Mediterranean. The Turkish naval forces had 
improved their effectiveness, and the Ottoman Turks had forged an alliance 
with the corsairs of Moorish North Africa. In fact, the Turks possessed 
enormous resources for making war, and the Islamic threat was heightened by 
the rebellion in 1568 of the Moriscos of Granada, the Moors who had 
supposedly converted to Christianity, but surreptitiously continued to practice 
the Muslim religion. Following the suppression of this revolt, the Moriscos 
were expelled from Granada and dispersed throughout Castile. Because of the 
continuing difficulty in assimilating the Moriscos, a quarter of a million of 
them were expelled from Spain in the reign of Philip III. After the Turks 
invaded Cyprus, Philip II acceded to Pope Pius V’s urgent plea for a crusading 
war against the Turks, and a Spanish naval fleet, joined by the Venetians and 
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the Genoese, was launched to make war on the Ottomans. The battle was 
joined September 16, 1571, at Lepanto in the Gulf of Corinth, and the Turkish 
navy was defeated.93
The Revolt of the Netherlands grew out of aristocratic and popular 
discontent with Spanish rule, and a Calvinist opposition to the militantly 
Catholic practices of the Spanish Habsburgs, which were even more harsh in 
the Spanish Netherlands than in Spain. Nationalism also played an important 
role, and led to one of the longest of European conflicts, the Eighty Years War 
(1568–1648), as the Dutch call their war of independence. The Low Countries 
were divided by the conflict, and only the northern half gained independence 
from Spain. The southern half was occupied by the Spanish Army of Flanders, 
a well- disciplined force with competent leaders, while the configuration of the 
coast of the Northern Netherlands together with their many waterways and 
islands allowed the irregular Dutch naval forces, known as the “Sea Beggars,” to 
hinder the operation of the Spanish land forces in what became known as the 
Dutch Republic.94
When Philip II inherited the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands in 
1555 he was determined to crush Protestantism. He began by increasing the 
number of Catholic bishoprics in the Low Countries from four to eighteen, 
and he gained papal approval for appointing all of the archbishops and bishops. 
His revamping of the ecclesiastical government went hand in hand with the 
integration of the Inquisition into the episcopal administration of the dioceses 
so as to stop the flow of Protestant ideas, books, and refugees into the Low 
Countries. Philip’s attempts to confessionalize the Seventeen Provinces violated 
many local privileges and customs and was at variance with the more tolerant 
attitudes that characterized Netherlandish culture and society. Politically, it 
forced a number of burghers and noblemen into opposition. The reaction of 
popular Protestantism was to challenge the ecclesiastical establishment by 
delivering public sermons and mounting a wave of iconoclasm beginning in 
1566, which destroyed images in hundreds of Catholic churches. After the 
armed revolt began, the Sea Beggars made it difficult for the Spanish Army of 
Flanders, under the command of the Duke of Parma, to operate in the maritime 
provinces such as Holland and Zeeland.95
The establishment of the Reformed religion in the Province of Holland 
owed much to the forceful tactics of the Sea Beggars, who began occupying the 
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towns after 1571–72. Although the stadholder and leader of the Dutch revolt, 
William of Orange, worked for a policy of toleration of both Calvinism and 
Catholicism, the Beggars entered on a campaign of murdering priests—
especially friars—and destroying Catholic buildings and images. It is open to 
question whether the Beggars were convinced Calvinists or merely antireligious. 
While William of Orange was devoted to promoting religious peace and 
toleration, he chose to finance the Dutch resistance to the Spanish with 
treasures plundered from Catholic churches rather than impose an unpopular 
tax. The Calvinists found that the cause of reform was not easy to carry out 
because the municipal corporations of Holland, which still included many 
Catholics, were uncooperative about assigning Catholic parish churches to 
Reformed congregations. This helps to explain why members of the Reformed 
religion continued to invade and vandalize Catholic parish churches. The 
magistrates of Leiden, Gouda, and other towns sought to deal with this popular 
violence and iconoclasm by closing Catholic churches, which effectively 
banned the Catholic liturgy. The prohibition against saying mass proved to be 
permanent, and as a consequence, many Catholic clergy departed. Thereafter, 
only Calvinist services were performed in public after the States General 
banned the Catholic mass in 1581 despite the fact that only a minority of the 
population were of the Reformed persuasion. This remained true as late as 
1600. Yet, failure to attend the services of the Reformed Church was an offense, 
and membership came to be a requirement for holding public office. Whenever 
Spanish forces captured a town in Holland, Reformed ministers were 
sometimes executed. Consequently, most people chose to remain uncommitted 
to either religious faction. In the countryside, support of the Reformed religion 
was very weak.96
As the more stringent members of the Reformed religion migrated from 
Flanders and Brabant to Holland and the northern provinces to escape Spanish 
control, they remained a minority because not all of their sympathizers were 
disposed to accept strict presbyterian discipline. Although they were a minority, 
they were well organized and attempted to forbid Catholic practices. At the 
same time, public sentiment was strong that no one should be compelled to 
accept one particular religion, and Catholics were tolerated as long as they did 
not worship in public. Above all, the Dutch magistrates wanted to maintain 
religious peace because discord would weaken resistance to the Spanish. The 
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Dutch were also well aware of the bloodshed that confessional disputes had 
brought in France and Germany. In 1578, the Synod of Dordrecht issued its 
Supplication, a document that advocated religious peace as a political solution 
to the growing discord among the Dutch religious parties and provinces. The 
Supplication was also meant to lend support to William of Orange’s campaign 
for religious concord. Another widely circulated pamphlet, The Admonition 
and Advice for the Netherlands, attributed to the French Huguenot, Philippe 
Duplessis-Mornay, also argued that religious concord must be the foundation 
of the Dutch Republic if it were to avoid civil war and survive. The persecution 
of heresy only led to sedition. Christians of different denominations should 
attempt to convert one another only by preaching, not by force. The Dutch 
religious compromise partly repudiated the teachings of John Calvin, who 
never accepted the concept of religious liberty, but it cannot be said to have 
granted full toleration because religious minorities were not allowed to 
worship in public.97 Patriotic sentiment continued to identify Catholicism 
with loyalty to the Spanish regime, and the Catholic religion remained illegal 
and could only be practiced in private. Many Catholics fled south to the 
Flemish provinces, which remained under Spanish control while the seven 
northern provinces formed the loose confederation that became the Dutch 
Republic whose independence was recognized in 1648 at the end of the Eighty 
Years War. While Calvinism remained the only officially recognized religion, 
Jewish merchants and artisans fleeing persecution in Spain and Portugal, as 
well as others seeking an escape from repressive regimes, found a guarded 
welcome in Dutch cities such as Amsterdam, but this culture of toleration was 
not recognized by Dutch law.98
The Dutch Republic was born of war; the central institutions of the Dutch 
state were almost entirely military and diplomatic in nature. The Dutch liked to 
cultivate the myth that they were a peace- loving people, and had no territorial 
ambitions in Europe nor war heroes. It is true that they were little motivated by 
honor or military reputation, but they were ruthless enough to pursue their 
economic ambitions in a number of naval and colonial wars. Their naval and 
military forces always contained numerous foreign mercenaries until the end 
of the Republic. The Dutch themselves preferred civilian pursuits—especially 
those of a mercantile nature, and they had a small demographic base and a 
relative scarcity of labor. For this reason, foreign volunteers and mercenaries, 
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especially from England, Scotland, and France, together with many Protestant 
volunteers from the German territories, made up for the small number of 
Dutch soldiers in the States’ Army as the Dutch land forces were called. Under 
the leadership of the Stadholder Maurice of Nassau, later styled Prince of 
Orange, the States’ Army became a highly trained and disciplined military 
organization that drew many gentlemen volunteers from all over central and 
northwestern Europe who wished to learn the latest methods of warfare that 
modern military historians associate with the Military Revolution. The 
Protestant movement in the Dutch half of the Netherlands was less rigidly 
Calvinist, more humanist, and politically flexible than was the case with the 
French Huguenots. Nor were all of the provinces of the United Netherlands as 
Calvinist as was the case with Holland and Zeeland. Catholics remained a 
strong minority elsewhere. For this reason, the Eighty Years War was less 
overtly religious than were the French Wars of Religion.99
By the end of the sixteenth century Spain, drawing on the bullion that it had 
plundered in the New World, had built a huge empire, and had become the 
greatest power in the world, but had exhausted its resources on imperial and 
military adventures. When Philip III succeeded his father Philip II in 1598, the 
Spanish thought that their empire was greater than that of Rome and they had 
prospered thus far because they were, like the ancient Hebrews, a chosen 
people. They were also familiar with the belief, expounded by Polybius after 
witnessing the destruction of Carthage, that states are living organisms, and 
that periods of greatness are usually followed by decline and extinction. This 
made Philip III and the Spanish ruling class determined to preserve their 
empire and reputation. It was understood by political philosophers such as 
Giovanni Botero that preserving a state was more difficult than building an 
empire. This meant pursuing a foreign and military policy that would secure 
peace with the Dutch in their long war for independence from Spain without 
allowing it to appear that the Dutch had humiliated Spain and gained their 
independence. Likewise, the Spanish Habsburgs wished to secure an honorable 
peace settlement for their Habsburg cousins in Germany that would appease 
the Protestant princes and cities, and not drive them to take up arms again. 
This awareness of Spanish declinación, or decline, led to the policy promoted 
by Gaspar de Guzmán, Count- duke of Olivares, to reform the economy so as 
to increase revenues, maintain military strength, and preserve the empire. This 
Holy Wars, Crusades, and Religious Wars 155
so- called pax hispanica led Spain to revive the war in the Netherlands at the 
end of the Twelve Years Truce in 1621, and to intervene in the Rhenish 
Palatinate and to help the Austrian Habsburgs crush the Bohemian Revolt at 
the beginning of the Thirty Years War.100
French religious wars
One of the consequences of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis was that France, 
having withdrawn from foreign wars, was led into religious and civil wars. The 
peace settlement came about because Valois France and Habsburg Spain were 
both on the verge of bankruptcy and feared the spread of heresy and 
confessional strife within their realms. As a result of Cateau-Cambrésis, 
England lost Calais, France retained a few former Imperial cities in Lorraine, 
but was expelled from the Italian peninsula and Corsica. Savoy emerged as a 
strong state and an ally of Spain. Since the head of the Montmorency family, 
Anne, Duke of Montmorency and Constable of France, was blamed for France’s 
humiliation as one of the negotiators of the treaty, Charles of Guise, Cardinal 
of Lorraine, and his brother, Francis, Duke of Guise, did everything they could 
to destroy their Montmorency rivals. Following the accidental death of King 
Francis II in a jousting tournament in 1560, royal power fell into the hands of 
Catherine de Médicis, the Italian queen mother and her four ineffective sons, 
but was much diminished as the Guises on the one hand and the Montmorencys 
and the Colignys on the other vied for control of the rival Ultra-Catholic and 
Huguenot factions. France could no longer afford foreign adventures as the 
country dissolved in a series of religious and civil wars. This diminished the 
Habsburg-Valois rivalry during the latter part of the sixteenth century.101
The Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis left impoverished nobles in France, who 
had previously fought in the Italian wars, without employment. The French 
crown depended on the support of the French nobility, who had willingly 
followed monarchs such as Francis I and Henry II when they personally led 
their soldiers into battle. However, Francis II, only fifteen years of age when he 
became king in 1559, lacked military experience, and was too young to play the 
commander. Many of the provincial governors of France were high- ranking 
nobles, who had fought in Italy or resided at court in the time of Francis I and 
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Henry II. But after the end of the foreign wars, they lived in the provinces that 
they governed and commanded large escorts of armed noble clients who 
followed them about when they traveled through their jurisdictions. This 
brought about a militarization of French society, which exacerbated the 
confessional disputes and undermined royal authority. Disaffected nobles 
who were denied patronage or who were disgusted by the corruption and 
venality at court and among the higher nobility were often attracted to the 
Huguenot party.102
Protestantism in France first spread among the more humble social orders—
especially urban craftsmen. However, in the 1560s, Calvinism made many 
converts among the nobility, and probably between one- third and one- half of 
French noble families became Huguenots at one time or another. Because 
there was so much popular hostility to the meetings and conventicles of the 
Huguenots, these noblemen, who mostly still regarded themselves as soldiers, 
took it on themselves to provide armed protection for the meetings, and 
organized themselves and their retainers into a sort of militia commanded by 
captains of congregations and colonels of provincial colloquies. Also, as a 
consequence of the numerous popular tumults of the latter part of the 
fourteenth century, the nobles had grown wary of arming the people. Thus, 
Huguenot communities had organized themselves along military lines, and 
were ready for action when the first of the religious and civil wars broke out in 
1562. While the French nobility had been hit hard by the inflation associated 
with the Price Revolution of the sixteenth century and the lack of opportunity 
for winning martial glory and booty abroad after the Peace of Cateau-
Cambrésis, the main reason for the recruitment of so many of the French 
nobility to the Huguenot cause probably had more to do with the influence of 
the bastard feudal system of patronage and clientage, which compelled many 
of the lesser noblemen to follow the political leadership of their patrons among 
the greater nobility.103
In the medieval period, the Catholic Church often had a role in peace- 
making, but confessional divisions had diminished that role, and aristocratic 
feuding made the bitterness of the French Religious Wars even worse. The role 
of royal leadership became more important as the process of peace and 
reconciliation fell to the monarchy. Queen Catherine de Médicis played an 
important part at court at the beginning of the French Religious Wars, and her 
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influence on the peace- making process was significant. Although she was a 
staunch Catholic, her main concern remained the survival of the dynasty, 
which was represented by her four young sons. For this reason, she urged a 
compromise with the Huguenots, which resulted in the Edict of January 1562, 
also known as the Edict of Saint-Germain, which allowed the Huguenots a 
degree of freedom of worship. The thrust of royal peace- making was political 
and social unity rather than religious uniformity. However, the Huguenots’ 
prêches, or meetings, could not be held publicly within walled towns. Some 
Huguenots were not content with these concessions since they expected parish 
churches to be handed over to them. The Catholic leaders were outraged by the 
arrogance of the Huguenots and began preparing for war. The first major act of 
violence occurred when the Duke of Guise stopped to hear mass in the town 
of Vassy. A large crowd of Huguenots had gathered in a nearby barn to attend 
their meeting. Since Vassy was a walled town, where Reformed worship was by 
law prohibited, the duke ordered the Huguenots to disperse, but, instead, the 
Huguenots threw stones at him. Guise’s retainers fired into the barn where the 
Huguenots were meeting and killed 23 and wounded more than 100. When 
Guise returned to the predominantly Catholic city of Paris after the so- called 
massacre at Vassy, he was welcomed as a hero, and did his best to appeal for 
popular support for his cause. Queen Catherine recognized that Guise was a 
bad influence on her son, King Charles IX, and appealed to Henry, Prince of 
Condé, to rescue him from Guise’s influence, which only worsened the 
factionalism. Condé refused the opportunity, but the French nobility began 
choosing sides for the coming conflict. However, Catherine’s hand was 
strengthened in the Royal Council.104
The teachings of John Calvin were the source of the Reformed religion in 
France. Calvin was born and educated in France, but had taken up residence 
in Geneva, in the French- speaking region of Switzerland, which may have 
limited his direct political influence, but did little to minimize his enormous 
intellectual influence as contained in the Institutes of the Christian Religion 
(1536), which went through various revised editions and set forth the most 
systematic exposition of Reformed doctrine. Calvin’s teachings concerning the 
role of Divine Providence are noteworthy for the uncompromising doctrine of 
predestination that instilled in Calvin’s followers a militancy and fatalism that 
disposed them to believe that they were the agents of God’s will on earth. The 
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Reformed religion was the most international variety of Protestantism, and 
Calvin’s followers were responsible for helping to bring about the Religious 
Wars in France, the Dutch Revolt against Spain, the Thirty Years War in the 
Holy Roman Empire, not forgetting the religious and civil wars of the British 
Isles.105 Calvin’s doctrine of Divine Providence appears to obliterate human 
free will and to make use of evil agents to perpetrate horrors such as war and 
all its accompanying calamities to carry out His divine will. This appears to 
make God the author of all evil deeds, but Calvin made a distinction between 
what God did and what He permitted. Calvin thought that it was impious to 
attribute such evil deeds to His divine will.106
When the Reformed religion began to take hold in France, Calvin was very 
careful not to become openly involved in the religious and political conflicts 
because he always emphasized the obligation to obey the civil powers when he 
wrote to the leaders of Reformed congregations in France. However, it does 
appear that Calvin had previous knowledge of the Conspiracy of Amboise of 
1560 when some of the Huguenot nobility attacked a royal palace in order to 
free King Henry II from Guise influence. Calvin later privately expressed the 
opinion that the deaths of Henry II and Francis II were providential acts of 
deliverance. There were those who urged Calvin to come out openly and 
support the king of Navarre, whom many Huguenots viewed as a leader, but he 
had no wish to listen to “the noisy outcries of the multitude.” Calvin taught that 
secular and spiritual government were quite distinct. The purpose of secular 
government was “to foster and protect the external worship of God” and “to 
defend pure doctrine.” It should also promote civil concord and dispose good 
Christians to accept a mode of behavior compatible with “civil justice.” Like 
Luther, he thought that while the elect of God might not need these restraints, 
“the effrontery of the wicked is so great, and their evil- doing so incorrigible, 
that laws of great severity are scarcely enough to keep them in check.”107
Calvin stated that rulers and magistrates were ministers of God, and subjects 
had no right to resist them. If a ruler was harsh and evil, then that might simply 
mean that he had been sent by God to punish the sins of his subjects. But 
Calvin did allow exceptions to the rule that subjects may not rebel against their 
princes: Sometimes certain divinely appointed messengers were charged with 
liberating good people from the rule of tyrants, or magistrates might sometimes 
act to restrain the evil deeds of tyrants. Although Christians had a general 
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obligation to obey their rulers, those rulers could also void their authority by 
stepping outside the bounds of good government. That would allow their 
subjects to resist them. It would seem that Calvin’s political thought always 
contained ambiguities, which sometimes approached equivocation. Although 
he feared anarchy, Calvin also opened the door to tyrannicide. Some of Calvin’s 
disciples, such as John Knox, even went so far as to openly advocate tyrannicide. 
And certainly, the Huguenot nobility had no qualms in resorting to armed 
rebellion, but they often clothed such resistance as the restoration of good 
government.108
Calvin assumed that rulers and their appointed officials possessed authority 
to seek “public vengeance” on those who seditiously disturbed the peace by 
rebellion, and they could also use that same authority to punish those who 
invaded a country without right. It made no difference whether the foreign 
invaders were kings or “the lowest of the common folk.” They were all to be 
regarded as robbers and punished accordingly. Calvin was especially fearful 
that countries might be invaded by Anabaptists or other radical sects. He was 
happy to see the attempt by the popular party of reformers who had attempted 
by violence to gain control of the municipal government of Schaffhausen, 
Switzerland, defeated. They had meant to impose a more radical religious 
settlement, and Calvin attributed their defeat to divine intervention.109
The Edict of Saint-Germain of 1562 signified a noteworthy departure in 
royal policy in that it attempted to impose a political solution on the religious 
conflict of the preceding months, which had seen an attempt by the Guise 
faction, led by Francis, Duke of Guise, to control the young king, Francis II. 
This was followed by the Conspiracy of Amboise, by which the Huguenots 
attempted to seize the person of Francis II, which was thwarted by the Guise 
followers with much bloodshed. When Francis died in 1560, his younger 
brother Charles IX, who was three years of age, became king and his mother, 
Catherine de Médicis, appointed herself regent and drove the Guises out of the 
court. She subsequently sought to heal the breach by bringing representatives 
of the two factions together at Poissy in 1561. The Guises had responded to the 
Edict of Saint-Germain with the massacre at Vassy in March 1562. So began 
the Wars of Religion. The novelty of the Edict of Saint-Germain was that it 
broke with the formula of earlier Reformation religious settlements that had 
insisted that the ruler decided the religion of his or her realm and maintained 
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absolute religious uniformity. The Edict of Saint-Germain, which was authored 
by Catherine de Médicis, Michel de l’Hôpital, and Jean de Montlac, asserted 
the doctrine of tolerance as a means of maintaining political unity. Actually, 
the toleration granted to the Huguenots was quite limited, and this edict was 
meant to be only a temporary measure until unity of religious practice could 
be restored.110
The decision to impose a political solution and grant a degree of toleration 
to the Huguenots was determined partly by the fact that decisions in the Royal 
Council were no longer advisory, but were determined by a binding majority 
vote. These votes were very close, and Catherine de Médicis sought to avoid 
being identified with only one faction, but rather attempted to keep a dialogue 
going between members of the council without abandoning the initiative. The 
increasing importance of securing a majority vote within the Royal Council 
appears to reflect a growing view that sovereignty did not reside within the 
king’s person, but rather in the concept of a larger sovereign body that 
incorporated the views and interests of those officials who were the enforcers 
of royal power, as well as the Parlements and the Estates General, which came 
to meet more frequently during this period. These ideas anticipated the later 
monarchomach concept of a mixed monarchy in which the king recognized 
that his personal power was limited. One adherent of the monarchomach 
school of thought, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, a Huguenot and a politique, 
went so far as to argue that there was a covenant among God, the king, and his 
subjects that justified rebellion if the king disobeyed God’s commandments.111
Even before the Religious Wars began in France, a loosely associated group 
of moyenneurs emerged that wished to pursue reconciliation between the 
Catholic and Reformed leaders. They included the queen mother, Catherine de 
Médicis, Michel de l’Hôpital, and a few royal councillors, prelates, and Sorbonne 
theologians. Their efforts were rooted in the Erasmian program of concord 
and their goal was a reunion of the different factions—perhaps by means of a 
church council. L’Hôpital realized that concord and reunion were distant 
prospects, and accepted the fact that France would, for the time being, have 
to live with a diversity of religious beliefs and practices, or what we call 
toleration, as a matter of practical politics. The alternative was religious warfare. 
Religion, he thought, was “what keeps a subject from obeying his king, and 
what causes rebellions.”112
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The politiques were mostly a faction of Catholics who broke with the 
mainstream of Catholicism in France in the early 1570s. Their ranks included 
a few Protestants such as François de la Noue. Following the failed attempt of 
a royal army to take La Rochelle by siege from the Huguenot defenders in 
1572, they realized that the Royalist forces lacked the resources to defeat the 
Protestants—especially the Huguenot leagues in the south of France—and 
came to believe that religious toleration, or the official recognition of two 
religions, was the only way to achieve peace. Some regarded the politiques as 
being little better than atheists; many were actually what we would call skeptics 
and utilitarians. They believed that toleration was the only way to avoid the 
breakup of the kingdom and achieve peace. Montaigne thought that the 
Religious Wars not only corrupted public morals, but that the differences 
between the two religions were exaggerated. Catholics and Huguenots had 
more in common than was generally admitted. Therefore, religious persecution 
was futile. At the same time, most politiques believed in a limited monarchy 
that needed to work with the Estates-General. Many were also drawn to 
Gallicanism, the belief in an autonomous Catholic Church in France, which 
would effectively limit papal intervention in French religious politics. In order 
to resist this papal interference, which was disinclined to accept toleration of 
heresy, the politiques were later drawn to uphold the concept of absolute 
monarchy. These were also the views of Henry of Bourbon-Navarre, the future 
King Henry IV, and the Huguenots who were also increasingly drawn to accept 
his leadership and the politique position.113
The Cardinal of Lorraine and the Guises were the leaders of the Ultra-
Catholic party in France and did much to fan the flames of animosity by 
proposing a “Brotherhood of Catholics in France”; they also invited Catholic 
powers such as Spain and Savoy to intervene in France. The Parlement of Paris 
organized a militia, but the Holy League (sainte ligue) was mostly a provincial 
movement. Catholic militancy against the Huguenots was first mobilized in 
1561 in the southwest of France, and the leadership was provided by the 
nobility, including some army officers under the command of Blaise de Monluc, 
with the assistance of local clergy.114 In Bordeaux, lay Catholics resisted 
attempts by Huguenots to alter the liturgy in a parish church by preaching a 
sermon along with a baptism, and by attempting to bury their dead in the 
parish cemetery. After demanding the church keys, Catholic parishioners 
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stoned the Protestants, and a riot broke out. Subsequently, the president of the 
Parlement of Bordeaux ordered the arrest of fourteen parishioners. The other 
parishioners immediately demanded their release. Citizens of Bordeaux and 
the inhabitants of the suburbs began organizing secret societies to protect the 
Catholic religion, and a number of members of the Parlement lent their 
support to those who resisted the Huguenots.115 Similar organizations appeared 
in Toulouse, where officers and soldiers swore to extirpate Huguenots and 
formed an association to which royal officials and the Cardinal of Armagnac 
lent their support. The Parlement of Toulouse authorized a Catholic League in 
March 1563, which had the power to levy taxes, swear adherents to obey its 
covenant and orders, and the authority to establish armories in every diocese 
and civil jurisdiction. Blaise de Monluc was appointed to command the 
Catholic League Army. Municipal and provincial leagues spread throughout 
the south, but a strong Catholic League movement did not develop in the 
north of France before 1568 when the Confraternity of the Holy Spirit was 
formed under the command of Marshal Saulx Tavannes, one of the procurers 
of the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. The local companies of this Catholic 
League Army, which included many professional soldiers of all ranks, pursued 
Huguenots from village to village with firebrands, and burnt and demolished 
the houses and chateaux of Huguenots or anyone who sheltered them. 
Collectively, the actions of the Catholic militants took on the form of a crusade. 
The patronage of Catherine de Médicis was sought, and pamphlets began to 
appear setting forth the historical precedents for punishing heretics to be 
found in the Albigensian Crusade.116
The French Wars of Religion displayed the characteristics of confessional 
strife found in other wars of the period of the Reformation, but also retained 
some of the features of earlier crusades against the heretical Cathars of 
medieval France. Members of confraternities formed at Dijon and Toulouse 
during the first of the religious wars wore the white cross of the earlier 
crusaders when going into battle or defending their cities against the Huguenot 
enemy, and were granted indulgences by Pope Pius V. The white crusaders’ 
cross was a sign of defiance against Huguenots, who held that symbol in 
particular horror. These newer confraternities resembled those that had been 
organized in 1212 at Marseilles by the papal legate for deployment against the 
Albigensians. The sixteenth- century confraternities frequently grew out of 
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guilds that had been formed by urban tradesmen, but were often joined by 
members of the nobility.117
Popular opposition in France to Protestantism often drew on popular 
religious rituals and organizations. These might imitate Good Friday 
processions or perhaps the dramaturgy of late- medieval flagellants; participants 
sometimes carried large crucifixes. Such processions often began at the door of 
the parish church with the priest carrying the Holy Sacrament. Among the 
religious organizations that perpetrated violence against Huguenots were lay 
religious confraternities. Some were newly founded to defend the Catholic 
faith against Calvinist reform; others were medieval confraternities revived 
after falling into disuse. These confraternities provided an organized outlet for 
the violence of the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of 1572 in Paris. Similar 
incidents on a smaller scale in provincial towns such as Toulouse, Limoges, 
and Aix- en-Provence were also carried out by confraternities.118
As in German biconfessional cities, the frequent religious processions 
staged by Parisian Catholics flaunted the images, relics, and other symbols of 
their faith and enraged Protestants; the latter were derided because of their 
refusal to participate in these civic and religious spectacles. Catholic processions 
were frequent in the years during which religious conflict manifested itself. 
These processions expressed not just religious fervor, but also loyalty to the 
monarchy and community solidarity. To take part in such processions, as one 
clerical pamphleteer put it, constituted “a public profession of faith.” They were 
also associated with the veneration of saints, such as Sainte Geneviève, a patron 
saint of Paris—a practice which especially offended Protestants. The increased 
frequency of such processions was associated with the diminution of royal 
power that led to the Religious Wars and the growth of heresy in Paris. 
Henry II, when he ascended the throne in 1559, ordered a procession 
specifically directed against heretics in which a number of them were burned 
at three different locations. Protestants responded with rioting and the 
smashing of statues in parish churches.119
The Huguenots invited the hostility of Catholics by setting themselves 
apart, affecting a moral superiority to their neighbors and refusing to 
participate in popular religious festivities. They also disrupted Catholic services 
with acts of violence and iconoclasm. Huguenot synods were often 
inflammatory, and the Wars of Religion had been preceded by Huguenot 
War and Peace in the Western Political Imagination164
revolts in a number of French cities, which also mobilized Catholic opinion 
against the Calvinists.120
The Huguenots also contributed to the Wars of Religion by refusing to abide 
by the terms of the Peace of Amboise of 1563, which ended the First Civil War. 
This agreement specified that the royal government would protect and support 
the Calvinist religion in all towns where it prevailed except Paris; in one town 
in each jurisdiction, Calvinist preaching was to be allowed, and the royal 
government was to pay for the upkeep of the Huguenot army. In the countryside, 
Huguenot lords who were licensed to dispense justice might have preaching 
within their households. The Peace of Amboise was difficult to enforce because 
the royal army could not contain the violence; both Catholics and Huguenots 
were armed, and civil violence continued in many parts of France.121
As the religious warfare continued, the Huguenots were subjected to a great 
deal of popular violence. The horror of the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of 
August 24, 1572, in Paris reverberated through provincial towns. Three 
thousand Huguenots, including their leader Admiral Coligny, were killed in 
Paris, and another 10,000 in provincial towns. During the rampages in Orleans, 
rioters broke into the houses of Huguenots and demanded money, plate, and 
jewels as ransom to spare their lives. The Protestants were then put to death 
whether they paid or not. All of this was done in the spirit of carnival. Similar 
massacres occurred in Bourges, Rouen, Meaux, Angers, Saumur, Lyons, Troyes, 
Bordeaux, Toulouse, and several other provincial cities following news of the 
bloody events in Paris. The leadership in these wholesale slaughters was usually 
popular, but the perpetrators claimed to be acting on the king’s orders. This 
was often the pretext offered for earlier religious riots. In actuality, Charles IX 
had written to his provincial governors and lieutenants commanding them to 
prevent the spread of violence in their jurisdictions. There is good evidence, 
however, that these written instructions countermanded earlier verbal orders 
uttered by the king. Thus, the king’s earlier words, perhaps hasty and ill- 
considered, may have contributed to the massacres. What can be said for 
certain is that the king failed to make his intentions absolutely clear. His 
subjects lost confidence in the Valois dynasty following these events.122
The Huguenots maintained the upper hand from about 1560 until the 
massacres, when they lost much of their leadership. Thereafter, they went into 
decline. One of the reasons that the Huguenots never developed much of a 
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popular following in France was that they distrusted the common people 
because of the demagoguery of the Catholic League. The word ligue in French 
seems to have acquired a new meaning at this time, if, indeed, it was not a new 
word. It connoted anarchy. After 1580, the Catholic League became dominant 
and was sustained by the militancy of Ultra-Catholic ideology. The leadership 
of the Guises was largely nominal and limited to the national level; at the 
provincial level, Catholic preachers whipped up fanaticism among the 
commonalty.123
From the beginning of the outbreak of violence in southern France in 1561, 
the motivation behind the civil wars involved more than just religious 
animosity toward the Huguenots. The various provincial Catholic leagues were 
drawn into the feud between the Guises and the Montmorencys, and became 
so truculent that they threatened the monarchy itself. The stronger monarchy 
that had emerged under Francis I and his late- medieval predecessors had 
weakened noble power and influence. As the manifesto of the Holy League 
circulated by Henry, Duke of Guise before his assassination in 1588, on the 
orders of King Henry III, made clear, the Guises and their supporters used the 
League to preserve and strengthen the powers of the Estates General and 
the ancient privileges of the nobility by curtailing the Renaissance monarchy.124
The Wars of Religion also touched off various local popular riots and 
rebellions. Although these usually began as protests against heresy, the unrest 
eventually focused on the high taxes and other exactions caused by the wars, 
and on the inequities of the tax system, which largely exempted the nobility 
and the clergy. One symptom of the unease caused by these conflicts was that 
in provinces such as Dauphiné, many craftsmen and peasants dared not leave 
their houses unless armed with daggers or swords. In many places, they 
organized themselves into militias for protection. Both the royal army and 
the Huguenot forces as well as outlaw soldiers pillaged and terrorized the 
countryside in the late 1570s, and the commonalty felt that they also needed to 
be armed. This kind of popular unrest usually began as simple opposition to 
Protestant heresy mixed with social conflict and popular rebellion, and later 
developed into ultra- orthodox militancy. In short, the French Wars of Religion, 
and the widespread social and economic unrest that accompanied those 
conflicts led to a general arming of the population. Denis Crouzet sees a 
“triumph of war” taking root in French society and culture.125
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Altogether, the Catholics and the Huguenots fought eight religious and civil 
wars. Each conflict had been temporarily ended by a royal edict or peace treaty 
that granted certain concessions such as a limited right of worship for 
Protestants in certain places and the right to retain and fortify certain towns 
(but not including Paris and its suburbs, where popular support for Catholicism 
remained strong). The religious conflict engendered much bitterness, and each 
peace settlement sought to consign the memory of each side’s grievances to 
oblivion. However, memories persisted and from these grew the religious 
identities of each party, thus making it more difficult to return to a state of 
peace. In the last of the peace settlements, the Edict of Nantes of 1598, the new 
Bourbon monarch, Henry IV, in effect, created a Huguenot state within a state 
by allowing the Protestants to retain and garrison some two hundred fortified 
towns. Just as each of the preceding peace settlements had proved temporary, 
Henry IV made it clear that the Edict of Nantes was meant to last only eight 
years until he could consolidate his rule under peaceful conditions. Religious 
identities had hardened for many Catholics and Huguenots, but the violence 
that accompanied the Religious Wars also caused many Huguenots to defect 
from the new religion. Political support for the Ultra-Catholic party also 
diminished as many moderate Catholics preferred to join the politique 
faction.126
Thirty Years War
The process of confessionalization split the medieval Latin church into three 
confessional churches: the post-Tridentine Catholic Church, the Lutheran 
Church, and the Reformed or Calvinist Church. It placed an emphasis on 
religious identity, doctrinal orthodoxy, and observable outward behavior. The 
clergy underwent professionalization to prepare them for more effective 
preaching and pastoral work among the laity. This fostered ideologies that 
were confrontational. The rituals and beliefs of each faith were employed in 
such ways as to exaggerate the differences in religious identity and contributed 
much to the outbreak of the Thirty Years War. An increased emphasis on 
organization and spiritual community led to stricter discipline and conformity 
among the Calvinists that separated the zealots from those who were not yet 
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deemed worthy to be full members of that elite spiritual community. Ultimately, 
the convergence of political interests and confessional solidarity led to the 
emergence of national identities during the many wars of this period.127
The fragile religious peace imposed by the Treaty of Augsburg began to fall 
apart after 1603 in the biconfessional city of Donauwörth. In that year, on St. 
Mark’s Day, the monks of the Catholic abbey mounted a procession through 
the mostly Protestant town. In subsequent years, the monks and the Catholic 
laity were violently confronted by angry Lutheran mobs who attacked their 
increasingly ostentatious processions. Because the Catholic minority possessed 
imperial immunity, the Emperor Rudolf II imposed a ban on the city and 
Maximilian of Bavaria occupied it with an army. Maximilian ordered the city’s 
Lutherans to convert to Catholicism or leave the city. The result was that a 
number of Protestant territories and cities organized the Protestant Union, 
and in response, the Catholics also formed an armed league.128
Religious conflict remained a part of almost all European wars until the end 
of the seventeenth century, but dynastic rivalries, competition for colonial 
empire and trade, and, in some cases, such as the Dutch Republic, Portugal, 
and the kingdom of Bohemia, an assertion of national identity also contributed 
to the continuing European conflicts. It was indeed an “age of iron”; standing 
armies had become the principal instruments of early modern sovereign states, 
whether they were republics or monarchies; and armies staffed by professional 
soldiers were dangerous when idle. War had become institutionalized.
The Thirty Years War (1618–48) does not easily fit the pattern of a religious 
war. While it is true that many of the noblemen who led the Bohemian revolt 
in Prague in 1618 were Protestants resisting Catholic pressure, they were also 
defending Bohemian identity and aristocratic power against Austrian 
Habsburg centralization. They were crushed at the Battle of White Mountain 
near Prague in 1620, and a more Teutonized nobility began to replace the 
Bohemian lords. The Calvinist Elector Frederick V of the Palatinate, who had 
unwisely allowed himself to be talked into becoming King of Bohemia, a title 
claimed by the Habsburgs, found that his German territories were overrun by 
the Habsburg army, and Germany was also drawn into the civil and religious 
conflict. Dynastic ambitions and an urge to grab territory led Christian IV of 
Denmark into the Thirty Years War on the pretext of helping the Protestants. 
The conflict expanded as the Dutch war of independence from Spain, known 
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as the Eighty Years War, became part of the struggle. Gustavus Adolphus, King 
of Sweden, intervened in the German war after 1631, and campaigned 
extensively in Germany with armies that included many volunteers from 
Scotland and England. Many of these volunteers had joined the Swedish and 
Dutch armies to fight for the Protestant cause, but the motives of the rulers of 
Spain and France, which were also drawn into the Thirty Years War, were more 
concerned with dynastic rivalries and the expansion of trade. The Franco-
Spanish conflict continued until 1659, after the Peace of Westphalia had ended 
the main conflict. On its peripheries, this European- wide conflict also spread 
into Eastern Europe in the war between Russia and Poland.129
Because of the continuing threat posed by the Turks, the Habsburg emperors 
could not neglect the affairs of Bohemia and Hungary. Bohemia on the eve of 
the Thirty Years War was an economically advanced part of Central Europe. 
Because so much of Hungary was in the hands of the Turks, Bohemia was vital 
to the defense of the Habsburg Empire. However, besides being Slavic rather 
than German, perhaps as many as nine- tenths of the population of Bohemia 
and Moravia were Hussite or Protestant. They had a strong national identity, 
and were fiercely antipapal and anticlerical. During the time that Rudolf II 
(1576–1612) was emperor, he resided mostly in Prague and worked to preserve 
peace between Protestants and Catholics.130 The situation in Hungary was 
perhaps even more dangerous. Bethlen Gabor, Prince of Transylvania, was the 
political leader of the Hungarian Protestants, who included Bohemian 
Brethren, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Hussites. He contested those parts of 
Hungary not controlled by the Turks in order to protect Protestantism, and at 
one point, he launched an incursion into Austria. The possibility existed that 
Bethlen might join the Turks in order to oppose the Habsburg-Jesuit Counter-
Reformation, which the Turks encouraged by making Bethlen King of Hungary. 
Albert von Wallenstein, a Bohemian noble who was at first loyal to the Emperor 
Ferdinand II and had raised a large mercenary army for the Habsburg cause, 
was sent into Hungary to attempt to contain Bethlen’s forces; Wallenstein later 
became too independent and ambitious, and was assassinated on the emperor’s 
orders.131
The Thirty Years War was long viewed as one of the most destructive wars 
of European history. Earlier estimates of population decline as a consequence 
of the Thirty Years War stated that Germany, or the Holy Roman Empire, lost 
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between one- half and two- thirds of its population. More careful recent 
estimates, although far from precise, put the population loss at between 15 and 
20 percent. Post- war demographic growth brought the German population 
back to its prewar level by 1700. The population losses were mostly caused by 
malnutrition and epidemic diseases rather than by battle casualties. Although 
the armies of the time were not very well disciplined, most commanders did 
make an effort to prevent injury to noncombatants.132 The Peace of Westphalia 
of 1648 repudiated the militancy of the Catholic Reformation. Otherwise, little 
was achieved toward granting religious toleration that had not been contained 
in the Peace of Augsburg. The terms of the Peace of Westphalia allowed 
individual princes and free cities to determine the religion of their subjects or 
allowed the latter to go somewhere else. It was also symptomatic of the decline 
of papal and imperial power.133
Europeans now accepted that religious unity could never be restored, and 
that they must now learn to live with one another. It was also assumed that the 
Enlightenment that followed brought religious toleration to the European 
world. Benjamin Kaplan questions this argument and reminds us that more 
religious conflict followed. Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685 
causing perhaps 300,000 Huguenots to flee France; the Duke of Savoy rescinded 
the edict of toleration that had been granted to the Waldensians. After the last 
Calvinist Elector Palatine died, his Catholic heir began to reinstate Catholicism 
in the Rhenish Palatinate and to force Protestants to abandon or share their 
parish churches. In retaliation, Catholics were persecuted in Prussia and other 
Protestant states of Germany. Religious civil wars broke out again in Switzerland 
in 1702. In England, anti-Catholic violence surfaced again in the so- called 
Popish Plot of 1678, in reaction to the Scots Jacobite invasion of England in 
1745, and especially, during the Gordon Riots of 1780, when for two weeks, 
London was in the hands of a mob protesting Parliament’s enactment of the 
Roman Catholic Relief Act of 1778. Although the philosophes advocated 
tolerance, most Protestants and Catholics continued to hate one another’s 
beliefs and practices.134
However, it can be said that the Peace of Westphalia ended large- scale 
religious conflicts within the Holy Roman Empire. This came about because of 
the emergence of a fully developed body of international law that recognized 
the constituent member- states as equals that were now free of the authority of 
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the Holy Roman Empire. This, in turn, owed much to the principles laid down 
in the writings of Vitoria and Grotius, who applied Roman law to new 
situations, and to the increasing tendency to view politics in secular terms 
without completely ignoring the legitimate concerns of religion. This transition 
to an era of many competing sovereign states brandishing their independent 
status by military and economic means also provided the opportunity for 
cooperation by more peaceful means. The Peace of the Pyrenees of 1659 
likewise signified that France had succeeded Spain as the dominant power in 
Europe. That France asserted its military power during the reign of Louis XIV 
is widely recognized, but at the same time, France also exerted its influence by 
establishing a diplomatic service staffed by professional diplomats who took 
up permanent residence in all the courts and capitals of Europe. France led in 
the development of diplomatic practice, which was as important in asserting 
French influence as its military arm, and became a model for other sovereign 
powers. Significantly, French also replaced Latin as the diplomatic language at 
this time.135
British and Irish civil wars
The British and Irish civil wars were the last of the European religious wars. 
There was always the possibility that religious armed conflict, so pervasive in 
mainland Europe, would spread to the British Isles, but unification of the Three 
Kingdoms of England, Ireland, and Scotland under the Stuart dynasty and a 
Protestant king appeared to have lessened that prospect after 1603. This 
effectively closed off the possibility of intervention by France or Spain in 
Ireland. Also, by the end of the sixteenth century, the religious wars in the Low 
Countries had largely run their course. Although the religious conflict 
reopened on the Continent after 1618, the danger of it spreading to the British 
Isles had diminished. Both England and Scotland were mostly Protestantized 
by the beginning of the reign of James VI and I, and Catholicism retained a 
strong presence only in Ireland. By the 1640s, the Catholic powers of mainland 
Europe had fallen out with one another, and were too busy struggling for 
dominance to invade the British Isles. Insofar as religion influenced the English 
civil wars, the struggle was between two rival varieties of Protestantism.136
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If England was spared armed religious conflict in the late sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries, there were those in the British Isles who were 
drawn to the religious wars of mainland Europe. Protestant gentlemen 
volunteers viewed service in the armies of the mainland European Protestant 
powers as a religious crusade. However, the rank and file who served under 
them in the English and Scots regiments of the Anglo-Dutch Brigade and the 
Scots Brigade of the Dutch Republic’s army, as well as the armed forces of other 
Protestant powers, were usually impressed from among masterless men, but 
Protestant preachers and pamphleteers thought such rogues should not 
begrudge serving in a just war. Some of the lords, who commanded regiments 
in the Low Countries wars, recruited tenants by means of a feudal levy. 
Recruiting masterless men was thought to be a good way of cleansing the 
streets of London and the countryside of vagrants and criminals. In the 
last seventeen years of the reign of Elizabeth, an estimated 2 percent of 
the total population of England and Wales were impressed to serve in the wars 
in the Netherlands, Ireland, France, and naval expeditions to Spain, Portugal, 
and the Azores. Because of deaths from battle, disease and malnutrition as well 
as desertion, few of these men ever returned home. The Privy Council of 
Scotland followed similar policies of impressment—especially following the 
end of the Scots civil war in 1573. Probably 10 percent of the male population 
of Scotland served in various mainland European armies during the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries both as impressed soldiers and as 
mercenaries. The numbers of English and Scots who served in the field forces 
of the Dutch army during the Eighty Years War varied between one- third and 
two- thirds of the total.137
The civil wars in England were fought between two factions of Protestantism, 
but an exaggerated fear of popery certainly did help to bring on those civil 
wars. This largely derived from James VI and I’s plans to marry Charles, Prince 
of Wales to the Spanish Infanta. The scheme was based on a desire to get the 
Spanish to agree to return the Rhenish Palatinate, which had been conquered 
by the Austrian Habsburgs following the foolish attempt by James’s son- in-law, 
Frederick, Elector Palatine to become King of Bohemia, which had for some 
time been part of the Habsburg Empire. These marriage negotiations fell 
through. Charles was then married to Henrietta Maria, sister of Louis XIII, 
King of France. It was widely feared that this marriage treaty contained 
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provisions to suspend enforcement of the recusancy laws penalizing English 
Catholics. The fear of the potential resurgence of Catholicism reflected a fear 
of the two greatest Catholic powers in Europe more than the potential for a 
revival of Catholic religious practice in England. English Catholicism had long 
since been marginalized.138
Fear of popery at home and apprehension of the threat from France and 
Spain, the major Catholic powers abroad, helped to sow the seeds of division 
both in London and in the provinces, but the absolutist direction in which 
Charles I’s rule was proceeding also aroused popular fears. The arbitrary 
governance, levying taxes without parliamentary approval, and the 
imprisonment of critics of the regime without trial in the common- law courts 
provided evidence that the king believed that he was above the law and the 
ancient constitution, and that he acted on that assumption. To these problems 
was added the intractable task of trying to govern three separate and distinct 
kingdoms—each with its own constitutional forms and religious preferences. 
Charles’s subjects mostly adhered to the Anglican Church, while the better 
part of the Scots were Presbyterians and saw little difference between 
Anglicanism and Catholicism. In Ireland very few people belonged to the 
Anglican Church of Ireland, and hardly any of its clergy spoke Irish Gaelic.139
One of the most important royal prerogatives that King Charles possessed 
was that of summoning and dissolving Parliaments. When the English 
constitution functioned in a healthy manner, meetings of Parliament allowed 
the king to become aware of his subjects’ grievances, and king and Parliament 
worked together enacting statute law and authorizing the levying of taxes. 
Unfortunately, Charles I did not listen to good advice and thought that he 
could dispense with Parliament during the period of his personal rule between 
1629 and 1640. After 1638, when the Scots moved in the direction of armed 
rebellion, Charles discovered that he did need Parliament in order to raise and 
pay for an army to bring the Scots to heel. More than any other country in 
Europe, except, perhaps, the Netherlands, the English were a well informed 
and politically aware people. When Charles finally summoned their elected 
representatives to Westminster in May 1640, he found that the members of 
Parliament were determined to secure redress of their grievances before they 
were willing to trust Charles with an army, and England began its descent into 
civil war.140
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Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, a contemporary observer, a faithful 
servant of Charles I and a pious Anglican, did not think that religion was 
the main cause of what he called “the civil war and rebellion.” He stated 
that “religion was made a cloak to cover the most impious designs” of members 
of the Long Parliament. Clarendon was also of the opinion that Anglican 
clergy such as William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, intruded religious 
matters into the political affairs of the day; he was of the opinion that religion 
was a matter of private concern. Clarendon’s view was that the war was a 
conflict between Royalists, who were persons of honor, good lineage, and 
property, and Parliamentarians, people of mean birth and no reputation, who 
were jealous of their social superiors. The fear of popery, Clarendon thought, 
was a mere pretense. In other words, Clarendon’s account of the civil war and 
rebellion emphasized “class conflict,” as a later generation of historians would 
have put it.141
Thanks to the breakdown of official censorship during the Interregnum, 
we have inherited a vast contemporaneous literature in which the religious 
reasons for justifying the English civil wars from the viewpoint of both 
parties to the conflict are recorded. It is important to remember that popular 
political discourse in the British Isles at this time had not yet become fully 
secularized. Both sides produced numerous arguments to assure their 
audiences that they were fighting a just and necessary war, sanctioned by the 
Lord. The Parliamentary army was always well equipped with chaplains and 
preachers, and the soldiers often went into battle singing hymns. The rhetoric 
of the two contending armies would have been familiar to those who had 
fought in the mainland European religious wars, and their justifications for 
taking up the sword reached back to St. Augustine and drew on the examples 
of holy war in both the Old and New Testaments. Their religious convictions 
were sustained by the belief that God was on their side. Religion was still a 
useful propaganda tool.142
In Scotland, a seemingly trivial issue of contention between the crown and 
the Scots arose from Charles I’s peremptory treatment of the Scots nobility and 
his attempt to make them abide by the very formal English court rituals. As in 
England, the religious side of the conflict was also between two incompatible 
forms of Protestant church government—the Presbyterian Kirk of Scotland 
and Charles’s attempt to impose on the Kirk an episcopal type of church 
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government and an Anglican liturgy. When Charles was crowned king of 
Scotland in Edinburgh, the Scots were horrified by the elaborate rituals and 
pageantry of the king’s coronation ceremony, which the Scots thought was 
excessively popish and that were conducted by an archbishop and a bishop—
officials who had no place in the hierarchy of the Presbyterian Kirk. It was a 
clear indication that Charles meant to alter the presbyterian government of the 
Kirk. The following Sunday an Anglican service was conducted in the High 
Church, formerly the Cathedral of St. Giles. The direction in church polity that 
Charles was pursuing had become all too obvious, and it was unacceptable to 
the Scots. It should hardly have caused any surprise that the first of the king’s 
subjects to rebel were the Scots who did so by proclaiming their National 
Covenant in 1638. The so- called Bishops Wars that followed were the first of 
the Wars of the Three Kingdoms—the British and Irish civil wars. The 
ramshackle army that King Charles put together with militia units and tenants 
of royalist gentry and peers was no match for the Covenanting Army that the 
Scots assembled from amongst experienced Scots veterans of the Thirty Years 
War. The need to finance his army led Charles to summon two English 
Parliaments in 1640, which led to an impasse between the king and his subjects. 
Thus, began the first of the three English civil wars.143
Religion played an even more important role in the Elizabethan Irish wars 
and the later civil wars of the 1640s, but national identity was also very 
important. England had never conquered Ireland in medieval times beyond 
the English Pale, a small group of counties surrounding Dublin. The English 
regarded the Irish as pagans and barbarians comparable to the Turks, the 
indigenous peoples of the New World, or even the Scythians. As late as the 
reign of Elizabeth, the English crown failed to recognize the Irish as subjects 
with legal rights. They were viewed as rebels and were not accorded the usual 
treatment allowed to enemy prisoners in the mainland European wars. 
Consequently, the Irish rebelled frequently during the Elizabethan wars in that 
unfortunate island. Both sides assumed that the only way of settling their 
differences was by war.144
The question of national identity was complicated by the existence in 
Ireland of several distinct groups. The Old English of the Pale and the littoral 
settlements of the Province of Munster had lived in Ireland for many 
generations, and many were descended from the Norman conquerors. They 
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were disposed to loyalty to the English crown, but since they remained 
Catholic, they were alienated by the Protestantizing policies of the crown. 
Many of the mostly Protestant New English had gone to Ireland during the 
Elizabethan period as soldiers and behaved like Spanish conquistadores; they 
carved out estates by displacing the Gaelic Old Irish who defiantly continued 
in their attachment to Catholicism. The latter retreated into the bogs and 
forests and resisted their conquerors by the tactics of guerilla war. Both sides 
frequently hired redshanks and gallowglasses, who were mercenary warriors 
brought over from Scotland.145
The Irish Civil War (1641–53) in its early stage was a contest between the 
Royalist forces on the one hand and the Scots Covenanters and the new 
British settlers in Ulster and Munster, who chose to side with the English 
Parliamentarians in their rebellion against Charles I. Between 1642 and 1649, 
the situation was complicated by the existence of a third entity, the Catholic 
Confederation of Kilkenny, which hampered the Irish cause by dividing the 
Catholic ranks. The Scots Covenanters also maintained a separate army in 
Ireland, so for a time, there were four distinct armies campaigning in the 
field.146
The Protestant faction in the Irish Civil Wars recruited followers by greatly 
exaggerating reports of a Catholic massacre of Protestants and using the same 
for purposes of propaganda. Some deaths did occur as the native Irish 
reclaimed lands from which they had earlier been forcibly ejected. But most of 
these deaths resulted from hunger and disease. The lords justices of Ireland 
estimated the number of deaths caused by the so- called massacres at 154,000, 
but a more accurate figure would be 6,000. The animosity between Protestant 
and Catholic certainly made the Irish Civil Wars more brutal. Because of the 
rumors that they heard about the massacres, English Parliamentarians such as 
Oliver Cromwell and Henry Ireton resolved that revenge must be exacted and 
the Irish would have to pay in blood for these alleged atrocities. Participants 
claimed that the cruelties inflicted on combatants and noncombatants alike 
were worse than those perpetrated by the Turks and Christians during the 
Wars of the Crusades. The Catholics said that Irish soldiers taken prisoner 
were immediately put to the sword, and in Britain, Irish soldiers captured there 
were usually hanged until Prince Rupert of the Rhine, a Royalist commander, 
threatened retaliation on Parliamentarian prisoners.147
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When Sir Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, became lord deputy of 
Ireland in 1632, he managed not only to estrange every important group in 
Ireland, but also to unite them in opposition to his rule. He alienated the Old 
English by undercutting the power of the Irish Parliament to criticize his 
policies, by weakening the protections of land ownership that had been granted 
by King Charles in return for loans to the crown made in 1628, and by reneging 
on promises made by the king to relax the Irish penal laws against Catholics; 
he also expropriated the lands of the Old Irish and attacked their religion, 
their Gaelic language and customs; and he offended the Scots settlers in Ulster 
by purging their church of Presbyterian practices and ministers, and by 
imposing fines on the latter when they departed from the conditions of their 
tenancies.148
Another Irish group whom Strafford offended were the New English, whose 
antecedents had come to Ireland in the sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries to make their fortunes by dispossessing the Old Irish. Looking for 
ways to make the government of Ireland pay its way, Strafford inaugurated the 
Connacht Plantation scheme. This would raise money by selling land grants in 
the west of Ireland, and it also fitted in with the policy of civilizing the Gaelic 
Irish by moving them to Connacht and making them tenants of the New 
English. The latter could be expected to support such a policy because they 
stood to acquire some of the lands from which the Old Irish were being evicted. 
Strafford meant to squeeze money out of the New English as well by compelling 
them to return church lands that they had acquired earlier in an irregular 
manner. He demanded the return of these alienated church lands in order to 
introduce the Anglicanizing reforms that were sponsored by Archbishop 
William Laud, his partner in forcing through absolutist policies of Charles I. 
The New English and the Ulster Scots were much offended because these 
Laudian reforms had a distinctively popish flavour.149
The Wars of the Three Kingdoms took a heavy toll—even by comparison to 
the two World Wars of the early twentieth century. In the latter conflicts, 
the mortality rate for combatants and noncombatants alike never exceeded 2 
percent of the population of Britain. The English civil wars resulted in 75,000 
deaths in battle, and probably 105,000 died as a result of disease and accident, 
which probably represented 3 percent of the total population. Scotland suffered 
25,000 battlefield deaths and another 35,000 died due to disease and accident, 
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which constituted 6 percent of the population.150 The civil wars in Ireland, 
between 1641 and 1652, were comparable in their destructiveness to the Thirty 
Years War, and lasted longer than they did in England and Scotland. The 
population of approximately two million was reduced by a third, and at least 
200,000, and possibly as many as 300,000, people died as a direct result of 
hostilities. In addition, many were displaced from their lands and died of 
disease or hunger. Irish soldiers, known as “wild geese,” were dispersed abroad 
in mainland European armies for generations thereafter. Those Catholic Irish 
who remained at home were denied the basic rights of subjects of the crown, 
and were dominated by English and Irish Protestants, whom they regarded as 
alien conquerors.151
Because of their departure from the methods and rules of war that 
characterized the civil wars of England and Scotland, the Irish civil wars need 
to be discussed at some length. After the beginning of the Third Civil War in 
England, the fighting also resumed in Ireland. The laws of war, which had come 
to be accepted on the European mainland, had little influence in Ireland where 
it was usual for victors to slay the defeated when they were taken prisoner. 
Only the prospect of ransom could bring mercy. When Cromwell took 
command of the Parliamentary forces in Ireland, he told his officers that God 
had commanded them to crush the barbarian Irish as the Israelites had 
slaughtered idolaters in the land of Canaan. In September 1649, Cromwell 
besieged the well fortified walled town of Drogheda that commanded the 
mouth of the River Boyne. He first called on the commander of Drogheda to 
surrender; when the latter refused, Cromwell began a heavy bombardment 
and finally breached the walls with great loss of life. Cromwell allowed no 
quarter, and some 3,500 Irish were killed. The following month another 
massacre of the same magnitude occurred at Wexford, which offered no 
resistance after a traitor opened the gates. Cromwell’s men slaughtered 
noncombatants as well as soldiers. This was followed by similar massacres at 
Carrick, Callan, and Gowran Castle. The Cromwellian conquest of Ireland was 
consolidated by large- scale confiscations of land. The Catholic proprietors and 
tenants were driven westward to the barren lands of Connacht. This forced 
removal was accompanied by much brutality because Cromwell and many of 
his senior officers believed that the Irish needed to be punished further. 
Cromwell supposedly remarked that those Irish who had taken part in the 
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rebellion against the authority of Parliament were to have the choice of going 
to Hell or Connacht.152
Cromwell was able to defeat the Royalist and Catholic Confederation 
armies in Ireland because of the disunity among these factions. This divisiveness 
can be traced back to the failure of the Gaelic or Old Irish to reconcile with the 
Old English of Leinster and Munster—despite the Catholic beliefs that they 
shared. The Irish civil war was well under way before the Old English lords of 
Munster joined forces with the Gaelic Irish following the formation of the 
Catholic Confederation at Kilkenny in 1642. The prospects of the Catholic 
forces were much improved with the arrival later that year of experienced 
military commanders such as Owen Roe O’Neill and Thomas Preston, who 
had served in the Spanish Army of Flanders. O’Neill, in particular, brought 
with him several hundred experienced officers and noncommissioned officers 
who introduced their Irish recruits in the Confederation’s Ulster army to the 
latest continental European battlefield tactics, which allowed his army to 
become a formidable force. Otherwise, the Confederate army remained 
badly divided because the Old English lords, led by James Butler, earl of 
Ormond, continued to work for a closer alliance with the Royalists, while the 
Gaelic Irish sought closer ties with Spain. The dispatch of a papal nuncio, 
Cardinal Rinuccini, to Kilkenny in 1647 did little to promote unity among the 
Confederates. Rinuccini took a hard line against the members of the Supreme 
Council, which had governed the Confederation for the previous five years, 
and excommunicated those who did not agree with him and sought a 
compromise peace with the Royalists, which would have ended the Recusancy 
Laws and discrimination against Catholics in Ireland.153
The victors in the Wars of the Three Kingdoms were the English Rump, or 
purged Parliament and its army, the New Model, a well disciplined force led by 
Sir Thomas Fairfax and Oliver Cromwell. The people of England and Wales 
were not as divided by religious or ethnic animosities as were the peoples of 
Scotland and Ireland. In England there existed wide recognition and acceptance 
of Parliament as a national institution, and the only real threat to this unity 
came from the Leveller revolt within the army, which the generals easily 
suppressed. The civil wars in Ireland and Scotland displayed many of the 
characteristics of religious conflict, but in England religious sects so proliferated 
that none could completely dominate the others. As Adam Smith later 
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explained, this was how religious toleration eventually came about. Cromwell 
had been the scourge of Irish Catholics and his atrocities cannot be forgotten, 
but Cromwell always considered Irish Catholicism to be a political religion, 
and he thought its links to Spanish Catholicism posed a threat to religious 
liberty for Protestants. Cromwell never believed in full religious toleration, but 
he was willing to allow more religious freedom than most other English rulers 
of the seventeenth century. As lord protector of the Commonwealth or English 
Republic, he allowed Catholics and Anglicans to worship in private without 
disturbance. Cromwell told Cardinal Mazarin of France that he wanted to 
grant more liberty of worship to Catholics, but political considerations such as 
the opposition of Parliament and his council stood in the way. Alexandra 
Walsham makes the useful distinction between concord and toleration in 
Anglican thought that continued to cling to the notion of the indivisibility of 
religious truth. Full toleration of non-Protestants was conceded only very 
slowly; legal recognition of Catholic worship was not granted by Parliament 
until 1778, and full civil rights were not restored until 1829.154
The concept of holy war, in the various guises of the medieval crusade and the 
Reformation wars of religion, was never fully accepted in the mainstream of 
Western political theory because the usual legal and moral justification for 
declaring war was based on the concept of just war. That doctrine had its roots 
in classical antiquity, and always had its defenders during the medieval period. 
Except for periods when the papacy or other religious leaders asserted 
themselves when temporal authority and power were weak, it was usually 
assumed that only the recognized leader of a political society or a sovereign 
ruler possessed the right and authority to declare war.155 The sovereign states 
that emerged during the Renaissance and early- modern period of European 
history could not allow contending religious and aristocratic factions to 
disrupt the peace, as happened in France during the latter part of the sixteenth 
century. Violent confessional conflict came to be classified as civil war or 
nonwar, which could not be considered just war.156 For this reason, most states 
that aspired to sovereign status pursued Erastian state churches if they were 
Protestant, or severely limited the authority of the popes and bishops if they 
remained Catholic, as was the case in Spain and with the Gallican Church in 
France. The latter monarchies were major powers, and could apply pressure on 
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the papacy to grant extensive royal control over the Catholic Church within 
their realms because they wielded military and political power in Italy or were 
in close proximity to the Italian peninsula. Also, both Spain and France 
gradually eliminated earlier policies of tolerating religious minorities. Spain 
had expelled the Jews and Moriscos who refused to convert to Catholicism, 
and Louis XIV revoked the Edicts of Nantes that had allowed the Huguenots 
to worship in certain designated places.
Increasingly, in the early modern period, political philosophers as well as 
monarchs rejected religion as a valid reason for going to war. In his The Law of 
War and Peace, published in Latin in 1625, Hugo Grotius argued that relations 
between states should be grounded in natural law and historical experience. 
This, of course, embodied the just war tradition, but it also reinforced the 
growing secularization of political thought. Grotius insisted that the only 
grounds for a just war were “the defence of persons and property.” He denied 




No state . . . can support itself without an army.
Niccolò Macchiavelli, The Art of War, trans. Ellis Farneworth 
(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965; rpr. 
New York: Da Capo, 1990), bk. 1, p. 30
Rash princes, until such times as they have been well beaten in the wars, will 
always have little regard for peace.
Antonio Guevara, Bishop of Guadix, The Diall of Princes, trans. 
Thomas North (London: John Waylande, 1557; rpr. Amsterdam: 
Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1968), fo. 174v
The Humanist response to the perpetual problems of war and peace divided 
into the polarities of a martial ethos and an irenic or peace- loving culture. 
These opposing cultures were linked to an obsession with fame or reputation, 
honor, and the military legacy of ancient Greece and Rome on the one hand, 
and on the other, a concern with human dignity, freedom, and a stricter 
application of Christian morality. Machiavelli and his followers advocated the 
martial ethos; Erasmus was the most widely read of those who fostered an 
irenic culture. The latter was also the author of The Education of a Christian 
Prince (1516), which was intended as a manual for the Emperor Charles V. In 
this work, Erasmus maintained that “A good prince should never go to war 
unless, after trying all other means, he cannot possibly avoid it. If we were 
of this mind, there would hardly be a war.”1 Another school of thought, 
which combined an admiration for Machiavelli’s analytical approach to 
political theory with an Erasmian sensitivity to ethical practice, was called 
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Neo-Stoicism. Michel de Montaigne and Justus Lipsius, the founding fathers 
of this modern adaptation of the Stoicism of ancient Greece and Rome, while 
expressing a longing for peace, accepted the reality of war, but sought to impose 
ethical restraints on how it was declared, waged, and concluded.
The Renaissance and the study of war and peace
Christian humanist, Neo-Stoic, and Protestant thinkers all recognized that 
discord was a basic part of human existence. Their knowledge of human 
history, largely derived from the ancients, suggested that war and peace had 
tended to run in cycles since the dawn of recorded history, but war was the 
main theme of history. Certainly, many of the earlier Italian humanists saw war 
as a test of character and an opportunity to win fame and honor. From a 
theological perspective, war was viewed as a punishment for man’s sins. 
From a more secular and analytical point of view, war arose from man’s 
disposition to violence, just as he was subject to plagues, famines, and other 
natural disasters that were attributable to forces beyond his control. Some 
commentators were cynical enough to argue that foreign wars helped to avoid 
civil wars, kept the population down, and purged the body politic of some of 
the more undesirable social elements. The Christian humanists launched a 
general attack on the glorification of war and attempted to demonstrate that 
human nature could be cured of its supposed disposition to war and violence. 
Indeed, some Christian humanists went so far as to suggest that communities 
could be constructed in which it was possible to imagine a world without war. 
The problem with building utopias, however, was that war- making and the 
Renaissance state were so bound together that it would be difficult to abolish 
the one without dismantling the other.2
Many humanists who studied the past tended to idealize Rome during the 
Pax Romana as a kind of golden age following an earlier heroic age that had 
been characterized by strife. Thus, the myth of a golden age came into existence 
among early sixteenth- century humanists, who lacked a critical historical 
understanding of the Roman world. Hence, Erasmus thought that the Pax 
Romana was indeed a time when peace prevailed. Perhaps he did not 
understand that the Roman peace was not only preceded by strife, but also was 
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established by wars of conquest and a total and crushing victory.3 Antonio de 
Guevara believed in the poetic truth of the Golden Age as described by Hesiod 
and Virgil, and he equated it with the Garden of Eden as described in the 
Old Testament.4 The more that humanists debated the concept of a “golden 
age,” the more diverse their interpretations and understandings became. 
One interpretation, derived from Ovid, was that of a primitive pastoral 
society characterized by “primeval innocence.” This might have been a good 
refuge for poets, but had a limited application to the modern age. Another, 
a vision of an idealized future, derived from Virgil, had hoped for an age of 
gold when peace would be restored to the world by a new Augustus, or perhaps, 
a child sent from heaven. Christian writers, understandably, interpreted 
the latter to be the redemptive mission of Christ; courtly poets of the 
Renaissance shamelessly exploited the secular concept of a golden age to 
compose panegyrics to describe the alleged virtues of their royal patrons.5
A good example of this is provided by the courtly propaganda surrounding 
Elizabeth I of England. Elizabeth is frequently compared by poets, artists, and 
theologians to Astraea, patroness of the golden age, that is, the age and empire 
of Augustus when universal peace supposedly reigned. In Christian times, 
Astraea was identified with Mary, the Virgin Mother of Christ, and the return 
of the golden age brought the advent of Christianity. The poets and theologians 
who were the advocates of an Elizabethan golden age seized on the concept of 
empire—a sovereignty that united the powers of church and state to effect a 
reformation leading to pure religion, unity, and justice, when the virgin queen 
would become the patroness of peace.6 What the queen’s subjects actually got 
was an intolerant, persecuting regime and foreign wars.
The Machiavellians and the martial ethos
Myth- making, however, would carry a Renaissance monarch only so far, 
and there were those—both inside and outside the sphere of government in 
England—who sought to remind Elizabeth of the realities of exercising power 
in a world torn by religious and dynastic warfare. Peter Whitehorne, who 
translated Machiavelli’s The Art of War into English in 1560, told the queen in 
a dedicatory epistle that the preservation of peace and the uninterrupted 
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administration of justice depended on the perpetual exercise of arms and 
preparation for war: “It is impossible for any realm or dominion long to 
continue in quietness and safeguard where the defence of the sword is not 
always in readiness. . . .”7 Machiavelli’s treatise went on to emphasize the 
intimate relationship between the art of politics and the art of war. Military 
power was the basic foundation of a civil society in which subjects gave their 
primary loyalty to their rulers rather than to kinship groups or feudal lords. 
Machiavelli insisted that the foundations of every state were “good laws and 
good arms.” The latter was the more important: good laws would follow if 
the state were well armed and defended. “Good arms” meant that a state 
should depend on a popularly  based citizen army and must avoid employing 
mercenary forces. Machiavelli was consistently emphatic in arguing that a 
citizen army, or civic militia, would always promote unity and social and 
political stability.8 Machiavelli also viewed a well ordered militia as having an 
important political function. It would serve as a school of citizenship, promote 
respect for the laws, and inculcate a common sense of identity. This would 
erect an obstacle to attempts by ambitious noblemen to seize power, provided 
that the commanders and officers did not come from the same district in 
which the members of the militia resided. For these reasons, civic militias were 
more compatible with republics than monarchies. Machiavelli addressed his 
writings to the rulers of all states, but he personally preferred a republic with 
a broad base of popular participation in which the people were subjected 
to military training and discipline, and which, like Rome, pursued a policy of 
expansion. It would seem that Machiavelli assigned a higher priority to political 
stability in a commonwealth than to military success. And, although political 
stability was highly desirable, Machiavelli believed that popular participation 
was necessary even if it did lead to a certain amount of popular turbulence.9
Like Polybius and Livy, Machiavelli recognized that all human societies are 
constantly “in a state of flux” and cannot remain the same; a commonwealth 
that is devoted to preserving tranquility must soon decay. Thus, there was 
a danger in remaining too long at peace. The only way to avoid idleness, 
effeminacy, factionalism, and sedition among its citizens was to follow the 
example of the Roman Republic and employ the militia to pursue a policy of 
imperial expansion.10 Machiavelli’s advice to princes who wished to remain 
on their thrones and to those who aspired to become rulers was to devote 
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themselves exclusively to studying warfare and exercising arms: “A prince . . . 
should have no other object or thought, nor acquire skill in anything except 
war, its organization and discipline. The art of war is all that is required of a 
ruler. . . .”11 Rulers cannot expect their subjects to submit to them and obey 
them unless they are armed. “A prince who does not understand warfare as 
well as the other misfortunes which it invites, cannot be respected by his 
soldiers or place any trust in them.” In preparing for war in peacetime, he 
should read the histories of great soldiers, hunt regularly, and keep his soldiers 
well trained and organized. By reading the histories of great men, especially 
the famous military commanders of antiquity, princes could acquire examples 
of how they should conduct themselves.12 Machiavelli records that Alexander 
the Great, Julius Caesar, and all great military leaders always marched on foot 
at the head of their armies and carried their own weapons into battle. Thus, if 
and when they were killed in battle, they died with their virtù intact, and could 
not be accused of “softness or effeminacy.”13
Machiavelli argued that it was necessary for a prince to enjoy a degree of 
popular support as much as the rulers of a democratic government. It was 
desirable that the people love their ruler, but in any case, they must fear him. 
In order to avoid the hatred and contempt of his subjects, the prince needed 
to enhance his reputation, because reputation was all important in politics. 
The prince must appear to be virtuous, religious, and clement—even if this 
required a certain degree of deception and manipulation of public opinion. 
One of the best ways to build a reputation was by performing great military 
deeds; another was by providing good laws. A state could not enjoy good laws 
without the means of enforcing obedience, which presupposed the existence 
of a military force. Religion was also necessary to sanction obedience and 
loyalty to the state, as the history of pre-Christian Rome demonstrated. Indeed, 
religion was a necessary function of the state for that very reason.14
Most aristocrats in late- fifteenth-century Florence believed that the 
principal instruments of politics were law, diplomacy, and force, but as a 
consequence of the helplessness of a divided Italy after it was overrun by 
the French in 1494, as well as a growing disenchantment with the rule of the 
Medicis, some of them began to view force as the best way to secure their 
liberties. Some Italian city- states and principalities had begun to rely for their 
defense on mercenaries, but humanists, such as Machiavelli and his friend and 
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close contemporary Francesco Guicciardini, instead advocated citizen armies 
because that was the way it had been done in the Roman Republic of antiquity. 
This incorporated the notion that, in a well governed commonwealth, military 
force should replace diplomatic negotiations in both external and domestic 
affairs. The Medicis, after their return to power, however, used this concept 
to overthrow the Florentine Republic and establish a despotism behind the 
facade of republican institutions. Guicciardini made the observation, based 
on the Medici despotism that lay behind this facade that “Every government 
is nothing but violence over subjects, sometimes moderated by a form of 
honesty.” Guicciardini anticipated Machiavelli in providing a new vocabulary 
for discussing politics, and emphasized that the political power of all states had 
its origin in violence. Christian moral principles were, therefore, not relevant 
to a discussion of politics or its practice.15
Machiavelli argued that an armed citizenry organized as a civic militia need 
not pose a threat to the authority of the prince or to political stability, but 
a mercenary army certainly would. Mercenary soldiers of the Renaissance 
were notorious for fanning the flames of war in order to keep themselves in 
employment. So deeply ingrained were their martial inclinations that they 
could not imagine any other way of earning a living. For this reason, subjects 
who fought for the glory of the prince were to be preferred to mercenary 
soldiers who fought to satisfy the ambition of someone else. This insistence 
that mercenary soldiers were always dangerous was endlessly repeated by the 
disciples of Machiavelli, and made it difficult for rulers in later times to raise 
well disciplined standing armies of long- service professional soldiers.16 A 
prince who lacked an army of well trained soldiers had only himself to blame 
for not providing his subjects with the opportunity to exercise arms. Yet, it was 
better to go to war with inexperienced citizen soldiers than to hire experienced 
mercenaries. Indeed, a prince who wished to expand his territories should 
never alter his plans merely in order to avoid war, because postponing a war 
would always work to his disadvantage.17
The so- called “free companies” of mercenaries, or routiers, had become 
especially troublesome in the fourteenth century because of the abundant 
wars of that period. The lack of resources meant that the state armies of the 
period could not fight continuously, and when knights and soldiers of lesser 
rank found themselves without employment they devastated the countryside 
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and extorted tribute from towns. They were particularly troublesome in 
Italy where they were known as condottieri. The military term “company,” to 
modern readers, can mask the size of such bands. One, known as the “Great 
Company,” may have numbered as many as 10,000 men. Small wonder that 
many Italian communes in the wake of the Black Death lacked manpower and 
financial resources to field citizen armies to resist such adventurers, and chose 
to pay bribes or tribute to get rid of them. Even when mercenary companies 
disbanded, they contributed to crime in the countryside, but the soldiers 
discharged by the military forces of communes were hardly better.18
At the same time, Maurizio Arfaioli rejects a number of assumptions based 
on the writings of Guicciardini and Machiavelli; namely, that mercenary 
companies were inferior to native militias or foreign armies from transalpine 
Europe in fighting wars in Italy in the early sixteenth century. Actually, the 
mercenary bands that fought in the Italian wars of that period were 
experienced in the use of a number of recent military innovations, such as 
artillery, light cavalry, and highly disciplined infantry formations, and they 
also had a good knowledge and experience of permanent fortifications as well 
as field entrenchments. In fact, the wars of the Italian peninsula became “a 
bloody laboratory of experimentation.” The Italian mercenary bands learned 
much from the Swiss infantry in regard to how well disciplined companies of 
pikemen could defeat the heavy cavalry of feudal armies, but only after the use 
of militia units or bands composed of both militia soldiers and mercenaries 
had failed. After initially being at a disadvantage, the Italian infantry improved 
on the Swiss tactical organization composed of a large square of pikemen 
by integrating arquebusiers, or handgunners, into pike formations.19 While 
Machiavelli had many followers—especially with regard to the desirability of a 
civic militia in preference to a mercenary army—there were also those who 
were repelled by his rejection of both natural and divine law. One was Giovanni 
Botero, a sometime Jesuit priest who was urged to leave the Jesuit order after 
giving a sermon questioning the temporal authority of the pope. Botero’s 
approach to politics was not so different from that of Machiavelli, despite the 
fact that he was under the influence of the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. 
Botero’s book, The Reason of State (1589), dealt with many of the same topics 
that Machiavelli had discussed—especially those relating to the question of 
when a prince was justified in going to war. Quite often, Botero’s explanations 
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concerning which occasions justified declaring war can only be described as 
expedient. As Professor Quentin Skinner has noted: “Botero is recognizably an 
inhabitant of Machiavelli’s moral universe.”20
Like Machiavelli, Botero warns that peace can never be so certain that one 
can dispense with the military means to defend one’s country.21 It is only with 
regard to wars of expansion that Botero parts company with Machiavelli. He 
states that the right of defensive war is absolute, but an offensive war can only 
be justified for purposes of defense. Botero, who had experience of the French 
Wars of Religion, was more sensitive to the issues of religious warfare than 
Machiavelli when he said that although warfare against infidels was always 
justified, war against heretical Christians must be a last resort.22 A foreign war, 
he thought, was a good remedy against popular rebellion and civil war because 
it keeps the people occupied and dissipates their feelings of hostility toward 
the aristocracy. The examples of ancient Greece and Rome furnished proof 
that this was a good policy.23 Botero also warned that long wars can make 
warfare a habit because it teaches men that they can acquire what they want 
by the sword. The conclusion of foreign wars, once the habit of violence is 
acquired, can lead men who are used only to warfare to turn on their rulers. 
Botero was, like Machiavelli, an advocate of wide popular participation in 
government, and he recognized that the prince who employs his own subjects 
as soldiers did risk danger, but the use of foreign mercenaries could entail even 
more dangerous consequences because a prince’s subjects should never be 
“beholden” to anyone for defending the state except himself.24
Baldasare Castiglione, although he had been a soldier and thought that 
military experience was an important part of aristocratic life, believed that the 
aristocrat, or “courtier,” should be known primarily as a man of letters, educated 
in the classics, who valued moral virtue. It was the duty of a ruler to provide his 
subjects with laws that would “enable them to live safe and dignified lives in 
peace and quiet.” Castiglione conceded that many states had enjoyed prosperity 
during time of war, only to fall into decay with prolonged peace. This was 
because they had not learned how to take advantage of the leisure afforded by 
peace and to cultivate the necessary moral virtues to enjoy the same. Many 
rulers had promoted a martial culture that taught their subjects that
their principal aim must be to subjugate their neighbours, and in consequence 
they incite their people to become bellicose and aggressive. . . . But this was 
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never feasible, seeing that the process could go on forever, short of the 
conquest of the whole world, and was in conflict with reason as propounded 
by natural law, which requires us not to want for others what we should not 
wish for ourselves. Therefore, rulers should make their people warlike not 
for lust of conquest, but in order to insure the defence of themselves and 
their subjects. . . . It is outrageous and deplorable that in war, which is 
intrinsically evil, men should be valourous and wise, whereas in peace and 
quiet, which is good, they are so ignorant and inept that they do not know 
how to enjoy their blessings.25
Antonio de Guevara thought that a prince “which keepeth his commonwealth 
in peace hath great wrong if he were not of all men beloved. What good can the 
commonwealth have where there is war and dissension. . . . What availeth a 
prince to banish all vices . . . otherwise he keepeth it in war.”26 Castiglione’s 
appreciation of the pursuit of more peaceful pastimes was further explored by 
the adherents of Christian humanism.
Erasmianism and irenic culture
The European state system in the Renaissance was organized for wielding 
power and making war. Garrett Mattingly has suggested that Machiavelli, the 
Florentine humanist, who is almost universally viewed as a cynical realist and 
who adapted his political philosophy to this state of affairs, was actually 
something of a disillusioned idealist.27 Erasmian humanism, on the other 
hand, criticized this political realism and glorification of martial culture by 
launching a direct attack on crusading, chivalric, and patriotic values. Erasmian 
humanists hoped to convert princes to more peaceful policies by showing 
them the usefulness of negotiation and arbitration as an alternative to war, yet 
Erasmus himself remained suspicious of the deviousness inherent in the 
diplomatic practice of the period. Treaties between rulers were supposed 
to prevent wars, but because they were often drawn up with the intent to 
dissimulate, they often led to wars. Erasmus thought that if rulers were men of 
good faith there would be no need for treaties. Still, negotiation offered an 
alternative to war. In order to inculcate more pacific values, Erasmus and his 
followers proposed to draw up a course of studies emphasizing Christian and 
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the best of classical ethics based on the New Testament and the works 
of Roman Stoic authors such as Cicero’s De officiis. The Ciceronian or Neo-
Roman variety of humanism provided the critical tools to question the 
dedication of the nobility to seeking honor and glory in war rather than 
pursuing “the arts of peace.” It asserted that nobility should be based on virtue 
rather than lineage. The audience that the Erasmians aimed this curriculum at 
consisted of merchants whose trade might benefit from peace, and gentlemen 
who valued the pen more than the sword and who were likely to become 
magistrates, royal counselors, and servants, and who might help wean 
monarchs from their bellicose habits.28
Aristotelianism had dominated the scholarship and philosophy of the 
medieval world—especially the universities—and was the basis of the scholastic 
philosophy that, under the guidance of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, 
had provided a rationalist approach to the truths of the Christian religion. 
From the beginning of the Italian Renaissance, humanist scholars, often 
working outside of the academic world, began promoting an alternative to 
scholastic Aristotelianism, which was called Ciceronianism, or more simply, 
Romanism. These humanists, such as Petrarch, preferred the moral values and 
rhetorical Latin style that they found in Cicero and Seneca. Later, Christian 
moralists such as Erasmus discovered a grave fault in Cicero—he had come 
to be admired by Machiavelli, who made effective use of Cicero’s argument 
that the interests of one’s own country were to be preferred above all other 
considerations.29
Erasmus was an early and severe critic of the martial ethos that had prevailed 
in Christian society from late antiquity through the Middle Ages when 
the Church had often stood in need of armed protection. This position was 
at first emotional rather than intellectual because his pupil, Alexander, son of 
James IV of Scotland, was killed at the battle of Flodden in 1515. Erasmus 
called Mars “the stupidest of all gods.” War did not confer glory in his opinion; 
it was irrational, and Erasmus came to detest all professional soldiers. Erasmus 
condemned war, not because it was incompatible with the Christian religion, 
but because it was an inhumane activity. The argument that war was unnatural 
and irrational became one of the foundations of modern pacifism.30
The Christian humanists, such as Erasmus, Sir Thomas More, and John 
Colet, rejected the argument that war was an instrument of Divine Providence 
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to punish the sins of man; they insisted that wars occurred because of the 
actions of men, and sins were “learned in war.” Erasmus said that since more 
innocent than evil people were hurt by war, the divine use of war to punish 
sins would be unjust. Further, the Erasmians insisted that peace was possible in 
a society founded on reason and justice. For that reason, a good Christian 
prince should be too busy governing and dispensing justice to have time to 
hunt, make war, dance, or gamble.31 If Plato, a pagan, thought that civil war 
was the worst kind of calamity imaginable, how much more careful should 
Christians be about shedding Christian blood, said Erasmus, because war 
among Christians was a kind of civil war. Erasmus also thought that it would 
be very difficult to justify a war against the Turks unless provoked, because this 
was contrary to the means by which Christianity was first spread. Since one 
war tends to lead to another, a good Christian prince should be very circumspect 
about declaring war. If he does go to war, he should be careful to wage war with 
as little harm to his own subjects and as little shedding of Christian blood as 
possible, and to conclude the struggle as soon as possible.32 Although Erasmus 
was the leading exponent of peace in his time, it needs to be said that he had 
never taken the trouble to think through the complex subject of why states go 
to war with one another.33
Erasmus was most insistent in his condemnation of the just- war doctrine. 
Princes deceive themselves when they declare that the wars that they are about 
to undertake are just wars. There was no point in discussing whether a war was 
just or not since rulers have always found the requisite arguments to assert that 
their cause was just. Moreover, the problem with allowing the prince to decide 
whether to wage war was that princes have difficulty distinguishing between 
their own ambitions and the interests of a commonwealth. Erasmus was also 
insistent that princes should not consult their lawyers and courtiers on this 
subject, but rather should listen to their subjects. He did concede that a good 
prince might be obliged to fight a war for a compelling reason, but it could not 
be called a just war unless he pursued and exhausted more peaceful solutions.34 
Erasmus thought that the true message of the New Testament enjoining 
Christians to be men of peace had been perverted by the Roman law doctrine 
of just war and by the rationalism of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. That 
message of peace had been further diluted by canon lawyers, theologians, and 
papal practice during late antiquity and the medieval period.35
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Erasmus singled out Pope Julius II as a particularly bad example of a pontiff, 
whose bellicose behavior made him indistinguishable from the worst of 
the Renaissance Italian princes. It was during Julius’s pontificate (1503–13) 
that the papal states emerged as a sovereign entity as a consequence of his 
pursuit of war and diplomacy. Erasmus wrote a satirical dialogue in which 
he compared Pope Julius to Julius Caesar. Although perhaps not as corrupt as 
some of his predecessors, Julius was a very worldly pope whom Erasmus 
styled the “warrior- pope.” Erasmus depicted Julius II entering cities he had 
conquered in the manner of Roman military triumphs such as those staged by 
Scipio Africanus or his alter ego, Julius Caesar.36
Among the adages that Erasmus added to the 1515 edition of the Adagiorum 
Chiliades was dulce bellum inexpertis, that is, “war is sweet to those who have 
not tried it.” It was a proverb with many variants and was found in the writings 
of classical authors from the Greek poet Pindar to the Roman military writer 
Vegetius. Erasmus lamented that despite the terrible destruction of war, it was 
entered on lightly:
If there is anything in mortal affairs which should be approached with 
hesitancy, or rather ought to be avoided in every possible way, guarded 
against and shunned, that thing is war; there is nothing more wicked,  
more disastrous, and more widely destructive, more deeply tenacious, more 
loathsome, in a word more unworthy of man, not to say of a Christian. Yet, 
strange to say, everywhere at the present time war is being entered upon 
lightly, for any kind of reason, and waged with cruelty and barbarousness, 
not only by the heathen but by Christians, not only for lay people, but by 
priests and bishops, not only by the young and inexperienced, but also by the 
old who know it well; not so much by the common people and the naturally 
fickle mob, but rather by princes, whose function should restrain with 
wisdom and reason the rash impulses of the foolish rabble. Nor are there 
lacking lawyers and theologians who add fuel to the fire of these misdeeds. . . . 
And the result of all this is, that war is now such an accepted thing that 
people are astonished to find anyone who does not like it.
The new 1515 edition of Erasmus’s Adages seems to have been prompted by 
the youthful Henry VIII’s wars against Scotland and France.37
Until well into the early modern era, the distinction between the nobilities 
of the sword and the robe (or in the British Isles, between swordsmen and 
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gownsmen) persisted, and many young noblemen and gentlemen believed that 
a period of time spent in the army as an officer or a gentleman volunteer 
constituted an initiation into manhood and a validation of their honorable 
status.38 Erasmus regarded time spent in military service as time wasted and 
thought that the effort expended was destructive. He made a particular point 
of attacking the writers of military memoirs and their accounts of battle as 
pure fiction because the “hallooing, hurly- burly, noise of guns, trumpets and 
drums, neighing of horses and shouting of men”:—what modern military 
historians call the “fog of battle”—produced such noise and confusion that it 
would have been impossible for any one person to know what was going on 
everywhere on the battlefield—never mind being able to repeat verbatim 
speeches made in different places by noble officers and commanders.39
A protégé of Erasmus, the Catalan Juan Luis Vives, carried on Erasmus’s 
denunciation of martial culture. As a child, Vives saw his father, grandmother, 
and great- grandfather all executed by the Spanish Inquisition as relapsed 
conversos (or crypto-Jews). His mother died soon after of the Plague, and her 
body was dug up and also burnt by the Inquisition. Vives left Spain never to 
return, receiving his education at the University of Paris. He spent the rest of 
his life in England and at Bruges in the Spanish Netherlands. Like Erasmus and 
Thomas More, Vives, in his The Education of a Christian Woman, directed his 
literary efforts toward condemning bellicosity as depicted in books of chivalry 
such as Thomas Mallory’s Morted’ Arthur, which these humanists wished to 
see banished from the lists of recommended reading for aristocratic men 
and women. Indeed, they wished to purge all works of history and romantic 
literature that praised despots and conquerors such as Alexander the Great 
and Julius Caesar. These works were hardly suitable for the education of 
Christian monarchs and their officials who were supposed to rule with justice. 
The education of a Christian prince should be aimed at ending the endless 
wars between Christians. True honor and glory could not be found in the 
senseless bloodshed of war. Vives also emphasized the idea that civility 
flourished best in an urban commonwealth in which civic participation in 
government and the rule of law were to be found.40
Éméric Crucé, another disciple of Erasmus, a French monk and the author 
of Nouveau Cynée (1623), also rejected the concept of just war, and proposed 
an international congress to maintain peace, which would meet at Venice 
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and include representatives from Muslim as well as Christian countries.41 
He thought that warriors had no place in civilized society because of their 
arrogance and brutality, which were the causes of all wars. Such men could 
never settle down to peaceful habits. Like Erasmus, he did not believe in 
the legal concept of just war. While Crucé did not think that martial men 
could be entirely banished, he did insist that free trade and the development 
of agriculture, commerce, and manufacturing could shift the social balance, 
encourage peaceful occupations, increase wealth, and draw men away from 
martial pursuits. Those who could not adapt themselves to living in a mercantile 
world could be recruited into professional armies and sent to the fringes of the 
civilized world to fight pirates and savages.42
The Salamancan School and just-war theory
Not all humanists followed Erasmus in rejecting all forms of violence. Many 
clung to the just- war tradition, and while unable to follow the Erasmian peace 
ethic, they did seek to impose constraints on methods of warfare. Nor should 
we forget that Machiavelli’s jettisoning of ethical standards from political and 
military discourse also derives from the Italian humanist tradition. Other 
humanist scholars cited classical authorities to perpetuate or revive a martial 
ethos for their princely or aristocratic patrons.43
Because Erasmus had mounted a devastating attack on the ancient doctrine 
of just war, which had been upheld and defended by theologians and canon 
lawyers for a millennium, his writings caused alarm in those quarters. His 
Querela pacis (The Complaint of Peace), published in 1517 while he was living 
in England, was condemned and seized by the Sorbonne, the theological 
faculty of the University of Paris. Taken aback that his book was banned in 
France, Erasmus backed down to a degree in later life, and admitted that armed 
conflict was not totally prohibited to Christians. Rulers were allowed to wield 
the sword to protect the commonwealth, but not to pursue their personal 
ambitions by means of war.44
However admirable these sentiments were, the Erasmian peace ethic lacked 
practical application. The pacifism of Erasmus and the Christian humanists 
was parochial because it built Utopias within a world that possessed Christian 
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values and was confined to Western Europe. It failed to anticipate European 
expansion into the East Indies and the New World, and it could not comprehend 
or deal with the nature of the early modern state that came into existence for 
the purpose of making war on a grander scale over a sustained period of time.45 
Also, many humanists rejected the Roman concept of kinship within human 
society, and preferred the more narrow Aristotelian belief that the polis was 
the ideal society. At the same time, not a few of them also accepted Aristotle’s 
argument that barbarians and other lesser people were fit to be enslaved 
because of cultural and moral shortcomings. This was an argument that could 
be used to justify both the aggressive pursuit of war and the conquest of the 
native peoples of the New World.46
Spain, during its so- called Golden Age, when it was the dominant European 
power and was in the process of acquiring a vast colonial empire, was hardly 
in the mood to listen to the Erasmians. Where Erasmus had said that it might 
be better to accept an unjust peace in preference to a just war, Francisco 
de Vitoria, a Dominican friar and a philosopher who had studied at the 
University of Paris and later taught at the University of Salamanca, rejected 
pacifism and cited St. Augustine to argue that in the earthly city peace is 
only momentary. Like other Spanish political theorists of the early sixteenth 
century, his outlook was shaped by the Spanish conquests in the New 
World. Unlike Erasmus, whose writings he took a part in condemning, Vitoria 
recognized the need to accommodate the sovereign state and the right of 
political society to defend itself. Moreover, Vitoria also insisted on the right 
of a state to wage offensive war, if after a lapse of time, it failed to obtain 
satisfaction or reparations from an enemy for injuries suffered. Thus, the 
ethical and legal doctrine of the just war was extended by philosophers such as 
Vitoria; this was done by reaching back to the Old Testament, rather than 
grounding their teachings on war solely on the New Testament as Erasmus 
had done. At the same time, Vitoria was not prepared to allow the prince to 
declare war without constraints; he rejected differences of religion, princely 
ambition, and conquest of empire as sufficient causes for waging war. The only 
morally acceptable reasons for going to war were self- defense, the restoration 
of peace, and the avenging of injuries. Vitoria also rejected the papal claim 
that the Indians of the New World might be conquered because they practice 
cannibalism. It was morally acceptable for any ruler to stop such practices, but 
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not to acquire territory.47 The Italian Protestant, Alberico Gentili, also joined 
this controversy by arguing that it was just to make war on the Indians because 
they supposedly practiced sodomy with beasts, which was contrary to natural 
law. However, he rejected the argument that the conquest of the Indians was 
justified because they refused to accept the missionaries who came to preach 
the Gospel.48
Vitoria laid down rules for waging war. Only the prince had “the authority 
to wage war,” but he should first strive to live in peace with his enemy and 
“above all to avoid all provocations and causes of war.” Assuming that his 
subjects did not object, the inability to maintain peaceful relations with a 
potential enemy was grounds for a legitimate war. War should be waged not to 
destroy the enemy, but to reestablish peace and security. Once victory had 
been achieved, the victorious prince must act as a judge and not as a prosecutor. 
“He must give satisfaction to the injured, but without causing the utter 
ruination of the guilty commonwealth.” However, Vitoria lays down a number 
of exceptions to this last rule. Sometimes, when fighting the infidel, it becomes 
necessary to kill all who can bear arms when that enemy refuses to surrender. 
This cannot be done in wars against fellow Christians because this would 
provoke endless warfare. Mindful that the Book of Joshua (6:21) records that 
Saul and the Israelites, by divine command, had killed the children and young 
women of Amalek, Vitoria rejects so broad a doctrine of holy war even when 
fighting the Turks. Even though it can be assumed that Turkish male children 
may grow up to fight Christians, they may not be slain for what they might do 
in the future. One must presume that all noncombatants are innocent, even 
though Deuteronomy (20:10–20) allows the killing of all adult males—whether 
combatants or noncombatants. Vitoria does allow that if it is necessary to 
besiege and storm a fortification in order to keep the war from spreading or to 
prevent the enemy from winning, no moral fault is incurred if innocent people 
die, but “care must be taken to insure that the evil effects of war do not outweigh 
the possible benefits sought by waging” the war in the first place. Vitoria also 
specifies the conditions that allow the killing of enemy combatants: The 
defenders of a city or fortress who have refused to surrender when called on to 
do so, may be put to the sword following victory, but only after taking “account 
of the scale of the injury inflicted by the enemy, [and] of our losses and their 
other crimes . . . without cruelty or inhumanity”; and when the enemy is an 
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infidel from whom one can never hope for peace; and when prisoners of war 
turn out to be “deserters and fugitives,” but not otherwise.49
Another member of the Salamancan School was Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, 
a diplomat and a canon of Santiago. His The Idea of a Politico-Christian Prince 
called for the ruler to maintain his reputation by the display of moral virtue 
and political wisdom. To cultivate that reputation could be more difficult than 
building a state, and once lost, it could never be regained. Virtue helped to 
build the support of citizens and subjects, and was a major source of political 
power and the maintenance of authority. This had more to do with respect 
than public opinion, but the ruler could not ignore his subjects’ wishes either. 
While Saavedra did not approve of outright lying by a prince when conducting 
affairs of state, he believed that a prudent ruler might sometimes need to 
dissimulate when dealing with foreign princes, his own subjects, or even his 
own councilors. In this respect, Saavedra was not all that different from 
Machiavelli. And, like Machiavelli, Saavedra believed that religion, with its 
assurances of future rewards or punishments, helped to ensure obedience to 
the prince.50
A number of Portuguese Jesuits joined the friars of the Salamancan School 
in their desire to impose limits on offensive war. Luis Molina wrote that wars 
for the pursuit of glory and preemptive strikes were not morally permissible. 
Unlike Gentili, he said that wars cannot be just on both sides, and the aggression 
in defensive wars must be proportionate to the injury suffered. Warfare against 
“barbarians” living without lawfully recognized government, in places such as 
Brazil, was permissible only to protect “innocent victims of their aggression.”51
Utopianism
A genre of Christian Humanist literature that arose in protest against 
Machiavellian “reason of state” political theory and its glorification of the 
martial ethos was Utopianism. Thomas More was the modern inventor of 
Utopian schemes, which were widely imitated by later writers such as Sir 
Francis Bacon, in his New Atlantis, and Robert Burton.52 Most early modern 
schemes for Utopias offered models for small perfected communities within 
a larger imperfect world. They were often located on the periphery of the 
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European world away from the vortex of war. In some of these communities, 
there was an absence of gold so as not to arouse the envy of bellicose neighbors, 
yet in none of these ideal societies could their creators imagine a larger world 
completely purged of war.53
The inhabitants of Sir Thomas More’s Utopia were not entirely pacifist; they 
were prepared to fight in self- defense, although they preferred diplomacy or 
even paying tribute to actual warfare. However, unlike Machiavelli and the 
classical republicans who insisted on civic militias for military undertakings 
because they distrusted mercenary soldiers, the Utopians hired mercenaries to 
fight their wars of self- defense. They also mistrusted mercenaries, but they did 
not want the Utopians mixed up in the nasty and unprofitable business of war. 
Sir Thomas More, being a lawyer, was prepared to accept the just- war doctrine, 
dating back to St. Augustine and Roman law. Erasmus, by contrast, thought 
that war was so unchristian and destructive that he could not think of any 
circumstance that justified a declaration of war.54
A striking feature of More’s Utopia is that it was not conceived as a 
Christian commonwealth. Whereas Sir Francis Bacon imagined that the 
citizens of New Atlantis possessed both the Old and the New Testaments, More 
chose to withhold Christian revelation from the Utopians, and despite the 
fact that he dressed them in the garb of Franciscan friars and had them 
dwell in a community that looked suspiciously medieval, the Utopians lived 
in accordance with an ethical code that would have been familiar to Plato. The 
purpose of this was to show that if the Utopians possessed only the four 
cardinal virtues of classical pagan morality and could live in peace, how much 
more perfect would be a society possessing the three Christian virtues as well. 
Thus, More depicted the Utopians, having only reason to guide them, as living 
to a higher moral standard than the inhabitants of the war- torn Christian 
Europe of More’s time who had the benefit of Divine Revelation.55
It is perhaps misleading to think of the inhabitants of More’s Utopia 
as living in a perfected society. Whereas the Utopians were highly moral 
and restrained in their domestic political behavior, their relations with other 
nations were sometimes devoid of moral restraint. They did not make treaties, 
they practiced deception, and when they went to war with other peoples, 
they hired foreign mercenaries to do their fighting. They also attempted 
to undermine the governments of their enemies by suborning treason and 
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procuring assassinations. The Utopians also dealt with the problem of surplus 
population by pursuing aggressive colonial expansion.56
With respect to external relations, More’s highly principled behavior as a 
royal servant to Henry VIII was in contrast to that of the Utopians. Most of 
the rulers of Europe in the early sixteenth century liked to attract humanist 
scholars to their courts for adornment if not enlightenment. The humanists, in 
turn, were flattered to be invited, and hoped to exert some influence on these 
would- be patrons. Christian humanists usually discovered that the princes 
and aristocracy were eager for a humanist education that would help them 
adapt to a rapidly changing world, provided it did not interfere with their 
predilection for hunting and making war. A problem that Sir Thomas More 
explored in his Utopia was whether a Christian humanist should involve 
himself in the political affairs of a prince if invited to become an adviser. The 
royal councilors had their own sycophantic culture and inner dynamic, and 
intellectuals would have to give up their independence of judgment. Erasmus 
understood that a Christian humanist could not give honest advice on the 
justness of war to a powerful prince who was determined to go to war.57 More 
thought that Renaissance monarchs were preoccupied with “pursuits of war” 
in order to add to their kingdoms, rather than providing good government to 
the territories that they already possessed. His opposition to war was partly 
motivated by the heavy burden that taxation placed on ordinary people—
especially the poorest segment of the population—and by the looting of 
soldiers. More also believed that the insatiable needs of war corrupt good laws 
and government.58
Neo-Stoicism
At the time of More’s death in 1535, it must have appeared that the chances 
of universal peace were fading. The more practical humanists turned their 
attention to the task of limiting the scope of war and imposing ethical 
constraints on how war was waged, employing the examples of Roman 
Stoicism. Just as classical Stoicism was generated by the conflicts and violence 
of the Hellenistic world, so also the revival of Stoicism, or Neo-Stoicism, had 
its origins in the 1570s in the reaction of humanist moral and political 
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philosophers against the spread of bloodshed resulting from the religious 
wars in France. Similar disasters plagued Germany, the Low Countries, and the 
British Isles. One of the earliest exponents of this Neo-Stoicism was Michel 
de Montaigne, who implicitly rejected the Huguenot theory of resistance 
to constituted authority and blamed it for the moral, political, and social 
disintegration that accompanied the French religious and civil wars. These 
extraordinary times explain his espousal of Neo-Stoicism: “In ordinary and 
peaceful times, a man prepares himself for common and moderate accidents; 
but in this confusion, wherein we have been for these thirty years, every 
Frenchman, be it in general or in particular, doth hourly see himself upon the 
point of his fortunes overthrown and downfall.”59 Montaigne withdrew from 
his judicial offices in the Parlement of Bordeaux and retired to his estate, 
employing his leisure for scholarship and the writing of his Essays. Montaigne’s 
example of stoic endurance and tolerance encouraged Neo-Stoic disciples in 
France and other countries beset by civil and religious strife.60
Montaigne was trained in the law and held offices associated with the 
nobility of the robe, but he considered himself to be a member of the sword 
nobility. Despite his peaceful inclination, he believed that the profession of 
arms was the only source of nobility. He disliked the law, but was vague about 
the details of his military service. His father had fought in the Italian wars, and 
kept a journal, which Montaigne read. Montaigne also made a special study 
of Roman soldiers, such as Scipio Africanus (the “Elder”), the conqueror of 
Carthage, and Lucullus, a patron of learning, and a friend of scholars and 
poets. Being surrounded by violence and civil war, it is not surprising that 
Montaigne’s Essays are filled with references to and anecdotes about warfare 
both ancient and modern. As befitted a humanist, he showed a particular 
interest in the ethics of war.61
The theme that runs through Neo-Stoic philosophy is the acceptance of 
the vicissitudes of fortune, and the determination to remain constant and 
courageous in the face of the miseries that civil war brought. Justus Lipsius 
defined constancy as “a right and immoveable strength of mind, neither lifted 
up nor pressed down with external and casual accidents.” It was characterized 
by patience and the acceptance of suffering without complaint and it was 
guided by “right reason.” Although he was a steadfast Catholic, Montaigne 
incurred the official displeasure of the Catholic Church because of his frequent 
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citation of the goddess Fortuna; other Neo-Stoic thinkers such as Justus 
Lipsius and Guillaume de Vair, Bishop of Lisieux, invoke Divine Providence 
as a cause of the conjuncture of disasters associated with the civil conflict 
that Montaigne, in his humanist- classicist style, assigned to fortune. The 
constancy that Neo-Stoics advocated required faithfulness to established 
religion, which in France was Catholicism. Coupled with the maintenance of 
religious uniformity (although Montaigne was a man of tolerant views), Neo-
Stoic thinkers insisted on loyalty and obedience to rulers by law established, 
whatever their imperfections, and an acceptance of ancient custom. Therefore, 
political and religious resistance could not be condoned.62 Late sixteenth- 
century Neo-Stoics thought that it was of supreme political importance to 
preserve the ruler’s hold on the state in order to preserve political stability. The 
advancement of justice was of secondary importance, and unjust things might 
be done to preserve the state and maintain political order and civil peace.63
Montaigne believed that the French civil wars were more cruel than 
anything to be found in the ancient world. They were worse than interstate 
conflicts because they obliged everyone to be a soldier and guard his own 
house. Montaigne seems to be referring to the fact that most of his neighbors 
were Protestants, and he felt besieged and had ever to be vigilant: “Civil wars 
are worse in this respect than other wars, that they make us all sentinels in our 
own houses.” Indeed, Montaigne believed that the age in which he lived was so 
vicious that it was not sufficient to call it an age of iron. A new and more base 
metal was called for to describe his times.64
The cruelty of the French civil wars was intensified by the widespread 
aristocratic feuds of the period that increased bloodletting beyond what the 
political and religious disputes would otherwise have warranted. Stuart Carroll 
says that this endemic feuding had been inherited from the Burgundian-
Armagnac wars of the fifteenth century, was made worse by the Italian fashion 
for dueling, and resulted in a homicide rate that exceeded anything in present- 
day society. These violent predilections reached their peak during another 
period of civil war in France—the Frondes in the 1650s. Aristocratic feuding 
replicated the civil wars on a smaller scale, because dueling in the Italian 
fashion, with rapiers rather than military swords, required the numerous 
seconds that Italian dueling protocol called for also to participate in duels 
rather than to merely witness the contest.65 Montaigne’s disciple, Guillaume du 
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Vair, offered the advice that armed noblemen should avoid those occasions 
and places where insults might be offered of a kind that a man of honor would 
be obliged to answer with violence.66 The chivalric revival of the Renaissance 
intensified the egotism and martial ethos of the military aristocracy in early 
modern France. In aristocratic circles, it came to be believed that revenge 
acquired more legitimacy if it was performed in public. Moreover, judges 
were prepared to accept the argument that murder and mayhem committed 
while seeking revenge under the aristocratic code of honor constituted 
mitigating circumstances. Because the Valois kings of France had succeeded in 
suppressing most of the larger aristocratic vendettas, feuding, and dueling 
were largely confined to the lesser ranks of the French aristocracy. However, 
the religious wars turned these conflicts into blood feuds and thus intensified 
the enmity.67
Montaigne’s Neo-Stoic values reflected his desire to develop an ethical 
system that would urge men to restrain their passions and renounce revenge in 
order to curb the cruelty of war. Like many Frenchmen, he believed that the 
religious wars reflected a decline in ethical standards.68 He insisted that when 
punishing an enemy or fighting a war, passion and anger could cloud one’s 
judgment. Furthermore, when engaging an enemy in combat, there was no 
need to demonize him since he might be an honorable man with admirable 
virtues.
Philosophy wills that in chastising injuries received we keep anger out of  
it, not so that the vengeance may be less, but on the contrary so that it  
may be all the better dealt out and heavier; which purposes, so philosophy 
thinks, this impetuosity hinders. . . . He who bears himself more moderately 
toward winning and losing is always self- possessed. The less he becomes 
excited and impassioned about the game, the more advantageously and 
surely he plays it.69
The distinction between robe and sword in sixteenth- century France has 
probably been exaggerated, as the career of Montaigne suggests. Montaigne 
always assumed that he belonged to the sword nobility, and saw no reason why 
one could not combine the careers of being a soldier and a scholar. He insisted 
that “the proper, the only, the essential form of nobility in France is the military 
profession.” Judges sometimes interrupted their careers to seek military 
experience, and some of them pursued feuds and engaged in duels. Yet, despite 
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his condemnation of civil wars and wars of aggression, Montaigne continued 
to admire soldiers and the military life.
There is no occupation so pleasant as the military one, an occupation both 
noble in execution (for the strongest, most generous, and proudest of all 
virtues is valour) and noble in its cause: there is no more just and universal 
service than the protection of the peace and the greatness of your country. 
You enjoy the company of so many noble, young, active men, the regular 
sight of so many tragic spectacles, the freedom of that artless relationship,  
a manly and unceremonious way of life, the variety of a thousand diverse 
actions, the brave harmony of martial music which delights your ears and 
arouses your soul, the honour of this exercise, even its severity and 
hardship. . . . To fear the common risks that affect so great a throng, not to 
dare what so many kinds of souls dare, that is for a heart immeasurably weak 
and base. . . . Death is more abject, lingering and distressing in bed than 
battle. . . .70
Montaigne was clearly ambivalent about warfare. He condemns wars 
undertaken for conquest and glory, such as the Spanish acquisition of a colonial 
empire in the New World, but at the same time, he condemns as cowardly and 
shameful the failure of the kings of Spain to lead those campaigns in person. He 
held Henry III of France in contempt for his failure to appear on the battlefield, 
but admired the warlike qualities of Henry of Navarre (later Henry IV), 
although he did not trust the latter’s motives.71
Montaigne was a humanist with a strong moral sense, and was clearly 
influenced by Erasmian pacifism. He agreed that the king’s primary duty was to 
dispense justice and condemned those princes who were driven by ambition to 
expand their territories. While he had a strong aversion to civil conflicts, he also 
could not condone the chauvinism of a monarch who sought to quell domestic 
factionalism or strife by undertaking foreign wars. However, Montaigne realized 
that the uncompromising pacifism of the early sixteenth- century Erasmians 
had failed to deter warfare, and thus, he accepted the ancient and pessimistic 
view of human nature that made war seem inevitable. Consequently, he believed 
that rulers had a duty to prepare their countries for defensive wars, and should 
be ready to lead their subjects personally in such endeavors.72
Justus Lipsius, a Flemish classical scholar who changed his religion every 
time he moved his residence, was a disciple of Montaigne but also an admirer 
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of Machiavelli. Like Montaigne, he came down on the side of morality in 
political and military affairs. Drawing on the writings of both Seneca and 
Tacitus, Lipsius sought to devise a system of politics and ethics that was 
compatible with Christian morality.73 Beginning in the 1570s, Tacitism became 
a model of humanistic discourse on politics and replaced the earlier Ciceronian 
humanism. Although Machiavelli had not acknowledged the influence of 
Tacitus, Justus Lipsius and Michel de Montaigne found that Tacitus’s skeptical 
way of looking at politics suited the age of the civil wars that characterized 
France and the Netherlands. Tacitus was a classical writer to whom Lipsius and 
Montaigne could turn and who also provided the moral dimension that was 
lacking in Machiavelli. Lipsius and Montaigne are also noted for their fusion of 
secularized political analysis with Tacitean skepticism, which is one source of 
what we call Neo-Stoicism. But Lipsius retained a belief in Machiavellian 
“reason of state” and conceded that in an imperfect world where deception 
pervaded diplomatic relations, the prince must sometimes “play the fox” in 
order to protect himself and his realm.74 Lipsius may have abhorred war, but 
he recognized that the prince needed military power to keep order at home 
and to defend the realm. That power needed to be guided by what he called 
“military prudence.” Machiavelli was the only modern writer whom Lipsius 
recommended to his readers, and he placed him in his pantheon alongside 
Plato and Aristotle, but he did insist on a Neo-Stoic code of morality in military 
matters.75
Lipsius inspired scholars throughout early modern Europe to study 
Roman political and military institutions in order to apply Roman practice 
to contemporaneous problems. Whereas Machiavelli thought that a state’s 
military forces should rest on a citizen militia, Lipsius favored a standing army 
composed of long- service professional soldiers recruited from among the 
state’s own citizens. The development of the fiscal resources of the early modern 
state had progressed far enough to make this possible by the end of the 
sixteenth century. Indeed, Lipsius made military force the foundation of the 
early modern absolutist state, and at the same time, argued that military 
questions could not be divorced from foreign and domestic affairs and fiscal 
resources. Because his prescriptions for military organization, methods of 
warfare, and the financial underpinnings of these activities were incorporated 
into a political theory, Gerhard Oestreich believed that Lipsius was the 
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“philosophical father of the early modern state.” Lipsius’s call for military 
reforms was taken up by Maurice of Nassau, stadholder of the United Provinces 
of the Netherlands and captain- general of the States’ Army, and his Nassau 
cousins, who turned the Dutch Army into an effective and disciplined force 
during the Eighty Years War (1568–1648), the Dutch war of independence. 
Lipsius’s distinctive contribution was to lay out a system of discipline derived 
from Roman models, and to provide an ethical system based on Roman 
Stoicism.76 Unfortunately, one of the chief lessons that European rulers learned 
from their study of Roman political and military institutions was that imperial 
expansion led to greatness. Consequently, their imperial expansion helped to 
keep alive the fires of religious and dynastic warfare. Lipsius believed that the 
reason Europe was beset with so many wars and rebellions was because it was 
divided into small parcels ruled by competing dynasties. He pointed out that 
the same situation had prevailed on the Western European continent before it 
was incorporated into the Roman Empire. If Europe could achieve both 
political and religious unity once again, it could enjoy internal peace and put 
an end to the Turkish threat. To achieve such unity, of course, would have 
required a considerable degree of coercion on the part of a powerful state 
with plentiful resources of money and military power, such as the Roman 
Empire had possessed. This was a view of history that was consistent with 
the fashionable Tacitism then current in European intellectual circles. The 
kingdom of France had also maintained a standing army composed of 
mercenaries from the late medieval period, but because the kings of France 
wished to employ only experienced soldiers, they were always looking for 
pretexts for war to provide their soldiers with battle experience. They forgot 
the lesson to be learned from Rome, Carthage, and the other empires of the 
ancient world that mercenary soldiers often turn on their own masters.77
Lipsius spent much of his career at the University of Leiden, where 
his writings were thought to provide a suitable basis for the education of 
the young Maurice of Nassau, so that he might follow in the footsteps of his 
father William I (“the Silent”), Prince of Orange, as the military leader of the 
Dutch war of independence from Spain. Lipsius subsequently returned to 
Catholicism and the Spanish Netherlands, spending his last years at the 
University of Louvain. However, he never abandoned his Tacitean belief that 
courts of princes were corrupt, and war was sometimes preferable to peace 
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when living under rulers such as the Spanish Habsburgs. The lesson could also 
be learned from reading Lipsius that honor was something to be acquired on 
the battlefield, not at court—especially a court that had become effeminated 
like the English court of King James VI and I. King James hated violence, but 
for the Stoic, violence was part of the human condition and could not be 
avoided.78
Lipsius hoped for a negotiated peace in the Low Countries war, rather than 
a victory by either side. He disapproved of the policy followed by Alexander 
Farnese, Prince of Parma, the Spanish military commander, in his attempt to 
settle the war by conquest and the imposition of religious uniformity. Lipsius 
had accepted a teaching post at the University of Leiden because William I had 
declared himself in favor of a degree of religious toleration; Lipsius moved 
back to Louvain and became a Catholic once again when he perceived that the 
Spanish government had abandoned Parma’s policy of conquest and was open 
to negotiations. As Lipsius surmised, the Spanish agreed to the Twelve Years’ 
Truce in 1609. Although Lipsius’s views on the need for religious uniformity 
altered according to the circumstances, he remained consistent in arguing that 
the public observance of religion must always be subordinate to politics. At the 
same time, he believed that the private observance of religion was a matter of 
individual choice. These views remind us of why Lipsius was always considered 
to be a Machiavellian.79
Lipsius did adhere to the traditional Roman and medieval criteria for a just 
war—especially those laid down by St. Thomas Aquinas. Only the prince had 
the authority to make war, and the only just cause for taking up arms was 
defense against invasion, but this also included going to the aid of a neighbor 
or ally who was threatened by tyranny. An enemy’s territories might also be 
invaded to avenge injuries suffered or to recover something wrongfully taken 
by that enemy, but only after the enemy had been warned and given the 
opportunity to make restitution. Lipsius also quotes St. Augustine to say that 
preemptive war may be undertaken against barbarians who are uncivilized 
heathens—especially if they have previously invaded Christian territory. “Wise 
men make war that they may have peace. . . .”80
One should not enter upon war lightly, Lipsius advised princes, because it 
was easier to begin a war than to extricate one’s kingdom once the war had 
begun. Moreover, the outcome of a war was always unpredictable, and the 
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wake of war would leave behind much death and destruction, visited on 
princes as well as peasants. For this reason, the prince had a Christian obligation 
to seek good counsel before undertaking a war, and to banish from his court 
warmongers—those who “are the furies and firebrands of war” and cannot live 
in peace. Lipsius paraphrased Erasmus: “War is sweet to them that have not 
had experience thereof.” But then, he cites Caesar Augustus to the effect that 
while a prince should be peaceful and renounce ambition, he should maintain 
sufficient military resources to defend his kingdoms.81
Arguing from the precepts of Homer, Lipsius saw the perfect prince as 
“a good governor and a worthy warrior,” who was distinguished by courage, 
military virtue, industry, and military prudence, which meant that he was 
conversant with the ways of making war and the laws and customs governing 
the same, and always observed those laws and customs. The prudent prince 
understood that “all wars are unlawful which are grounded upon no other 
cause than ambition and covetousness.” Whereas early sixteenth- century 
Christian humanists had criticized the martial ethos, Lipsius collaborated in 
the creation of the absolutist states of the seventeenth century, which were 
certainly not compatible with the values of the Erasmians.82 While Lipsius may 
have longed for peace, and cautioned princes—especially those of smaller 
states—to avoid war if at all possible by seeking to negotiate a settlement of 
differences, he spent more time discussing the practical aspects of waging war, 
such as organization, discipline, strategy, and tactics than he did examining 
war as a phenomenon. However, he did try to impose a moral dimension 
on the practical aspects of warfare by discussing the concepts of just war, 
constraints on war, and how to conclude a war in a manner consistent with 
justice. In this way, he indirectly contributed to the development of international 
law in the seventeenth century.83
In his advice to rulers and commanders, observing what he took to be the 
example of the Roman Republic, Lipsius urged that wars be concluded by an 
honest peace in which the victors displayed leniency, moderation, and modesty. 
The losing side should also understand that they had been defeated, but 
unnecessary destruction of resources, plunder, and spoil were to be avoided. At 
the same time, he counsels the defeated prince and his subjects to consider well 
their loss, to accept it, and not to harbor revenge. They should endure their 
losses with dignity and courage, and be consoled by the knowledge that 
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reversals of fortune in war and peace often occur. They should learn from their 
mistakes, and should be prepared to defend themselves more effectively the 
next time.84
In order to find constancy and peace in the midst of war and turmoil, 
Lipsius insisted that one must abandon belief in chance and fortune and trust 
to Divine Providence. This was at the heart of Neo-Stoicism.85 Thus, unlike the 
Roman Stoic thinkers such as Seneca, Lipsius also rejected the role of fate, 
fortune, or destiny, although he sometimes uses the word in a figurative sense, 
and insisted on the doctrine of Divine Providence in historical causation. In 
this respect, he differed from Montaigne. However, he was also determined to 
preserve a role for human free will.86 In England, Neo-Stoicism was found in 
both Protestant and Catholic circles, and derived not only from the influence 
of Lipsius, but also from the writings, translated into English, of Montaigne, 
Charron, and Du Vair. Neo-Stoicism, when coupled with the sharp edge of 
Tacitean inquiry into politics, was particularly influential among the followers 
of Sir Philip Sidney, Robert Devereux, second Earl of Essex, and in the 
household of Henry, Prince of Wales.87 James VI and I disparaged Neo-Stoic 
values because he thought that they led men down the path to war, seeking 
only honor. Yet, he did pay tribute to the constancy and the invicti animi (i.e., 
“the unconquerable spirit”) of the Neo-Stoics.88
A perhaps understandable reaction of Neo-Stoic thinkers such as Montaigne 
to the pervasive warfare of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was 
to emulate the Stoics of the age of Epicurus and to withdraw from active 
participation in worldly affairs—to cultivate their gardens in both a figurative 
and literal sense. The Lipsian method of seeking valid modes of political and 
moral behavior in an age of perpetual warfare was to employ the tools of 
scholarship to look for examples from the ancient wisdom of the classical past. 
As such, it shared much with the broader movement of Erasmian humanism, 
but Lipsian Neo-Stoicism was intended for those who pursued an active 
life despite the chaos around them. The Lipsian emphasis on constancy and 
prudence owed much to the Stoic influence of Seneca, who urged moderation 
in all things and avoidance of basing one’s thought and behavior on passion. 
Seneca had taught that the good of the commonwealth must be preferred to 
what the individual wanted for himself. This was in perfect accord with man’s 
rational faculties and his sociable inclinations.89
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Secular explanations of war and peace
The main thrust of Renaissance political thought was to offer secular and 
rational explanations for the causes of war and peace. There were those in 
Elizabethan England who did not believe that war was sent as a punishment 
for sin, but rather could be explained in secular terms, and this view appears to 
have enjoyed popular support as well. For example, George Gascoigne thought 
that the main cause of war was “princes’ pride,” which was part of the natural 
cycle of “war, ruin, poverty, peace, riches, envy, malice and war.” War was part 
of a self- regulating political system—an explanation that appears to originate 
with Livy.90 Thomas Fenne, on the other hand, rejected this cyclical explanation 
of war and peace, and insisted that war was caused by the actions of men, and 
could be prevented by human wisdom.91 Edmund Spenser was well acquainted 
with a wide variety of views on war and peace from the classical authors to the 
Christian Humanists. From St. Augustine, he had learned that wars and conflict 
sprang from evil and were widespread, and that perfect peace could never be 
achieved in this life. Yet Spenser continued to believe that peace must be strived 
for, and he employs combat as a metaphor for moral struggle.92 The characters 
in Shakespeare’s plays sometimes utter antiwar sentiments. This may reflect 
Shakespeare’s awareness that chivalric culture was in decline, and this posed 
the danger that such restraints on warfare as granting quarter or the humane 
treatment of prisoners of war might give way to more barbaric methods.93 In 
depicting Richard III as a villain, Shakespeare draws on the Senecan concept 
of Nemesis (personified as the Greek goddess of retribution) and depicts that 
king as an extremely vengeful person who possessed none of the Stoic virtues. 
This enhanced Richard’s evil qualities as a villain totally liberated from moral 
restraint, and thus, empowered his schemes to do evil.94 Thomas Nashe thought 
that the theater could teach important moral lessons to those persons who 
were inclined to violence and disorder:
There is a certain waste of people for whom there is no use but war. . . . If the 
affairs of state cannot exhale these corrupt excrements, it is very expedient 
that they have some light toys to busy their heads withal, cast before them as 
bones to gnaw upon. . . . [Plays] show the ill success of treason, the fall of 
hasty climbers, the wretched end of usurpers, the misery of civil dissension, 
and how just God is evermore in punishing murder.95
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Wars were begun, said the cleric and scholar Robert Burton, “to make sport for 
princes, without any just cause”; they arise from vanity, ambition, and the desire 
for revenge—which were “goodly causes all for plunging the world into an orgy 
of war and slaughter.” The courtiers and councilors who urge such wars 
will always be safe at home while soldiers endure the wounds and privations 
of battle. Burton then reflects on the misguided motives that led men to 
volunteer to be soldiers, and the ways in which military commanders appeal to 
their sense of honor and ambition for glory through displays of military dress, 
martial music, ceremony, and spectacle. He particularly regretted the losses 
suffered by their wives, families and friends.96 Burton expressed his hatred of 
warfare, and thought that offensive wars were seldom justified. The only just 
reason for going to war was ad populi salutem, that is, “for the safety of the 
people.” Diplomacy was to be preferred to armed conflict: “Fair means shall 
first be tried. Peaceful pressure accomplishes more than violence. . . . For 
strategy can inflict greater blows on the enemy than uncalculating force.”97
Much as Burton hated war, he had to admit that a civil society “lies under 
the protection of warlike virtues, because whensoever there is any suspicion 
of tumult, all our arts cease.” Indeed, “fighting men are more useful to the state 
than husbandmen.” Burton concedes the need for standing armies and a 
“prepared navy”; the necessity of providing for the sinews of war should be 
recognized by dedicating a portion of the revenues of the commonwealth for 
supporting such standing forces, anticipating the inevitable costs of war, as 
well as subsidizing “chaste sports” and exercises that prepare men’s bodies for 
the physical exertions and hardships of war.98
Burton was a Utopian and severely criticized contemporaneous warfare, 
but he was, like other Neo-Stoics, far from being a pacifist. He believed in 
just wars—especially those directed against non-Christians who had invaded 
Christian territories—and he insisted on the necessity of always being prepared 
for war. Yet, it must be said that he also believed in moderation and restraint 
in warfare. He praised the Stoic principle that a wise and prudent man will 
avoid all manner of passions and disturbing thoughts, and subdue them by 
self- discipline and well guided reading so as to avoid violent actions.99
Throughout the Renaissance, there were widely differing views concerning 
whether war was a natural part of the human condition. The study of history, 
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whether of the ancient world or the contemporary world of the Renaissance, 
certainly suggested that war was the main theme of historical writing. It was 
also the favorite theme of poets and dramatists. Thus, the study of history 
offered little help in trying to imagine a world in which peace reigned. Some 
humanists looked to the concept of a golden age for help in constructing a 
vision of a world without war, or at least a model society on a smaller scale 
from which violent conflict had been banished. But the humanists of the 
Renaissance could not agree on whether a golden age had ever existed, where 
it might have existed, or when. The poets of the ancient world had not been in 
agreement on this question, and the writers and political propagandists of the 
Renaissance only confused matters further by inventing panegyrics concerning 
new golden ages in order to flatter their princely patrons.
Machiavelli and Guicciardini would have none of this myth- making, and 
they urged princes and their advisors to confront the harsh realities of the 
European world of the Renaissance, and told them they had no chance to 
compete, or even survive, unless they constantly prepared for war and saw to 
it that their subjects did likewise. If a state remained constantly in a posture 
of military preparedness, and its citizens maintained the exercise of arms, 
good government would inevitably follow. Although popular participation 
in the government and defense of the state might occasion some turbulence, 
Machiavelli and his classical republican followers did not see this as a serious 
threat to political stability. Depending on an army of mercenaries presented a 
far greater threat to political stability and liberty.
Machiavelli’s thoroughly secular analysis of politics and the art of war 
brought a new clarity to the study of these subjects, and was widely admired 
even by those who were troubled by his indifference to both divine and natural 
law. All humanists, even those of the Erasmian persuasion, were ultimately 
prepared to admit that all political societies had the right to defend themselves 
from their enemies, but they were not prepared to accept the disposition of 
Machiavelli and the classical republicans to expansionism and empire- building.
The Erasmians launched an attack on the political realism and the 
glorification of martial values that characterized the Machiavellians, and hoped 
to devise an educational program that would wean the aristocratic classes from 
such values. Although Erasmus had good reason to distrust the diplomatic 
practices of the Renaissance, he did very much wish to induce princes to try 
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negotiation and arbitration to settle differences before resorting to war. To 
accomplish these ends, the Erasmian humanists had hoped to draw up a whole 
new curriculum of studies aimed at those aristocrats who were likely to enter 
the service of rulers that incorporated the best of classical learning and 
Christian ethics. Such Christian humanist principles hopefully might influence 
princes to abandon their bad habits and pursuits of war, hunting, gambling, 
and the like for the more regal duties of governing their kingdoms and 
dispensing justice. The Erasmian program of reforms meant abandoning much 
intellectual and cultural baggage from the past: This included the Roman 
concept of just war, the Augustinian doctrine that wars were sent to punish 
men for their sins, the belief that war provided a means for validating 
honor, acquiring glory, and demonstrating prowess and manliness. Ultimately, 
Erasmian pacifism failed because it lacked a practical program for implementing 
reforms, it alarmed many theologians sufficiently to cause Erasmus’s works to 
be condemned, while governments of the period simply ignored what he had 
to say. The rulers of the early modern period remained devoted to war and 
imperial expansion.
A more practical variety of humanism was Neo-Stoicism, a revival of Roman 
Stoicism associated with Michel de Montaigne and Justus Lipsius. A former 
soldier and a lawyer, Montaigne withdrew from high public office, condemned 
the Huguenot political theories of resistance that he blamed for the outbreak of 
the French religious and civil wars, and retired to his estate to write about the 
virtues of tolerance and constancy in troublesome times. He was particularly 
attentive to the problems of the ethics of warfare. Montaigne’s Neo-Stoic 
philosophy, like that of the Flemish humanist Justus Lipsius, required acceptance 
of the constituted authority of church and state. Although Montaigne could 
never condone offensive wars or rebellion against the prince or church, and 
condemned acts of passion or revenge and feuding, he continued to admire the 
military life and thought kings must display the appropriate military virtues 
and appear on the battlefield to lead their armies in person.
Justus Lipsius had a widespread following among military men because he 
succeeded in combining Machiavelli’s political realism concerning the needs 
of the Renaissance state in a dangerous world with a determination to apply 
Christian morality to political and military problems. Lipsius urged on his 
readers a close study of Roman political and military institutions in order to 
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adapt ancient practice to the contemporaneous questions of how to raise, 
organize, finance, and discipline standing armies led by a professional officer 
corps. Lipsius spent much of his academic career in the Dutch Republic where 
he provided inspiration for Maurice of Nassau’s reforms of the Dutch army. 
Lipsius adhered to the traditional Roman definition of what constitutes a just 
war, and not trusting the corruption and sycophancy of court life, he wished to 
see warmongers banished from the prince’s council. War must be a last resort 
after first attempting diplomacy.
Lipsian Neo-Stoicism had adherents among both Protestants and Catholics 
in mainland Europe and the British Isles. Its values were sufficient to make 
men perceive war as an evil that was destructive of all the civilized arts. Neo-
Stoic values taught men to restrain their passions and thirst for revenge, and 
thus, furnished a moral underpinning for limitations on the ferocity of warfare. 
But it did not give them the moral vision to imagine a world without war.

5
The Search for a Science of Peace
Warfare has no place among the useful arts. Nay, rather it is so horrible that 
only the utmost necessity, or true affection, can render it honourable.
Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace: De Jure Belli ac 
Pacis Libri Tres, trans. Francis W. Kelsey, 2 vols. (Washington: 
Carnegie Institution, 1913–25), II: xxv. ix. 3 (pp. 585–86)
That is the best government which best provides for war.
Algernon Sidney, Discourses concerning Government (London: 
various booksellers of London and Westminster, 1698), bk. II: 23
The conflict between martial culture and the peace ethic was one of the main 
themes of humanist thought; in the seventeenth century, these topics were 
elevated to a more theoretical level of discourse in the writings of Alberico 
Gentili, Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, and the classical republican followers 
of Niccolò Machiavelli. Warfare and military preparedness were at the center 
of Machiavelli’s political discourse, and everything else was of secondary 
importance. In the age of religious wars, Gentili had to flee his native Italy 
because he had become a Protestant; he subsequently found refuge in 
Elizabethan England. Grotius, who witnessed much of the Eighty Years War in 
the Low Countries, also had to deal with the problem of war overwhelming 
politics.1 Hobbes lived through both the English civil wars in the 1640s and 
the Fronde in France in the 1650s. All four political philosophers shared the 
common experience of being forced into exile or flight by war, political 
factionalism, or religious persecution. Gentili believed that there were no 
natural causes that justified going to war because all men have a kinship to one 
another: “If there seems to be a natural enmity between two peoples, then it is 
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because they are trained to be enemies of one another. But this is the result of 
education, which is a second nature.”2 Grotius went on to provide a language 
of natural law that furnished a theory of natural rights and a foundation for 
international law, which in more recent times, has helped to provide a number 
of constraints on how wars have been fought as well as a series of rules 
governing the behavior of sovereign states. Their experience of interstate and 
civil war gave both Grotius and Hobbes an abiding dislike of violent conflict. 
Hobbes, who learned to distrust the inflammatory rhetoric of ambitious 
politicians in democratic governments from his study of Thucydides, preferred 
to trust the security of the commonwealth to an absolute sovereign. For this 
reason, he has never been appreciated for his endeavors to promote the 
scientific study of peace until quite recently. The classical republicans, the 
principal heirs of Machiavelli in the Atlantic world, continued to insist that 
citizens of states with popular governments who valued their liberty must be 
prepared to give their blood to maintain those political traditions.
Gentili and Grotius: Natural law and constraints on war
As we have seen, Justus Lipsius, along with Gentili and Grotius, was one of the 
founders of international law because he had sought to synthesize Stoic ethics 
and Christian morality and apply these principles on a case- by-case basis 
to the same topics that Machiavelli wrote about, thus introducing a moral 
dimension to political theory that was missing in Machiavelli. Lipsius further 
applied Dutch social and moral values not only to the task of waging war, but 
also to an attempt to prevent the blight of war from disrupting the lives of 
civilians while at the same time protecting trade and the economy. Lipsius’s 
values were distinct from aristocratic preoccupations with honor, glory, and 
privileged status. Like Hobbes, he leaned in the direction of absolutism, 
preferring peace and stability to individual freedom.3
The political philosophers of the seventeenth century recognized that 
rational and scientific explanations of the causes of war were not to be found 
in divine commands, Divine Providence or man’s sinful nature. A more fruitful 
approach could be discerned in the study of what we term political and social 
structures and in the animosity generated by conflicting religious views. 
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Algernon Sidney recognized that the function of the feudal nobility had 
been making war; they were “perpetually in arms” because they placed a high 
value on valor and were acquisitive.4 The Scots political theorist Andrew 
Fletcher observed that a profound alteration in government had occurred in 
most European countries in about 1500 whereby kings who possessed greater 
financial resources began to keep armies standing in peacetime as well as war. 
The nature of warfare quite altered as missile and gunpowder weapons replaced 
edged weapons, and the aristocracy gave up martial pursuits and were replaced 
by professional officer corps. “Thus, the armies which in preceding times had 
always been composed of such men as these, ceased . . . and the sword fell out 
of the hands of the barons.” Princes began instead to raise standing armies paid 
for by levying taxes voted by representative assemblies and levied on “people 
grown rich by trade, and dispirited for want of military exercise.” War became 
more pervasive in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries “and grew a constant 
trade to live by.” The nobility adjusted to the changed conditions by taking up 
military commissions in the officer corps of these new professional armies.5
The Italian jurist Alberico Gentili viewed the laws of war as a subdivision of 
international law. He was forced to flee his homeland and seek refuge in 
England because he had converted to Protestantism. In England, he became 
a protégé of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester and Chancellor of Oxford 
University, who secured a position teaching Roman law for Gentili in 1580. 
In 1587, he was appointed Regius Professor of Law on the recommendation 
of Sir Francis Walsingham. Gentili later attracted the attention of Robert 
Devereux, second Earl of Essex, who was a member of the Elizabethan war 
party. Gentili was an admirer of Machiavelli and shared some of the views of 
classical republicans, but he also became, as we now understand, one of the 
founders of the corpus of international law. The study of this discipline was 
based on natural law rather than divine law or theology. The debate that Gentili 
participated in did not concern whether war was a just instrument of the state, 
but rather focused on the variety of justifications for war.6
Gentili insisted that the laws of war arose from natural law because they 
concerned the whole human community, and did not derive from the teachings 
of political or moral philosophers. This was a premise to his argument that 
defensive war had to do with the duties of citizens and pertained to only one 
community, whereas a philosophy of war would be the concern of the whole 
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human community and would comprehend enemies as well. Roman law, as 
embodied in the Justinian code, Gentili says, citing Jean Bodin, was ignorant 
of the laws of war. The concept of natural law was, however, known to the 
ancients, and they assumed that a common understanding of the laws of 
war could be derived from natural law, which was innate. However, the 
understanding of natural law varied from one man to another, according to 
his level of intelligence.7
Gentili maintained that war was a legitimate exercise of the power not only 
to defend one’s country, but also to preserve the wider human community. 
He used this argument to justify the Spanish conquest of much of the New 
World, citing the unnatural practices of some of the American Indians, such 
as cannibalism, as violations of natural law. At the same time, Gentili rejected 
the Aristotelian argument that all barbarians were inferior, and could for 
that reason, be enslaved. However, because their moral standards diverged so 
widely from those of the Christian world, he distrusted the Turks, and took 
note of their barbaric behavior in the way that they waged war and enslaved 
conquered peoples. For this reason, Gentili believed that Christian monarchs 
should never enter into treaty relations with the Turks, as the king of France 
had done.8
Gentili excluded many varieties of human conflict and violence from the 
category of war. War must be public, just, and fought with the usual and 
customary weapons of war between two sovereign rulers, and it must be 
officially and publicly declared according to a mutually understood protocol, 
which included an announcement of intentions, an opportunity to make 
satisfaction for a stated grievance, and a waiting period. No war should 
be declared unless the need for such conflict was first demonstrated and 
arbitration attempted. Arbitration was the only available peaceful means for 
settling disputes. Moreover, there were many examples in former times of 
arbitration between sovereigns. Gentili also maintained that war should be 
waged only against armed combatants; he did not approve of the deliberate 
devastation of the lands, properties, and houses of noncombatants, or the 
deliberate destruction of works of art. He urged moderation in war and the 
avoidance of needless cruelty except against brigands and pirates, who were 
not protected by the laws of war. Gentili believed that the purpose of every war 
was to secure peace. Peace was “the orderly settlement of war.” Permanent 
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peace was best procured by ensuring that the terms imposed on the vanquished 
were just and moderate. The victors were entitled to reparations covering the 
cost of the war as well as the payment of tribute, but if the peace settlement did 
not embody justice, then the peace would not be lasting. Gentili quoted Seneca 
as saying that an unjust war was no better than organized murder. But he 
reminded his readers that the Romans never recognized rebels, brigands, and 
pirates, or participants in slave revolts as enemies entitled to be dealt with 
according to the rules of war. All could be summarily condemned to death. To 
be a recognized enemy, one had to be part of a sovereign state.9
The pursuit of war to seek vengeance was just, Gentili states, because 
the failure to seek vengeance invited another injury or wrong. The right of a 
sovereign to seek vengeance rose out of natural law. This was a natural right that 
had been allowed to individuals before the formation of political societies, but 
was now exercised by rulers and magistrates on behalf of individual citizens. 
The human causes of war consisted of violations by a sovereign state of man- 
made laws. From this perspective, war was simply an instrument for dispensing 
justice by avenging an injury and punishing a crime. However, Gentili admitted 
that this view of war was dangerous, and a war for such reasons should not be 
declared without first attempting arbitration. Preemptive strikes had been a 
frequent cause of war from antiquity to Gentili’s time, and Gentili believed that 
preemptive strikes could be justified by fear of an injury rather than a real 
injury. There was no good reason to needlessly expose one’s self to danger. This 
was sometimes used as an argument for making war on the indigenous peoples 
of the New World.10 It was possible, thought Gentili, for both parties to a war 
to have justice on their sides. It did not follow that in a war one side had justice 
entirely on its side, while the other belligerent was in the wrong. Gentili gave 
the example of the Jewish conquest of the land of Canaan by divine command, 
while the Canaanites, being ignorant of the divine command, were fighting a 
war of self- defense: “if it is doubtful on which side justice is, and each side aims 
at justice, neither side can be called unjust.”11
Gentili was also a strong advocate of religious toleration, and he argued 
that it was against natural law to force another person to change his religion 
against his will. Religious freedom should be allowed unless harm was done to 
the state thereby. He disagreed with Justus Lipsius, who believed that only one 
religion should be practiced in a state. Contrary to what Lipsius said on the 
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matter, Gentili claimed that toleration in practice was allowed in the Imperial 
Free Cities and in the Habsburg lands of the Holy Roman Empire, as well as in 
the papal states, and it was also the practice of the Turks toward Byzantine 
Christians and Jews.12
Gentili’s approach to formulating the rules of warfare and their place in the 
body of international law bears some resemblance to the Neo-Stoical and 
Salamancan schools of thought. His firm belief in religious toleration separates 
him from the Neo-Stoics, who believed in adherence to a state religion as 
a social glue to hold civil societies together in an age of religious warfare. 
Whereas members of the Salamancan School, such as Francisco de Vitoria and 
the Portuguese Jesuit Juan Luis Molina ignored classical authors and employed 
Thomist criteria to condemn many of the characteristics of modern warfare, 
such as the conquest of the New World, Gentili used humanist scholarship to 
approach classical authors in order to devise his rules of war. He also thought 
that Vitoria, Balthazar Ayala, and other members of the Spanish School did not 
pay enough attention to concepts of peace, and gave too much attention to 
matters concerning war. Gentili’s English patrons, such as the second Earl of 
Essex, to whom he dedicated his De Jure Belli, drew him into the fringes of the 
Elizabethan war party, and his admiration for Machiavelli suggests that he 
displayed some of the characteristics of a classical republican. But he does not 
fit neatly into any of these categories.13
Grotius also drew most of his examples of unjust wars from the ancient 
world, but in addition, he addressed the contemporaneous problem of religious 
conflict by denying that the pope’s claim to universal jurisdiction was justified 
by scripture or patristic authority, while at the same time, attacking Protestant 
claims for going to war based on ancient prophecies or the explicit command 
of God. Even when just causes for declaring war presented themselves, Grotius’s 
counsel was not to do so rashly.14 Grotius, in effect, had undermined the legal 
authority of the Bible and provided a secular explanation for the causes of 
wars, and thus, had rejected the traditional medieval explanations of when war 
was justified. Grotius’s determination to separate religion from politics and 
legal discourse represented a significant new direction in political theory. His 
treatment of war was based on natural law, which was discoverable by reason, 
and his examples were mostly drawn from classical antiquity. Thus, the rules 
governing warfare should be knowable to all men and not just Christians.15
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The political theories of both Grotius and Hobbes were based on the 
assumption that men had once existed in a state of nature, and for mutual self- 
protection, had made a compact to enter into political society. Sir Robert 
Filmer, the defender of patriarchalism and royalism, rejected Grotius’s concept 
of a state of nature that existed before men entered into political society. 
Because all men were descendants of Adam, who was the first patriarch, 
political society had always existed. Filmer believed that Grotius had a bad 
influence on political theory because he conflated natural law and the law of 
nations.16 Filmer insisted that popular governments must always tend toward 
war and violence because the opinions of the people will always be so varied, 
and they lacked the judgment to distinguish between truth and falsehood. 
Only a king or a dictator could remedy this situation. Thus, popular government 
must always give rise to more tumults than the most tyrannical of monarchies. 
Like Grotius, Filmer drew most of his examples from ancient history to support 
his assertions: “The murders by Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, Domitian, and 
Commodus put all together cannot match the civil tragedy which was acted in 
that one sedition between Marius and Sulla. . . . This was the height of Roman 
liberty—any man might be killed that would. A favour not fit to be granted 
under a royal government.”17
Whereas Algernon Sidney believed that civil society would dissolve without 
constant vigilance and military preparedness to defend liberty against tyrants, 
John Locke maintained that war, however just, was detrimental to civil society 
because men, when entering political society, gave up the right to make war as 
individuals. Arbitrary monarchs, by their ambition and aggression, caused the 
dissolution of political society and brought perpetual disorder. Their subjects 
thereby gained the right to wield the sword, and rebellion and resistance against 
the prince thereby became justified.18 In interstate wars, Locke attempted 
to impose legitimate limits on the objectives of war: The aggressor could be 
punished and reparations demanded. This meant that the offending government 
could be subdued or brought to terms, but the enemy could not be annihilated. 
The problem in securing a peace settlement was that just as man as an individual 
living in the state of nature experienced disorder and a lack of security, so also 
commonwealths experienced the same kind of insecurity because of the absence 
of a universally recognized body of international law and some universal 
authority to enforce the same. Consequently, it fell to individual states to be 
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“both judge and executioner of the law of nature.” Since men tended to be “partial 
to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far. . . .”19
Hugo Grotius was appalled by the lack of restraint in war throughout the 
Christian world and the “rush to arms” for the slightest of pretexts. He did 
not believe that Erasmus’s solution of forbidding Christians to take up arms 
was practical. Rather, Grotius set out to discover “a common law among 
nations” based on natural law, which would impose restraints on war and 
which would be understood and accepted by all men, whether civilized, 
enlightened or barbarian. This would be based on a prodigious knowledge of 
“philosophers, historians, poets . . . [and] orators.”20 Grotius said that “it should 
not be supposed that while a war rages all laws are in abeyance.”21 Citing 
numerous Roman precedents, he stated that wars should be conducted with 
the same scrupulousness as judicial processes. Even though the courts may not 
be able to operate in wartime, there were laws that govern conduct in war as 
well as relations among people in time of peace. Wars should be waged only 
against those who refuse to abide by judicial decisions, and only in accord with 
recognized laws of war.22
Grotius’s greatest contribution was to provide a legal and historical 
foundation for constraints on war. But it must be remembered that others, 
such as Balthazar Ayala, also made significant contributions to rules limiting 
the horrors of war. In addition, Grotius was also indebted for many of his ideas 
to the Spanish school of political theory concerning the origins of international 
law with regard to natural law and the laws of war.23 In the seventeenth century, 
the laws of war also evolved out of the codification of military customs and 
conventions by professional military officers in the capitulations of besieged 
fortresses, protocols for the ransom of prisoners of war, articles of war, and 
codes of military justice that imposed discipline on soldiers with regard to the 
distribution of lawful booty and the treatment of noncombatants. Among 
the earliest written instruments were articles of war drawn up by field 
commanders in the Dutch and Swedish armies in the times of Maurice of 
Nassau and Gustavus Adolphus. Such instruments were widely copied in the 
various armies that fought in the British civil wars, but the basic principles 
would have found approbation among the officers of mainland European 
armies. Ultimately, such customs and conventions had derived from chivalric 
culture, aristocratic codes of honor and conduct, and the teachings of the 
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medieval Catholic Church. In the early eighteenth century, these laws of 
war, inherited from the professional soldiers of the seventeenth century, 
were praised by many of the philosophes as evidence of progress and 
humanitarianism in the conduct of war among European nations.24
Regardless of Grotius’s poor opinion of the military profession—he 
considered mercenary soldiers more abominable than executioners because 
they kill without cause—the degree of status assigned to professional officers 
was rarely challenged. Indeed, the Seigneur de Saint Evremond, a French 
veteran of the Thirty Years War who lived in exile in England during the reign 
of Charles II, believed that the noble profession of arms made “subjects 
equal in authority to the sovereign.” The question concerning whether a good 
Christian could be a soldier resulted in divided opinion within the Catholic 
Church in France. The Jansenists tended to condemn military life and 
discouraged careers in the army, but Jesuit chaplains organized confraternities 
within the army to minister to soldiers who wished to be pious.25
Despite repeated declarations of his aversion to war, Grotius went on to 
attempt to define when war was justified. Those who hoped for perpetual peace 
often cited the prophecy of Isaiah, ii. 4, of a time when swords will be beaten 
into instruments of cultivation, but Grotius insisted that this refers to a time in 
the future when all men will have become Christians and put aside un-Christian 
habits. Until that time, the world will continue to experience an age of iron. 
St. Peter’s admonition that “he who smiteth with the sword shall perish with the 
sword” is not applicable to public war lawfully declared, but only to private war. 
According to Grotius, Christ did not intend to prevent the Christian from 
fighting in a lawfully declared, just war when he stated that his kingdom was 
not of this world (John xviii. 36). A public war was a lawful and formal war 
waged between two sovereign states. The possession of sovereignty assumes the 
legal right to declare and wage war. A private war is waged by someone who 
lacks the authority to wage war, but it is justified to wage private war to avoid an 
injury where no public tribunals exist.26 Grotius says that war is more than 
contending by force; it is a condition that persists over time. Bellum, or public 
war, often subsumes duellum, or private war, which is more ancient than public 
war. “War . . . is undertaken in order to secure peace,” but peace can exist only 
where factionalism and feuding have been suppressed to such an extent that we 
may speak of a political community as having achieved “union.”27
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Grotius reconciled the concept of a just war, lawfully declared, with natural 
law by arguing that war is not opposed to nature, but is in perfect accord with 
it, since nature has given every animal strength sufficient for self- defense. Right 
reason allows the use of force to protect oneself and one’s possessions provided 
the rights of others are not infringed. Reason also dictates that this right to 
employ force in defense of one’s rights should be exercised as a community. 
Thus, the right to forcibly resist an attacker to avoid an injury is a natural right, 
but with the establishment of civil society, the individual must yield that right 
of self- defense to the state, which in exchange for the obligation to protect the 
individual and his property, seeks to acquire a monopoly on violence, or at 
least, to limit the resistance that an individual can offer. Otherwise, the state 
cannot function. However, if a ruler violates the laws or becomes an enemy of 
his people, then his subjects have the right of forcible resistance, and may even 
put the tyrannical ruler to death.28
Grotius says that the best of Greek and Roman thinkers insisted that the 
laws cannot exist without sanctions, and that sometimes nations and rulers 
need to go to war to secure justice to themselves, but they must also remember 
that they were part of the human race, and their principles of justice needed to 
extend beyond their own borders, even to those who were their enemies. It was 
unwise not to adhere to the rule that concepts of justice needed to be shared in 
the wider international community because every state will someday stand in 
need of a defensive alliance or trade agreement in order to survive. To depart 
from this concept of international law and justice is risky.29 Grotius was very 
careful to specify the unjust causes of war in order to validate his just- war 
theories. The main distinction here was between “justifiable and persuasive 
causes.” Following Polybius, he calls the first category “pretexts” because they 
were the reasons for going to war that were publicly alleged. The “persuasive” 
causes were the actual reasons for which a state or a sovereign undertook a 
war. Those who rushed into war without either pretexts of persuasive causes 
were no better than savages. Those who alleged pretexts for going to war, but 
had no justifying causes, were regarded by classical Greek and Roman authors 
as brigands.30
Grotius is sometimes considered an advocate of peace, but in fact, he was 
something less than a pacifist. First of all, Grotius justified the Dutch rebellion 
against Spanish rule because he thought that the duke of Alva prosecuted the 
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war against the Dutch rebels in a manner that violated the king of Spain’s oath 
to uphold the law. Moreover, the Dutch republicanism that Grotius espoused 
was bellicose and expansionist. During the Eighty Years War, he distanced 
himself from the party of Oldenbarnevelt, which advocated peace with Spain 
that subsequently resulted in the Twelve Years Truce of 1609. He opposed this 
truce because members of his family had an interest in the United East India 
Company (VOC) and he believed that commercial expansion at the expense 
of Spain and Portugal was necessary to sustain Dutch republicanism. This was 
also a motive behind his advocacy of freedom of the seas in his Mare Liberum, 
which advocated the right of trading companies such as the VOC to wage war 
as if they were sovereign entities.31 In England, John Selden, who had at first 
opposed peace with Spain, changed his opinion on this matter and joined the 
court faction in supporting a rapprochement with Spain because he came to 
fear the growing power of the Dutch in both naval and commercial power. 
This was the occasion of Selden writing his Mare Clausum (1636) in answer to 
Grotius’s Mare Liberum.32
Classical republicans and martialism
The classical republicans, especially the seventeenth- century English followers 
of Machiavelli, were at odds with the Grotian school of thought in their 
emphasis on a martial ethos. Like their Florentine mentor, the classical 
republicans saw liberty not as an end in itself, but as a means to a military end 
by seeking to imitate the military expansion of Rome rather than the stability 
of Venice. The reception of Machiavellian classical republicanism in England 
during the period of the English Commonwealth was accompanied by the 
conquest of Ireland and Scotland, and the defeat of the formidable Dutch navy 
during the First Anglo-Dutch War. Seventeenth- century England suffered 
from mostly weak or unstable governments, and consequently, was pervaded 
by a climate of war even during the periods when actual hostilities had 
subsided. For that reason, English political theorists such as Bacon, Harrington, 
Hobbes, Sidney, and Locke devoted much discussion to the subject. Those who 
inclined toward classical republicanism insisted that war was necessary to 
defend liberty, while those who sought to explain the endemic nature of 
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warfare found abundance of sin and political failure a sufficient explanation. 
That historians and political scientists should associate the martial ethos with 
classical republicanism is hardly surprising since ancient Greece and the 
Roman Republic were perpetually at war, and this martial disposition made 
every citizen a soldier. The cultural antecedents of classical republicanism in 
the ancient world were self- destructive, and early modern political theorists, 
such as Machiavelli and Hobbes, sought to impose self- discipline, but war 
nonetheless remained a preoccupation of classical republican thought in the 
seventeenth century.33
One of the very first of the English classical republicans was Sir Francis 
Bacon, who like Machiavelli, insisted on the importance of a race of valiant 
men continually exercising arms in order to achieve civic greatness. Contrary 
to what some writers had maintained since antiquity, Bacon, like Machiavelli 
and Harrington, adhered to the somewhat old- fashioned view that it was 
valiant and well disciplined soldiers possessed of a warlike spirit that 
constituted the nervi belli, or “sinews of war,” and not money. As important as 
riches and trade were to making war, Bacon insisted that one should never lose 
sight of the fact that poorer nations sometimes made war and achieved civic 
greatness more readily than those states that had grown wealthy, but had sunk 
into luxury and effeminacy.34 Even Thomas Hobbes had been more inclined to 
advocate war in his younger days. He began his career in the household of the 
Cavendishes, a military family, and he was closely associated with Sir Francis 
Bacon, who, in 1624, advocated a preemptive war against Spain and who was 
more “Hobbesian” than Hobbes himself in believing that “humanity is in 
a condition of public war of every man against every man.”35 Hobbes was 
also involved in colonizing activities in Virginia and Bermuda during his 
association with Sir William Cavendish, later Lord Cavendish, who sat on the 
council of the Virginia Company.36
Algernon Sidney, perhaps the most bellicose of the classical republicans, 
believed that making war was one of the most important functions of a state, 
and that a state that did not change and expand must decline and disintegrate. 
This was based, in part, on the mercantilist assumption that the world contained 
a fixed amount of resources and competition was absolutely necessary for 
survival. The principal criterion for judging a government, whether a monarchy 
or a republic, was how well equipped they were with regard to the competence 
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of their commanders and the fitness and loyalty of the people who furnished 
the state’s soldiers. The commanders of the armies of popular governments 
must demonstrate competence and merit, whereas those of monarchies need 
only be favorites of the king. For this reason, a state should not depend on a 
single ruler to defend itself, but rather on citizens and magistrates who are 
trained in arms. Failure to provide for defense in this way should be regarded 
as a shameful thing.37
James Harrington, like Sidney, drew on Machiavelli’s distinction between 
those republics that were expansionist and sought conquest, such as Rome 
and ancient Israel; those that were armed only for defense, such as Sparta; 
and those, such as Venice, that pursued peace and trade as a matter of policy. 
Sidney believed that all sought the public good. Rome was most successful 
in terms of its preparedness for war; Venice was the weakest because of its 
habit of depending on mercenary soldiers. As Jonathan Scott points out: “This 
unqualified bellicosity is the touchstone of Sidney’s political thought.”38 Having 
read what Machiavelli had to say about the various historical examples of 
republics, Sidney concluded that it was better for a state to be organized for 
both war and trade. It should be prepared to wage both offensive and defensive 
war, employing citizens as soldiers. Trade was useful in order to finance war, 
but it must be assigned a role inferior to making war.39
James Harrington was more interested in peace and stability than Sidney. 
Based on his study of classical Greek history, Harrington concluded that peace 
could only be secured by a government that sought a balance between the 
power of the aristocracy and the commonalty. In this commonwealth there 
must be liberty and property for the citizen as well as participation in 
government. Not to establish a government of this sort invited bloodshed.40 
Harrington strongly disagreed with Machiavelli’s assertion that what enabled 
Rome to expand its empire by military conquest was the arming of the plebeians, 
and that the cost of such greatness was the continuing problem of popular 
tumults that the Roman senatorial class had to tolerate. Harrington valued 
political stability more highly, and he thought that allowing the commonalty 
such a large share in government led to anarchy. Harrington agreed with 
Thucydides and Hobbes that the source of popular tumults and foreign wars 
was political passions and demagoguery, and in his Oceana, Harrington devised 
elaborate safeguards in his ideal commonwealth to defuse such passions by 
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avoiding inflammatory oratory. Effectively, Harrington abolished freedom of 
speech and allowed such freedom only to written expression that would be 
regulated by “moderators.” Harrington derived this “peace of silence” from 
Hobbes’s translation of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War (1629), 
which condemned political passions leading to unbridled rhetorical excess. 
During their reigns, James I and Charles I both complained of the inflammatory 
rhetoric in the English House of Commons. Hobbes had studied the politics of 
the classical world of Greece and Rome, and had found that they afforded an 
inappropriate model for seventeenth- century England.41
Harrington thought that maintaining a large standing militia that required 
military service was generally the best way to avoid war and secure peace. This 
standing militia that Harrington envisioned for England, Ireland, and Scotland 
would consist not of soldiers of fortune, but rather of “citizens at their vocations 
and trades.” These citizen- soldiers would maintain a constant state of readiness, 
and would serve in the horse or foot according to their social rank. Although 
exempt from military service, persons above the age of thirty could volunteer 
for military service in order to gain honor.42
English writers in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were much 
concerned about what they perceived to be a decline of the martial ethos. The 
reception of Tacitism caused them to view this as a problem of luxury causing 
sloth and a diminishment of manliness. Authors who had received a classical 
education further saw this as a decline from an earlier golden age.43 Sidney 
considered the noblemen and gentlemen who dominated the political life of 
Restoration England to be an “effeminate titular nobility” because they no longer 
exercised arms, and instead, based their claim to exalted position on “riches and 
birth.” The implication was that they were less noble than the commoners who 
had recently taken up arms to defend the English Commonwealth during the 
Interregnum. For Sidney, the model aristocracy was the Anglo-Saxon nobility 
that had consisted of the whole of the citizenry because, in Anglo-Saxon 
England, all free men bore arms and were therefore noble. All others were 
villeins or slaves. Sidney had trouble accepting that feudalism was long since 
dead.44
Sidney placed little value on peace. “Peace may be good in its season,” but it 
had no absolute value; it was thought to be worth having only by those nations 
that did not value courage or justice. Human society was not constituted for 
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peace: the world “being so far of another temper that no nation can be safe 
without valour and strength,” which, as the leaders of the Roman Republic 
understood, could be achieved only by “discipline and exercise [of arms].”45 
But, following the establishment of the Roman peace, citizens ceased to be 
employed as soldiers; their courage withered while plebeians were hired as 
soldiers for pay. They were eventually replaced by barbarians; consequently, 
Italy lacked men possessing the strength and virtue to defend the homeland. 
Sidney was both a relativist and a believer in progress. He thought that 
the early Church Fathers, such as Tertullian, St. Augustine, or St. Ambrose 
had nothing to say to his generation about the value of peace because the 
circumstances of political life changed constantly. The early Christians might 
turn the other cheek or seek martyrdom because they expected that death was 
imminent; as a persecuted minority, they were not focused on taking up the 
duties of citizenship or the office of magistrate.46 Arguing against Filmer, 
Sidney insisted that popular tumults, seditions, and wars could find moral 
justification. God did not intend that men should do wrong, nor did he say that 
they should suffer wrong, for that would be an injustice, which must be 
punished, whether in a malignant magistrate or in the violence offered by 
a foreign enemy. To fail to recognize that war and rebellion are justified in 
the face of cruel tyranny or gross injustice, where more peaceful methods of 
persuasion have failed, subverts the basic principles of law and virtue.47
The great poet of seventeenth- century England John Milton launched an 
attack on the remnants of the martial ethos and chivalric culture. His epic 
poem, Paradise Lost, begun in 1650 and published in 1667, was written for 
Englishmen who had long been subjected to “the odious din of war.”48 His 
audience included not only those who had lived and fought through the three 
English civil wars, the conquest of Scotland and Ireland, and the First Anglo-
Dutch War, but also those whose memories reached back before the Wars 
of the Three Kingdoms began in 1638. Even before the beginning of these 
internecine and interstate conflicts, the English people had lived in a climate of 
war. Not only had Spain attempted to invade England several times after 1588, 
and actually landed in Ireland, thousands of soldiers from the British Isles had 
fought in the religious and dynastic wars of mainland Europe for the better 
part of a century prior to the British civil wars. There had developed in England 
and among English- speaking readers elsewhere an audience for a vast literature 
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on every aspect of warfare—manuals on the art of war by classical and modern 
authors, war memoirs, sermons justifying war, and news books recounting the 
events in the mainland European wars. And of course, there were the secular 
works of political theory by Machiavelli and the classical republicans equating 
military preparedness and the exercise of arms with good citizenship as well as 
numerous works on medieval chivalry and the chivalric revival celebrating 
individual acts of valor and feats of arms.49
Milton’s Paradise Lost relies heavily on military metaphors and martial 
discourse because military books were widely studied by members of the 
reading public among the country gentry and the citizens and burgesses of 
towns. There was a widespread belief in the inevitability of war that went 
beyond its acceptance as part of the human condition and that embraced the 
belief that honor needed to be validated on the field of battle. Milton was 
repelled by these values, but he makes use of this widely shared martial ethos 
to condemn war and to show how it was repugnant to reason, morality, and the 
teachings of religion. He uses poetic imagination to depict Satan and the fallen 
angels as possessing martial values and behaving like professional soldiers. 
Milton’s Paradise Lost is meant to be a subtle attack on the notion that equates 
martial endeavors with true nobility and to persuade his reading audience to 
alter their views. Milton’s condemnation of war is an attitude that was largely 
absent from previous ages, and was exceptional even in the Renaissance.50
The presence of Satan and his martial hosts in Paradise Lost reminds us that 
Milton is not offering us a secular explanation of the phenomenon of war. He 
realized that it was difficult, if not impossible, to provide rational alternatives 
to the crusading mentality of divines and preachers when so many great 
thinkers of antiquity and the modern world had failed to come up with an 
escape from the belief in the inevitability of war. Milton continued to offer a 
theological explanation for the pervasiveness of war, as exemplified by his 
explanation of how changes in military technology had made modern warfare 
more horrible. Milton asserted that gunpowder weapons (especially those 
called great ordnance in the seventeenth century) were invented by Satan, 
composed of substances dug deep from within the bowels of the earth, and 
shot from a distance for the purpose of punishing man for his sins.51
Samuel Daniel, an Elizabethan predecessor of Milton, had also lamented 
the baneful effect of missile and gunpowder weapons on warfare. Although 
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Daniel is said to have had pacifist leanings, his epic poem The Civil Wars, which 
was about the Wars of the Roses, complained that face- to-face combat had 
grown less frequent, warfare had become shrouded in anonymity, and no one 
could say who had killed whom or had performed valorous deeds. Ordinary 
peasants could now kill nobility. Daniel attributed the intensification of wars 
to the introduction of the new weapons and the invention of printing, which 
he thought had caused the dissolution of Christendom by introducing “impious 
contention and proud discontents.” This he blamed on “fierce Nemesis, mother 
of fate and change, sword- bearer of th’eternal Providence.”52
The political philosophy of the English classical republicans enabled them 
to justify rebellion against tyrants, and they had no difficulty in identifying the 
tyrant when explaining the origins of the English civil wars. James Harrington 
argued that the Tudor and early-Stuart monarchs, by neglecting the nobility 
and allowing that class to become less powerful both politically and militarily, 
contributed to a collapse of royal government that caused the civil wars: 
“wherefore the dissolution of this government caused the war, not the war the 
dissolution of government.” “Of the king’s [Charles I’s] success with his arms it 
is not necessary to give any further account, but that they proved as ineffectual 
as his nobility. But without a nobility or an army . . . there can be no monarchy.”53 
This raises the question whether a feudal army led by the nobility, would have 
been useful in the civil wars or whether a reformed militia could have saved 
the monarchy. The classical republicans placed more faith in militias than 
actual historical examples of such forces would warrant. Nor were the king’s 
armies as badly served as Harrington seems to imply. Officers and other ranks 
from the British Isles who served in the various armies that fought in the Wars 
of the Three Kingdoms frequently had already acquired much knowledge and 
experience in the dynastic and religious wars of mainland Europe.54
Perhaps the most radical feature of Harrington’s Oceana was its assertion 
that the bedrock of all government was the exercise of the sword, which 
allowed the people, through the instrument of the New Model Army, to 
overthrow the monarchy and nobility. Harrington insisted that the transfer of 
power was perfectly natural and did not depend on providential intervention. 
Therefore, it was justified by natural law. The emergence of an army during the 
time of the English Republic led to increased democratic agitation on the part 
of junior officers and ordinary soldiers, which despite Harrington’s secularism, 
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was sometimes justified in terms of a covenant with the Lord God. The exercise 
of arms by the members of the New Model Army promoted political awareness 
and activism that gave them the means to achieve their goals.55
One of the limitations of the standing militia advocated by Harrington 
in his Oceana was that it was based solely on the tenure of land. Although 
Harrington had served in an English regiment of the Dutch army, he had no 
understanding of political societies, such as the Netherlands, which rested 
largely on trade. Because the Netherlands and Venice preferred to have their 
citizens contributing to economic productivity by working at their trades, both 
of these republics employed armies that were largely composed of mercenaries 
rather than citizen- soldiers.56
John Milton employed religious imagery in Paradise Lost to launch his 
attack on the bellicosity found in many of the books read by the gentry and 
the citizens of early seventeenth- century England, yet his justification of the 
removal of the king and the establishment of the Commonwealth employs 
the secular vocabulary of English classical republicans. Milton became the 
secretary for foreign tongues in the Council of State of the Commonwealth in 
1649, which made him, in effect, the chief propagandist of the new republic. 
Going beyond Protestant theories of resistance, Milton’s justification for 
removing tyrants was grounded in natural reason, and allowed the individual 
citizen as well as the magistrate to punish tyrants. Thus, Milton rejected the 
view, dating back to classical antiquity, that the sword of justice belongs 
exclusively to the magistrate or the prince. Like Grotius, Milton stated that the 
law of nature granted individuals as well as sovereign rulers and legislatures 
the right to punish offenses against the law of nature. In effect, Milton is saying 
that the office of king is elective, and popular assemblies possessed the power 
to elect them and to remove them.57 Moreover, since the power of declaring 
war was always in the power of Parliament, Milton says that it was unlawful 
and without precedent for the king to make war on Parliament.58
Milton’s views on tyrannicide could hardly promote peace or stability. He 
could see no difference between a foreign tyrant such as the king of Spain, who 
had attempted to invade England, and a domestic tyrant, such as Charles I, who 
made war on his own subjects. Milton employed Cicero’s characteristically 
Stoic argument that all participated in the brotherhood of man, and that tyrants, 
whether foreign or domestic, had cut themselves off from that brotherhood. 
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Having, so to speak, placed themselves outside the pale of civilization, a tyrant 
was no better than “a Turk, a Saracen, a heathen.” Moreover, by abolishing the 
distinction between resisting a foreign invader and overthrowing a domestic 
tyrant, Milton eliminated the distinction between external war and civil war 
because the individual citizen need not wait for the inferior magistrate to take 
the initiative in resisting a domestic tyrant.59
Marchamont Nedham, like his friend Milton, was another propagandist for 
the Commonwealth government. A journalist who changed sides in the civil 
conflicts more than once, he was hired to write for the official journal of the 
Rump Parliament, the Mercurius Politicus, whose purpose was to defend 
Cromwellian policy and to celebrate the military and naval achievements of 
the English Republic. Nedham also wrote a long pamphlet entitled The Case 
of the Commonwealth, Stated, which was intended to reconcile royalists to 
the commonwealth. He stated that all governments went through cycles of 
birth, glory, and death, and ultimately, all perished regardless of merit. All 
governments, good or bad, rested on “the power of the sword”; this had been 
“the foundation of all titles of government.” Thus, whether the commonwealth’s 
acquisition of power from the monarchy was legitimate or not, was a question 
that was quite irrelevant. Nedham reminded his readers that the English 
monarchy was historically based on the right of conquest, and thus, was no 
different from the English Republic.60
Algernon Sidney, perhaps the most bellicose of all English classical 
republicans, thought a rebellion now and then was not a bad thing: “Civil 
tumults and wars are not the greatest evils that befall nations.” In response to 
Sir Robert Filmer’s assertion that more men died in civil conflicts under 
“popular governments than in absolute monarchies,” Sidney replied that it 
was worse for nations to suffer “misery, weakness and baseness” because they 
lacked the courage and strength to contend for a better life. Turning Calgacus’s 
speech as recorded in Tacitus’s Agricola upside down, Sidney said that failure 
to fight for liberty gives “the name of peace to desolation.” No state can be 
entirely free from civil wars and tumults, but republics were less troubled by 
such contentions than monarchies because merit will advance men of wisdom 
and courage to lead the commonwealth.61 Filmer had asserted that rebellion 
was a sin comparable to witchcraft. While individual men are obliged to obey 
the commands of the magistrate, Sidney replied, “The general revolt of a nation 
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cannot be called a rebellion,” and “rebellion is not always evil.” Whether 
seditions, popular tumults, and civil wars are just or unjust is to be determined 
by whether a government works to preserve liberty or not. This principle 
derives from Grotius’s concept of a just war between states, but Sidney applied 
the principle to the internal affairs of a state.62 There is no government in the 
world that can provide a guarantee against sedition and civil war. Such popular 
resistance will always be justified as long as magistrates exceed their authority 
or powerful people break the laws of the commonwealth. For these reasons, 
the threat of popular violence is always necessary to preserve republican 
liberty.63
“Mixed and popular governments,” Sidney thought, also “preserve peace 
and manage wars better than absolute monarchs.” The latter were dependent 
on mercenary soldiers who served only for wages and “often betray their 
masters in distress, and always want the courage and industry which is found 
in those who fight for their own interests, and are to have a part in victory.” 
Sidney stated that the examples of ancient Greece and Rome demonstrated the 
wisdom of having citizens fight wars abroad to preserve liberty at home, but 
also to teach them by the constant exercise of arms to be valiant. An expansionist 
policy based on trade was compatible with these goals as long as the wars were 
fought by citizen- soldiers and not mercenaries.64
Hobbes’s fear of civil strife
Whereas Algernon Sidney thought that an occasional foreign or civil war kept 
the citizens of a commonwealth in a warlike stance and ready to defend 
republican liberty, Thomas Hobbes labored to discover a science of peace. 
Hobbes had a particular horror of civil war because he had observed the effects 
of internal strife both in the British Isles and while residing in France, but he 
had also learned from Thucydides the lesson that internecine strife was the 
most usual cause of the demise of city- states. Hobbes further thought that 
domestic conflict invited foreign aggression. At the conclusion of the English 
civil wars, Hobbes, like other Englishmen of the time, was disposed to support 
whatever regime held power because of a desire for peace and a continuing 
fear that the civil wars would revive. Although he would have preferred a 
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legitimate royal government, Hobbes was prepared to support the Cromwellian 
regime, and consequently, returned home from France and swore the 
Engagement Oath pledging loyalty to the lord protector. His justification for 
this action may be found in the “Review and Conclusion” of The Leviathan, in 
which he states that a soldier was obliged to adhere to his military oath of 
loyalty only so long as his army “keeps the field and giveth him means of 
subsistence.” Thereafter, the soldier might swear allegiance to whomever 
offered him protection.65
The causes of interstate and civil wars arose not so much because people 
desired such conflicts, but because men are “ignorant of the causes of wars and 
peace,” and have neglected to learn their responsibilities for preserving peace 
by practicing the principles of moral philosophy that derive from natural law. 
For Hobbes, moral philosophy consisted of a set of “laws of nature,” which 
sought self- preservation and promoted peace. These could be discovered by 
the use of reason, but Hobbes admitted that they were not universally 
recognized because “the violence of their passion” and “evil custom” often led 
men in another direction.66
Hobbes thought that the fundamental causes of wars were to be found in 
the diversity of opinions of individual people rather than the differing interests 
and policies of states. These threats to peace erupted from the excessive 
ambitions of individual politicians who risked plunging their countries into 
factionalism, sedition, and civil war. Such ambitions could spill over into 
imperial adventures abroad, or tempt hostile foreign states to intervene in a 
country suffering from weakened government. Although Hobbes was more 
concerned about the dangers presented by seditions and civil wars, he did 
have certain assumptions about the causes of interstate wars. These were 
largely caused by dynastic ambitions and rivalries, and by disagreements about 
religion. In the latter case, loyalties transcended national identities based on 
language, culture, and history, and challenged allegiance to a particular royal 
dynasty in which it was believed that a conflict existed between the obligation 
to obey divine commands on the one hand, and the duty to remain loyal to 
one’s sovereign on the other. Hobbes thought that the best way to calm religious 
passions was to suppress all theological beliefs except belief in the divinity of 
Christ. This rather impractical solution depended on an Erastian church- state 
relationship in which the clergy of an established church continually reiterated 
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the necessity of obeying all the laws and commands of a sovereign monarch. A 
secular state with religious toleration would have been unthinkable for Hobbes, 
who could not conceive of a legitimate diversity of interests occurring within 
a stable society.67
Hobbes was appalled by the way that differing religious opinions led to civil 
strife. This confirmed his strong belief in a religion established by law in which 
preaching was licensed and carefully controlled. Among those whom Hobbes 
blamed for popular disloyalty to Charles I during the civil wars were the clergy 
of the Church of England—especially those of the presbyterian party who still 
generally remained within the Anglican Church before 1640. In their sermons, 
they pretended “to have a right from God to govern every one in his parish, 
and their assembly the whole nation.” Hobbes thought that the clergy of the 
Church of England—both those who taught in and governed the universities 
as well as the bishops and those who served in the parishes—had arrogated 
to themselves the power of the Catholic popes and bishops, which the 
Henrician Reformation had abolished. This power of ecclesiastical government 
properly belonged to the king, Hobbes insisted, but the clergy had come to 
claim this divine right for themselves. The clergy pretended to be learned in 
divinity, which they confounded with religion. Hobbes denied that the Church 
of England or any established church possessed political authority over a 
sovereign ruler, but he did concede that the clergy of such a church should be 
listened to, and that a sovereign might find their pronouncements persuasive.68
Hobbes was a philosopher with a European- wide reputation, but he was not 
appreciated at home where he was unjustly accused of atheism, which in the 
seventeenth century meant heresy. This was because he ignored the spiritual 
dimension of religious life and advocated mechanistic philosophy. He was later 
considered a deist. The latter accusation was perhaps not entirely unfair, since 
he wished to make ethical behavior and not religious beliefs the test of loyalty 
to the established church. Hobbes wanted an established religion that de- 
emphasized individual conscience, took away the church’s right to insist on a 
correct interpretation of the scriptures, abolished clerical power, and merely 
insisted on moral behavior. Hobbes was not prepared to allow freedom of 
speech or unregulated preaching because to do so would abandon the power 
of controlling public discourse, which properly belonged to the sovereign. 
When men make a covenant by means of civil laws to form a commonwealth, 
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said Hobbes, they agree to impose on themselves a restraint on speech so as to 
avoid contention, and this is especially necessary in the matter of religion in 
which disputes are most likely to occur.69
One contradiction in Hobbes that is difficult to explain is his fear that 
religious controversy might disturb the peace of the commonwealth and 
infringe on the authority of the sovereign as the head of church and state, 
while at the same time, he continued to cling to an independence of thought in 
religious matters that others interpreted as “atheism,” or more properly, heresy. 
A royalist by preference, for twelve years, Hobbes had lived abroad, mostly in 
France, where he had a wide circle of admirers. Although his works were 
banned by both Catholic and Protestant authorities in mainland Europe, they 
were still possible to obtain in different translations, and they were widely 
read.70
Hobbes blamed both the clergy and members of Parliament for failure to 
instruct the people of England concerning the obedience that they owed to 
their king. He believed that it was obedience that held together political 
societies: “Take away in any kind of state the obedience (and consequently 
the concord of the people), and they shall not only not flourish, but in short 
time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience to do no more 
than reform the commonwealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it.”71 
The members of Parliament and the relatively small group of electors who 
possessed the parliamentary franchise refused to recognize the duty that they 
owed the king to pay taxes to help raise an army for the common defense at the 
beginning of the civil wars. This failure to recognize and support the king’s 
authority was widespread, and the voters were inclined to choose members of 
Parliament who opposed granting taxes to the king.72
The science of politics
In his pursuit of peace, Hobbes had first to construct a science of politics based 
on natural law and an investigation of the origins of conflict. Hobbes was 
acquainted with many scientists, and he was conscious that he was working 
in the midst of a scientific revolution, although his understanding of what 
constituted science was sometimes imperfect. His own study of natural science 
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led him to prefer the empirical over the theoretical approach to knowledge, 
and to emphasize practice. Hobbes associated prudence with the empirical 
study of accumulated historical examples. This, in turn, would lead one to 
sapientia, a kind of moral and political wisdom, which would confer a 
knowledge “of what is right and wrong and what is good and hurtful to the 
being and well being of mankind. . . .” These scientific and rational methods of 
inquiry would lead one to an infallible knowledge of how political society 
worked, and would help mankind avoid many of the mistakes of the ancient 
Greeks and Romans. This brought Hobbes into strong disagreement with 
Aristotle, who placed theoretical science above moral philosophy and the 
empirical study of political behavior. Hobbes’s continuing disagreement with 
Aristotle led him to denounce that philosopher as “the worst teacher that ever 
was.”73 Hobbes thought that ancient authorities such as Aristotle, Cicero, and 
Seneca had derived their philosophical principles from traditions, customs, 
and older authorities rather than constructing a more rational and methodical 
or scientific approach to politics. The uncritical study of Aristotle in the 
universities had led to the teaching of the rebellious notion “that any lawful 
sovereign may be resisted under the name tyrant.” Only time and a revision of 
the university curriculum could overcome such seditious notions, thought 
Hobbes.74
When constructing his science of politics, Hobbes insisted on the need to 
investigate the origins of political society and how concepts of justice had 
originated. This required doing a kind of dissection of the body politic in order 
to discover how it was put together and also analyzing human nature in order 
to understand the nature of social bonds.75 Hobbes says that living in a state of 
nature, before civil societies were entered into, was like living in a perpetual 
state of war “of every man against every man.” War consisted not only of battle, 
but also of living in a climate of war in which other men had a disposition to 
offer violence. The consequence was a “continual fear and danger of death; and 
the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”76 Thus, Hobbes asserts 
that the state of nature was characterized by anarchy, and he turns the 
primitivist Golden Age as described by Hesiod and Ovid (not to mention 
the Biblical Garden of Eden) upside down and says that it was like living 
in Hell. Commonwealths, even when they were formally at peace with one 
another, continued to distrust neighboring states, and felt the need to maintain 
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armies and defend their borders. Within commonwealths, individual citizens 
distrusted their neighbors enough to feel the need to bolt their doors and carry 
weapons when they traveled.77
Hobbes believed that people had been given the gift of reason so that they 
might discern moral and natural law, which he said was the same thing as 
divine law. The basic principle of natural law is “the pursuit of peace,” which is 
the essence of divine law.78 Men establish commonwealths and agree to place 
restraints on their individual actions in order to free themselves from “the 
miserable condition of war.” Hobbes thought that men were so prone to fall 
into disputes about honor, that it was absolutely necessary for the sovereign 
power to strictly regulate the laws of honor. The sovereign power must not 
only jealously guard the right to sit in judgment on disputes that could disrupt 
the commonwealth, but also maintain armed forces to restrain and control the 
same, or “he retains the judicature in vain, for want of execution of the laws.”79
Hobbes’s views concerning social hierarchy and aristocratic honor changed 
as his ideas developed. It is only in an earlier work, The Elements of Law (written 
in 1640 and widely circulated, but not fully published until the nineteenth 
century), that he regards honor in war to be a virtue. In The Elements of Law, 
Hobbes states that in ancient times aristocratic virtue had imposed limits on 
taking lives and booty among the defeated. This concept of aristocratic honor 
had been the only motive for constraints on methods of warfare, since in time 
of war the law was silent, as an old proverb supposedly phrased it. Aristocratic 
honor depended on the recognition by others of the superiority of aristocracy. 
This, in turn, rested on the exercise of power and a readiness to employ force 
against those who were not prepared to be “sociable.” The problem with the 
concepts of honor, aristocratic pride and magnanimity, which were all linked 
together, was that they rested on the notion of social superiority. But Hobbes, 
in his later writings, came to attach great significance to natural equality of 
status because it was this natural equality among people as they existed in the 
state of nature that made individuals vulnerable to the aggressions of others 
and disposed them to constant warfare. This was actually a rhetorical device 
that expressed Hobbes’s horror of the concept of social equality.80 Hobbes 
rejected the Aristotelian view that there was a natural hierarchy of merit that 
allowed one to discern the difference between, for example, an aristocrat and a 
less well born person, or between a free man and a slave. Hobbes insisted that 
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the sovereign was the source of all honor—not aristocratic descent. It was 
pride in descent that made aristocratic quarrels so frequent an occasion of 
violent conflict. Hobbes wished to promote the view that it was a universal 
consent on the part of everyone to live in peace and acknowledge that it was 
the authority of the sovereign that held political society together.81
The thirst for revenge and factionalism presented two threats to the 
maintenance of peace in a political society. To seek revenge for past injustices 
is in accord with natural law, provided that one does so with an eye to the 
future. To seek revenge only for past wrongs without being willing to forgive is 
mere vainglory and contrary to reason. To hurt another without cause is to risk 
providing one’s enemy with the pretext for war. Insulting words are fighting 
words that readily lead to violent conflict, because men in a traditional society 
would rather die than suffer reproach or insult. It is therefore contrary to 
natural law to offer reproach because it sows discord.82 Factionalism, or the 
defense of particular rather than common interests, can also lead to civil 
conflict or exposure to foreign wars. Popularity is another kind of faction, and 
often rises from mischief procured by men “of immoderate private wealth” 
who pursue their own ends rather than the common good. It is the duty of 
rulers to break up factions because to allow them to continue is like admitting 
an enemy within one’s defensive walls. Factionalism, fanned by the eloquence 
of ambitious orators, can also lead to civil wars or worse.83
Hobbes thought that absolute monarchy represented the best means of 
calming the passions and factionalism that led to violent conflict, yet he was 
enough of a realist to understand that absolute rulers with no limitations on 
their power and who were also subject to the same defects as other mortals, 
made wars seem inevitable.
In all times, kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their 
independency, are in continual jealousies, and [in] the state and posture  
of gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one 
another; that is, their forts, garrisons and guns upon the frontiers of their 
kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours, which is a posture of 
war. . . .
To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent: that 
nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice 
have there no place. Where there is no common [i.e., international] power, 
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there is no law; where no law, no justice. Force and fraud are in war the two 
cardinal virtues.
While some might argue that war can unite a political community, Hobbes 
would reply that with the conclusion of war domestic factions will once again 
become dominant.84
There was always an ambivalence in Hobbes about whether human nature 
was universally disposed to war. Hobbes did not believe that men were evil by 
nature; he thought that fear was the basic cause of war. Some men were more 
aggressive than others, but fear was still the main cause of war, even when they 
launched preemptive strikes.85 Certainly, his study of Thucydides’ thoughts, 
occasioned by his translation of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian 
War (1628), which was Hobbes’s first important piece of scholarship, brought 
out the pessimistic side of Hobbes’s ambivalence. Hobbes learned from 
Thucydides that war, with its attendant problems of compulsory military 
recruitment, dearth, disease, and mortality, broke down the bonds of human 
society, creating stasis, or civil conflict. The Peloponnesian Wars, Thucydides 
concluded, were more than merely a civil war of Greek states fighting other 
Greek states that nearly destroyed the Golden Age of Greece, but at a different 
level, constituted a war “of every man for himself against everyone else.” 
Thucydides had concluded that war had become a “condition of human 
nature.”86
Hobbes’s interest in Thucydides may have been prompted, at least in part, 
by an interest in finding an antidote to Tacitus’s insistence on equating the 
government of kings with tyranny, as well as the recognition that Tacitism, as 
promoted, for example, by Justus Lipsius and his writings about Tacitus, 
provided a set of ideas espoused by swordsmen as well as classical republicans. 
In England, as Hobbes would surely have noticed, the study of Tacitus was 
associated with the circle of Robert Devereux, second Earl of Essex, who 
showed a keen interest in the events that had led to the overthrow of 
Richard II. Essex himself led an abortive rebellion at the end of Elizabeth I’s 
reign because of his discontent with her policies such as peace with Spain. The 
members of Essex’s circle constituted a war party, which believed that peace at 
home was best procured by continuing the war with Spain.87 Hobbes’s 
experience of translating Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War made 
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him aware not only of the need to pursue peace, but also left him skeptical 
about aristocratic and democratic participation in government. He believed 
that the bellicose aspects of classical republicanism would bring only instability 
and endless civil strife.88
Paraphrasing Thucydides, Hobbes states that the main causes of civil war 
were fear concerning security, a desire for honor and glory as well as profit: 
“Men compete for honour and dignity . . . hence men experience resentment 
and envy, which are sources of sedition and war. . . .”89 The vain seeking after 
rank and precedence was something that Hobbes thought characterized the 
public assemblies in the ancient world that he associated with aristocracies and 
democracies; he thought monarchy gave less scope for the expression of such 
passions. “Man’s tongue is a trumpet to war and sedition; and it is said that 
Pericles once made thunder and lightning in his speeches and threw all Greece 
into confusion.”90
Just as Thucydides thought that the overheated rhetoric of demagogues was 
one of the causes of the Greek civil wars, Hobbes, in his translation of 
Thucydides, saw a parallel with the confrontational politics and inflammatory 
speeches of politicians in the Caroline Parliaments of 1625–28, and also saw a 
reflection of the dangerous influence of classical republicanism. It was difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that more temperate speech would promote more 
political stability. Yet, Hobbes noted that any orator who spoke with restraint 
was thought to be a coward—both in Athens and in Charles I’s Parliaments. 
Hobbes offered the opinion that there were few wise men in the Caroline 
Parliaments because wise men knew how to get business done without 
resorting to eloquence.91
Turning from Greek to Roman history, Hobbes used the example of Catiline, 
who had been the instigator of the most serious rebellion during the Roman 
Republic, as depicted in Sallust, to demonstrate the danger of a demagogue 
who was possessed of eloquence, but not wisdom. Such rabble- rousers always 
pose a threat to the peace because they are adept at stirring up the passions of 
the people. Their arguments are rhetorical rather than logical, and are devoid 
of wisdom or acquaintance with factual analysis. One cannot be said to be 
possessed of wisdom unless one understands “the rules of justice and injustice, 
honour and dishonour, good and evil” together with a knowledge of “what 
achieves and preserves peace among men and what destroys it; what is one’s 
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own and what is another’s. . . .” Fake eloquence always makes a good situation 
seem bad, or a bad situation seem worse. Such orators are skillful in employing 
eloquence to appeal to the raw emotions of the members of a popular assembly 
rather than their rational faculties. The purpose of their eloquence is to 
persuade rather than to teach. Because all political societies are devised by the 
hand of man, they are impermanent and must inevitably collapse. Thus, they 
are especially vulnerable to discontented individuals who see the chance to 
change their circumstances by employing their oratorical abilities to start a 
rebellion, which often leads to civil war. Since rebel leaders usually possess 
more eloquence than wisdom, they fail to understand that rebellions rarely 
succeed.92
Political psychology: The science of peace and absolutism
Thucydides’ use of what modern social scientists call political psychology very 
much influenced how Hobbes went about writing his Leviathan, which sought 
to examine people’s motives for going to war in universal terms. Hobbes 
assumed that human nature, in all periods of history and throughout the 
world, remained the same. In order to achieve peace, one must study war as a 
phenomenon, but this must also be preceded by an attempt to analyze humans 
in a state of nature. Here, there existed such a threatening climate of war that 
people were reluctant to undertake the industrial arts, dared not venture on 
commerce, did not engage in agriculture, nor undertake the arduous task 
of cultivating knowledge because the future prospects were so dismal. Men 
neglected to form social bonds because they lived in fear of death. The 
similarity of Hobbes’s description of the perpetual climate of war, where one 
could not imagine a state of peace, was derived from Thucydides’ History of 
the Peloponnesian War. By painting such a dark picture of the persistent clouds 
of war that enveloped men living in a state of nature, Hobbes’s rhetoric aimed 
at focusing attention on how to seek self- preservation, avoid civil wars and 
wars between nations, and how to pursue peace. Hobbes saw Thucydides 
depicting the Athenians as a people of passion perpetually in motion, reckless 
in their oratory, always ready to go to war, unwilling to allow other people to 
live in peace, and “fatally self- destructive.”93
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Because Hobbes is usually thought to hold the view that mankind is, by 
nature, involved in a perpetual war in an insecure world in which concepts of 
morality count for naught and only coercive power commands obedience, 
he is usually regarded as a realist. In internal politics, his abhorrence of civil 
conflict is so great that the individual’s rights are surrendered to an absolute 
ruler. Although Hobbes has less to say about this struggle when applied 
to relations between states, it is widely assumed that he was a realist in this 
sphere also. Yet, an argument can be made that Hobbes sought to develop a 
science of peace to pursue this seemingly elusive goal. Hobbes insisted that the 
prescription was simple: Men need only obey their rulers and the laws granted 
by them and listen to the judges who interpreted those laws, and they would 
find themselves on “the highway to peace.” But they must not listen to those 
philosophers who tell them that they may rebel against and overthrow those 
so- called tyrants who had been set to rule over them.94
Hobbes states that it is a fundamental law of nature to work for peace as far 
as possible. This is based on the premise that a person should avoid anything 
destructive of his own life, which means that he should avoid becoming 
involved in conflicts in which he might lose his life. This requires that everyone 
yield the right to protect himself by force to the state, which then acquires the 
right to protect everyone collectively. It is only when one has failed to secure 
peace that one may justly pursue war. Hobbes’s interpretation of natural law 
assumes that men will first attempt to bring about peace within domestic 
society before pursuing international peace.95 While all men seek peace, they 
do so by different paths because of a diversity of opinions, which can be made 
manifest by a condition of perpetual warfare, but that does not mean that they 
are not seeking peace as a future goal. Since it is only reasonable to pursue 
peace as a future goal, it follows that the path that men should follow in seeking 
peace is to practice good manners. Good manners, in this sense, refer not 
to social conventions “or such points of small morals,” but to those larger 
principles of moral philosophy that are based on virtues discoverable in the 
laws of nature. These include “modesty, equity, trust, humanity, mercy. . . .”96
Clearly, Hobbes was not prepared to accept Thucydides’ belief in the 
inevitability of war. He believed that it was possible for a commonwealth to 
achieve peace through a demonstrated record of having the means to defend 
itself, and through the discouragement of political ambitions that might lead 
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to foreign adventures and imperial expansion. Because Hobbes thought that 
the exercise of liberty in the public sphere had led to intemperate speech and 
threatening rhetoric, his first step toward establishing a science of peace was 
to insist that the exercise of liberty in the Greek sense had to be surrendered. 
Demagogues could not be allowed to use inflammatory rhetoric to urge 
military adventures, and counselors who advised prudence and restraint should 
not be called cowards. This, it goes without saying, was a solution that was 
incompatible with a parliamentary system that allowed room for aristocratic or 
democratic participation. Absolutism remained the only choice.97
The seventeenth century—especially the 1640s and the 1650s—saw 
numerous aristocratic and popular rebellions in various parts of Europe, and it 
is not surprising that Hobbes and his contemporary James Harrington were 
both driven by a desire for peace. Harrington believed that the best path to 
peace was to have a republic in which the laws were enacted by a popular 
assembly such as the English Parliament. However, he admits that this form 
of government is fraught with danger. There was an inherent risk that such a 
popular assembly would be subject to factionalism and vested interests in both 
the selection of representatives and in the ways in which legislative business 
was conducted. The people were often “careless” and “tumultuous”; the clergy 
were the “declared and inveterate enemies of popular power”; the lawyers 
pursued their own “private interest point- blank against the public”; men with 
too much wealth and land tended also to pursue their own interests, while the 
tendency, on their part, to retain a monarchy was a distraction. Harrington 
thought that plain gentlemen who did not possess the “great estates of noblemen,” 
but rather enjoyed “a good honest popular estate” which was heritable, would 
have no interest in establishing or retaining a monarchy, but would naturally 
incline toward a commonwealth characterized by popular participation in 
the civil administration on the part of those who served or had served in 
the militia. As in the Swiss cantons, electoral rights were conferred only 
on those who performed military service. Having learned discipline during 
their military service, the civil officers, serving as sheriffs, magistrates, and 
elected representatives, would be able to govern and achieve “perfect reformation 
by degrees and without violence.” Hobbes, of course, had abolished civic 
participation altogether. Harrington agreed with Hobbes that natural law 
requires peace, and this, in turn, necessitates obedience to man- made or positive 
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law. Harrington preserved a ritualized participation in government, which, says 
Jonathan Scott, was obligatory, but was devoid of any substance or choice.98
Hobbes rejected the notion that sovereignty could be divided or limited. In 
effect, he said, as far as this principle applied to England at the beginning of the 
civil wars, that sovereignty rested in the king- sole, not the king- in-Parliament. 
This doctrine assigned to Parliament only an advisory role. Thus, it was the 
king alone who possessed the authority to declare war and to wield “the sword 
both of war and justice”. The king- sole possessed the power to make all laws, 
decide all controversies, and command the militia; his subjects had no right of 
resistance to these actions. Hobbes also insisted that the king’s subjects could 
not refuse to pay taxes that the king had levied. This quite explicitly denied the 
theory of possessive individualism or the absolute and unqualified rights of 
private property that was coming to be widely accepted in the seventeenth 
century. Such views about the absolute nature of sovereignty would have found 
acceptance only among high royalists, but then, Hobbes spent much of his life 
in the rarefied company of aristocrats.99
Subsequently, in his Leviathan, Hobbes admitted that the possession of 
goods and land was a natural right that the subject possessed, but he made it 
dependent on the exercise of sovereignty by the ruler. The possession of such 
goods and land was likely to lead to perpetual conflict, and only a strong 
government in the hands of a sovereign with unlimited power could protect 
subjects and allow them to enjoy their property rights. Coercive power, without 
force, cannot uphold sovereignty and protect such natural rights.100
Another power that pertained to a sovereign ruler was “to be a judge of 
what opinions and doctrines are averse and what conducing to peace”; it 
followed that a ruler might suppress those opinions and doctrines that were 
likely to disrupt peace and concord. Agents of the ruler should be appointed to 
censor all books before they are published. Hobbes does concede that through 
unskillful government or the teaching of false doctrine, a truth could disrupt a 
society and possibly lead to war, but the fault lay with those who governed 
ineptly or taught false doctrines because they were careless about preserving 
peace, and consequently, lived in a state of undeclared war.101 Hobbes believed 
that all civil and moral philosophy before his time inculcated error because 
all moral opinions and their political implications could be disruptive. His 
solution to this problem was to confine all political activities to the sphere of 
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the sovereign, and to limit his subjects’ intellectual activities to private life 
and to teach them not to meddle in the sovereign’s affairs. The concept of a 
legitimate command or a just war derives from the legitimate authority of the 
ruler. Private men who presume to pass moral judgment on political matters 
are “aspiring to be kings.” A commonwealth could not be expected to remain 
stable where subjects laid claim to moral judgment in political matters.102
Charles II would have agreed with Hobbes about the sovereign power of 
censorship. The restoration of the monarchy and the re- institution of press 
censorship made it difficult to discuss the recent civil wars because Charles II 
was determined to prevent a revival of the bitter controversies that surrounded 
those conflicts. Royal control of the press was something that he took a 
personal interest in, and he sometimes read proposed books in manuscript 
before allowing publication to proceed. He read the manuscript of Hobbes’s 
Behemoth, in which Hobbes discussed the origins and causes of the civil wars, 
and consequently, that book was not published until 1682, after press censorship 
had broken down during the Exclusion Crisis of 1678–81.103 One wonders if 
Hobbes understood how inflammatory some of his own remarks must have 
seemed. In his Behemoth, he charged that the citizens of London and other 
centers of trade in England had envied the prosperity of the people in the 
Netherlands after they had thrown off the rule of the king of Spain, and thought 
that they might achieve the same commercial prosperity by rebelling against 
their own sovereign. Since Charles II’s government continued to be very 
dependent on the City of London for loans, banking services, and assistance 
in collecting the customs and excise duties, the king could hardly have been 
pleased by Hobbes’s analysis.104 While many Englishmen were troubled by 
Hobbes’s advocacy of political absolutism, the French, following their 
experience of the Fronde and its myriad attendant blood- feuds, welcomed his 
political theories justifying absolutism, which were based on and accorded 
with a French Neo-Stoic tradition dating back to Montaigne.105
Hobbes was a well read classical scholar, and except for his Behemoth, he 
drew most of his examples used for illustration in his principal works from 
ancient authors. This led to a pronounced distrust of the ancients. Hobbes 
thought that exposure to the writings of Greek and Roman authors without 
“the antidote of solid reason” and the corrections “of discreet masters” instilled 
in young men in the Three Kingdoms harmful ideas such as love of martial 
War and Peace in the Western Political Imagination248
glory, a disposition to war, a fondness for popular government, and a tendency 
to view kings as tyrants, which could easily lead to rebellion and civil war. 
Some of these men found their way into the House of Commons, where they 
stirred up trouble with their eloquence.106
The famous deeds and sayings of the Greeks and Romans have been 
commended to history not by reason, but by their grandeur and often by 
that very wolf- like element which men deplore in each other; for the stream 
of history carries down through the centuries the memory of men’s varied 
characters as well as their public actions.107
In classical Greece, observed Hobbes, aristocratic and democratic factions in 
neighboring city- states caused discontent within the states that were ruled by 
kings. So also, the imitation of political principles and practices observed in 
the Dutch Republic aroused a love of novelty that bred discontent in early 
Stuart England.
One of the reasons why Hobbes rejected the political philosophy of the 
ancient Greeks and Romans is that they derived their principles, not from 
nature, but from customs of their city- states, which had a long history of being 
unstable and perpetually at war. The turmoil that resulted not only led to civil 
strife, but also caused their leaders to favor a policy of expansionism that 
involved citizens in foreign wars and occasioned the exaltation of the exercise 
of arms and military glory. In short, Hobbes thought, “the learning of the Greek 
and Latin tongues” produced a legacy in the Western world of “tumults” and 
“the effusion of much blood.” The moral philosophers of the past had been 
wrong; they had departed from moral law and their teachings had led to a state 
of perpetual war. They failed to seek out the universal principles of moral law, 
and instead, merely codified the customs of their society and culture. These are 
among the reasons that Hobbes cited when he laid part of the blame on the 
universities for contributing to the outbreak of the civil wars.108
Inventing peace
Sir Henry Sumner Maine thought that “war appears to be as old as mankind, 
but peace is a modern invention.” However, the longing for peace and the 
revulsion against war have a long history. Such attitudes were often expressed 
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in religious terms—especially in the Middle Ages. The Age of Reason did not 
invent such attitudes; it merely secularized them. Because the Old Testament 
legacy of sin was war, St. Augustine of Hippo could imagine peace only in the 
next life and only for those who would be saved. Those who followed him had 
such small expectation of longevity that they doubted whether they would live 
long enough to pursue peace in this world. In our own age, fewer people believe 
in an afterlife, but the threat of obliteration by nuclear weapons makes the 
cause of permanent peace seem more urgent.109
Peace must always be a “contested concept” because every participant in 
a war will always have different objectives in sight when starting a war or 
negotiating a peace settlement. A peace that is dictated after a crushing victory 
can hardly be acceptable to the losing side. The defeated may obtain a release 
from the hardships and suffering that accompany war, but otherwise will 
gain little by the peace accord. Victors have been known to impose punitive 
peace settlements that burden the vanquished with unacceptable forms of 
government, and which sow the seeds of future conflict unless ameliorated by 
some strong and impartial form of international government. Unless all parties 
to a peace settlement participate on equal terms, there can be little prospect for 
permanent peace.110
Throughout the Middle Ages, learned men—mostly clergy– recognized 
that war was a legitimate and just activity. Not until the very end of that period 
did the Erasmian humanists begin to argue that war was not “a significant part 
of the natural or divine order.” They began to imagine a social and political 
order from which war had been banished, but they were able to do so only by 
degrees and on a small scale. Any scheme of universal and permanent peace 
must necessarily be fragile. It takes generations to build such a political and 
social order, but as long as sovereign states, which have the recognized power 
to make war, still exist, such a scheme of universal peace could be destroyed in 
short order. Peace, as Sir Michael Howard has observed, is an ideology—and a 
recently invented one at that. It is in the nature of ideologies to simplify the 
truth. War is also an invention of man, but it is very much older than pacifism, 
and has long since been institutionalized.111
Most of the proposals for universal and perpetual peace in the Age of 
Reason and the Enlightenment were based on principles laid down in the 
writings of Grotius and Hobbes. Some of these later political and moral 
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philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant, were in general agreement with the 
Hobbesian view of man in the state of nature; others, such as Samuel Pufendorf, 
rejected those views. This influence can be attributed to Hobbes’s tendency to 
be a more skeptical philosopher than Grotius had been, which enabled him to 
be a greater advocate of peace than Grotius.112
Hobbes had allowed that all individuals had a natural right to decide when 
they needed to defend themselves from grave danger, but he insisted that, at 
some point, they must surrender that independent judgment and agree on a 
common means of defense. When Hobbes discussed the turmoil and violence 
that was found in the state of nature, he stated that he was thinking more of 
interstate relations than the relationship between individuals. Just as individuals 
did well to surrender their natural right of self- defense to a sovereign ruler or 
a leviathan, Hobbes also thought that since sovereign rulers were always 
contemplating war with one another, even during those times when they were 
not actually engaged in hostilities, it made sense for those rulers of sovereign 
states to submit to the authority of a single sovereign ruler.113
The Enlightenment presented a much more serious challenge to church and 
state than did the Reformation. While the Protestant Reformation caused 
a division in Christendom, none of its confessional positions challenged 
the basic tenets of Christianity, nor were the assumptions of monarchy, 
aristocracy, and the sources of religious authority questioned (except, perhaps, 
papal authority). What was called “Cartesianism” appeared in the middle of 
the seventeenth century and introduced rationalism and secularism, which 
challenged the fundamentals of all revealed religions, the authority of the 
Bible, Aristotelianism in philosophy, the accepted principles of politics and the 
assumptions about nature and the universe. It ushered in mechanistic principles 
of science and repudiated divine causation.114
Benedict Spinoza is regarded by some as the thinker who did the most to 
undermine the philosophical basis of revealed religion, traditional ways of 
thinking, morality, and political authority based on divine right. He is often 
compared to Hobbes in his attack on the old intellectual order, but Hobbes 
insisted that Spinoza was much more radical than he. Spinoza was an atheist 
and a materialist who not only rejected Divine Providence, but could see no 
external creator beyond a mechanical universe. He was expelled by his own 
synagogue when he was only twenty- three years of age. Hobbes, by contrast, 
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remained more conservative in his political views, insisting on the need for a 
strong ruler to preserve the political and social order as well as a state church 
to regulate moral behavior, even if his own personal religious opinions were 
less than orthodox.115 Spinoza’s philosophical writings, to a considerable extent, 
are commentaries on the moral and political philosophy of Hobbes—especially 
as they were applicable to the Dutch Republic. Unlike Hobbes, who believed 
that outward conformity to a church by law established was necessary for a 
stable political society, Spinoza was an advocate of religious toleration. He 
could see that the policy of religious uniformity had failed in England, and he 
favored the practice of toleration that had attracted Iberian Jews, among whom 
were numbered his ancestors, to the Netherlands. Subsequently, the political 
influence of the Calvinists largely undid the policy of toleration in Holland 
and other of the provinces of the Netherlands.116
Spinoza thought that men as individuals are prone to anger and envy to a 
high degree, and are therefore natural enemies of one another: “For he is my 
greatest enemy whom I need most to fear, and against whom I have most need 
to guard myself.” Once man realizes that there is anarchy in the state of nature, 
he seeks to cling to others and form a society for protection, and thus, to 
preserve peace. Spinoza has effectively reformulated Hobbes’s question: How 
can a state be constructed that will provide men with the maximum peace? 
Peace is not the mere absence of war, nor can it exist merely through apathy; it 
must be based on a concept of what is good for the commonwealth. A political 
society whose subjects are constrained from civil wars or rebellions may be 
free of war to a degree, but they do not enjoy peace. Peace is best secured where 
a number of commonwealths enter into peace treaties with one another—the 
more which do so the more likely they are to observe the conditions necessary 
for peace: “concerning peace it can decide nothing, save with the concurrence 
of another commonwealth’s will. Whence it follows that the laws of war regard 
every commonwealth by itself, but the laws of peace regard not one, but at least 
two commonwealths, which are therefor called the contracting powers.”117
The main purpose of the state was to provide peace and security for its 
citizens. This was best achieved by promoting harmony, and the ideal form of 
government for accomplishing this was a democratic republic. By contrast, a 
political society that fails to provide harmony—where crime and internal 
disorder prevail—differs little from living in the original state of nature. The 
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form of government most likely to give rise to internal disorder and to engage 
in war was a monarchy. The only way to ensure that a monarchy would avoid 
these evils was to oblige the monarch to consult a large council of citizens 
elected not for life, but for specified and limited terms of office. A strong state 
requires the participation of its citizens; a political society whose citizens are 
apathetic resembles nothing so much as a “desert.” This would minimize the 
dangerous influence of the courtier interest, which has always tended to erode 
royal power and enhance aristocratic interests—especially when the king was 
a child or otherwise impaired. The greatest danger to peace and the public 
good occurs where kings possess complete control of an army made up of 
foreign mercenaries or professional soldiers. Indeed, employing mercenaries 
or professional soldiers was to lay “the foundations of eternal war.” The way to 
prevent this was to have a citizen army whose officers and commanders were 
not paid salaries, but served out of a sense of duty. Clearly, Spinoza had little 
respect for the kind of monarchy found in early modern Europe.118
In Spinoza’s opinion, a stable state was one that was just powerful enough to 
preserve its own possessions without coveting those of another state. Such a 
state will do “its utmost to avoid war and maintain peace.” Spinoza reveals 
Machiavelli’s influence here when he insists that his model commonwealth 
would be sufficiently strong so that no other state would desire to attack it, but 
not so strong that other powers would fear it. Spinoza’s model commonwealth 
closely resembled the Dutch Republic, which he thought had a bias toward 
peace. The reason that Spinoza believed that rulers and magistrates had a 
strong obligation to avoid war and protect trade is not difficult to ascertain. His 
family’s mercantile business had been ruined by losses and debts resulting 
from their ships and cargoes being seized by the Barbary pirates and by English 
warships during the Anglo-Dutch Wars. Although he was a republican in 
his political thought, he was no friend of Oliver Cromwell or the English 
republicans.119 Spinoza anticipated the problem of vested military and defense- 
related interests, which make it difficult to avoid military adventures and 
remain at peace. In his model commonwealth, Spinoza specified that the 
salaries of his “senators” should be derived from import- export duties on the 
assumption that foreign wars always disrupt trade. Additionally, he specified 
that members of the legislature could not hold positions of command, or 
indeed, perform any military duties, and could not look forward to sharing in 
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the spoils of war. Thus, Spinoza hoped that legislators would have more to gain 
from peace than war, and would never attempt to prolong a war. He thought 
that wars should only be waged to secure peace, and when an enemy city was 
captured it should not be retained and garrisoned. But if an enemy city once 
captured refused to accept the terms of peace offered and was thought to pose 
a future threat, it should be destroyed and its inhabitants moved elsewhere.120
In contrast to Spinoza, the North-German philosopher Samuel Pufendorf 
rejected Hobbes’s view of the state of nature as utter savagery; he believed that 
the natural order could be better characterized by peace, in which individuals, 
under the guidance of God, sought to build a better society. Pufendorf, like a 
number of North-German men of learning, was in the employ of the Swedes, 
and distrusted the belligerent and expansionist views that characterized the 
writings of many English and Dutch thinkers. Pufendorf saw the German 
attempt to build a more peaceful order following the end of the Thirty Years 
War as a refutation of what Hobbes had said about man in a state of nature 
and an affirmation of the concept of sociability. Pufendorf thought that the 
Treaty of Westphalia’s recognition of religious diversity was a good solution 
to the problem of irreconcilable religious differences and was an important 
characteristic of that peace settlement. Pufendorf also rejected Hobbes’s 
insistence on the need for an absolute leviathan to maintain order. The 
German Empire, Pufendorf believed, was not a sovereign entity, but a mixture 
of different forms of government that was something less than a sovereign 
government.121
Pufendorf also sought to reduce the occasions that led to war. In this case, 
he was undoubtedly thinking of the third parties that had intervened in the 
Thirty Years War and the numerous colonial wars of conquest. He rejected 
Grotius’s notion that a state had a natural right to punish any other state for 
actions contrary to natural law, and he also insisted that punishment could 
not be visited on individuals who were not subjects (with certain exceptions 
such as pirates and bandits). What Pufendorf had in mind here was to argue 
that European conquerors and colonizers could not expropriate the lands 
of indigenous peoples in the New World simply because they engaged in 
barbarous and unnatural acts, such as human sacrifice and cannibalism. 
Pufendorf also stated that a third party could not intervene in a war that did 
not directly affect its own interests as a neighboring state. Otherwise, wars 
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would multiply. He also condemned preemptive strikes against a possible 
enemy, although a state could go to the assistance of a third country to which 
it was bound by treaty.122
Earlier in the seventeenth century, Henry IV’s minister, the Duke of Sully, 
had put forward his “Grand Design” for peace, which was based on accepting 
the religious and political status quo of the European states, except for partially 
dismantling the Holy Roman Empire. Territories would be taken away from 
the Austrian Habsburgs in order to entice the other states of Europe to join this 
scheme. The Habsburgs would be removed from Central Europe and confined 
to their Spanish dominions. These European states would then form a league 
to drive the Turks out of Europe. All of this, of course, necessitated making war 
on the Hapsburgs before taking on the Turks. If the czar of Russia, whom Sully 
thought of as the khan of the Scythians, did not agree to this plan, he would be 
confined to Asia like the Turkish sultan. Sully’s “Grand Design” would have led 
to a European government with a composite army. Sully does not seem to have 
understood that his grandiose plans would have sown the seeds of revanchism 
among the Austrians and all the other losers, and probably would have 
encouraged the growth of Prussian expansion and militarism. Sully’s method 
of bringing peace to Europe was simply another crude version of the Roman 
practice of first securing a total and crushing victory and then dictating a 
peace settlement.123
François de Callières, an envoy of Louis XIV who signed the Treaty of 
Ryswick in 1697, offers a complete contrast to Sully’s clumsiness. Callières 
thought that every Christian prince had a moral obligation not to pursue war 
until he had made a serious attempt to settle differences with other states by 
peaceful means. He believed that France’s lack of a system for training diplomats 
contrasted unfavorably with that provided for military officers. Diplomatic 
assignments were often given to men of little education and knowledge who 
had never before been out of the country. They were hardly better than the 
heralds of medieval times, who were sent to deliver specific messages, rather 
than having permanent diplomatic missions abroad, which negotiated on a 
continuing basis and kept their princes and governments well informed about 
events before they developed into crises. Callières thought that good diplomatic 
practice in France began only with the ministry of Cardinal Richelieu in the 
reign of Louis XIII. The transition from ad hoc to permanent diplomatic 
The Search for a Science of Peace 255
representation abroad had been necessitated by the decline of papal power and 
the emergence of sovereign states and shifting diplomatic alliances. The new 
diplomacy spread from Renaissance Italy to Northern Europe. Hugo Grotius, 
the most eminent jurist of the early seventeenth century, also served in a 
diplomatic capacity representing the Dutch Republic in England, and later, 
spent ten years as the Swedish ambassador to France. He looked on these roles 
as a painful experience, and did not believe that permanent diplomatic missions 
were desirable.124
William Penn, the Quaker founder of the colony of Pennsylvania, also put 
forward a plan for the international government of European affairs. Penn 
wrote his essay because he was distressed by the “bloody tragedies” of the Nine 
Years War (1688–97). He feared that men could not “know the comforts of 
peace, but by smart and penance of the vices of war.” Penn proposed that the 
sovereign princes of Europe agree to meet every year or so in a diet or 
parliament to take up weighty matters and disputes that could not be resolved 
by embassies. These disputes would be dealt with by discussion in order to 
preserve peace. The states that refused to participate would be compelled to 
submit to arbitration by the other participating powers. Allowing a ruler to act 
as his own judge in a dispute was to be avoided at all costs. The weight to be 
assigned to the votes of large and small countries was to be determined by an 
estimate of the number of persons and the gross wealth of each country based 
on the revenue of that country. To avoid arguments about precedence in this 
European parliament, the chamber in which the body was to meet should be 
round in shape with many doors for entrance and exit. The presiding officer 
could be chosen “by turns.” Decisions would be made only by a majority of 
three- quarters of the members. The language of debate should be French or 
Latin, the language of men of quality in the first instance, or of civil lawyers in 
the second.125
William Penn assumed that his proposal to establish a European parliament 
to preserve the peace would be met with a number of objections. One was that 
a prolonged peace would engender effeminacy; another was that there would 
“be a great want of employment for younger brothers of families; and that the 
poor must either turn soldiers or thieves.” His reply was that, instead, society 
would have trade and employment for everyone. The philosophers of the 
eighteenth- century Enlightenment would also note the correlation among 
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commerce, civil societies, and peace. Penn also argued that if the European 
powers adopted his proposal for universal peace, the reputation of Christianity 
in the sight of infidels would greatly increase.126
Another plan for universal peace and a proposal for a European union 
came from Charles Castel de Saint-Pierre, a French cleric. Saint-Pierre was a 
perpetual student, who has been called the patriarch of the philosophes and an 
early exponent of utilitarianism. He was secretary to Cardinal de Poligniac, 
one of the French emissaries who negotiated the Peace of Utrecht of 1713, 
which ended the War of Spanish Succession. He had lived in the Netherlands 
for more than a year, and his contact with Dutch intellectuals influenced his 
own political and economic ideas. Saint-Pierre had not heard of Emeric Crucé’s 
Nouveau Cynée, which anticipated some of his ideas until his friend Gottfried 
von Leibnitz made him aware of it. However, he had read the work by the Duke 
of Sully.127
Saint-Pierre’s plan for perpetual peace proposed a republic consisting of 
twenty- four Christian states of Europe as defined by the Treaty of Utrecht. 
Each state would send the same number of delegates to a senate of peace, which 
would meet on a permanent basis in a neutral city such as Cologne, Geneva, or 
Utrecht. The presidency of that senate would rotate on a weekly basis. No state 
could secede from this European union. An army would be raised to protect 
this European union from Asiatic aggression until a similar Asian union for 
perpetual peace could be formed. When disagreements occurred among the 
European states mediation would be obligatory before a court of arbitration, 
which would hand down a verdict. But that verdict would go into effect 
only after five years. The long- term goal of Saint-Pierre’s scheme for perpetual 
peace was disarmament, which he assumed would promote greater economic 
prosperity. Saint-Pierre assumed that the twenty- four states of his republic 
of peace would retain most of the attributes of sovereignty and continue to 
negotiate treaties with one another. Implicit in his plan was the assumption that 
the Austrian Habsburgs’ pretensions to universal monarchy would be undercut. 
Saint-Pierre is generally regarded as a Utopian, but the ministers of the French 
crown of his day saw him as a “tiresome and disturbing agitator.”128
After the Thirty Years War, warfare became more limited in nature. 
Thereafter, the thrust of philosophers such as the Swiss Emmerich de Vattel 
was to impose constraints on war so that as little damage was done to 
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noncombatants and their property as possible. Vattel entertained no doubts 
about the natural right of making war. He thought only a fanatic would take 
seriously the pacifist message of the Gospels, and allow himself “to be massacred 
and plundered, rather than oppose force to violence.” The right to make war 
belonged only to “nations” and could be employed to remedy an injustice, but 
only as a last resort. A just war must be publicly declared, the grievances had to 
be specified, and the designated enemy must be given time to reply with a 
proposed remedy. A defensive war, however, required no formal declaration. 
The only just reasons for going to war were to prevent or avenge an injury by 
an aggressor. Vattel did say that a preemptive strike against a neighboring state 
could also be justified when that state prepared for war in time of peace and 
refused to explain why it was doing so.129
While Vattel, like Kant, rejected the concept of an international government 
possessed of sovereign powers, he did believe that the states of Europe had 
enough in common to constitute a sort of republic. Modern Europe had a 
shared political system that was characterized by the exchange of resident 
ambassadors and a continuing process of negotiating treaties with one another 
for “the maintenance of order and the preservation of liberty.” The states of 
Europe were no longer constantly at war with one another, but had achieved a 
degree of peace by means of what was called “the balance of power.” Although 
the alliances in this system were constantly shifting, this did achieve a greater 
degree of peace than had prevailed a century earlier.130
Immanuel Kant was the first major philosopher to imagine a world free of 
war. From the time of the first Classical Greek philosophers, the great thinkers 
of the Western world had believed that war was a permanent and even 
dominant feature of human life. Most thinkers, although they might deplore 
war as evil, also viewed war as the usual path to peace. Kant was a Pietist, a 
Protestant sect that emphasized ethics and avoided theological dogmatism. He 
lived much of his life in Königsberg, East Prussia, and taught at the university 
there. He must have had a puckish sense of humor since he tells us that he got 
the idea for the title of his treatise on pacifism, Perpetual Peace (1795), from a 
Dutch innkeeper’s sign, which depicted a graveyard. The point was that most 
philosophers—and rulers—assumed that war was the main theme of history 
because it had dominated relations between states since antiquity, and lasting 
peace was to be found only in the next world.131
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Kant regarded war as a great evil and denied that it was a legitimate way to 
settle disputes. At the same time, he was not a pacifist, and insisted that in the 
long history of mankind, warfare often contributed to human progress. It had 
driven men to form political societies for protection, and to settle uninhabited 
parts of the earth. The fear of future wars had caused people to think about 
humanitarian values, to devise technological and scientific innovations, and 
generally, to pursue learning. Kant argued that war was generally “a deeply 
concealed, perhaps intentional attempt of the most supreme wisdom, if not to 
establish then at least to prepare lawfulness along with the freedom of states 
and thereby the unity of a morally grounded system of states.” Fear of what the 
future might bring drives people toward progress, and hopefully, that will 
eventually lead to some universal scheme for preserving peace on a universal 
scale. All of the previous peace treaties had been mere truces. Kant looked 
forward to the future establishment of a kind of “representative republic,” but 
he doubted that any of the monarchs or diplomats of his time had anything to 
contribute to such an idea. Kant does not precisely state what such an 
international organization for preserving peace would have looked like, but 
the model that he often employed was based on the leagues of Greek city- 
states, such as the Delian League.132
We hear an echo of Hobbes when Kant says that nature, by instilling in 
people an unsociableness that leads to wars interspersed with undeclared 
states of war and “unremitting military preparations,” drives them by their 
suffering to abandon the savage state in which they exist to seek peace and 
security by renouncing the state of nature and uniting together to form an 
international federation. Human beings are violent and will fight among 
themselves until an “external coercive” power intervenes. A state of undeclared 
war was the more natural condition of mankind than peace, and it was 
necessary to establish a state of peace by mutual formal agreements. Otherwise, 
people will always regard their neighbors as enemies. In other words, they 
must form a civil society and agree to submit to arbitration by competent 
judicial authority. The establishment of a declared state of peace can occur 
only between two or more states that are characterized by civil societies.133
In a state of nature, sovereign states are permitted to make war on one 
another because there is no international legal tribunal to which they can 
apply for justice. In such a lawless state, sovereign entities are also free to make 
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preemptive strikes on a neighbor that engages in military preparations or is 
pursuing territorial expansion in order to be more powerful. The existence 
of such an expansionist state justifies other states attempting to maintain 
a balance of power in order to thwart such expansion. This constitutes a 
condition of perpetual war, whether declared or not. Even if there are no 
declared hostilities, such a situation is completely devoid of justice and should 
be abandoned. Such states are bound to enter into a federation dedicated to 
mutual self- protection. In his desire to promote peace, Kant believed that the 
sovereign state had to be preserved; the international federation that he 
envisioned could not be one where sovereign rights were given up.134
Kant condemned actions that might possibly cause wars together with 
actions, which, undertaken during a war, might make it difficult to secure a 
peace settlement. He disapproved of promoting treason or rebellion within a 
belligerent country. He viewed assassinations and the dispatching of spies 
as inimical to the restoration of peace. He could not conceive of a punitive 
war since no international government, authority, or tribunal existed to render 
a judicial decision warranting punishment of a sovereign state. Although there 
might be occasions when one power would be justified in intervening in a civil 
war, such interference was best avoided until the conflict reached a critical stage. 
It was better to allow an independent people the opportunity to settle their own 
affairs. Otherwise, it “would render the autonomy of all states insecure.”135
Kant believed that the “spirit of commerce” suppressed the desire to make 
war, and would urge nations to make peace with one another. This urge was 
based on self- interest and not morality. The appearance of the commercial 
instinct derived from the “power of money” and was an important step in the 
formation of a civil society. Before any system of international security among 
sovereign states could be established, these states must display the characteristics 
of a civil society. This means that each state that aspires to the status of a civil 
society must possess a republican constitution. This cannot be a democracy, 
where all citizens possess the sovereign right to make decisions, which 
necessarily results in a despotism, nor can it be an absolute monarchy where 
one person makes all the decisions. Rather, it must be a political society where 
all agree to abide by the rule of law and where there is a separation of the 
executive power from the power to legislate, and the exercise of this legislative 
power is based on a system of representation.136
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Kant urged that states possessed of a “civil constitution,” that is, states 
characterized by a civil society living under the rule of law, should form 
themselves into a “league of nations” with the intention of abolishing war. Such 
a federation could not be called a state or a union since Kant did not contemplate 
these states giving up their sovereignty. What he did envision them giving up 
was the right to make war. Having entered into such a league, they would 
submit their disputes to an international tribunal to be adjudicated according 
to the body of international law. Kant imagined this “league of nations” 
gradually expanding membership as more nations decided to give up war and 
settle their disputes by arbitration. While an international federation of states 
dedicated to preserving the peace was the best solution, Kant thought that the 
existence of many sovereign states was preferable to a “universal monarchy” 
because such a large and monolithic state would degenerate into a despotism. 
He apparently did not envision this “league of nations” extending beyond 
Europe.137
Kant’s Perpetual Peace, published in 1795, was one of the last works of the 
Enlightenment. The philosophers of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, 
by developing theories of war, helped to place constraints on how wars were 
fought, and thereby, helped to lay the theoretical foundation for theories on 
how to achieve peace. At the same time, as constraints became codified in the 
rules of war, they also helped prevent interstate war from degenerating into 
something resembling warfare between prestate tribes.138
The concept of a civil society owed but little to the world of classical 
antiquity, thought Adam Ferguson, a Presbyterian minister, sometime chaplain 
to the Black Watch Regiment, and subsequently, professor of moral philosophy 
at the University of Edinburgh. Modern civil societies could find nothing to 
admire in the methods of war practiced by ancient Greece and Rome, he 
insisted. The theme that Ferguson explores in his treatise The History of Progress 
and the Termination of the Roman Republic is that republican institutions 
could not work in a sprawling and expansionist state, and would result in the 
dominance of the of the military over civilian authorities. By contrast, the 
armies of the eighteenth century accepted constraints on their methods of war, 
and were lenient toward defeated enemies. They valued this compassion for 
their defeated enemies more than martial prowess. Ferguson believed that the 
laws of war of his time imposed constraints on how wars were conducted, and 
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reflected the humane values of civil society. This was an idea that Ferguson 
probably got from Montesquieu.139
The concept of a civil society was thus a modern invention, although it had 
derived some of its elements from the ancient world. Ferguson praised the 
ancient Roman legacy of civil law, but he thought that the excesses of democracy 
in the Roman Republic had led to despotism. The decade of the 1760s were 
years of crisis, he said, because Britain during that period resembled the 
Athenian Empire and the late Roman Republic. Large- scale demobilizations 
during that period led to social unrest and popular tumults that could have 
resulted in either militarism or egalitarianism. But the government of Great 
Britain, he thought, had “carried the authority and government of law to the 
point of perfection, which they had never before attained in the history 
of mankind.” The rights of the people were preserved in the laws, and no 
despotism on the part of government officials was allowed to interfere with 
the proceedings of the courts. In short, this was a mixed constitution 
where the “vigour and jealousy of a free people” guarded against the 
arbitrary acts of the crown and the nobility, and protected the “safety of 
the person and the tenure of property” far better than any other political 
society on the past. But the danger remained that too much democracy 
could destroy a political system such as that found in Great Britain. And that is 
why Ferguson wasted little sympathy on the American attempt to secure 
independence.140
Adam Smith, Ferguson’s contemporary who held the chair of moral 
philosophy at the University of Glasgow, identified religious toleration as 
another important characteristic of a civil society. He believed that state 
churches that possessed a monopoly of religion were employed by political 
leaders to support their own party and often promoted violent factionalism. 
But if there were many religious sects—preferably two or three hundred—the 
clergy and adherents of those sects would learn to tolerate one another, and 
would be no position “to disturb the public tranquility.”141
Yet, both Ferguson and Adam Smith recognized that the degree of civility 
that Britain had achieved by the last quarter of the eighteenth century came 
with risks. One of the dangers of a civil society was its reliance on standing 
armies consisting of professional, long- service soldiers because this inhibited 
the martial spirit of citizens, and made them vulnerable to a government 
War and Peace in the Western Political Imagination262
backed by physical force. In Part V of his History of Civil Society, entitled “Of 
the Decline of Nations,” Ferguson says:
The boasted refinements, then, of the polished age, are not divested of danger. 
They open a door, perhaps, to disaster, as wide and accessible as any they 
have shut. If they build walls and ramparts, they enervate the minds of those 
who are placed to defend them; if they form disciplined armies, they reduce 
the military spirit of entire nations; and by placing the sword where they 
have given a distaste to civil establishments, they prepare for mankind the 
government of force.142
Both Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith agreed that a well established 
commercial culture was an important characteristic of a civil society, but it also 
carried risks. In barbarian or prestate societies, the principal activity was 
making war, and this preoccupation favored the rise of successful military 
leaders, and usually led to monarchical government. As a political society 
becomes more commercialized and the subdivision of labor more specialized, 
citizens have less time to spare from their occupations. They become more 
reluctant to exercise arms in a militia, and thus, become less warlike. 
Commercial nations become, at the same time, more wealthy and offer the 
temptation to armed neighbors to invade their countries. At the point where 
enforcing military obligations becomes less feasible, states usually constitute 
standing armies in which being a soldier becomes a full- time trade requiring 
that they spend all their time in military training. Adam Smith was of the 
opinion that states that depend on militias for defense risk conquest by other 
powers. However, standing armies can also pose a danger unless they are well 
disciplined and their loyalty to the government guaranteed.143
Adam Smith thought that the martial ethos among the Athenians first 
began to wane when commerce with the Greek colonies and other states 
became important on the eve of the Peloponnesian Wars. Previously, the usual 
way to acquire riches had been by the spoils of war, and citizens were glad of 
such opportunities. Commerce gave, then, a chance to acquire wealth and 
luxuries and raise themselves to equality with the nobles. Smith thought that it 
was at the Battle of Platea in 479 BCE that Athenian soldiers were first paid out 
of the public treasury; he argues that this signifies a decline of the heroic spirit 
and civic participation among Athenian citizens. In fact, mercenaries had been 
employed at least three centuries earlier in the Greek world and among its 
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neighbors. But they came to be remunerated with money only in about the 
fifth century BCE when coinage came into general use in the Greek world. 
Before that, mercenaries were recompensed in other ways.144 The belief that 
the development of commercial society caused citizens to become more 
concerned with private business and less devoted to the public good was 
widespread in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.145
Commercial societies often generated a taste for luxury and consumption. 
This disposition was usually shared by the rulers and the aristocracy, who 
became disinclined to save money in peacetime. But, in time of war, 
governments were obliged to borrow great sums of money to expand their 
military and naval forces and to equip and provision the same. Merchants and 
manufacturers were inclined to lend money to these governments to fund 
the public debt in political societies where the citizens had confidence in 
the equitable administration of justice and the guaranty of property rights. The 
existence of a permanently funded public debt could, of course, make it easier 
for states to go to war. The availability of such large amounts of capital was thus 
diverted from mercantile investment, and could make wars last longer than 
was needful.146
Great Britain’s manufactures and commerce had allowed that country to 
carry on wars in distant parts of the world. Britain did not depend primarily 
on the export of gold or the expenditure of much of the money in circulation, 
but derived its wealth from the export of commodities and the profits derived 
from the transportation of commodities—especially goods of finer quality. 
Thus, Britain in the eighteenth century was able to carry on wars without 
interruption, whereas earlier rulers often had to interrupt their wars when the 
money ran out.147
Immanuel Kant noticed that the existence of a permanently funded public 
debt allowed European countries to engage in increasingly expensive and 
more frequent wars. This, of course, entailed spending a larger amount of 
the government’s revenues on standing armies. Kant believed that the very 
existence of standing armies was itself a provocation to neighboring states. 
He disapproved of the employment of mercenary soldiers, and continued to 
believe that a voluntary militia was all that was permissible to deter foreign 
aggression. Kant also believed that commercial nations, such as Great Britain, 
which sold government bonds to build up their financial resources to wage 
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war, represented as great a threat to peace as the maintenance of standing 
armies. The existence of credit systems such as this represented a major 
obstacle to the establishment of perpetual peace, and other states were justified 
in forming alliances against such governments.148
Emmerich de Vattel (1714–67), however, recognized the need to maintain a 
standing military force if a neighboring prince also did so, but at the same 
time, he lamented that this was a financial burden to any state. He thought it 
desirable that every treaty of peace should specify “that belligerent powers 
should disarm on both sides” and “disband their troops.” He reveals his classical 
republican sentiments when he notes that England, unlike most mainland 
European states, was not obliged to support a large standing army, which he 
considered to be “an instrument of despotism.” And, being Swiss by birth, he 
was eager to proclaim the unique position of his native land, ringed as it was 
by natural fortifications.
Happy Switzerland! if continuing carefully to exercise her militia, she keeps 
herself in a condition to repel any foreign armies, without feeding a host of 
idle soldiers who might crush the liberties of the people, and even bid 
defiance to the lawful authority of the sovereign. Of this Roman legions 
furnish a signal instance. The happy method of a free republic—the custom 
of training up all her citizens to the art of war—renders the state respectable 
abroad, and saves it from pernicious defect at home. It would have been 
everywhere imitated, had the public good been everywhere the only object 
in view.149
Vattel anticipated the levée en masse by which the enormous armies of 
the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon would be raised, but he 
preferred the citizens’ militias to standing armies. While Vattel thought that 
it was preferable to call on volunteers to serve, and assumed that those “who 
are incapable of handling arms or supporting the fatigues of war” would be 
exempted, he was not prepared to say that natural law allowed an exemption to 
the clergy because of the strictures of canon law. He was prepared, however, 
to allow exemptions from military service to those clergy who performed 
useful religious services. But this latter category specifically excluded monks 
and friars.150 The growth of religious toleration was sometimes accompanied 
by the appearance of anticlericalism, which could work against the civilizing 
process.
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A number of leading French philosophes had concluded by the middle 
of the eighteenth century that the European monarchies of that era were 
obstacles to peace. Montesquieu believed that “the spirit of monarchy is 
war and expansion; the spirit of republics is peace and moderation.” Jean-
Jacques Rousseau thought that wars would not end until all monarchies 
were abolished–although he understood that this could not achieved without 
spilling much blood. Rousseau had a project for writing a grand treatise on 
political science that would replace Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws, but it 
never came to fruition. He had hoped to lay out a form of government that 
would ensure that the law would always prevail over the mind of man.151
Rousseau was a severe, although not intellectually rigorous, critic of Hobbes. 
He agreed that man in a state of nature was ruled by his passions rather than 
reason, but he rejected the Hobbesian view that primitive man lived in a 
perpetual state of conflict. Only hunger could drive him to violence. Man’s 
naturally peaceful nature was corrupted by civil society as he adopted concepts 
and institutions such as marriage, property, and social stratification that rested 
on man- made laws rather than natural law. Men became warlike only after 
they formed political societies, and a martial disposition was acquired only 
through habit and experience. In the state of nature, relations between man 
and man were not stable enough to constitute either a state of war or a state 
of peace. Quarrels among individuals came and went quickly, so personal 
relations did not constitute a basis for war. War became possible only when 
societies were formed and concepts of property were institutionalized. Man 
became a soldier only after he had become a citizen. War is a relationship 
among states, not individual persons. Thus, the age of the “noble savage” gave 
way to endemic warfare.152
Rousseau rejected the assertion by Hobbes that humans lived in an 
undeclared state of war. Rousseau believed that Hobbes confused individuals, 
as they supposedly lived in a state of nature (which Hobbes had never actually 
observed), with individuals as they actually existed in society. Rousseau 
believed that man was naturally inclined to peace, but the laws, as made and 
administered by princes to dispense justice, were merely a cover for imposing 
the prince’s will by force. As for the so- called “rights of nations,” because 
international law lacked sanctions, it was weaker than the law of nature. 
Political society represented “an artificial concord” imposed on people to make 
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them fight the ruler’s wars. When the first such political society was formed, 
others were bound to follow. The larger that political societies grew, the more 
likely they were to expand outward and make war. The state is an artificial 
creation that continues to grow, and as it feels strong or weak in comparison to 
other states that surround it, it tends to absorb neighboring, and especially, 
weaker states to strengthen its own political stability. The bigger it grows, the 
more dangerous its quarrels with its neighbors become. It is in the nature of 
well organized political societies always to be active, and the interaction among 
such great societies tends to produce war and mutual self- destruction.153
As for peace, Rousseau stated that it was a much broader concept than war 
since it encompassed meanings such as concord, unity, benevolence, and 
mutual affection together with a desire to preserve God’s creation of humanity, 
but it was easily disturbed and damaged in ways that fall short of open warfare. 
For example, the object of a declared war might be to force the enemy to accept 
a peace treaty that imposed even greater harm than was done by war.154
An important milestone in the search for a science of peace was Hugo Grotius’s 
attempt to explain the causes of war in purely secular terms. This had the 
effect of playing down the differences between the Catholic and Protestant 
camps during the age of religious wars. In his attempt to ascertain the criteria 
governing a just war and the methods that might or might not be employed in 
conducting such a war, Grotius provided a rational mode of inquiry that 
might be used by the non-Christian as well as the Christian world. This 
was to become the basis of international law. The realization of a more 
developed system of international law lay in the distant future; Grotius’s more 
immediate contribution was to cite Roman historical precedents and to 
provide a foundation in natural and civil law for constraints on war, which 
pacifist idealists sometimes forget represents a praiseworthy intermediate 
stage in the ultimate goal of universal peace. One must first determine which 
actions in war are unjust before one can declare what constitutes a just war. 
And it is well that the international community reach agreement concerning 
what is lawful in war before moving on to the next step of determining how to 
achieve and preserve peace in future.
The message of Machiavelli, Algernon Sidney, and the English classical 
republicans that liberty must be contended for, suited the temper of many 
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merchants and military men in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
when it was combined with a disposition to expand trade and engage in 
empire- building. Since making war was seen to be the principal function of 
the state, classical republicans such as Sidney looked for competence in their 
military and naval commanders. However, contrary to the doctrines of the 
classical republicans, this goal could not be achieved through the sporadic 
exercises of an amateur militia, but rather required a disciplined long- service 
soldiery and a professional officer corps which offered careers of merit. This 
did not accord well with the appointment and promotion of court favorites or 
the martial aspirations of the aristocracy. The professionalization of the Royal 
Navy was achieved in the late seventeenth century in England, but the same 
process in the army took much longer. Although it is difficult to gauge how 
completely the governing classes were persuaded by the intellectual currents 
associated with classical republicanism, the acceptance of the idea that military 
preparedness, empire- building and the expansion of trade at the expense of 
the Dutch, the French, and the Spanish were desirable objectives helped to 
propel the British kingdoms and the English colonies into wars with France 
and its allies that lasted from 1689 to 1815, and raised Britain from the status 
of a third- rate power in a backwater of Europe to that of a global great power.
James Harrington was also a classical republican, but he was closer to 
Hobbes in his desire to maintain peace and stability. Both men had been 
alarmed by those passages in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, 
which identified democracy and demagoguery as the principal causes of 
internecine strife. Harrington and Hobbes attempted to avoid civil war by 
prescribing governments that imposed varying degrees of censorship and 
absolutism. Algernon Sidney was remarkably unsympathetic to this peace 
ethic, and insisted on the need to constantly train for war. Indeed, he welcomed 
the occasional war or rebellion because of fear that the nation would become 
effeminate and devoid of valor without the experience of armed conflict from 
time to time. Moreover, Sidney did not doubt that moral justification could be 
found for sustaining this martial ethos. The values of this bellistic culture were 
reiterated in a great outpouring of books on the art of war together with 
sermons urging a holy war against the enemies of the Protestant cause, whether 
Catholic or Muslim. It was this audience that John Milton had in mind when 
he composed his Paradise Lost. Milton understood that such an audience was 
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so conditioned to the idea that war was a consequence of sin that it would do 
no good to offer a secular explanation for the phenomenon of war. Milton 
meant to condemn this disposition to war, but he had to do it in terms that 
were readily comprehended. Yet, his condemnation of royal tyranny and his 
justification of the right of a people to rebel and choose their own leaders did 
little to promote the cause of peace.
Thomas Hobbes’s words to the effect that in a state of nature men were 
perpetually at war with one another, and consequently, “the life of man [was] 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short,” are frequently torn out of context and 
misunderstood. Hobbes insisted that the causes of this seemingly perpetual 
conflict rose not so much from a widespread delight in war, but rather from 
an ignorance of the origins of war and peace, and the failure to study those 
principles of moral philosophy and the laws of nature discoverable by all men 
which could promote peace. In other words, Hobbes insisted that the difficulty 
in imagining peace in this world was caused by intellectual slovenliness. This 
remains as true today as it was in the age of Hobbes.
In his search for a science of peace, Hobbes looked about for the causes of 
bellicosity and the ignorance of those principles of moral philosophy that 
might promote peace, and he placed the blame on several categories of people: 
there were the clergy of different religious persuasions who exceeded their 
clerical authority and promoted a diversity of religious opinion; he castigated 
the philosophers and authors of classical antiquity who inculcated martial 
values and false principles of moral philosophy together with those modern 
scholars and authors who continued to reiterate those values—especially those 
who failed to teach obedience to royal government and thought that every 
king was a tyrant to be overthrown; and he singled out for special disapprobation 
those demagogues described by Thucydides whose rhetorical excesses often 
helped to precipitate conflict.
Anticipating the philosophes and scholars of the Age of Reason and the 
Enlightenment, Hobbes wished to completely revise the curricula of schools 
and universities. He intended to construct a new science of humankind, and 
like the deists, wanted to emphasize ethics and de- emphasize theology. But, in 
the interests of promoting peace, he parted company with the mainstream of 
political philosophy in the English- speaking world by seeking to increase royal 
power and to reinforce the monopoly of the established religion. Although in 
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his own career he deviated from many of these restraints, he could not imagine 
a stable political society in which there existed unrestricted intellectual inquiry, 
religious toleration, free speech, and popular, or even aristocratic, participation 
in government. Yet, we must remember that few people did more to promote 
rational and scientific inquiry into the topics of war and peace than Hobbes, 
and he certainly must be numbered among the founding fathers of political 
science and political psychology.
The political and moral philosophers who followed Grotius and Hobbes in 
the next century or so were able to envision supra- national bodies that would 
urge sovereign states to settle their differences by submitting them to tribunals 
that would render decisions based on the developing body of international law. 
International law was useful for imposing constraints on how wars were fought. 
Wars grew less frequent, but expanded in scale and length as governments 
increased their financial resources through improved methods of funding 
their public debts by issuing bonds. Consequently, wars lengthened and spread 
over larger geographical areas. Indeed, some of the wars of the second half 
of the eighteenth century were global in scale. Perhaps, only Immanuel Kant 
could imagine a world completely free of war, but he was unable to draw up a 
more specific map of how to reach that destination. It could hardly be reached 
without limiting the power of sovereign governments to some degree.
Probably, the best way of bringing about peace, and one over which 
governments had but limited control, was through the development of commerce 
within their societies and also with other nations. There was general agreement 
that the spread of commercial culture led to the decline of bellicose cultures that 
had been inherited from classical antiquity and the medieval world and the 
emergence of civil societies that were characterized by the rule of law. The more 
that governments were subjected to constitutional limitations and characterized 
by civil societies, the more they would be drawn together in peaceful commercial 
relations. This might be followed by international cooperation to limit wars, and 
possibly, abolish war altogether and settle all disputes by arbitration. Unfortunately, 
the growth of commerce can also lead to international and colonial competition, 
and does not invariably guarantee peaceful relations. Moreover, the profits 
of commerce, when appropriated by government in the form of taxes and 
investments in the public debt often continued to be spent largely on weapons 
and armies, which necessarily pose a risk to peace.

For mankind, o’er wearied with a life
Fostered by force, was ailing from its feuds;
And so the sooner of its own free will
Yielded to laws and strictest codes.
Titus Lucretius Caro, Of the Nature of Things, trans. William Ellery 
Leonard (London: Dent, 1921), bk. V (p. 232)
War pervaded classical antiquity and is a legacy of the ancient world. It was 
what poets, dramatists and historians wrote about more than any other topic, 
and tales of heroism and martial glory were what their audience wanted to 
hear. Contemplation of a world free of conflict, both civil and interstate, 
required poetic imagination, but poets such as Hesiod, Ovid, or the prophets 
who wrote the Hebrew Bible, could imagine peace only in the very distant past, 
perhaps in the distant future or in the next world, but not in the world in which 
they actually lived. In the Greek world, the obligation to bear arms came to be 
viewed as one of the duties of citizenship, and since the Greek city- states were 
highly competitive and jealous of one another and went to war frequently, it 
was necessary for citizens to exercise arms on a regular basis. This bellicosity 
also shaped their athletic games, and their gods smiled on such endeavors 
when they were not fighting among themselves. If the gods fought among 
themselves and encouraged those mortals whom they favored to do the same, 
it was difficult to have anything but brief periods of peace among mortals.
The Greeks frequently had to repel invasions by their Asian neighbors, and 
their earlier philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, taught them to think 
of non-Greek peoples as barbarians fit to be conquered and enslaved. The 
conquests of Alexander the Great enlarged the Greek world and promoted 
the idea of cosmopolitanism. This brought a degree of peace within the 
Hellenistic world, but at the same time, encouraged aggression and expansion 
on the frontiers of empire. Another reason for going to war frequently in the 
archaic, classical, and Hellenistic periods, and later in Roman times, was that 
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the honor and glory won on the battlefield conferred prestige and could 
advance one’s political career. The belief that the individual warrior won glory 
on the battlefield was peculiar to the Greeks, and, apparently, was not found in 
the martial cultures of other Near-Eastern empires. This was to be an enduring 
concept and persisted in Western cultures into medieval and early modern 
times; it predisposed aristocratic warriors to engage in individual combats 
as well as to seek honor and glory on the field of battle. The belief that 
their enemies were inferior peoples sometimes led them to demonize such 
peoples—a tendency that persists into the present, and that tempts soldiers to 
commit acts of atrocity or causes their commanders to be disinclined to end 
wars by negotiated treaties.
The Roman state in the days of the Republic was a political society organized 
for constant war and expansion, and became the model for the fiscal- military 
state of the early modern period. The Roman army during the republican 
period had demanded military service of all citizens, but in the transition to 
the empire became an organization made up of long- service professional 
soldiers. The activities of this army consumed most of the taxes raised by the 
Roman state. The link between citizenship and military service anticipated the 
militant nationalism of the French Revolution, and the scale of the mobilization 
of manpower for military service was at times greater than that of Western 
states during the age of total war in the early twentieth century. Although the 
Pax Romana of Augustus brought peace to the interior of the empire for several 
centuries, the fact remains that Rome was a bellicose state by any comparison. 
The concept of peace in Roman thought was limited, developed slowly, and in 
any case, was imported from the Greek world. It does not appear before the 
time of Augustus. While Roman intellectuals were influenced by Greek 
Stoicism, and sometimes condemned war in general terms, it is difficult to 
demonstrate that such sentiments had any influence on how the empire was 
governed. Seneca concluded that man’s corrupt nature made war inevitable. 
The Romans were fastidious about providing legal justifications for making 
war, but cared little about eliminating it.
The Romans were slow to develop a concept of peace, and their political 
imagination did not carry them very far in that direction. For the Romans, 
peace came only after a crushing victory and a dictated peace. The Gates of 
War were seldom shut in the Temple of Janus, and peace was never durable. 
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The Greeks were more imaginative. It was they who first engaged in the 
negotiation of peace treaties between equals, thus establishing an important 
precedent for the emergence of international law in the early modern period. 
The Athenian Sophist philosopher Isocrates, who witnessed the disintegration 
caused by the Peloponnesian War, came to advocate peace among the Greek 
city- states; he questioned Athenian expansion and condemned possession of 
and employment of mercenary soldiers and naval forces as bellicose and 
provocative. The Sophists also argued for the principle of human equality—not 
only among the Greek city- states, but between Greeks and their Asian neighbors.
The Stoics, with their imperturbability and their emphasis on ethical behavior, 
also expressed an abhorrence of war and a longing for peace. They promoted 
cosmopolitanism, which they believed could best be realized in a universal 
monarchy or state. Stoicism, while it had considerable influence on such major 
Roman thinkers as Cicero, remained a personal philosophy. Its most important 
contribution is that it caused both the Greeks and the Romans to see the wisdom 
of imposing constraints on how wars were fought, and a thousand years later, it 
influenced Erasmian and Neo-Stoic thought during the Renaissance.
Stoicism insisted on a moral standard by which wars could be judged just or 
unjust. Stoicism also endorsed cosmopolitanism, which promoted the concept 
of the brotherhood of man and a belief in a natural equality among men, and 
thus, anticipated some of the tenets of Christianity. Its most enduring idea is 
the belief that war should be subjected to constraints on how it was fought. 
Individual Stoic philosophers went further in advocating the abolition of war 
as irrational, but again, these ideas remained a personal philosophy rather than 
being integrated into a more widely accepted political philosophy. Stoicism 
underwent a revival during the Renaissance, and as Neo-Stoicism, did much to 
introduce an ethical dimension to how wars were fought. It also had some 
influence on the Erasmian pacifism of the Christian humanists. However, the 
Greeks and the Romans, the intellectual leaders of the world of classical 
antiquity, devoted more thought to how to win glory and sustain honor than 
they ever did to attempting to imagine a world in which peace prevailed. 
The Roman state was organized for making war, and that was the model to 
which the emerging sovereign states gave priority during the Renaissance 
and early modern period when they turned their attention to making their 
armies more effective.
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In late antiquity, after the time of Constantine, the emergence of Christianity 
as the official religion of the Roman Empire seems to have bred public disorder 
and contempt for non-Christians, whether pagans or Jews. Despite the early 
Christian aversion to war, the Augustinian doctrine that war is a consequence 
of man’s sinfulness and that peace was to be found only in the next world cast 
a shadow over the Middle Ages. Pacifism came to be associated with heretical 
sects. Augustine and his followers devoted their efforts to laying out a sweeping 
doctrine of just war, which included making war on heterodox Christians. The 
bitterness that such crusades engendered could last for generations, and made 
it difficult ever to achieve peace. Although it was universally assumed that 
the end of war was peace, everyone wanted peace on his own terms, so peace 
always remained a contested concept. The concept of just war, which derived 
from classical antiquity, was a meager inheritance for the Christian world, but 
it did offer more constraints on how wars were fought than the concept of holy 
war derived from the Old Testament. The classical doctrine of just war taught 
that only a legitimate temporal ruler could declare a just war, but this made no 
sense when the political authority of the Western Roman Empire disintegrated 
during the Germanic and Turco-Mongolic invasions, and the collapse of 
imperial authority provided the opportunity for the popes of the Latin Church 
to assume the power to declare war and proclaim the Crusades.
The decentralized system of feudalism, which emerged toward the end of 
the early Middle Ages, also proved an ineffective means of preserving peace. 
The knightly code of chivalry, with its need to continually display martial 
prowess, worked against peace between kingdoms and within lordships. 
Chivalric values, with their emphasis on the acquisition of individual honor 
and glory undermined attempts to impose discipline and to focus on political 
and military aims in war. Such undisciplined displays of histrionics could only 
diminish opportunities to secure peace. The medieval knight was devoted to 
war because the quickest way to enrich himself was by winning ransom and 
booty. Although the code of chivalry imposed constraints upon methods of war 
between knights, medieval war remained brutal for lesser persons. The Church 
decided that the best way to suppress conflict between feudal monarchs as well 
as feuding and private combat was to send these troublesome knights against 
the Saracens and infidels and to confer upon them the status of crusaders. But 
as feudal monarchs gradually gained a monopoly on violence within their 
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realms, they built up armies with which they could fight one another to 
further their dynastic ambitions. Thus, another solution to restraining knightly 
violence was for monarchs to take such knights into royal armies for permanent 
military service. The Decretals of Gratian served to rehabilitate the soldier by 
making him a warrior in the service of God since he punished sin and crime in 
the administration of justice. All of this was based on the assumption that the 
object of war was peace, although the individual knight did not necessarily have 
this in mind. There were times when medieval writers clearly suffered from war 
weariness, but they often feared peace more since it was generally believed that 
extended peace would lead to effeminacy and the decay of military prowess.
The concept of holy war derives from the Hebrew Bible or Old Testament. 
Modern Jews generally reject the idea that the ancient Israelites ever engaged 
in anything other than defensive war in territories that they had always 
occupied. Nevertheless, St. Augustine and the Prophet Muhammad claimed to 
have discovered the concept in various passages of the Hebrew Bible. The early 
Christians before the time of Augustine would not have understood the 
concept of holy war since they were pacifists and could not comprehend the 
concept of holy war except as described in the Book of Revelation, which 
foretold a battle between angels and demons in which they would have no part. 
Nor would Roman political theory have allowed a war that was not declared by 
those possessing political authority in the Roman state. The Christian concept 
of holy war did not emerge fully developed until the ninth century CE, a 
period of political weakness when the Western Roman Empire was no more 
than a distant memory, and all parts of that former empire were beset by 
barbarian invaders or Muslim conquerors. The Muslim tradition of holy war 
also derived from the Hebrew Bible, and was intended to destroy idolaters or 
compel them to convert to Islam, but the main driving force of Islam was 
expansionism. The Islamic tradition never recognized a distinction between 
religious and secular authority. By contrast, the concept of holy war was never 
fully accepted in the Byzantine or Eastern Roman Empire, where imperial 
authority remained much stronger. In the long run, the Western distinction 
between spiritual and temporal authority, inherited from the Roman political 
tradition, did not provide fertile ground for the growth of theocracy.
In both theory and practice, holy war was the most vicious kind of armed 
conflict, because, unlike war in late antiquity and later in early modern Europe, 
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there were no constraints on how armies treated their enemies and prisoners. 
However, not all of the wars that the Saracens and the Franks or crusaders 
fought with one another were full- scale holy wars, and sometimes rulers such as 
Saladin, Sultan of Egypt, or the Emperor Frederick II were prepared to negotiate 
truces, but the clergy of the two opposing faiths usually did their best to sabotage 
such efforts. Generally, both Muslim jihadists and Christian crusaders aimed at 
destroying one another. Both also pursued wars against heretical elements 
within the Christian and Islamic worlds. Muslims could imagine peace only 
within the Islamic world, and Christians thought that permanent peace could 
be attained only in the next world. Both Christians and Muslims thought that 
those who died in these holy wars were martyrs to their faith.
When the Ottoman Turks came to dominate the Near-Eastern Islamic 
world in the thirteenth century, the focus of Muslim holy war shifted from 
conquest in all directions to a strategy of expanding westward into Europe as 
far as the Atlantic Ocean. The Ottoman sultans also claimed the caliphate and 
attempted to subdue their Arab co- religionists. The Ottoman army became 
professionalized and highly effective, and it continued to expand westward 
into Europe, conquering the Byzantine Empire and advancing up the Danube 
Basin until it was stopped at the gates of Vienna in the late seventeenth century. 
The Turkish threat helped to keep alive the crusading spirit and gave longevity 
to the idea of holy war in the West. That the later crusades were not pure holy 
wars can be seen in the alliance of the Genoese with the Ottomans at the 
Crusade of Varna.
The crusading ideology grew out of the determination to halt the expansion 
of Islam and to recover the holy places of Jerusalem. Holy war had become an 
instrument of papal policy while the temporal rulers of Western Europe 
remained weak. These motives remained at the heart of the movement, but 
crusading wars were also directed against heretics within Christendom, and 
against enemies of the papacy and pagans in the Baltic Sea region. In order to 
secure the cooperation of secular rulers and members of the feudal nobility, the 
crusades against Christians also had to serve the needs of secular rulers and 
their dynastic interests. The Teutonic Knights continued their crusades against 
the Lithuanians even after the latter were converted to Christianity. When it was 
objected that the holy war of the Teutonic Knights was nothing but a pretense, 
the Knights launched campaigns against the heretical Hussites in Bohemia and 
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fought the Turks in Transylvania. The Hussite heresy, which fed on Czech 
nationalism and was effectively led by John Hus, with military leadership from 
Jan Žižka, proved to be the most difficult of all medieval heretical movements 
to deal with. Four separate crusades were sent against the Hussites, but the latter 
endured and retaliated by raiding several German states. The holy wars against 
the Hussites and the Waldensians were failures, and these groups survived into 
the sixteenth century when they merged with Protestantism.
The holy wars and crusades of the medieval period bequeathed an unfortunate 
legacy to Reformation and early modern Europe since religious motives, in part, 
provided a pretext for the numerous wars of that period. Although political and 
dynastic ambitions also contributed to the wars of the Reformation, the popular 
exhortations of religious leaders in both the Protestant and Catholic camps 
stirred up violence in the religious and civil wars that followed. Popular religious 
discontent helped to unleash peasant rebellions and other social and economic 
protests based on grievances that had accumulated under the seigneurial and 
manorial regimes in the latter part of the Middle Ages.
Unemployed soldiers always posed a threat to good order—especially in the 
case of France after that country withdrew from foreign wars for the half 
century following the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis of 1559. The many French 
noblemen and their followers who had fought in the Italian wars returned 
home, and their presence in the provinces brought about a militarization of 
provincial French society that undermined royal authority, and made the 
confessional disputes of the French religious and civil wars more deadly. The 
provincial governors and their armed retinues sometimes attempted to uphold 
royal jurisdiction and the Catholic faith, but many disaffected noblemen who 
failed to secure patronage found an outlet and a refuge in the Huguenot party. 
These swordsmen took it on themselves to organize militias to protect the 
meetings of Huguenot congregations. Both Ultra-Catholic and Huguenot 
noblemen found extensive popular support, and the descent into civil war 
inevitably followed. The Catholics formed the Holy League; various local 
armed confraternities were revived or newly organized, and their pursuit 
of war against the Huguenots not only displayed many of the characteristics of 
the religious strife seen in other wars of religion, but also reminded some 
observers of the medieval crusades against the Albigensians. For their part, the 
Huguenots invited popular hostility by their refusal to abide by the earlier 
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royal grants of limited toleration as contained in the Peace of Amboise of 1563. 
Thirty- four more years of religious and civil strife ensued, but the Huguenots 
did not gain any greater degree of religious toleration than had been conceded 
by the Peace of Amboise.
That the nature of religious war was changing is exemplified by the Wars of 
the Three Kingdoms. The Irish civil wars bore all the characteristics of religious 
conflict between Catholic and Protestant, but the civil wars in England and 
Scotland were both fought between different factions of Protestantism, although 
the exaggerated fear of popery played a role in fomenting these conflicts. Like 
the wars of the Reformation of mainland Europe, popular involvement was 
informed by the many books and pamphlets that poured forth from the printing 
press, and large segments of the English people displayed a remarkable awareness 
of the political issues—especially after the breakdown of official censorship. But 
popular political discourse had not yet become completely secularized, and 
religious propaganda still played a significant role in stirring up animosity.
The civil wars of Ireland were indeed religious conflicts, but they were also 
something more. Several distinct ethnic and religious groups had never been 
fully assimilated by the middle years of the seventeenth century. The Old Irish 
clung to their Gaelic language and customs—especially in Ulster—and their 
Norman and English conquerors had never accorded them the status and 
rights of subjects. The Old English of Munster and the English Pale had 
remained loyal to Catholicism, but the Old Irish were reluctant to trust them 
because the former chose the Royalist cause while the Gaelic Irish formed 
themselves into the Catholic Confederation of Kilkenny. As the more recent 
conquerors, the New English and the Ulster Scots were distrusted and hated by 
both the Old Irish and the Old English. The people of Ireland had never forged 
a common identity. Clearly, there were numerous political considerations that 
exacerbated the Irish conflict, but the use of religious propaganda—especially 
concerning the alleged massacre of Protestants—was even more exaggerated 
in Ireland than was the case in England and Scotland. This contributed to 
horrific atrocities that were worse than anything in the mainland European 
conflicts. The constraints on war, found in the mainland European wars, and to 
some extent in the civil wars of England, were absent in the Irish wars.
While Machiavelli can hardly be considered an advocate of peace, he, like 
earlier Italian scholars such as Dante and Marsilius of Padua, helped to secularize 
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political thought. This removed that intellectual discipline from the realm of 
clerical control, and by writing in the vernacular, admitted laymen to the world 
of political discourse. In the course of time, this helped to lessen the papal power 
of declaring holy war, and restored to the sovereign ruler the exclusive authority 
to declare war. The secular rulers were also quite capable of exploiting religious 
prejudices to justify their own wars, as happened during the wars of the 
Reformation, but they also had strictly secular ends in sight, and they tended to 
depend on a broader and more popular political base when they decided policy 
or declared war. Imitating the example of the citizen army of the Roman Republic, 
Machiavelli and the classical republicans advocated civic militias in preference 
to standing armies composed of mercenaries or long- service professional 
soldiers. A civic militia, they argued, was more likely to promote political stability 
than foreign mercenaries, who had an interest in keeping the wars going.
Despite the secularizing influence that the Italian humanists had on political 
discourse, they did not break with the view, derived both from the ancients and 
the Augustinians, that war arose from man’s disposition to violence—
something that man had no control over. Since war was inevitable, a prince 
must encourage his subjects to exercise arms in preparation for the next 
conflict. Peace always brought the danger that aristocrats and citizens would 
lose the martial spirit that was necessary to hold an army together and defend 
one’s country. On the other hand, Castiglione warned his readers that however 
necessary it was to maintain a political society and its people in a state of 
readiness for war, a prince neglected his duty if he did not encourage his 
subjects to take advantage of the leisure afforded by peace to cultivate the 
moral virtues necessary to enjoy peace and prolong the same.
Erasmus, the prince of Christian humanists, attacked the political realism of 
Machiavelli and the classical republicans by questioning the crusading, chivalric, 
and patriotic values on which the martial ethos rested. In the short run, he 
hoped to promote arbitration as an alternative to war, but he also understood 
that diplomacy was just another word for dissimulation. Ultimately, he aimed at 
providing a humanist curriculum based on the moral principles of the New 
Testament and the Roman Stoic philosophers. His audience was necessarily 
limited because he wrote and published in Latin, whereas Machiavelli and his 
followers wrote in the vernacular and were widely translated into other modern 
languages. Erasmus, unlike the Neo-Stoic philosophers, did not help his cause 
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by making clear his detestation of professional soldiers. Ultimately, Erasmus’s 
dislike of war was based, not on Christian principles, but on the argument that 
war was irrational and contrary to natural law. Thus, at the same time, he 
rejected the argument that war was a providential means of punishing man’s 
sins. He also threw out all of the classical Greek and Roman, Augustinian and 
Scholastic arguments supporting the doctrine of just war.
Erasmian humanism did not equip humanists for dealing with the dreadful 
political realities of early modern Europe. Erasmus took no account of the 
development of the Renaissance sovereign state, which came into being 
primarily to make war more effectively, and his ideas were unacceptable to the 
Portuguese and Spanish who were entering an extended period of colonial 
expansion. However, there were those who attempted to impose theoretical 
restraints on the conduct of armies in the just- war tradition, such as the 
political theorists of the Salamancan school who sought to place limits on how 
non-Christian noncombatants were treated in the Indies and in the continuing 
war with the Turks. The Salamancan thinkers also rejected differences of 
religion as a sufficient justification for declaring war.
The reason that Erasmian pacifism did not engage with the political realities 
of his age was that Erasmus, although he had fled the cloister, retained a 
monkish disengagement from the problems of politics and war. His bitter 
denunciations of war and soldiers could hardly commend him to those who 
had to deal with such realities, but needed moral guidance in doing so. For that 
reason, Michel de Montaigne, Justus Lipsius and the other Neo-Stoics were 
better guides in developing an ethics of war in an age of religious and civil 
conflict that Montaigne thought was worse than anything the ancient world 
had ever experienced, yet they were able to draw on the ancient Stoic virtues of 
constancy, courage, and tolerance in facing the changing accidents of war. 
Montaigne demonstrated that it was possible to be both a soldier and a scholar, 
to combine a rational analysis of war with a care for ethical restraint on how 
war was waged. He and Justus Lipsius helped to restore the moral dimension 
that was missing from Machiavellian political and military analysis and to 
combine it with a skeptical approach to history that characterized Tacitus. 
Consequently, they reached a wider audience than Erasmus was able to do. 
Lipsius was widely read by military reformers, which led to more disciplined 
standing armies and constraints on war, but at the same time these military 
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reformers also strengthened the sovereign state, the chief activity of which was 
making war.
Machiavelli’s secular and analytical approach to war and politics was much 
admired in early modern Europe, but many of those admirers were troubled 
over the Florentine’s omission of the moral dimension and endeavored to 
supplement his political theory with the study of moral philosophy. Whereas 
Machiavelli and the classical republicans viewed war as the main function of 
the state and the best means of preserving republican liberty, the Neo-Stoics 
such as Lipsius as well as Grotius and Hobbes, were concerned to place 
constraints on how wars were fought and to incorporate the same in a body 
of international law, which would be based on natural law rather than divine 
law or theology. As the European world engaged Asia, Africa, and the New 
World, the laws of war necessarily concerned the whole human community 
and not just Christendom. It was assumed that the concept of natural law was 
comprehensible to non-Western peoples, since it was known to the pre-
Christian peoples of classical antiquity.
None of these jurists, such as Gentili and Grotius, could imagine a world 
without war, but they certainly thought that some wars could be avoided by 
arbitration and that all wars could be rendered less destructive by the 
observance of international law and the rules of war. The reason that most 
jurists and philosophers could not imagine the total abolition of war was that 
war was accepted as a legitimate means by which a sovereign ruler dispensed 
justice. Gentili was one of the first jurists to insist on the distinction between 
public and private war. The former could only be declared by one sovereign 
ruler against another sovereign by formal declaration, and hostilities could not 
begin until a waiting period allowed an opportunity for arbitration. Public war 
could only be fought with customary weapons, and every effort should be 
made to spare the persons and property of noncombatants. Since securing 
peace was the object of war, the terms of the peace treaty should treat the 
vanquished in a just manner that would facilitate a lasting peace.
Grotius was but one of a number of jurists who contributed to the body of 
international law that established constraints on the conduct of war. Most of 
these derived from practices that had been embodied in articles of war and 
codes of military justice that emerged as more disciplined standing armies 
came into being in the early seventeenth century in Sweden, the Dutch Republic 
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and the Spanish Army of Flanders, and thereafter, these practices spread 
through the military forces of mainland Europe and the British Isles. These 
constraints on how wars were fought also owed something to the medieval 
code of chivalry and the teachings of the medieval Catholic Church. Despite 
his aversion to war, Grotius reminds his readers that it is a condition that 
persists through much of history. Rightly used, it can secure periods of peace, 
but only the sovereign state has the right to declare and prosecute wars. This is 
public war, and one of the political community’s functions is to suppress private 
war by securing a monopoly on violence. War is a necessary function of a well 
governed commonwealth because, as ancient authors insisted, the rule of law 
cannot be maintained without sanctions. This principle not only applies to 
domestic matters, but also needs to be extended into the international sphere. 
Such sanctions depend on the continuing use of war justly declared. Grotius 
used these arguments to justify the Dutch war of independence from Spain 
and the right of trading companies such as the Dutch East India Company to 
assume sovereign rights and to pursue a war of trade and commercial expansion 
against the Portuguese and Spanish. Thus, much as Grotius abhorred war and 
soldiers, he helped to provide a framework, based on international law, for its 
continuance—albeit subject to constraints on its conduct.
If Gentili and Grotius had been careful to insist on a distinction between 
public and private war, the English classical republicans, such as Milton, 
Harrington, Sidney, and Locke, effectively eliminated that distinction and 
furnished arguments and justifications for rebellions against monarchs and 
the pursuit of civil war. Sidney thought that republican governments preserved 
domestic peace better than monarchical governments. Thomas Hobbes would 
have been horrified by this line of reasoning, and more than any other thinker 
of his age, he worked to develop a science of peace. In addition to the study of 
history and natural law, Hobbes emphasized the need for people to study 
moral philosophy to discover and acknowledge their responsibilities for 
avoiding both civil strife and interstate war. Based on his close study of 
Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, Hobbes thought that the causes 
of interstate wars could be comprehended under the headings of dynastic 
ambitions and rivalries, differing religious opinions, and the rhetorical excesses 
of individual politicians. Whereas other thinkers of the Age of Reason were 
coming to insist that religious toleration could avoid the contention that led to 
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religious wars, Hobbes could not imagine a stable civil society without an 
Erastian state church. The main function of an established church was to teach 
obedience to the sovereign.
Hobbes was a careful student of Greek and Roman classics, but in his attempt 
to construct a science of politics, he came to reject the authority of classical 
authors such as Aristotle. Influenced by the Scientific Revolution, he preferred 
the empirical approach to knowledge over the theoretical method of the 
Aristoteleans, and he believed that the accumulation of and study of historical 
examples allowed one to acquire the moral and political wisdom that would 
enable one to construct a science of politics that was compatible with moral 
philosophy. This reflected the rationalism and scientific method of inquiry of 
his age, and a rejection of custom and tradition, which Hobbes maintained had 
led to political instability in the city- states of the ancient world. From his study 
of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, Hobbes learned to distrust the 
false eloquence of politicians—devoid as it was of wisdom—which along with 
ambition and the pursuit of honor as well as greed, was so often the occasion 
of war. Thucydides also brought out the pessimistic side of Hobbes’s nature, 
while his acquaintance with the classical republicans and the parliamentary 
demagogues of the war party in precivil war England led him to distrust 
aristocratic and democratic participation in government, and to put his trust in 
monarchical absolutism. Although Hobbes posited that in a state of nature 
there would have existed a continuously threatening climate of war, he also 
thought that it was a basic law of nature to work for peace, and refused to believe 
that war was inevitable, as Thucydides had maintained. Unfortunately, Hobbes 
could not reconcile this with political liberty and the parliamentary system of 
representation and an aristocratic and democratic voice in law- making. If the 
sovereign state was to preserve peace, all power must be vested in the king alone 
and Parliament’s role could only be advisory. Any liberties and rights possessed 
by the subject would derive from or depend on the absolute sovereign.
The jurists and political philosophers who followed Grotius and Hobbes 
refined some of the ideas of these two very influential thinkers. Kant was able to 
imagine a world free of war—or at least, the world that he inhabited. He accepted 
Hobbes’s argument that the natural state of man was undeclared war, but 
he thought that a state of peace could be established if two or more states 
characterized by civil societies agreed to submit to arbitration by an international 
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tribunal staffed by competent jurists, but he did not envision them abandoning 
their sovereign rights and powers. A key idea that Kant put forward was that 
commerce within political societies and trade among states promoted civil 
societies characterized by the rule of law, where laws were made by a representative 
body separate from but working with a sovereign ruler. The best chance to secure 
international amity would occur when sovereign states with similar civil societies 
and political constitutions banded together to form a “league of nations.” However, 
Kant could not imagine such an international body extending beyond Europe.
Adam Ferguson thought that the concept of a civil society represented a 
significant break with classical antiquity because it rejected the methods of war 
and the martial ethos of the ancient world. The spread of commerce undercut 
aristocratic attachment to the martial ethos and led to better disciplined armies 
led by professional officer corps rather than amateur gallants, and also brought 
constraints on the conduct of war. He attached importance to Kant’s belief 
that civil societies were associated with the rule of law and representative 
institutions, but he also feared that too much democracy could destroy a nicely 
balanced regime. Adam Smith thought that religious toleration was also an 
important characteristic of a civil society and rose from a multiplicity of 
religious sects in which none could dominate. Yet, both Ferguson and Smith 
recognized that the spread of commercial culture brought risks. Prosperity 
invited the envy of powerful neighbors, and commerce often promoted colonial 
expansion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Citizens in a commercial 
society were more interested in their private affairs and less concerned with 
their duties as citizens. Such societies were usually defended by mercenaries or 
standing armies composed of long- service soldiers, and the commonwealth 
was vulnerable to political interference by these permanent military forces 
unless their loyalty to the regime was somehow guaranteed. Kant was also able 
to see that countries with a well funded public debt were able to carry on wars 
of aggression and expansion without interruption, and he continued to favor 
citizen militias over standing armies as a means of defense. Thus, countries 
with abundant resources, permanent public debts, and standing armies 
remained a major obstacle to perpetual peace. Political societies with large 
standing armies and navies were rarely at peace for long.
Appendix
Changing meanings of the “sinews of war”
According to the Roman military writer Vegetius, the term nervi belli pecunia, 
“money, the sinews of war,” was used figuratively by Cicero, and was derived 
from nervi, or animal sinews or tendons, which were employed to make ropes 
or cables used in constructing catapults, mangonels and other torsion- engines 
necessary for mounting sieges and defending towns and fortified places against 
the same. Horsehair and even women’s hair could also be used for making 
ropes that were especially strong. Vegetius said that in preparing for sieges, 
cities needed to have a good store of animal tendons.1
The idea that money is indispensable for war dates back to Thucydides, 
who said: “War is not so much a matter of armaments as of money 
which makes armaments effective: particularly is this true in a war fought 
between a land power and a sea power. So let us first of all see to our finances 
and, until we have done so, avoid being swept away by the speeches from our 
allies.”2
Quintus Curtius Rufus, the Roman biographer of Alexander the Great, also 
maintained that money was the sinews of war.3 Curtius had drawn that 
conclusion after describing a battle that Antipater the Macedonian chose to 
fight with the king of Sparta because he had no money to pay his soldiers and 
feared that they would desert if he did not immediately join battle.
Machiavelli cited many examples of kings and republics with ample financial 
resources which nevertheless lost wars. Machiavelli insisted that “Gold is not 
the sinews of war, but good soldiers are. Gold is necessary, but of secondary 
importance, and good soldiers can get it for themselves [presumably by 
plunder]. . . .”4 Elsewhere, he says: “Men, iron, money and bread be the strength 
of war, but of these four the first two be most necessary, because men and iron 
find bread and money, but bread and money find not men and iron”; and “The 
armour on the backs of citizens or subjects, given by the disposition of order 
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and law, did never harm, but rather always it doth good and maintaineth the 
city much longer in surety through the help of this armour than without.”5
Giovanni Botero agreed with Machiavelli about the importance of valor, but 
he also pointed out that valor had to be learned and was not inherent: 
“Discipline is the nerve of an army. By discipline I mean the art of making a 
good soldier, and I define a good soldier as one who obeys valiantly. Roman 
soldiers had to take an oath to their captains to obey to the best of their ability. 
The first necessity in enforcing discipline is to keep soldiers from whatever 
fosters corruption and luxury.”6 Francesco Guicciardini believed that wars will 
always be expensive, and attempts at false economy will only hinder the 
prosecution of the war.
Those who try to be tightfisted while waging war always end by spending 
more. For nothing requires a more boundless effusion of money than war. 
The greater the provisions, the quicker the undertaking will be ended. Failure 
to make such provisions, just to save money, will make the enterprise take 
longer and, what is more, will result in incomparably greater cost. Accordingly, 
nothing is more pernicious than waging war by disbursing monies desultorily 
and without large amounts of cash at hand. For that is not the way to finish 
a war but to nourish it.7
The belief that valiant soldiers constituted the sinews of war became a kind 
of litmus test among Machiavelli’s disciples in England and the Atlantic world, 
whom we call classical republicans, such as Robert Devereux, second Earl of 
Essex, Sir Walter Ralegh, and James Harrington. When Ralegh addressed the 
question asked by Livy, whether Alexander the Great could have conquered 
the Romans, he put the question aside by insisting that the Englishman was the 
best warrior because of his valor (rather than any superiority of weapons, such 
as the long bow). Despite the fact that most English soldiers of his time were 
impressed men rather than professionals and were not as well trained as 
Roman soldiers, Ralegh still thought that they were superior.8 Although James 
Harrington recognized that the Dutch Republic’s war- making capacity rested 
on trade, he believed that England, being at that time primarily an agrarian 
society, must depend on citizens and freeholder cultivators of the land for its 
soldiers. Harrington said that Roman historians recorded that Rome had relied 
on citizens for its army, and paid for its military operations by conquest, booty, 
and expansion. Before the rise of the modern military- fiscal state, most armies 
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were expected to live off of the land when away from their home base. In any 
case, citizens who were not willing to defend themselves invariably surrendered 
their political power.9
Barnabe Rich accepted Machiavelli’s dictum about valor. However, he was 
also familiar with the Low Countries wars, and knew how much treasure they 
consumed. He had a most interesting solution for raising money for paying 
soldiers and other costs incident on keeping an army standing:
Let us fetch our example from the people of the Low Countries, who being 
generally given to drunkenness, hath an excise imposed both of beer and 
wine that it well sufficeth to pay all their soldiers during the time of the civil 
wars.
Now our people of England being generally given to inordinate lawing, if 
the like imposition might be raised for every writ they should fetch forth, 
and for every sentence in law that should be pronounced with them both, or 
against them, no doubt it would maintain a great many soldiers.10
Justus Lipsius recognized that, in order to make war successfully, a ruler 
needed good advice, soldiers, weapons, provisions, and supplies, but he could 
have none of these without money. Thus, fundamentally, money is the sinews 
of war, because without funding one cannot have the necessities of war. Valor 
was a quality he mentioned only as an afterthought. Reflecting his knowledge 
of war as conducted in the Dutch Republic under Maurice of Nassau, a plentiful 
supply of money was needed to keep an army standing and always ready to 
engage the enemy. Lipsius also remembered that the Romans maintained 
magazines well stocked with provisions in anticipation of war. Understanding 
the distinct advantage that the Dutch had over their Spanish enemies, he also 
emphasized the importance of maritime commerce and convenient ports for 
supplying money and mariners for fighting wars both on the sea and the land.11
One could count on Hobbes to succinctly put this whole discussion into 
perspective, and also to supply the missing moral dimension:
Two things are necessary for the citizens to prosper: hard work and thrift; a 
third contributing factor is the natural produce of earth and water; and there 
is also a fourth, military activity, which sometimes increases citizens’ wealth 
but more often erodes it. For a commonwealth set on an island in the sea, 
with only just enough room for habitation, can grow rich by trade and 
manufacture alone, without sowing and without fishing; but there is no 
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doubt that if they have territory, the same number can be richer or a larger 
number can be equally well off. The fourth factor, military activity, was once 
regarded as a gainful occupation under the name of piracy or raiding. And 
before the formation of commonwealths, when the human family lived 
dispersed in families, it was considered just and honourable. For raiding is 
simply making war with small forces. And great commonwealths, particularly 
Rome and Athens, at certain times so enlarged their country from the spoils 
of war, foreign tribute and the acquisition of territory by arms, that they did 
not impose taxes on poorer citizens; in fact they actually distributed money 
and land to individuals. But we should not take enrichment by these means 
into our calculations. For as a means of gain, military activity is like gambling; 
in most cases it reduces a person’s property; very few succeed.12
By the end of the seventeenth century, the controversy concerning whether 
valiant soldiers or treasure constituted the sinews of war had been laid to rest. 
Charles Davenant, the political economist and proponent of mercantilism, 
summed it up thus:
For war is quite changed from what it was in the time of our forefathers; 
when in a hasty expedition and a pitched field, the matter was decided by 
courage; but now the whole art of war is in a manner reduced to money; for 
nowadays that prince who can best find money to feed, clothe and pay his 
army, not he that has the most valiant troops, is surest of success and 
conquest.13
Ares see under Athena.
Arianism widespread early Christian heresy condemned by the Council of Nicea, 
which taught that Jesus and the Holy Ghost were not co- equal members of the 
Trinity, but were created by the Father.
Athena: patron of Athens and goddess of wisdom, and the strategic and disciplined 
side of war, in contrast to her brother Ares, the personification of bloodlust, violence, 
and the rawer side of war.
Bedouins nomadic desert- dwelling Arabs who lived in tribal societies.
Beguines lay women in the Low Countries who sought to live a religious life without 
taking vows; many devoted themselves to charitable endeavors. Some became 
associated with the Third Order of St. Francis, while others became flagellants. 
Many lived by begging, and some were suspected of heresy.
Cathars also known as Albigensians. Adherents of a heretical sect in Languedoc who 
allegedly believed in dual deities. The first was an evil deity that had created the 
physical world, and a second, that represented love and peace and who was purely 
spiritual. They worshiped only the second god.
Dar al- harb in Islamic terminology: territory of war; inhabited by unbelievers.
Dar el-Islam territory of Islam.
Dervishes Sufi Muslims who pursue an ascetic life.
Donatism doctrines of early Christian heretics who argued that the true church included 
only those saints who could withstand persecution and excluded relapsed sinners.
Eirene one of the horae or Greek goddesses who controlled orderly life; she was the 
personification of peace.
Equestrian order hereditary aristocratic order in ancient Rome, ranking below 
patricians; it furnished the mounted troops of the Roman army legions.
Erastianism a political theory that teaches that the secular authority of the sovereign 
state possesses a superior power over the church in ecclesiastical matters. Wrongly 
attributed to the Swiss Zwinglian theologian Thomas Erastus; more properly 
associated with the English divine Richard Hooker. Erastianism was also advocated 
by Thomas Hobbes.
Fortuna Roman goddess of fate and fortune; her influence could bring good fortune or 
chaos and disaster. Often involved in hopes of bringing victory in war. For Christians 
to speak of Fortuna could be construed as a denial of Divine Providence.
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Fronde the Fronde consisted of a series of two revolts in France between 1648 and 1653. 
The first was led by the Parlement of Paris and consisted largely of legal resistance to 
increased taxes imposed by the royal government to pay for the continuing war with 
Spain. The Second Fronde was led by a discontented group of nobles that was trying 
to stem the tide of royal absolutism, and offered armed resistance to the royal army.
Gownsman a pen- gentleman; members of court and council whose access to power 
and influence was gained through scholarly pursuits and legal or fiscal expertise 
rather than military pursuits. Loosely analogous to the French robe nobility.
Huguenot theory of resistance based on the concept of an elective monarchy and a 
covenant between God, the king, and the subjects of the king. French Protestant 
political theorists claimed the right of lesser magistrates to depose and even kill a 
tyrannical monarch. This assumption was used to justify Huguenot resistance to the 
king of France in the civil and religious wars following the St. Bartholomew’s Day 
massacre of 1572, and subsequently, influenced arguments for just wars and 
parliamentary and democratic revolutions.
Investiture Controversy eleventh- century conflict between Pope Gregory VII and the 
Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV concerning appointments of bishops and abbots, 
who often served as royal officials while holding ecclesiastical benefices.
Jansenism a puritanical movement within the Catholic Church in France and the Low 
Countries in the seventeenth century, which was based on a close examination of 
the writings of St. Augustine of Hippo, undertaken by a Flemish prelate, Cornelius 
Jansen, Bishop of Ypres. Aimed at countering the influence of the Jesuits, it 
questioned the doctrine of free will and was hostile to royal absolutism in France. 
Jansenism was condemned by the Papacy in 1653.
Jihād holy war; the normal state of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Jizza poll tax paid to Islamic authorities by unbelievers.
Manicheism a set of religious beliefs widespread in the ancient Near East and Asia that 
were characterized by belief in a struggle between good and evil. Considered to be 
a threat to Christianity and other religions, it was widely persecuted.
Maurice, Emperor (Flavius Mauricius Tiberius Augustus (539–602 CE)) Byzantine 
ruler and successful military commander in wars against the Persians and probable 
author of the Strategikon, a sophisticated military treatise.
Montanism second- century Christian movement, regarded as heretical, which claimed 
to be possessed of a new divine revelation replacing the apostolic version and which 
questioned the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity.
Military garden or yard; artillery ground; a training and parade ground for an artillery 
or municipal militia company; imitative of the Roman campus martius. The term 
artillery in seventeenth- century usage referred to hand- fired missile weapons such 
as bows and arrows.
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Odysseus Greek king of Ithaca in Homer’s The Odyssey.
Penitents members of lay confraternities who dressed in robes similar to religious 
orders of monks and friars, and who performed various charitable works. Following 
the Black Death, some of them practiced self- flagellation.
Perseus mythical Greek warrior and hero who slew Medusa, the only mortal member 
of the Gorgons; supposed founder of Mycenae.
Recusants Catholics who refused to attend the services of the Church of England in 
obedience to the Recusancy Statutes of 1559. From the Latin recusare, to refuse.
Saracen a word used by the Greeks and Romans to describe the inhabitants of the 
deserts of Arabia and Syria. During the Crusades, the term was applied not only to 
Arabs, but also to any Muslim.
Satrap the governor of one of the satrapies, or provinces, of the Persian Empire, or 
later, the Hellenistic Empire following Alexander’s conquest of the former.
Saturn Roman god of agriculture and civilization; father of Neptune.
School of Salamanca a group of theologians led by Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco 
Suárez who studied natural law and morality to reconcile the teachings of St. 
Thomas Aquinas with the existence of the early modern state.
Scipio Aemelianus Scipio the Younger (185–129 BC); Roman consul and commander, 
who led the siege of Carthage in 146 BC.
Sibyls wise women of antiquity who dwelt in temples, shrines, caves, and sacred groves; 
were thought to be possessed of the gift of prophecy.
Swordsman a military man; members of aristocratic families who believed that honor 
needed to be validated on the battlefield in every generation, and could not be 
acquired at court. Roughly analogous, but not equivalent, to the French noblesse 
d’épée.
Vassus, pl. vassi Warrior companions who owed fealty and military service to their 
lords in the era of feudalism. Preferred to the more recent term vassal.
Waldensians twelfth- century sect founded by Peter Waldo, a merchant of Lyons, who 
practiced poverty and claimed the right to preach the gospel without the approbation 
of the clergy. Declared heretical by the Catholic Church.
Zeus ancient Greek king of the gods.
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